The meaning of choice
Hello Rabbi, I saw on the Essach forum that you wrote about moral conduct according to the system that a person defines for himself the following:
A choice without the existence of two paths that are forced upon us, and not determined by us, has no value significance.
Example: There are three political election processes:
1. In Syria, every citizen enters the polling station and freely chooses the only ballot there, and drops it into the ballot box.
2. In Switzerland, every citizen enters the polling station and freely chooses one of the two ballots there. But this choice has no meaning, since in Switzerland there are no problems at stake. The various choices have no 'prices'. The prices are imposed on us from outside and are almost out of our control, but they are a condition for the value significance of the choice.
3. In Israel, every citizen enters… and here too there are problems. This is a real choice, with value significance.
There is an illusion as if giving commands and values that are imposed on us from above limits our freedom and choice. And it is not, not only do these not limit choice, but they actually constitute a necessary condition for the value significance of choice. A person who decides for himself what is good and bad acts as in Switzerland. This is true freedom, but it is valueless. His actions have no prices except what he himself sets. Only the existence of prices, of definitions of good and bad that are imposed on us, allows for the value of choice.
I wanted to ask about this:
- If a certain person has chosen/defined for himself basic humanistic values of equality, freedom, human dignity, etc., why is there no value in moral conduct in accordance with these values he has chosen?
- You wrote that "only the existence of prices, of definitions of good and evil that are forced upon us, enables the value of choice." What did you mean by the word "prices" (what is the analogy)?
1. Who said there isn't? Of course there is. And how is there?
2. Prices, meaning results. When we choose a political leader, we bear consequences (for better or for worse) that do not depend on us. If we were to determine the consequences, our free choice would have no value. Therefore, it is precisely the fact that things are not in our hands, that we do not define what is good and what is bad, and that the consequences of good or bad behavior are not, that gives meaning to our choices. A person who determines for himself what is good and what is bad always comes out right. By definition, he always acts well. So what does it mean that he chooses? He decides what to do and he also decides by what and how he is judged. Then he is always righteous. Only if the standards are not in his hands, but he is judged against standards determined from the outside, do his actions and their judgment have meaning.
Asks:
1. The person I described above (the humanist) has defined for himself what is good (equality, freedom, etc.) and what is bad. He decides for himself what is right to do, and he also decides by what and how he is judged (he sets the humanist standard for himself because apparently there is no such objective standard), and according to what you wrote in section 2, this behavior is devoid of value significance.
2. Even if there were some external, absolute humanist standard, then the mere choice of it as a binding standard is a choice in itself, and this choice is a choice that does not judge by the humanist standard. Therefore, does this mean that the humanist's mere choice of humanist values is devoid of value significance?
3. I didn't understand the relevance of the results of any behavior to its value significance? After all, the whole point of serving God for His own sake is to show that it is precisely the disconnect between the results of our behavior and the behavior itself that gives value significance to serving God, otherwise it is just self-interest (I remember that Leibovich separates needs/results from values/desires).
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Rabbi:
To the same extent, the believer chooses religious values and the command of God. This is not a choice in the sense of determining what is right and what is wrong. Rather, it is a choice to obey the right thing. And that is the difference. The humanist thinks that the right thing is the values of humanism, and in this sense it is exactly like the religious person. There is an external standard by which you are measured. Although in my personal opinion, without any external factor, there is no validity to an external standard, since without a legislator there is no binding law. But that is a different argument.
Behavior always strives for a result. It is true that according to Kant (and also according to my method) the measurement in the end is by intention and not by what actually came out. But beyond that, the results I talked about here are moral results. Did we do good or bad here? And that is determined by the external standard.
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Asks:
So if I understand you correctly, you are describing three levels of value significance (in ascending order):
1. A person who does not choose to obey anything right (follows the dictates of his own heart)
2. A person who chooses to obey what is right but one that has no binding force (e.g. humanism)
3. A person who chooses to obey the right thing with binding force (some divine command)
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Rabbi:
No. There are only two levels: 1. Those who set their own standards. 2. Those who obey some external standards.
But I have an argument with the humanists, as they claim that they are 2, and I claim that without God (an external source of validity) there is no validity for a type 2 system.
In principle, in both types one can obey or disobey, but in a system that a person arbitrarily determines for himself, this has no practical meaning (why wouldn't he obey himself?).
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Asks:
So where do you place the humanists in your opinion? Equivalent to group number 1? Or somewhere in between 1 and 2?
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Rabbi:
As far as I'm concerned, they are people who believe and are committed to divine morality as they understand it, that is, type 2. Of course, they deny it and consider themselves atheists, but they don't interpret themselves correctly. Commitment to values means implicit faith.
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Asks:
By the way, I wanted to ask if we really choose to do what is right, or maybe we are simply forced to act according to what is right to the best of our understanding, and what is holding us back is only "weakness of will." In other words, is the meaning of our choice expressed solely in the choice to conquer the weakness of will (we could call it the evil inclination)? Or are there perhaps other aspects in which choice is expressed?
In addition, is it possible for a person to choose to act the opposite of what he thinks is right (to choose evil), freely (that is, without having factors that incline him to choose evil, such as various physical impulses)?
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Rabbi:
I have dealt with these things in my books on the science of freedom.
There is no clear information, but Libet and other researchers claim that our choice is only about vetoing passions (not just bad)/instincts. I am not at all sure about this (my logic says that if veto is possible then positive choice is also possible).
Regarding the second question, I find it hard to believe. Weakness of will is usually surrender to instinct. Otherwise, why not act as I myself think?! It is possible to imagine a situation where doing x is good in my eyes but it is not what I want to do (because I choose evil), and then I will not do x. But I have no way of knowing what is true regarding this question.
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Asks:
That's what I meant to ask in the last question,
Is it possible to freely choose evil (meaning that someone really wants to do something that is bad in their eyes)?
By the way, I didn't quite understand what you meant by the words: "positive choice." Do you mean a choice even in a theoretical situation in which there are no passions at all? And if so, why wouldn't I do what I think is right if there is nothing holding me back? What is the choice here in fact (there is no other logical alternative).
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Rabbi:
I understood that's what you meant and that's what I answered. There is no principled prohibition, but psychologically I don't see why a person would freely choose evil.
The reservation I added is about the identity between what is good and what I think is right to do. Perhaps there is a person who thinks it is right not to do good even though he knows it is not good.
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Asks:
Continuing this email, if all our choices are expressed in overcoming the urge, does this mean that since the urge to eat has been abolished, there is no moral significance in abstaining from eating, and as a result, there is also no moral wrongdoing in eating?
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Rabbi:
Choice is not arbitrary. Choice has meaning, but mainly if you choose good. If you choose evil, then you are indeed a choosing person, but it is not a perfect choice of course. Therefore, it is clear that every act receives its value from the fact that you chose to do it. But all of this is only about good deeds. Therefore, there is evil in the world by its very nature. Only after it is defined as evil, there is value in choosing not to act in it. Just as a person who does not have the urge to murder is not allowed to murder just like that.
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Asks:
Let's take two religions for example. Religion A, and Religion B. Each religion defines the other as such. Should members of Religion A say that members of Religion B are doing a morally wrong thing by simply practicing Religion B?
It is clear that if someone who believes in religion A were to worship religion B, it would be morally wrong, but there is no logic in doing it without a desire. Therefore, I say that unlike the era before the abrogation of the Law of Moses, when even those who worshiped the Law of Moses before him understood that they were doing an evil deed (for example, Menashe), in our era, if someone worships the Law of Moses, should they be considered a person without values?
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Rabbi:
If he really believes this, then he is committing a wrong act by rape. The act is bad, but there is no guilt.
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