Noon – Elul 5777

Rabbi Michael Avraham

The usual way in which the Torah announces its will and the prohibitions and obligations that apply to the worshipper of God is through the commandments. Sometimes the impression is created that this is in fact the entirety of the obligations that apply to the worshipper of God. However, there are two additional sources of obligation in halakha: the explanation and the will of God. By the term ‘explanation’, I do not mean the use of the explanation in the interpretation of the Torah, which is an everyday thing for every student, but rather the innovation of new obligations according to the explanation. By the term ‘the will of God’ I mean the revelation of His will in ways that are not expressed in the system of the commandments. On the other hand, these desires do not stem from the explanation alone, otherwise this way would have been contained in the previous one.[1].

In the booklet Divrei Sofrim (Bauth 23), Rabbi Elchanan Waserman cites the verse (Jeremiah 19:5):

And they built the high places of Baal to burn their sons in the fire as burnt offerings to Baal, which I did not command, nor speak, nor did it come into my mind.

And in translation there:

 You have not kept watch over my flock, nor have you sent into the hands of my servants a messenger, nor a messenger before me.

From this he concludes that the prophet's words mention additional sources of obligation to the explicit commandments (=defkadit in Oriya). What we have called here "the will of God" he calls "the former ra'u'a kedmi."

What could be the indication of the existence of God's will, if we have no substantial explanation for it? Of necessity, this understanding is the result of some hint in Scripture, which does not appear as a halakhic command, and yet it teaches us that God expects us to act in a certain way. In this article, I would like to show, through a study of the rate of the donation and the manner of its interpretation, an example of an obligation that originates in God's will. We will then briefly present a few additional examples on this matter. The question of who is authorized to interpret God's will will not be discussed here. Our goal is to indicate the existence of this halakhic category, and nothing more.

A. Provision of an estimated contribution

Our discussion begins with a puzzling baraita cited in Tractate Gittin (30:2):

Abba Elazar ben Gamla says: “And your offering will be counted to you,” the scripture speaks of two offerings – one a large offering and one a tithe offering. Just as a large offering is taken with estimation and thought, so a tithe offering is taken with estimation and thought…

Rashi explains that there is an inference here from the tithe contribution to a larger contribution: just as the Terumah is interpreted, so is the law regarding the Terumah. And he adds there (3:1, 5 in the estimate):

One of the fifty sages who said, interprets the estimate, if he is mistaken, there is no prohibition here from the Torah, [d]one grain of wheat exempts the rabbi…

And in the Bible, even the tithe donation:

Even though its rate is set by the Torah as a tenth of the tithe, it is taken in an estimate.

The difficulty in such an inference is self-explanatory. After all, in the Torah there is no Torah portion at all, and therefore it is clear that it is not appropriate to separate the Torah portion from the estimate, since there is nothing to estimate. What is not true is the tithe contribution, the rate of which is determined to be one tenth of the tithe. It seems that Rashi sensed the difficulty, and offered a solution that does not seem to be a long way from our problem. He cites the Torah portion determined by the Sages, one in forty for a good eye, one in fifty for a mediocre eye, and one in sixty for an evil eye, and this is the rate that is separated from the estimate. However, this is difficult in my opinion:

1. Where did we learn that this rate can be deducted from the estimate? The reason Rashi gives for deducting from the estimate is that there is no rate for the donation and there is no fear of error; but according to the rabbis, there is a clear rate for it, and therefore if they deduct from the estimate, one could make a mistake and not fulfill his obligation.
2. Even if there is a good reason to separate the rabbinic teaching from the rabbinic teaching in the 2030s, how can one distinguish an rabbinic teaching whose teaching is from the Torah from the 2030s whose teaching is from the rabbis? And in general, how does one connect a law from the Torah to a law from the rabbis?

And here is a ruling from 2003 explained in Tractate Terumot (1:7):

There is no difference in size, weight, or number.

The Rabbi there wrote (in the name of the Jerusalemite) that it is commanded to separate the estimate so that he may give with a good eye, and so is the simplicity of the words of the Rav in his interpretations (Heb. Terumot 3:4). With these initial methods, it can be interpreted that this is the law of the rabbis in 1933, and then the difficulty arises as to where they learned this, and how they applied it to the Torah law of tithing, and so on.

And the Rambam wrote (in the same place):

It is forbidden to take out a tithe in a measure, since the scripture does not mention any measure for it; but they measure the same thing that is required as a donation and take out from it an estimate. And they rely on the statement of the Lord, “And your donation will be counted to you,” and they say: You donate in thought and not in anything else. And even though this scripture speaks of a tithe donation, the principle known to us in the Jewish jurists is stated in it, which is that it is said: If there is no matter for a tithe donation, then there is a matter for a tithe. And what we do not rely on is the verse, a tithe donation, since its measure is known and the Torah was strict about its measure and said, “a tenth of the tithe.”

It turns out that the source of the law in the 1930s is actually the verse dealing with the tithe! This is completely opposite to what we saw in the Gittin issue, for there the tithe is learned from the 1930s, and in fact the tithe is also interpreted in terms of the estimate. Why can't the verse "and it shall be counted to you" be applied directly to the tithe?

From the words of Maimonides, it seems that there is a disagreement here about the Tannaim. And so we find in my book (Numbers 18)[2]Abba Elazar ben Gomel believes that the tithe contribution is learned from the rabbinical book of

From the words of Maimonides, it is clear that this is a Torah law. After all, "if it is not a matter of interest" is not applied to references, as this is a precise consideration of complete inaccuracies.

According to this, the second side of our question returns in the Gemara in Gittin: It is appropriate to separate the Tarot from the Torah in a certain measure, and after all, it has no fixed amount at all.[3]! It is still necessary to clarify, according to the Rambam's method, how Abba Elazar ben Gamla himself would teach the section on estimating in 2033? According to his method, there is no exception to the verse "and it shall be counted to you," since even in the case of tithes, one excludes estimating, even though its amount is fixed.

In his Laws (Hebrew: Terumot 3:4), Maimonides writes in a somewhat obscure version:

This donation is not made in measure, weight, or number, since no amount is stated in it, but rather is estimated and interpreted in one's mind as one in fifty.

This brings us back to the difficulties we saw in Rashi in Gittin: How can we be precise about the fact that the Torah did not give a shiur for the 2038, that it can be separated from an estimate? The Torah did not give a shiur for the 2038 interpretation because it has no shiur, after all, one grain of wheat exempts the rabbi. The shiur of one in fifty is the shiur of the rabbis, and therefore it is not clear from where it can be separated from an estimate? And how, according to Rabbi Elazar ben Gamla, can we learn from it for the 2038 interpretation?[4]?

We note that although some of the early ones wrote that even though one grain of wheat exempts the priest, there is a lesson from the Torah for giving a terumah to the priest (see Torah, Kiddushin Noah; Psalm 33:7).[5], but this cannot be said in the Rambam. His consistent method is (see his dispute with the Ramban in Shoresh 12) that the setting aside and giving of all gifts are one mitzvah, and specifically in the case of a gift it is clear from his language in several places that there is no mitzvah at all to give, but only to set aside, and the priests benefit from a high table.[6]From this it is understood why in the case of a donation the rate is a percentage. If the rate was a condition of giving as the Torah teaches, it is difficult to understand why the rate is a percentage. The rate of giving is determined by how much the priest receives, and not by the percentage of the kari given to him (and in fact the Tosafot Rid itself does not speak of the percentage rate which is the rabbinical addition).[7].

B. A lesson in giving according to God's will

In explaining the Maimonides' method, it seems to say that the shiur 303 is from Torah law and not from rabbinic law. In other words, this shiur is an estimate of how much the Torah itself wants to be given, and not an additional severity beyond the Torah law. For example, the shiur of a cloth in order for a garment to be considered impure is 3 by 3 tefahim. This is of course a shiur that the Sages estimated, but its meaning is an estimate of the intent of the Torah.

This is also implied by Rashi's words on the subject of Gittitin there, who cites the rabbinical lesson as the basis for the inference. And refer to Rashi Chulin (Kal. 16:2, 45 'Daoriyta') who wrote that the parsha of one shiur out of fifty is a law that is initially implied in the Torah (and not the law of the rabbis), and these are our words.

It turns out that the foundation of the matter lies in the term "donation," which, as Rashi explains (Exodus 25:2), the Torah intends for the heart's generosity. Now the sages come and ask: How can one give one grain of wheat on a huge field as a donation from the heart? It is clear that the Torah expects us to give more. Although the Torah does not explicitly determine the amount, and even teaches us that one grain exempts the person from giving. However, since there is a law of the heart's generosity, it is clear to us from interpretive explanation that the Torah's will is to give more. Therefore, it is clear that the Torah's failure to explicitly determine the amount in the Torah is intended to teach us that the interpretation of this amount should be measured, so that one may give willingly and from the heart's generosity, and not as one who commands and does. Determining a fixed amount by measuring reduces the entire effect of the "ateruta deltata" that the Torah wanted to teach us in 2033.

Now the sages come and set the lesson so as not to give things completely in two parts. They determine that the same heart-warming parsha that the Torah alludes to should be in a ratio of one in forty, fifty, or sixty. And indeed, the observer is immediately surprised: throughout the Torah we find lessons from the sages, but here it is an unusual situation, in which the sages determine three different lessons: a good eye, a moderate one, and a bad one. Why didn't they determine one lesson as they usually do?

It turns out that the reason is that even when the sages intervened and set the rate, they did not want to completely neutralize the giver's choice, and therefore only set a framework within which he could still maneuver. Thus, the element of heartfelt generosity does not disappear even after the sages set the rate.[8].

To clarify, let's compare things to challah. The shiur in challah is clearly a stricture from the rabbis, and not an estimate of the will of the Torah as a contribution. And the fact that there are two shiurs in challah is not at all similar to a contribution, because in challah no one has the initiative and choice of how much to set aside: if he is the owner of the house, he must set aside one of the four hundred shekels, and if he is sealed, he will have to set aside one of the four hundred shekels.[9].

The Gemara (Minachot 44, 2) brought the baraita of Abba Elazar ben Gamla, and after it brought another projection of the inference from 2033 to Terum: that Terum must be separated with a good eye like Terum. And apparently you ask: Where does a good eye belong in 2033, if the obligation is only one grain of wheat? And in our opinion, the things are settled as a kind of matter. This is exactly what the baraita wrote, that there is also a will from the Torah that we should separate with a good eye. According to this, it is possible that even the Rash and the Rav, whom we cited above (chapter 2) in explaining the law of separation from the grain of wheat in 2033, believe as we say in the Rambam, and they do not mean the law of the rabbis as claimed above.[10].

If the purpose of the commandment of giving is solely to express gratitude toward God, unlike the other priestly gifts[11]It is also clear why, according to the Rambam, it does not include a part of giving. Its rate includes three levels of allocation, in order to leave the allocation dependent, at least partially, on the generosity of the donor's heart. We have seen that the rate of allocation of a donation is a percentage, and this is also due to the perception that in a donation, what is important is what the Israelite gives and not what the priest receives.

According to this proposal, the difficulties presented above regarding the shiur 2033 are reconciled with the Shofi: 2033 also has a shiur, but the Torah did not write it explicitly, in order to teach us to distinguish from an estimate. This shiur is actually the shiur that the Sages established. According to our words, the baraita of Abba Elazar ben Gamla, which the Terumah of 2033 explained in terms of distinguishing from an estimate, is well explained. This is the inference from Torah to Torah, since this shiur is not from the rabbis but from the Torah.

We have seen that the Maimonides, Rashi, and other Rishonim concluded from the fact that the Torah did not give a limit that must be set aside from an estimate. We wondered how this could be concluded when there is nothing to estimate at all? And now, let's not get too carried away. This is an interpretive explanation that sees in the Torah a hint that more than one grain of wheat must be set aside. From the very term "teruma," we learn that a good amount must be set aside from the heart's offering. At the same time, the Torah stated that one grain of wheat exempts the khari. The obvious conclusion is that this is not because there is no expectation of a significant contribution, but because they want the offering to come from a certain amount of time. If the Torah had explicitly given the desired limit for giving as a limit that hinders the correction of the khari, then a person would have been denied the opportunity to serve God by giving from the heart's offering. Therefore, the Torah should have left the limit to the sages to determine.

We will conclude the chapter with a comment from the Jerusalemite Resh Paha, who questions why the Mishnah there did not add the Terumah to the list of things that have no Shiur, and refer there to the Gemara's reply (and the commentators who disagreed about it). At the end of the Sugiya, they question why they did not add more things:

Rabbi Barachiah said: And why don't you give us the dust of a pervert? And why don't you give us the ashes of a cow? And why don't you give us the saliva of a leper? And why don't you give us the blood of a leper's bird?

And they answer:

I will not give them as a condition except things to which he adds and in their performance there is a mitzvah. Even though he adds to them, there is no mitzvah in their performance.

The question of Teruma at the beginning of the issue was not answered with this answer. And in our opinion, this answer is truly irrelevant to Teruma, since in Teruma, adding is certainly a mitzvah, even from the Torah. In light of what has been explained, adding is from the very mitzvah and not just a mere possibility, since it expresses the generosity of the heart in the Teruma.

C. Two explicit pieces of evidence from the language of Maimonides

Now I would like to present two pieces of evidence from the words of Maimonides, through a distinction between challah and teruma.

1. In the Book of Terumot (Chapter 3) written by Maimonides:

A. A large donation has no limit from the Torah. As it is said, "The beginning of your grain," anything, even a single grain, exempts the donor. And from the beginning, he will not set aside anything except according to the limit given by the Sages...

B. And what is the ratio that the Sages gave? A good eye is one in forty, a moderate eye is one in fifty, and an evil eye is one in sixty. And it should not be less than one in sixty.

We see from his language that this lesson is not a stricture from the words of the Sages, but rather the law of the parsha. To begin with From the Torah (Karshi Chulin, above). And for the sake of comparison, we will quote his words in the Book of Firstfruits (chapter 5) regarding challah, where he writes:

A. It is a positive commandment to set aside a terumah from the dough for the priest, as it is said, “From the first of your matzahs, you shall set aside a terumah.” And this beginning has no Torah reference. Even if the one who set aside the dough as it is, he should set aside the dough…

B. And from the words of the scribes who set aside one twenty-fourth of the dough so that it may be considered a gift to the priest, as it is said, "You shall give it to him," give him something that is worthy of being given as a gift. And the one who sells it in the market sets aside one forty-eighth. Since his dough is large, this amount is considered a gift.

We see from the Hadiya that here the wording is according to the law of the rabbis and not in the wording 'from the beginning' as in the wording 'from the beginning' as in the wording 'from the beginning'. In the book of Ma'deni Eretz by Rabbi Auerbach (Hal Terumot 53:1), he already felt the change in the wording and wrote that it seems that the amount of terumah does not delay, while in challah the amount does delay, see there in all his words. And in our opinion, the language is very precise. This is not a question of the law of delay. The delay is only a conclusion from the essential difference. According to the Rambam, there is no law of the rabbis at all to set aside one out of fifty, but it is a law from the beginning in the Torah, and therefore it does not delay. In contrast, in challah this is an additional law from the rabbis, and therefore it also delays (from the rabbis)[12].

We should also note that the wording used by the Rambam in the challah is to set aside serve asWhat is not true regarding a gift, there is no law of giving at all. It is further explained in the words of the Rambam that the purpose of the shiur is to be "as a gift to the priest," which is not true with a gift, which did not mention the reason for the shiur as a shiur in giving. This matter is explained according to what we explained above in the Rambam's system, that the mitzvah of challah has a part of giving and not as in the mitzvah of separating a gift.

2. It seems that according to this principle, the confusion of the Aharonim (see Aadnei Eretz Shem, sec. 3) regarding the contradiction of the Rambam's words regarding the law of challah and teruma at this time will be explained. In Hala Terumot (ibid.), the Rambam wrote that at this time, since the teruma is not handed over to the priest but is burned, he should only separate something and burn it. Whereas in Hala Bikurim (ibid.), the Rambam wrote that at this time, even though he burns the challah, he should take one out of forty-eight of the dough and burn it. And the Aharonim argued: If a teruma is not eaten in any way, it is a disease in their opinion to burn one out of forty-eight, and they remained in the B'teg.

And in our opinion, it seems that the contradiction is not self-evident. In the case of a teruma, there is no law at all to set aside one out of fifty, but rather it is the gratitude from the high. Therefore, where the gratitude is not expressed, since the teruma is burned, there is no point in doing so, and therefore one sets aside only some in order to allow the dip. As we have seen, this is not a rate that delays. In contrast, in challah, there is a rabbinical law to set aside one out of twenty-four, and it is for delay (although according to the rabbis). And even if it is impossible to give it to the priest, one must set aside as the Sages determined in order to comply with the rabbinical law, and therefore even though the challah is burned, one sets aside one out of forty-eight and burns it.[13].

D. Obligations that are based on God's will

Let us now return to our words in the introduction to the article. As argued above, the rate of setting aside a contribution is from the Torah. This is not an explicit commandment, but rather an unexpressed will of the Torah, which the sages estimated to be between one in forty and one in sixty. The Torah implied that it wanted Israel to set aside such a rate from the freewill of its heart to acknowledge God's gratitude for the grain given to it. From this we can learn a great rule: God's will also obligates man from Israel, just as the listed commandments do.

If our words are truly sincere, then the matter requires explanation. Why are there things that the Torah left as an unexpressed will and did not interpret it in specified commandments? And is it possible to formulate a criterion by which the Torah, or the Giver of the Torah, discerned which of His wills to formulate as a commandment and which to leave as a raw will? This question can also be asked about the other category mentioned in the introduction above (things learned from the explanation). Regarding these things, there are several references by Rabbi Kook in his letters and in the Holy Lights (3, discussion), and Rabbi Yehuda Amital has already discussed this in his article "The Significance of the Rabbi's Mishnah for Our Generation" (see ibid., letter 3).[14].

The Rabbi's words are included in response to the famous question of why the Torah did not explicitly command the work of virtue. The answer of Rabbi Chaim Vital is well-known, who said that the Torah was given to humans, and someone who needs to be commanded to work on his virtues is not a human being at all and there is no point in commanding him at all. Accordingly, the command to work on virtues is unnecessary. Rabbi Kook adds that such a command could even be harmful. After all, the entire value of the work of virtues is when it comes at the initiative of the worker, and not as someone fulfilling a higher command, such as someone who has frozen a demon. Only in this way can true spiritual progress be achieved. And these are his words (Letters of Rabbi Chaim Vital, p. 10):

And it is impossible to imagine the magnitude of the loss that human civilization would suffer if these noble virtues were established in a positive manner...

And Rav Kook continues and writes there that there are things in which the simple human explanation still remains that one who does not command and does is greater than one who commands and does. From this, we can say something similar in our case: sometimes the command is detrimental. The true gratitude that is expressed in the act of giving should stem from the person who gives thanks and not as a result of a command to recognize favor, and therefore the Torah left this as a hint and not as an explicit command. And perhaps this is the explanation for all obligations that are in general the will of God.

It should be noted that they are a donation as a thank you to God, and they are the work of virtues, not duties that can be attributed to simple human understanding. And here is the evidence – that in the wider world it is not accepted for a person to work on his virtues. Going to a psychologist is intended to relieve a person of one difficulty or another, but not to improve his moral qualities as an independent goal, to make him a better person.[15]Therefore, improvement of the qualities of the soul is not perceived as a normal obligation that is explained. In the terminology we proposed above, this is the will of God and not explained.[16].

E. Additional examples of obligations arising from God's will

The main argument of this article is the existence of an additional Torah category for mitzvah and explanation, which is the will of God. We have given a detailed example from the laws of teruma, and briefly another example from the improvement of character. Are there more examples? Here we will try to offer very briefly three more such examples: Yishuv A"Y, Talmud Torah, and Teshuvah. In the two previous examples (teruma and shifur hamidot), the reason why they are not explicitly written is the desire to preserve the voluntary dimension that they contain. In these three, it seems that precisely because of their importance and thoroughness, the Torah did not include them in its system of formal commandments. The Torah did not want us to think of these three as ordinary mitzvahs, like any other mitzvah, but rather to understand that these are foundations that underlie the entire Torah.

1. Settlement of the Land of Israel

The problem is well known that the Maimonides does not include the commandment of settling the Land of Israel in his list. On the other hand, many have already pointed out that this commandment is mentioned in his halakhah in indirect ways (through the law of a woman or a slave who wishes to immigrate to the Land of Israel, and also in detail, in 1 Kings, chapter 5). According to our words, it is possible that there is an obligation here whose foundation is the will of God, and therefore it does not appear in Scripture as a commandment. How do we know that this is the will of God? It is clear that it is not an explanation, since it is difficult to see an explanation in settling the Land of Israel without a Torah commandment.[17]The basis of the obligation is indirect indications found in the Torah that this is what God wants from us, even if there is no explicit commandment to this effect in the Torah.[18].

2. Talmud Torah

The Rosh's approach in his commentary on the vows (8:1) is that studying Torah beyond reciting the Shema morning and evening is a permission and not an obligation.[19]If so, why should we study Torah beyond that? What is the meaning of the term "abolition of Torah" (which already appears in the Talmud, and it appears that the Rosh does not dispute it)? It appears that when we are told that the Torah is "our life and the length of our days," we can understand that it is God's will that we study as much as possible. It should be emphasized: there is no explanation here related to the content of the mitzvah, since studying in order to know what to observe is not the essence of the mitzvah of studying Torah (this is also an obligation for women, who are exempt from the mitzvah of studying Torah). If so, according to the Rosh, it seems that the obligation to study Torah as much as possible (even beyond reciting the Shema morning and evening) is an end in itself, and there is no logical explanation at its core. If so, this obligation is also the result of various indications that this is God's will.[20].

It seems that the other Rishonim who consider it a halakhic obligation to study Torah at any possible time can also agree with the Rosh on this. They only claim that this obligation is accompanied by another obligation that is of a regular halakhic nature, even though it is probably not strictly Torah (this is proven by the issue of vows mentioned above, and see the Rabbi who teaches this in his midrash on "and memorized them").[21]This does not mean that they deny the existence of an obligation based on God's will that is not explicitly stated in the Torah.

An interesting source for this approach is found in the issue of offerings (Zet, 2), the entire course of which expresses this matter:

Rabbi Ami said: From the words of Rabbi Yossi, we learn that even if a person does not read more than one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he fulfills the commandment, “This Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth.” Rabbi Yochanan said on behalf of Rabbi Ben Yochai: Even if a person does not read more than one chapter of Shema in the morning and evening, he fulfills the commandment, “This Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth.” And this matter is forbidden to be said before the people of the land. And Rava said: It is a commandment to be said before the people of the land. Ben Dama, the nephew of Rabbi Yishmael, asked Rabbi Yishmael: For example, I, who have learned the entire Torah, what is the point of studying Jewish wisdom? He read this scripture about him: “This Torah scroll shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night.” Go out and examine an hour that is neither day nor night and study Jewish wisdom in it. And Dr. Shmuel bar Nachmani sailed… Rabbi Yonatan: This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing. The Blessed One saw Joshua, whose words of Torah were very dear to him, as it is said: "And his servant Joshua the son of Nun, a young man, would not depart from the tent." The Blessed One said to him: Joshua, are the words of Torah so dear to you? This book of Torah will not depart from your mouth. Tana Debi Rabbi Yishmael taught: The words of Torah are not obligatory upon you, and you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.

The Gemara begins by stating that there is no obligation to study Torah beyond reciting the Shema morning and evening. According to our path, there is no formal halachic obligation that is the product of a command, but there is certainly an obligation that is based on the will of God. Now the controversy arises as to whether it is a mitzvah or a prohibition to say this before the people of the land. How should we understand that it is a mitzvah to say this before the people of the land? It turns out that Rava believes that this mimra overstates the importance of study, not diminishes it. The reason is that the mitzvah is so important and fundamental that the Torah finds it appropriate to leave it without a command, but as an expression of the will of God. Therefore, it is a mitzvah to say this before the people of the land, as this will encourage them to study, and not prevent them from studying.

And then immediately comes Ben Dama's story, which is also difficult: If he truly knows the entire Torah, as he testifies about himself, then how come he doesn't know the answer to this very question (whether it is permissible to learn Greek wisdom)? And in our opinion, the things are settled as a kind of matter: studying Torah is not a commandment, and therefore he is not obligated to do so by the Torah. But there is an interpretive explanation here that this is the will of God. The answer to this question does not belong to the knowledge inherent in the Torah itself, and therefore Ben Dama does not know it. This is the will of God that accompanies the Torah and not part of the formal halakha itself.

Regarding this, Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani says that this verse is “not an obligation and not a mitzvah, but a blessing.” His intention is to say that there is truly no mitzvah here, nor even an obligation, but rather a blessing for Joshua. And it follows from this that those who disagree with him are reasonable in that there is an obligation and a mitzvah here. What is the difference between an obligation and a mitzvah? It turns out that the mitzvah is to recite the Shema morning and evening, and the obligation is at all times, meaning an obligation whose foundation is the will of God.

Immediately afterwards, Rabbi Yishmael says that the Torah will not be obligatory upon you and you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them. And this is exactly what we say, since there is an obligation here that is not a mitzvah, and therefore he says that we are not permitted to see this as an exemption. And here it seems difficult: since at the beginning of the issue, Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, and he believes that the obligation is constant, every day, all day long! We are forced to assume that his meaning is that the mitzvah of studying Torah is indeed morning and evening, according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, but that it is nevertheless forbidden to be waived from it because of the will of God, and not because of any formal law.

And in this, Eti Shapir also contradicted the words of Rabbi Yishmael and Rashbi on the issue of blessings (35:2), which, as several recent scholars have already noted, they reversed their positions on the issue as follows:

"And you shall gather your grain" - what should you learn to say - since it is said: "This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth," can words be written as they are? Learn to say: "And you shall gather your grain" - the custom of the land, the words of Rabbi Yishmael; Rashbi says: It is possible for a person to plow at the time of plowing, sow at the time of sowing, reap at the time of harvest, thresh at the time of threshing, and sow at the time of wind, what Torah should there be about it? Rather: while the Israelites are doing the will of a place - their work is done by others, as it is said: "And strangers shall stand and pasture their flocks." And while the Israelites are not doing the will of a place - their work is done by themselves, as it is said: "And you shall gather your grain"; and no more, but the work of others is done by them, as it is said: "And you shall serve your enemy." Abaye said: Many did as Rabbi Yishmael did - and it was done by them, as Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai did - and it was done by them.

Rabbi Yishmael believes that reciting the Shema morning and evening is sufficient, exactly the opposite of this, while Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai there actually thinks that there is no break in the obligation. And how do we reconcile these two contradictions from end to end? And according to our words to Eti Shapir, who did not mention it: When we talk about the obligation, it is only reciting the Shema morning and evening. And when we talk about the general truth, it is all the time. We note that within the framework we have outlined, there is still a disagreement between these conditions, and the latter have already elaborated on this, and so on.

3. Answer

The Manach (Mitzvah Shased) points to a contradiction in the Rambam regarding the commandment of repentance. On the one hand, in the Book of Mitzvot, it does not list a commandment to repent, but only a commandment to confess when repenting (as a sabbath): "When the sinner turns from his sin, let him confess." On the other hand, at the beginning of the halal Teshuva, it writes: "When the sinner turns from his sin before the Lord and confesses." It is possible that here too the basis of the difference is that we were not commanded to repent in the verse[22], but there is an obligation that is based on the will of God. Therefore, it is not possible to list it in the list of commandments, but it certainly should be included as one of the obligations within the framework of the halakhic book.

It is true that the question of whether the commandment to repent is derived from the will of God or whether there is a logical explanation that requires one to return must be discussed. This depends on the definition of the concept of repentance (see, for example, the wisdom of Deuteronomy 3:17, etc.), etc.

F. Conclusion: Words of the author of the Isharim Trail

We have learned that there are two types of commandments that are not listed: some are not listed because they are not important enough, some are not listed because they are very important, and some are not listed because the Torah wants to leave the voluntary dimension that exists in them. In all these cases, the absence of an occurrence in the Torah does not mean that there is no obligation to do so, an obligation that is based on doing God's will, even without a command. Obligations that are based on a fundamental explanation (such as the obligation to be a good and moral person) are also binding because of God's will (see my article on this in Tzohar 25), but our indication of the existence of such a will is the very explanation that it is right to act in this way, and not a biblical hint. This is another type of obligation without a command that we have not discussed here.

And now, at the time of closing the gate, I found, as we said in the book Mesilat Yesharim, the Ramchal, in explaining the measure of Hasidism (Chapter 18). The Ramchal opens with the fundamental definition of the Hasid:

Here is the root of Hasidism, as the late Rabbis said: Blessed is the man who labors in the Torah and brings pleasure to his Creator. And the point is that the commandments imposed on all Israel are already known and their obligation is known to what extent it extends. Indeed, one who loves the Creator, blessed be his name, true love, will not strive and aim to exempt himself from the obligation that is already known to all Israel in general, but it will happen to him as it would happen to a son who loves his father: if his father reveals his mind, even a little, that he desires something, the son will already increase in that thing and in that deed as much as he can.

The Ramchal then explains that this desire is learned from hints in the father's words:

And even though his father only said it once and in a half-word, it is enough for that son to understand where his father's mind is inclined to do for him, even what he did not say to him explicitly, since he will be able to judge for himself whether that thing will be pleasing to him and will not wait for him to be commanded more explicitly, or for him to say it to him another time.

And the commander concludes:

The whole of Hasidism is found in the expansion of the observance of all the commandments in all aspects and conditions that are appropriate and possible. And you see that Hasidism is a type of abstinence, except that abstinence is in the law and Hasidism is in action, and both are one thing, which is to add to the explicit what we can judge according to the explicit commandment that will bring peace of mind before Him, may He be blessed. This is the true boundary of Hasidism.

It should be noted that the Ramchal is not talking here about duties that are explained, but rather about duties towards God, the Blessed One, whose foundation is not in a command but in the understanding that this is His will. The obligation to fulfill them is not because we understand that this is the correct behavior, but because we have been hinted that this is the will of God, the Blessed One. And that is complete nonsense.

[1]    There is a discussion of the question of obligations that do not originate in the system of mitzvot in the book 'Nachalat Asher', by R. Asher Zelig Weiss, Bava Kama, 61 and in the first appendix; and also in the article by Rabbi M.M. Kasher, "Sab'ra Da'Oriyata", at the beginning of the book 'Mefenech Tzfunot'. Both do not distinguish between the will of God and Sab'ra. See regarding the blessing of the one who is before him, in my article "What is Guilty", in the issue of Magal 5767, the Higher Institute of Torah, Bar-Ilan University.

[2]    And see there in the commentary of the Malbim, letter 5, and also in the Toss of the Hebrews, on the issue of Gittith there.

[3]    In this regard, Rabbi David Terumot 3:4 wrote that in a terumah (which is not like a tithe), one can set aside more than one grain, and after he decides how much he wants to set aside, he should set aside an estimate, in order to make him set aside more than he decided so that his contributions will not be spoiled. This is a duq.

[4]    After writing, I saw two articles that addressed the Maimonides' method of giving: Rabbi Yaakov Yotkowitz, Alon Shvut 165, and Rabbi Yitzchak Ben David, Alon Shvut 166.

[5]    And regarding challah, see something similar in the Novitiate from the report of the Jewish scholar, Si' Ra.

[6]    There in the roots he does not bring the example of a gift at all, and consistently changes the language between a gift and the other priestly gifts (see עסע קקה, קקה, קכה, קלג, and against all these קקה).

[7]    According to the commentary of the Holy Prophet, Dilma Begitin 20:1, it is written that not every giving has a lesson, and he also mentioned a donation. And so in the above-mentioned Shalman, in the Talmud, and in the other subjects of the tools there.

     We note that in challah the rate is also a percentage, although in challah the rate is in giving (as we will see below). It is true that in challah there is a minimum rate to commit to, unlike in donation. Combining the two principles shows that in challah there is a minimum rate of giving.

[8]    It should be noted that we find several more examples in Halacha that have a triple shiur: a sacrifice that goes up and down – rich, poor and lowly in poverty. Chanukah – regular, mehadrin and mehadrin from mehadrin. Perhaps also charity: a third of a shekel, a tithe and a fifth. It seems that in all these cases there is a dimension of generosity of the heart, and therefore the shiur was set flexibly (the sacrifice that goes up and down is perhaps exceptional, and its purpose is not to impose a great burden on a poor person who is repentant and wants to atone, and so on).

[9]    This seems more like a rising and falling sacrifice rate. See previous note.

[10] In the issue of Chulin Kalez, 2, it is clear that the present Amina states that one-sixtieth of a shiur is from the Torah, and in its conclusion the Gemara deduces from this. In our opinion, this is not a complete repetition, but rather a matter of correcting the khiri, but in the parasha, the intention of the Torah is in this shiur. And indeed, in Rashi there (cited above) he used the language of the khiri and not the language of the rabbis, and see also to note that Maimonides also used such language with regard to the teruma.

[11]   I do not mean to say that the other priestly gifts do not have any part of gratitude. In the firstfruits, for example, the Torah makes it clear that this is an expression of gratitude to God. What distinguishes a teruma from the other priestly gifts is that in a teruma there is only The gratitude part.

[12]   It would be appropriate to say that the delay is from the Torah, and according to the words of the Torah, Sukkah 3:1 and Rabbeinu Yonah, Barakhot Reish, Chapter 1, one who does not perform a mitzvah according to the correction of the Sages has not fulfilled his obligation even in the realm of Torah and Akmal.

[13] And in particular, according to the Rambam's method, which views the parsha and the giving of challah as two parts of one mitzvah, then if there is a law to give as a portion to the priest, it is clear that this law already exists in the parsha, and it is also necessary to set aside as a portion. If so, after the law has been established on this portion, it also delays the correction of the dip, not just the giving. And according to the Rambam, who sees two different mitzvahs here, there is more room to divide between them.

[14]   Reprinted in the newsletter Shvut Gamalhon 3. See also Rabbi Shaviv's article in the above-mentioned, 7.

[15] Editor's note: See Yehuda Dahan's article, 'Tzohar' ****.

[16] It is possible that improving behavior derived from virtues is an obligation that is explained, but the obligation to improve virtues is fundamentally a spiritual-mental obligation, and not a means to proper behavior, and I agree with this.

     We will note that perhaps this will explain a difficulty that I have always wondered about and debated. We have quoted Rabbi Chaim Vital and the Rabbis as explaining why the Torah does not command the improvement of one's character. But there is such an obligation, according to most commentators on the commandments: "And walk in His ways" (see the Book of Mitzvot by Rambam, Acts 8). And according to us, it can be said that the specified halakhic obligation is the improvement of behavior, but the obligation to improve one's character as an end in itself is an obligation that is not specified, but rather stems from the will of God.

[17] There was room to see such an explanation in the fact that in the Land of Israel more than one mitzvot can be kept. But it has already been established that, at least to know how many first and last of the mitzvot of settling the Land of Israel is beyond the observance of the mitzvot dependent on it. Beyond that, such an explanation is still not a substantive explanation but only by virtue of the will of God (since even the mitzvot dependent on the Land, at least for the most part, are not mitzvot that are explained).

[18] My thanks to the editor, who suggested this example to me.

[19] And so the Gemara explained there, although according to Baran and other Rishonim, and others.

[20] There was room to see this as an existential mitzvah, but we do not find a separate source commanding this, other than the "Vahagit." Beyond that, even an existential mitzvah does not justify treating non-study as 'nullification of Torah.' Therefore, we are forced to arrive at a positive obligation that is based on the will of God.

[21] The details of the various methods should be discussed here, since from the Rambam and other Rishonim, it appears that there is an absolute obligation from the Torah to study whenever possible, and this is seemingly hidden from the issue there, and I will elaborate on this.

[22] As is known, the Maimonides in chapter 7 of the Hebrew Teshuva interprets "and the Sabbath until the Lord your God" as a promise, and the Ramban in his commentary on the Torah disagrees with him on this.