With God’s help

From the Desert of Matana – 5764

A.

In the blessing of our forefather Jacob to Judah, the verse appears:

Eyes darkened from wine and teeth whitened from milk.

The Hebrew text in Ketuvot 111b requires the verse as follows:

And will you say, "There is no taste in it [in the wine of the vines of Israel]?" The Bible says, "The eyes are like wine" - every palate that tastes it says, "I am." And will you say, "For the young are beautiful, and for the old are not beautiful?" The Bible says, "And the teeth are whiter than milk" - do not say, "For the teeth are whiter than milk" - but rather, "For the two-year-old."

This is the text's sermon. The Gemara then asks what the plain meaning of the verse is, and explains:

Pashtia, who read May, wrote? Because Rav Dimi [who traveled a lot from Israel to Babylon and back] said: The assembly of Israel said before the Holy One, the Lord of the universe, Your eyes are like those of a camel [Rashi: I have a taste for your eyes, and I prefer wine when you show me a yellow and worn face], and your teeth are like those of a camel [this is also a worn tongue, whose worn teeth are worn out].

Rabbi Yochanan assists him, as Rabbi Yochanan said: It is better to whiten one's teeth for one's friend [=show him a polished face] than to drink milk, as it is said: 'And whiten teeth with milk.' Do not read 'whiten teeth' but 'whiten teeth.'

And the commentators have already asked, why does the GEM, which seeks the plainness in the verse, offer a proposal that is so sermonic in nature? What kind of 'plainness' is being said here? How does it differ from the previous interpretation in the GEM, which is called 'sermon'?

The author of Torah Temimah on Atar (and he is also in the Maharsha's opinion there) explains that here we are talking about a simple explanation of the words, and not about the meaning of the entire verse. The first interpretation, the Midrashic, neuter the words. The second interpretation, the Pasha'i, explains the words in their simpler meaning. He states that in Tractate Chulin we found two additional cases of a similar nature.

In Proverbs 23 the following verse appears:

Because you will sit down to fight a governor, whether you understand what is before you and put a knife to your throat, whether you are a man of soul.

The Gm. in Cholin 6a asks: 'Is it written in the text that a student sits before his rabbi, and if he knows that when he asks him he will receive from him the reason for the ruling, then he must ask, and if he knows that he will not be answered, he must strengthen his will and not ask (= put a knife to his throat). And if he wants to ask for the reason for the matter (= have a soul), he must withdraw from this rabbi.

And so with regard to the verse in Proverbs 25:

Ada wore vinegar on a cold day and sang songs about a bad heart.

Here too, the Magistrate in Holin 133a asks: 'And the one who reads the text in the book, the one who writes it, is different from the one who is not decent.' And he answers: Unlike a student who is not decent.

Although it seems that the explanation of the author of the Torah Temimah is not a great step forward for our purposes, it is the Deus "Peshat (!) Gm" that seeks the plainness of the verse, and not the plainness of the words. If so, we are still left with the question: What is the plainness in the verse? Furthermore, it is not clear why the plainness in Gm is considered plainness in words, and after all, even in its context, "Do not read" appears, which negates the words in the text.

Therefore, we will try to understand the relationship between the two interpretations in the Hebrew Bible in a slightly different way. We will first note that a similar structure appears in three other places in the Hebrew Bible:

Regarding the verse in Exodus 27:

The length of the court was one hundred cubits and its width fifty by fifty.

The G.M. asks in Eruvin 23:2: "Is Pashtiah written in the text?" and answers: He erected the tabernacle on a rim of fifty cubits so that it would be fifty cubits in front of it and twenty cubits to each side.

And so with regard to the verse in Deuteronomy 13:

For your brother, your mother's son, will provoke you.

Regarding him, the Gamma Kiddushin, p. 12, asks: 'Is it true that a man is called a writer?' and answers: It does not come from a man who says so. It does not come from a son of a father who deprives him of his inheritance and gives him bad advice. Rather, even the son of a mother who is not his son, I obeyed her mother, KM"11.

And so with regard to the verse in Psalms 36:

            Your righteousness is like the mountains of God, and your judgments are a great deep.

The Gm asks in Arakhin 8:2: "Is it written by a scribe?" And the Amoraim are divided as to whether the meaning is that if his righteousness were not as great as the Hararim, who could stand by his judgments, which are a great abyss, or whether his righteousness is as great as the Hararim because his judgments are a great abyss, and so on, by a phile.

The commonality between these three places, as well as the previous two, is that there is a problem with the plain reading (the apparent 'plainness') of the verse. Sometimes the problem is in the interpretation, as in the case of 'Tzedekach Tzedek', where there is an apparent contradiction between the two parts of the verse, or in the case of 'Ki yishitach', where it is not clear why it is specifically a mother's brother and not a father's son (as explained there in the G.M.). Sometimes the words of the verse are not understood, or at least their connection to each other, as in the case of 'Arech ha-Hetzer'.

Therefore, in all these cases, the GM tries to clarify what the 'plain' in the verse is. In all these cases, the apparent 'plain' is not sufficient, and therefore the GM assumes that it is not really the true plain of the verse. There are cases in which the GM finds a literal plain, close to what we would call the 'plain of the Bible,' and it is indeed sufficient. This is the situation in the last three cases. However, in the first three cases, it seems difficult to regard the interpretation offered in the GM as an interpretation by way of plain. On the other hand, in these cases it is not clear whether this verse has a literal literal meaning at all (plain, apparently).

As mentioned, the problems in the above verses fall into two types: The problem in the verse Didan, as well as in the two parallel issues in Tractate Chulin, and in the example from Erubin, is the problem of the second type: it is not at all clear how the words are connected to each other. In contrast, the problem in the last two cases is a problem of interpretation.

The solutions to these problems are also divided into two types: there are solutions that nevertheless find a reasonable interpretation of the verses through the path of simplicity, and there are solutions in which, out of lack of choice, the sermon becomes the simplicity.[1]

If we return to the verse Didan, it seems that the problem lies in a lack of understanding of the connection of the words (and even of the meaning of the individual words themselves), and the proposed solution is that the sermon becomes a literal interpretation of the verse. This is not the literal interpretation (known as: 'literally'), but it can certainly be considered the literal interpretation of the verse.

on.

We have accepted that the Torah has seventy facets. We have also accepted that we must interpret the Torah on four different levels simultaneously: plain, hint, sermon, and secret. Here we see cases in which the G.M. claims that there is no plain meaning to a verse, but only sermon. There are other examples of this.

1. At the beginning of the Ramban's commentary on Genesis, he writes that the verses of creation have no simplicity but only a secret, and in his words:

Because the act of Genesis is a deep secret, not understood from the scriptures, and will not be known to those who do not know it except from the mouth of Kabbalah until Moses our Lord, from the mouth of the Hero, and those who know it must hide it…

Due to the difficulties in simplification, and the difficulties in simply describing the processes of creation, which by their very nature cannot be fully described in the language of the created, we choose the secret as an alternative to simplification.[2]

2. In conclusion, the same is true of the interpretation in the Bible, by Yod Si' Rach 228 (and see Menochat Ahavah, p. 67, note 67), and this is also known as the interpretation, which is better to emphasize in language than to emphasize in explanation. Here too, the 'Darshi' interpretation, which aligns better with the explanation, is offered as an alternative to the simplified one.
3. Rabbi Shabbat Chulin 3:2, 5:5, 6:5, 7:5, 8:5, 9:5, 10:5, 11:5, 12:5, 13:5, 14:5, 15:5, 16:5, 17:5, 18:5, 19:5, 20:5, 21:5, 22:5, 23:5, 24:5, 25:5, 26:5, 27:5, 28:5, 29:5, 30:5, 40:5, 51:5, 6:5, 10:5, 11:5, 12:5, 13:5, 14:5, 15:5, 16:5, 17:5, 18:5, 19:5, 26:5, 27:5, 28:
4. Rashi, who declares himself a simpleton whose tendency is simple interpretation, sometimes finds it appropriate to cite a Midrash of the Sages in his commentary. Such a situation indicates a difficulty that exists in the simpleton, and therefore Rashi decides that the Midrash is the true simpleton.

In all these cases, we find that the decision on the reasonable interpretation is not a decision based on linguistic simplicity (='plain as it is meant') but rather on the simplicity required by reason or reason (='plain as it is not meant').[3]

third.

These situations raise several questions.

1. In almost all of these places we find an interpretation based on the simplified version of Rashi and the other Rishonim. If so, it is not clear how the G.M. did not find this interpretation acceptable? And the opposite is also difficult: if the G.M. did not find a clearer simplified version, how do the Rishonim allow themselves to interpret the verse in this way?
2. And we must also consider, when the language is concise and not the explanation, we must ask ourselves what is the reason that the writer used concise language in this place?

It should be noted that this question is not the same as the question of whether there is a simpler (literally) simplification. Here we ask ourselves, having come to the conclusion that this is indeed the simplest simplification of the verses, why did the writer choose such an unreasonable way to express his intention?

It is apparent from this that wherever we adopt modes of interpretation that are not literal, we must also implicitly assume that there are additional factors in the arrangement of the language that we are trying to explain. In general, the assumption is that the only factor in choosing a formulation is the desire to convey the message. However, here we encounter situations in which the message can indeed be understood, but if that were indeed the message, the writer could have conveyed it in a simpler form. This in itself undermines the claim that what we have found is indeed the simple interpretation, and to which the writer was aiming, unless we conclude that there are additional factors that led the writer to choose precisely such a form of writing.

Although in the language of the Torah it is possible to understand that there are additional considerations for the arrangement of words, such as considerations of secrecy, for example. Even in the language of the Mishnah (Chasuri Mahsara, etc.) the Gra and the Ari write that the arrangement of words is also derived from considerations of secrecy, and so on. However, where there is no sufficient explanation for additional considerations in the formulation (rhyme and aesthetic considerations in poetry can also constitute a sufficient reason for this), it seems that there is no justification for interpreting the text in question in a way that is not simplistic. In such situations, at most one can remain with the Tza.

What emerges from all of the above is that the principle, "Expound and explain and expound - do you expound except as the explanation is" is certainly a principle in Torah interpretation, but it cannot be simply copied (!) to other places.

D.

So far we have dealt with form. We will conclude with a comment concerning the essence (substance) of the 'Pasht' in the verse Didan.

The Gamma says that it is better to show a displeased face to a friend than to feed him and give him all sorts of things. A well-known example of this principle is given in the Book of Kiddushin (31:1):

The sons of Abbahu, the father of the rabbi, say: There is one who feeds his father a pheasant [=a valuable and fat bird, a type of quail that descends in the wilderness] and is driven out of the world [=who is punished for showing him a narrow-mindedness over his meal]. And there is one who grinds him in millstones and brings him to the life of the world to come [=who honors him with good and comforting words and imposes upon him the task with a soft tongue, showing him the need of the hour that they cannot earn a living except by this means].

And Bashi there cites two acts from Jerusalem, which are apparently the source of this mimra, and the following:

There was an incident in which a man used to feed his father pheasants. Once his father said to him: Where did you get all this from? He said to him: Grandfather, what do you care, grind and eat (meaning, chew and eat. Show him that it is difficult for him).

And again, there was a story about a man who was a miller, and he had an old father, and the king sent for his father to come to the king's service. His son said to him: Father, grind, and I will go in your place to the king's service, which has no allowance.

This is, of course, an incredibly simple interpretation. It does not contain any Midrashic elements. If so, can it still be said that the interpretation that the GEM offers for the verse Didan is indeed in accordance with the interpretation?…

Shabbat 31:

Mishnah. A man should not go out with a sword, a bow, a shield, a spear, or a spear, and if he goes out, he is liable to a sin offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: They are for him ornaments, and the sages say: They are nothing but a disgrace, as it is said: +Isaiah 2:1+ And they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; and nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. A girdle – pure, and they may go out in it on the Sabbath. Fetters – impure, and they may not go out in them on the Sabbath.

Gemara. What is wrong with these? – Kolpa.

Rabbi Eliezer says, they are his ornaments. It is said, they said to Rabbi Eliezer: And since they are his ornaments, why are they invalid for the days of the Messiah? He said to them: Since they are not needed, as it is said +Isaiah 2:1+ “Nation shall not lift up a sword against nation” – and it is said to us, “I will not be ashamed!” – Abaye said: From the hand of God, who will exalt himself in purity, and who will flee from Samuel, as Samuel said, “There is nothing between this world and the days of the Messiah except that he will serve as a captive, as it is said +Deuteronomy 15:1+ for the poor will not cease from among the land.” Rabbi Chiya bar Abba helps him, saying, Rabbi Chiya bar Abba: All the prophets did not prophesy except for the days of the Messiah, but for the world to come – +Isaiah 33:1+ “The eye has not seen any God besides You.” And here, they said to Rabbi Eliezer: And since they are his ornaments, why are they invalid for the days of the Messiah? He said to them: Even the days of the Messiah are not invalid. We were Shmuel, and the flight of Rabbi Chiya bar Abba. Abaye said to Rav Dimi, and I told her Rav Oya, and Rav Yosef said to Rav Dimi, and I told her Rav Oya, and Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer to say that they are jewels for him? It is written in the Psalms, "Gird your sword on your thigh, O mighty one, your glory and the way." Rav Kahana said to Mr. Baria Rabbi Huna: Is it written in the words of the Torah! - He said to him: No reading comes out of his mouth. Rav Kahana said, "There was a son of Tammany, and he was a teacher of the Talmud, and he did not know that no reading comes out of his mouth until he understood what it meant - a deligmar inish, and a hidard to understand.

book Biblical understanding To Rabbi Menashe of Ilya, with a preface by the Rabbi on behalf of the Gra.

[1] It seems that there is no necessary connection between the type of problem and the type of solution. Indeed, we find in the verse "The Length of the Courtyard" that the problem is a lack of understanding of the words, and the solution is to find an interpretation through simplification. However, it should be noted that in the examples here we do not find the opposite case: a verse in which the problem is an explanatory problem, and the solution is through exhortation.

The reason for this is clear: the verse is understandable, and the connection of the words to each other is reasonable. Our problem is in understanding the meaning and the explanation (the logic or justification of the words). In such a situation, it turns out that the solution would be to find logic for the verse in question as it is understood through the literal interpretation.

If so, there is a dependence between the type of problem and the type of solution, at least in one direction: a problem of the first type (not understanding the explanation: the logic, or justice) will lead to a solution of the first type (a logical explanation while reading the verse in a simplified way).

[2] Although the Ramban's intention here is to discuss whether he is claiming that the verses have no plain meaning but only a secret, or whether the plain meaning is deeply hidden, after we learn Kabbalah from the Ramban, we will understand them through the plain meaning, and I will elaborate on this further.

[3] The entire discussion here hinges on the question: What, in general, is Peshat? And what is the relationship of Peshat to Darsh? On this matter, see the two articles by David Haneshka, 'HaMa'yan' 1977, and especially the response by Rabbi Ze'ev Wittman, 'HaMa'yan' 1978.

Recently, I received issue 13 of the journal 'Tzohar', and there was a comprehensive discussion, spanning several articles, on the issue of the relationship between Pesht and Derash, by the name of