Explanation KV

In the article there (Shemini 5765, number 26), in order to explain two opposing qu's from two data that operate in parallel, the 'two-view' model appears, according to which the qu's are discussed according to the data expressed in the Torah only, without the laws that are taught in the midrashim. Therefore, at the qu's stage, the missing law is used as if it does not exist, even though in reality there is another study (the second qu's) that teaches about this missing law.
If I understood correctly, then this is a very strong and general claim. And if it is correct, it is a bit difficult to assume that the Rishonim will not win. What about a prepared question regarding something taught in the GAZSH that is repeatedly taught in the KJV? And one can also find examples of interpretations of something that is not explicitly stated in the Torah, such as at the beginning of Yevamot, what does a monk have to do with the question, even though the rest of the vows are floating in the air.
Why not formulate the rule in a more limited way – that two subsequent studies start together from the data (two data) and teach their own in parallel, but studies and explanations are always made from the products of sermons.
I remember some who wrote that a sakku lacking such two data is actually a parent building.

I assume you meant something that will be taught in the curriculum.
I don't remember exactly what I wrote, but I don't think that what is taught in the midrash doesn't play out on the field at all. One could say that only where the two squares can be filled in in a contradictory way do they leave them blank as if there is a negative law there. Maybe that's what you meant here.
It could be a parent building, but that is not the wording in the Gemara. She is learning a keuch here. Otherwise, this two-sided keuch would really always remain by virtue of the parent building.
Now I thought it might also be possible to say that when a law does not appear in the Torah's explanation, it is not that it does not exist, but that it is a weaker law (since what is explained in the Torah is stronger than what is not explained). Then one can build a case study from a weak law to a strong law (and not from its absence to a positive law): And what about the fact that the Torah did not write that one who owes a blessing before it (in food) is obligated after it, is it not a law that instead of the Torah writing a blessing before it (Torah) he will be obligated after it? And maybe I raised this possibility there, I don't remember anymore.

You raised this possibility there and rejected (around note 7) that if the explicit is stronger than the implicit, then this gap remains even after the KV and can be used as a pirkha. For example, in the KV you wrote that the Torah is more severe than food and therefore we learn that a blessing is obligatory after it, we will explain what the pirkha is for food, since a blessing is explicit after it, therefore there is a blessing after it. It will be said in the Torah that, however, it is not explicit in it, so perhaps for the same reason there is no blessing at all in it. [Although perhaps for this reason there are 11 who try to narrow the gaps, and since we found a more severe Torah than food in the blessing before it, we will try to narrow the gap also in the blessing after which the Torah will be at least obligatory even if it is not explicit in it. But in any case, if it is possible to make a pirkha from the gap between explicit and implicit, then it turns out that it is possible to find many more pirkhas for the studies that exist in the Shas, and this requires serious examination.]

If what is also learned from lectures is a game on the field, then my quantitative measure returns to being a logical measure (i.e. one that deals with actual laws) and not a textual one (which ignores laws if they are not learned directly from the text). Now I noticed that in the last comment (comment 11) you wrote, "It is possible that the question of learning from the learned is also related to this topic (see the page for Parashat Pakudi) and "AKM", which is what I asked. It is interesting and instructive, although I did not understand why "possibly" and not certainly related (I will see in the evening on the page for Parashat Pakudi).

By the way, as usual, whenever I have the opportunity to engage in sermons, I am reminded of the initiative you wrote in one of the issues of Good Measure to build a segmented and organized database of all sermons in the literature of the Sages.
In particular, all the topics will be there with all their severities and voices, and it will be possible to find all the explanations in a single query (categorized, for example, according to a realistic explanation such as 'because we enjoy' or the explanation 'because we live forever' or an explicit law or an interpretive midrash or a sermon based on the extent of the sermon).
In addition, it will be possible to create all the easy and hard things that can be done based on the data that appears in Shas but does not appear (for example, the easy and hard thing in issue 26 above that a tzitzit is obligatory, especially from four corners that are exempt from a mezuzah and are obligatory with a tzitzit. The answer "it is not relevant" is not so clear to me. There are discussions about whether to do a 'pirka dala sheikha', but 'easy and hard thing that is not relevant' is a matter that requires a more orderly analysis). And also perhaps to create an 'equal side' from a large number of teachers.
The problem is that it is hard, long, and very dark work, and it is likely that the person who would engage in it themselves would not have sufficient tools to even analyze and eat the fruits of the carob orchard he plants. May I ask whether, from your position and connections at the university, you have tried to interest groups in raising such a project? If I had a jar with nine more souls, I would invest two of them in building such a reservoir.

Here you have returned to a different problem: the contradiction between the two directions of the KOH. I am interested in the study of each of them separately.
Since I don't have any connections at the university, I don't know how to raise this.

The possibility that an unexplained law is easier than an explicit law and allows one to learn a kohach was rejected, as stated, on the grounds that it is a contradiction to every easy and serious matter in the world: "Such a problem arises in every easy and serious matter... If so, the conclusion of the easy and serious matter contradicts its premises [7]. In another word: the result of the kohach constitutes a contradiction to the conclusion itself: what to teach, since the validity of the law in it is easier (since it comes from a lecture) than in a melamed (which is explicitly written in the Bible)"
Is it because it is a parable, on the whole, that it is not a good parable, meaning that it is included in the innovation of the doctrine of the sermon, all the more so that it is not a parable. But it is still possible to make it a parable. In other words, you are assuming here that what is considered a kulah/humura in terms of parable is also always considered a kulah/humura in terms of establishing the axis of hierarchy. Maybe not? I have no reason to offer on the matter, but it can be said that since as a parable it is a parable for all qu'an, then we learned from the doctrine itself that it is not a good parable, but we have nothing in it but its innovation, and it can indeed be used for the purpose of studying qu'an.

Now I understand what you said (meaning my words). You may be right. This is a difficult issue for me.