With God’s help

The Daily Daf – Lod – 2014

Michael Abraham

This is an introductory lesson to the Sukkah tractate. At the beginning, I will describe the structure of the tractate, present some of the fundamentals of the Sukkah laws for the benefit of the learners (while emphasizing the dimension of the relationship between kosher and the substance of the matter), and finally I will discuss the question of the status of the construction of the Sukkah and the kosher mitzvah in general, and their relationship to the act of the mitzvah itself.

A. General Introduction: Haftza of a Mitzvah and the Kosherness of Haftza

 

Tractate Sukkah: General Description

The laws of Sukkot are divided into several categories: the laws of the structure of the Sukkah (thatch, sides, area and height. Its location – ship and wagon. Ashtaroth with horns). The laws of its construction (make it and not from what is made. For its name and shadow: ganbach and rekabash). The laws of the Sukkah Yeshivat (like a tadoru. Sick and grieving. Mitzvah messengers. In the rain. Obligation to eat and sleep). The laws of the Sukkah objects (holiness and set aside for its mitzvah). The laws of the four species (agida, hadar, gazul) and their taking, and the laws of the willow cutting. The holiday sacrifices. The mitzvah of joy and praise and the pouring out of the water. The holiday and its prayers.

The chapters in the tractate are divided as follows: The first chapter deals with the Sukkah, the second with its seating and location. The third chapter deals with the laws of the willow and the four species. The fourth chapter deals with the laws of the holiday and its prayers. The fifth chapter deals with joy and praise, blowings and sacrifices.

The Haftza Kosher: The thatch is the Sukkah

As mentioned, the first two chapters deal mainly with the structure of the sukkah itself and its construction, and to a lesser extent with its seating. The laws of the sukkah are divided into the laws of the thatch, the laws of the walls, the laws of the space, and the laws of the sukkah seating.

Rashi, on the first mishna in Tractate משכעת, writes about the disqualification of her anger from being more severe than her salvation:

And its anger is great, its shade is great – the few are useless in the many, and indeed he is as if he were not, and the Sukkah is named after the thatch.

Rashi also writes about the Mishnah on page 12a:

And all of them – the garbage we both have in the thatch.

As for the walls – every Sukkah written as a thatch means a thatch, a thatch is not a Sukkah, and it is said (Sukkah 6:2) that the walls are made of a sheet of bark – from the omission of the word “yalfinen”, and not from the meaning, therefore you will make a Sukkah in your gathering from your granary, a thatch is a thin one.

He explains that the prohibitions of the sukkah recited in this mishnah (bundles of straw and a tree) were all stated on the thatch, but his reasoning implies that all the prohibitions of the sukkah were stated in the thatch.

At least according to some of the earlier and later views, there are no laws on the sides at all. According to these methods, the laws of the sides (e.g. size and height) are actually laws on the space or, more precisely, the essence of the kosherness of the thatch. These are laws that constitute a condition for the thatch to be called a 'thatch.' According to this, a curved side, a good assik, and the like are part of the requirement for the kosherness of the sides, which is a condition for the name 'thatch.' In any case, it is factually clear that most of the laws of the sukkah are about the thatch.

Rabiah and Tos disagree with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshya (on page 7b) that it is invalidated when its anger is great because of the walls: Is it in his opinion that this is a special law because its anger is great because of its protection (Todah 'Machicha', ibid.), or is it because in Rabbi Yoshya's opinion that all the invalidities of the sukkah were also stated in the walls (Rabiah, brought by Mordechai 30, 1551). In any case, according to the halakha, Rabbi Yoshya certainly does not agree, and therefore it seems that according to the Talmud, all the invalidities of the sukkah were stated in the sukkah.[1]

Implication: The Sanctity of Sukkah Trees

The main argument presented in this context is the disagreement between the Rambam and the Rosh regarding the sanctity of the trees of the Sukkah. Rambam 15:15:

Sukkah trees are forbidden throughout the days of the holiday, between the trees of the walls, between the trees of the thatch..

On the other hand, the Rosh, Pasha, 13:

Oh, the trees of the Sukkah were in the thatch.…

(See Arul"n A place that discusses the question of how one establishes a prohibition only on two and a tap, whether this is a ruling in the case of a shek)

The Garid in his novellas to the beginning of the tractate explains that their disagreement is over the status of the walls, whether they are part of the sukkah's hafza or only kosher for this hafza (because the main part of the sukkah is the hafza, as we have seen). If so, according to his view, there is a disagreement among the Rishonim on this basis of Rashi.

But his grandfather, the Grach, on the aforementioned Rambam, proves from the issue of 7:2 that according to the law it is certain that the laws of the sukkah were stated only on the roof, and the roof is the sukkah for the Rabbis. Therefore, the Rabbis agree that the main law of the sanctity of the sukkah was also stated only on the roof, but according to the Rambam, the walls that are part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah of the sukkah (the act of the mitzvah also uses them) were also specified. If so, according to the Rosh, the prohibition is on the haffza of the sukkah, and therefore it is only on the roof, while according to the Rambam, the prohibitions of the sukkah are only on the roof, but the prohibition of the sanctity of the trees is not invalid in the sukkah but a prohibition on everything that is used for the mitzvah of the sukkah, and therefore it also includes the walls:

[15] Sukkah trees are forbidden all seven days of the holiday, between the trees of the sidewalls and the trees of the thatch. They are not permitted to use them after all seven days, etc., etc. And the Rosh in the Book of Desukkah wrote, and the one who is

And it seems to be said in the opinion of the Rambam, the Rambam, that if we come to discuss the sukka itself, then certainly the roof is considered the essence of the sukka, and certainly in the sukka, page 7 [a.b.] See there, Depligi, on this, R. Yashi and the rabbis, whether the walls were included in the rules of the roof or not, and according to them, the walls were not a roof, and there was also a great deal of anger because the walls were kosher, because there was no soldier in the law of the sukka, and only the roof alone was a dehla on it and the law of the sukka was upheld. Indeed, all of this is only in the laws that concern the impermissibility and kosherness of the sukka, which are in the body of the sukka, and this concerns only the roof and not the walls, since the walls are not in the sukka at all, since in this case the walls of the sukka are forbidden, they are referred to in the text of the Sukkat, p. 111, by the Rambam, that this does not depend on the sukka itself, and that there should be a decree The scripture says that it is forbidden to enjoy it, because if this ruling was made about the mitzvah of a sukkah, then everything that is done in the house of the mitzvah of a sukkah is forbidden to enjoy it, and the ruling of the mitzvah therein is that it is forbidden to enjoy it, and therefore since the walls are also included in the text of sukkahs, and without walls it is not permissible, then in any case the design of the walls was included in the mitzvah of the sukkah, and even on the back of it, not that it was a dzukkah, but because of this, the mitzvah is, they built a sukka on the roof, and they also had walls, and it is for this reason that the Rambam ruled that the design of the trees of the sides of the sukkah were forbidden.

Below, at the end of the lesson, we will see a different formulation of this controversy. However, we will first discuss the law of building a sukkah and the kosher nature of the mitzvah in general.

The entire sukkah is a kind of kosher mitzvah.

We will conclude with another note from the words of the Meiri, who writes on page 30a:

but It seems to me that the Sukkah does not come out in its body, and it sits on the ground forever, except that the Sukkah Surrounding it… but the lulav in its body is a departure and it is appropriate to apply the law of the following mitzvah to it. In a transgression. And like what they said in the Western Talmud: What is the difference between a lulav and a shofar? The lulav itself is A shofar is blown, and he goes out, and there is no sound of judgment, robbery..

On the surface, it would seem that he is talking about the manner of fulfilling the mitzvah, in that the body of the sukkah is not used, but rather one sits inside it. But it seems more likely that he understands that the sukkah is also just a type of instrument of the mitzvah. Perhaps the mitzvah is for the man to sit in the sukkah. According to this, the entire sukkah is not an object of the mitzvah, but rather a means for fulfilling the mitzvah.

And it is true that some of the laws of the sukkah are laws that were not stated about the thatch or the sides, but about the whole: a sukkah under a sukkah. Or a sukkah that is not made for shade. A sukkah on a ship and a wagon, and so on.

Summary

We have learned that the sides are the kosher for the object of the mitzvah (not the kosher for the act of the mitzvah). This is one type of kosher that constitutes a means to the body of the matter. Below we will see the relationship between the kosher of the mitzvah and the act of the mitzvah, and then we will return to comment on the controversy we saw here.

B. The Status of Building a Sukkah: A Mitzvah and Its Kosher Mitzvah

The status of making the sukkah

Above we distinguished between making the sukkah and sitting in it. The mitzvah is, of course, to sit in the sukkah (in Sukkot you shall sit). What is the status of making the sukkah? It seems that this is a kosher mitzvah in the literal sense. The verse "The Feast of Sukkot you shall make for yourself" simply speaks of making the holiday and not of making a sukkah. Indeed, Chazal learn from it the impermissibility of "making and not of what is made," and therefore it seems that in their opinion there is room to interpret this also to mean making the sukkah itself. And according to this, the verse commands the making of the sukkah. Does this mean that there is a mitzvah in making the sukkah, meaning that it is not only a kosher mitzvah?

In the following, we will discuss what exactly is the kosher nature of a mitzvah? Is it a neutral act or does it have halakhic status? And what is its connection to the body of the mitzvah?

There was room here to bring up the judgment of the Rema inShulchan Arba'ah Sohal Yohk (Och 3, 1864):

And the grammarians begin immediately on the eve of the 12th with the construction of the sukkah, in order to proceed from one mitzvah to another (Maharil and Managim and the G.M. P.2 in Debarchot Mahari 6).

The Maharil writes to begin building a sukkah on the eve of Yom Kippur in order to move from one mitzvah to another. Does this mean that building a sukkah is a mitzvah in the full halakhic sense? Not necessarily. It may be just a matter of perception and not a substantive halakhic definition. "Pursuing a mitzvah" in the conceptual, not halakhic sense. We must move from engaging in a mitzvah to engaging in another mitzvah, but engaging in a mitzvah does not necessarily mean fulfilling a mitzvah in the full halakhic sense. Nevertheless, we find in several contexts that there is a mitzvah in building a sukkah, and we will see some of them now.

A. Timber division and sukkah construction

In the Mishnah (Makoto 8:1) it is stated:

"And whoever brings his neighbor into the forest" (Deuteronomy 19:5)... Abba Shaul says: What is the use of cutting down trees, even every kind of use? The father who strikes his son, the rabbi who humiliates his disciple, and the messenger in the fourth chapter.

Cutting trees in the forest is an act of permission, and one who accidentally kills while performing an act of permission is exiled. From this, Abba Shaul learns that one who accidentally kills while engaged in a mitzvah will be exempt from exile, for he is like a father who beats his son to teach him Torah, or a rabbi who beats his student, or a court messenger who fulfills his duty.

The Gemara mentions this:

That Rabbi said to him: Why do you chop trees for sermons? Do you not chop trees for a grove and for a field? And even the most merciful said: I will! He said to him: Since if one finds a tree that is not cut down, it is not a mitzvah, then one should not chop it, it is not a mitzvah.

From Rava's words it follows that the rabbi's blessing on the student and the father's blessing on his son is indeed a mitzvah, but the division of the trees of the Sukkah is a permission.

The Ritva explains there that cutting wood for the Sukkah is a kosher mitzvah, not a mitzvah in itself, and therefore one who accidentally kills while cutting wood will still be found guilty (and so it is in Meir Shem):

Even when he did not find a hatut that he should have and did not have a sagi anyway, that division is not an important mitzvah, and the kosher mitzvah is a mere mitzvah, and even the enunciation of a mitzvah is nothing more than a disgrace. And for me, a father who beats his son and a rabbi who humiliates his student for interpreting the Talmud, and they will forever be a mitzvah, is a mitzvah.

He writes that this is a kosher mitzvah, and adds that there is no point in even engaging in it unless he needs it (he has no trees).

The latter wrote that according to the Ritva and Meiri system, one is not exiled from the division of sukkah trees even if one does not have trees and needs to chop them down, because sukkah is not a mitzvah. In other words, even if one does not have trees and kosher is necessary, this is not a mitzvah and is an act of permission, even less so than the rabbi's scolding of his student and the father's beating of his son, whose halakhic status also does not seem to be a real mitzvah.

On the other hand, in the Tosafot Shantz writes:

Hadar Am Rava is not a word, as they say, etc. And there is a mitzvah that is not a sed, but therefore it is not a sed, and To the Matni, to those who are not exiles, he went into the forest to cut down trees for Sukkah and willow, and all the divisions commandment.

From this it is to be learned that if a person does not have hewn trees, and he hews trees for a sukkah and accidentally kills a person, he will not be exiled, even though his action is only a mitzvah. The essential act of kashrut is a mitzvah for the purpose of exile.

But Rashi there adds another layer that can be agreed upon by both:

I was surprised – because I did not find a well-made one. Well-made one is not a mitzvah, but rather the construction of the sukkah.

We see that in his opinion, even if the conclusion of the issue is that the division of trees is not a mitzvah, whether according to Tos' Shantz or Ritva, building the sukkah is certainly a mitzvah according to the Law.

It is true that it must be rejected and said that he does not mean to say that building the sukkah is an actual mitzvah, but only that it is a mitzvah kosher, but according to him, even the kosher exempts from exile (like a father who beats his son and a rabbi who is jealous of his student). What he intends to argue here is only that not every remote step (like going to work to buy the wood for the sukkah) can be considered a mitzvah kosher. Therefore, the division of the wood, even if it is necessary, is not a mitzvah kosher with a halakhic status (of course, it is kosher in the factual sense. Without it, there is no sukkah), whereas building the sukkah is.

And here, Rabbi Zalman Pines wrote to Rabbi Kook (Igrot HaRaia 3, p. Ratsad-Rata):

In Matot 8:1, Rashi states: "Because he did not find a suitable one, the division is not a mitzvah, but the making of the Sukkah." Apparently, "but you did the mitzvah" is an extra phrase. And what about the act of doing it, if he found it suitable, is it not a mitzvah? And Rashi's statement is that it is always a mitzvah from every place, because it is written in the text of the Hadith, "You shall make the Feast of Sukkot for yourself."

He interprets the verse as one that speaks of the making of the sukkah.

To this the Rabbi responds (Letters of the Rabbi 3, p. Raed, and see also Good looking Sukkah on the right):

I remember that the Rabbi wrote a commentary on the words of Rashi Makot 8:1 on the issue of the ordination of trees, on what Rashi wrote that the mitzvah is the making of the sukkah. And in truth, there is no mitzvah except the sitting, and the sukkah of a stolen person is kosher. Indeed, it is necessary to sit, according to Debiyt Shammai, who explains it as a sukkah for its own sake, and also according to Debiyt Hillel. It should be said, as in the words of the book of Haredim (Baal Chaiyy Adam, in the summary of Sefer Haredim 5:10), regarding the explanation of a mitzvah, that there is no need for intention, which he said, namely, that the intention is a mitzvah from "work with all your heart," but rather an understanding of it that does not hinder it. And here, it should be said that we do not derive the qura from its interpretation, and that doing is a mitzvah (and blessings be upon him, who saved us), but that it does not hinder the kosherness, and even if he did not perform the mitzvah of doing, he fulfills the mitzvah by sitting...

Rabbi Kook believes that building a sukkah is a complete mitzvah, but even if one does not build a sukkah because his sukkah is ready, this does not prevent the mitzvah of living in the sukkah. The Rabbi's innovation is that the verse actually commands the construction of a sukkah, and this is a complete mitzvah (and not a kosher mitzvah), but the construction does not prevent the kosherness of the sukkah, and even if one does not do so, one can fulfill one's obligation in a sukkah that he did not build. This is a very extreme approach, and as mentioned above, it does not necessarily follow from Rashi's words.

B. The blessing when making the sukkah

In Yerushalmi (Sukkah 1:2; Berakhot 9:3) it is said:

One who makes a sukkah for himself says: Baruch Akab"u to make a sukkah. After: to make a sukkah for his name. He enters to sit in it and says: Baruch Akab"u to sit in the sukkah. If he blesses it on the night of the first Yom Tov, he does not need to bless it anymore from now on.

According to the Yerushalmi, one must recite a blessing when building the sukkah, and there is even a difference in the wording of the blessing whether a person is building the sukkah for himself or for others. It seems to the Yerushalmi that this is a blessing of the commandments, and therefore it seems that according to his view there is a mitzvah in building the sukkah. This certainly supports the words of the Rabbis cited above.

Indeed, in the Tosefta in the Blessings ([Lieberman], P. 59-10):

9. He who performs all the mitzvot blesses them. He who builds a sukkah for himself says: Blessed are we that we have reached this time. He enters to sit in it and says: Blessed is He who sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us to sit in the sukkah. If he blesses it on the first day, he does not need to bless again.

10. The one who makes a lulav for himself says: Blessed is He who has given us life and has sustained us and has reached this time. When he takes it off, he says: Blessed is He who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to take a lulav. And one should recite a blessing over it every seven days. The one who makes a tzitzit for himself says: Blessed is He who has given us life. When he wraps himself up, he says: Blessed is He who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to wrap ourselves with a tzitzit. And one should recite a blessing over them every day. The one who makes tefillin for himself says: Blessed is He who has given us life. When he places them, he says: Blessed is He who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to place tefillin. Since when did he place them in the morning, he did not place them in the morning all day long.

Here we are talking about the blessing of praise, and it cannot be learned that there is a mitzvah in building the sukkah. The method of the Tosefta is that the blessing of praise is also blessed for doing the desired deeds of the mitzvot, and not just for their fulfillment. Ostensibly, this could also be interpreted in the Yerushalmi, but the text of the blessing in the Yerushalmi teaches that it is a mitzvah that we are commanded to do. And indeed, in the Babylonian Tosefta this blessing is given (Pesachim 7:2; Sukkah 40:1), but the law for blessing for building the sukkah is not given. Therefore, it is accepted to say that there is a disagreement between the Babylonian and the Jerusalemite (and as mentioned, Rashi in the plagues does not necessarily follow the Jerusalemite).

In another place in the Gemara (Menachot 44a), we discuss the blessing for performing a mitzvah (specifically tzitzit). During the discussion, the Gemara proves that one should not recite the blessing for making tzitzit, since one does not recite the blessing for making a sukkah:

Datania: One who builds a sukkah for himself says: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, who has given us life and established us and brought us to this time. When he comes to dwell in it, he says: Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe, who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to dwell in the sukkah. However, when building a sukkah, he does not say a blessing.

Here the Gemara explicitly states that there is no blessing recited for making the sukkah. The conclusion that emerges from the Gemara there is that for every mitzvah that is not performed as a fulfillment of the mitzvah, such as the four kinds, sukkah, tzitzit, and tefillin, there is no blessing recited at the time of making it, but only the blessing "Shehachaynu."

The Tosafot (Menachot 44b, 45 Illu), mention the words of the Jerusalemite quoted above, and write that we are faced with a disagreement between the two Talmuds:

And the chapter on the Seer (Yerushalmi Berakhot Pet 53) requires reciting the blessing for making the tzitzit sukkah and tefillin. In the Aruch, they brought about the third Tzetz. And they divide it into our Shas.

We see that there is a dispute over whether to recite a blessing upon building a sukkah or not. Simply put, the dispute is whether there is a mitzvah here or not.

But there in the second part the Gemara explains the Babylonian method:

But if we were not to say that, every mitzvah that is a final mitzvah, such as circumcision, even if it is done in the case of idolatry – in Israel one must recite a blessing, and every mitzvah that is not a final mitzvah, such as tefillin, even if it is done in the case of idolatry – in Israel one does not need to recite a blessing, and with the tzitzit in the case of a kamiflag, a scholar holds: it is the obligation of a tallit, and a scholar holds: it is the obligation of a gabra.

Here the wording is "the mitzvah of the completion of the mitzvah." It seems that this is not about the mitzvah of the mitzvah, but rather the beginning of the mitzvah.[2]

In the book Arm light (Chapter 1: Laws of Tefillin, section 547, 45 in the chapter on the Blue Sky), states:

The Jerusalem Talmud has a section on the Blue Sky, and it is not supported by the Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud holds that since a mitzvah is to be performed for the sake of the mitzvah, one is blessed for performing it.

It is not clear whether he means to say that there is a mitzvah in building the sukkah, and the proof is from the fact that in them it is a work for the sake of God (according to the B'Sh, and to God for the sake of God - see 8:2, Genbach and Rekabash, and Rambam 5:59), or whether he learns from this that there is a mitzvah in building the sukkah for the sake of God (i.e., this is a requirement for the kashrut of the sukkah, like all the laws of "for the sake of God", and not a direct mitzvah on the man).

Simply put, the fact that an action is required for its own sake does not prove anything, since baking matzah is also for its own sake, and the law of 'for its own sake' is a law in preparing the object of a mitzvah (as opposed to the law of intention, which is sufficient for the act of the mitzvah). So many more (see Rabbi Lichtenstein's lessons on sacrifices and more).

But to put it simply, it seems that since there are laws regarding the act (and not just the hafza that is performed), this proves that the action of the mitzvah has already begun at the time of the act and therefore it is appropriate to recite a blessing for it already at the time of the act. According to this, the act of the hafza is the beginning of the fulfillment of the mitzvah. This is what we also saw in the Babylonian language of the offerings, which do not recite a blessing because it is not the "completion of the mitzvah." The Babylonian sees the kosher as the beginning of the fulfillment of the mitzvah, but does not recite a blessing because it is only the beginning and lacks completion.

We note that the GRIP in its interpretation ofThe Book of Commandments For the RSG (cited by Rabbi Zvi Pesach Frank, Holy Bible(Sukkah I, p. 111) writes that even according to the Yerushalmi there is no mitzvah, but blessings are given for the kosher mitzvah.

Maimonides rules the law as a Kabbalist, and uses the Kabbalist's formulation (Berachot Pi'a 58):

Every mitzvah whose performance is a mandatory completion, one recites a blessing at the time of performing it, and every mitzvah that has other commandments after its performance does not recite a blessing except at the time of performing the last commandment. How? One who makes a sukkah or lulav or shofar or tzitzit or tefillin or mezuzah does not recite a blessing at the time of performing it that We have sanctified in His mitzvahs and commanded to make a sukkah or lulav or to write tefillin, because there are other commandments after his performance. And when does one recite a blessing? While sitting in the sukkah or when the lulav is shaken or when the sound of the shofar is heard or when he wraps himself in tzitzit and while wearing tefillin and while setting up a mezuzah. However, if one makes a railing, one recites a blessing at the time of performing it that We have sanctified in His mitzvahs and commanded to make a railing, and so on.

If we are honest, then this formulation in the Rambam also teaches that koshering is the beginning of the fulfillment of the mitzvah itself.

Although the wording incolumn (O'H. Si' Therma) is different:

One who builds a sukkah for himself does not need to recite a blessing upon its construction. Even according to the Jerusalemite tradition, one who builds a sukkah for himself blesses Akabvu when building a sukkah for his friend, and one who builds a sukkah for his friend blesses Akabvu when building a sukkah for his friend, as supported by the Agama Didan, which states that one should recite a blessing upon its construction.

From this it seems that there is no point in doing anything. He does not formulate that this is a mitzvah that is not the completion of doing something. It seems a bit like he is learning that the language of the issue in the menachot is not necessarily the same, and that kosher has no halakhic status.

C. Linguistic Accuracy

In the Shavuot of the 3rd of the 4th month we find:

Swearing to nullify the mitzvah – not to build a sukkah, not to wear a lulav, and not to wear tefillin – is a false oath that requires beatings for its adultery, and exemption for its negligence.

There is a difference in language here between a sukkah, which refers to its construction (and not its sitting), and a lulav, which refers to its taking off, or tefillin (which refers to its putting on).

The Mishnah Nedarim, p. 2, 2-3, also gives these examples:

This is material in Shavuot from Benderim, and material in Nadir from Shavuot. How? Konem said, "I make a Sukkah, I take a Lulav, I put on Tefillin." It is forbidden in vows, it is permitted in Shavuot. One does not swear to transgress the matzot.

Indeed, in Gemara Nedarim 16b we find an explanation for this mishna:

 Rava said: He said that I should sit in a sukkah, and he said that I should swear that I would not sit in a sukkah.

It seems that this is still about sitting in a sukkah. But it still seems that the Shigra Delishna also says something.

We also find in the Gemara in Ketubot (40:1; and see also Chulin 11:2):

 Rav Kahana said to Rav Papa, according to you, you said: Repaying a debtor is a mitzvah, he said: It is not acceptable for me to perform a mitzvah, what? He said to him, explain: In what ways are things said in mitzvot not to do, but in mitzvot to do, such as when they say to him: Build a sukkah and he does not do it, or a lulav and he does not do it, he prepares it until his soul departs.

Although the lulav also says "Oshe" here, the Britva actually reads "Notel".

Similarly, we find in Yerushalmi (Pah 1:1; Kiddushin 1:17):

"Honor the Lord with your substance" (Proverbs 3:9). What do you honor Him with? Your anointing. You set aside a forgotten offering and a tithe, you set aside a tithe and a first tithe and a second tithe and a tithe for the poor and for bread, and you make a sukkah and a lulav and a shofar and tefillin and tzitzit and you feed the poor and the hungry and give drink to the thirsty. If you have, you are obligated to do all of these, and if you do not have, you are obligated to do none of them.

Although here they practiced "doing" in all the commandments, but inHalacha explanation (C. Teranu, cf. 'even') explains that the Jerusalemite here, according to his method, is a loser:

The Jerusalemite Azil, according to his opinion, says in the blessings of the ninth chapter of the halakhah 3, that one who makes a sukkah for himself says, “Blessed is He who has sanctified it with His commandments and commanded us to make a sukkah.” … For the Jerusalemite Desover says that the fulfillment of the mitzvot is a mitzvah in itself, and it is not obligatory upon him to buy tefillin or a sukkah from a fellow believer in his own name. And for this reason the Jerusalemite says that in this matter the Torah does not obligate him to make the sukkah himself. … If he does not have it, the Torah does not obligate him to go back and look for wood for the sukkah, and parchment for the tefillin, and that he is not a deviant. Rather, he buys tefillin and a mezuzah made by others with his own name, and so on in the sukkah and all the mitzvot of doing so is nothing but kosher, but the very mitzvot he did was to wear tefillin, and that he was not a deviant in fulfilling the rest of the mitzvot, from which the Torah does not exempt him at all, which is a debt imposed on his person.

According to him, according to the Jerusalemite, a person who cannot afford to buy wood for a sukkah will be exempt from doing so, although he is not exempt from the very act of observing the sukkah commandment, and will sit in someone else's sukkah.[3]

But it seems that the Jerusalem plague is not as the Lord says.In the name of JehovahThe Jerusalemite only says that one must spend money on the mitzvah, and it is clear that in the sukkah the expenditure is on its preparation and not on its performance.

The 'Query' Method

onQueries In the book, Rabbi Achai writes:

Since the House of Israel is obligated to make a tent and live in it, the House of Israel is obligated to build a Sukkah and live in it.

And the National Guard, there (The Valley asked, there is a letter A), writes:

However, the main mitzvah of the sukkah is the sitting, and the making of it is nothing but preparation. In any case, there is a mitzvah in it, since this preparation is mentioned in the Torah and is more important than the other preparations for a mitzvah that are not written in the Torah. And the making of a sukkah and the writing of tefillin and mezuzot, as it is written: “And you shall write them,” and the keeping of the mitzvah of the mitzvah, as it is written: “And you shall keep the mitzvahs”… are not similar to the saying of the lulav and the blowing of the shofar, etc., in which no preparation is mentioned, but only the body of the mitzvah.

And I learned from the commentator of Makot, page 8, that it is written, "And whoever comes to his neighbor in the forest"... and Rashi interpreted: "He is not a man - because he did not find a well-groomed one, the well-grooming is not a mitzvah, but the making of the sukkah." Thus, Rashi distinguishes between the cutting of trees and the body of the work of the sukkah, and in the body of the work of the sukkah he certainly considers a mitzvah, even if he finds one ready-made, a mitzvah that he must do himself, because there is more mitzvah in it than in its sending, which is not the case with the cutting of trees, for if he finds a well-groomed one, it is certainly not a mitzvah.

He claims that cutting wood for a sukkah is not considered part of the sukkah's construction, but when building the sukkah - the construction itself is considered a mitzvah.

C. The status of kosher is a mitzvah written in the Torah.

Interim summary: What is a mitzvah kosher?

The status of kosher mitzvah in general should be discussed. So far, we have seen two approaches: There is room to see it as a neutral action that is required only because of the necessity of reality. As we saw above in Meiri, there is no point in engaging in it. At most, it is a matter of necessity that will not be condemned. On the other hand, kosher can be seen as an action that is of interest to the law, and perhaps even as the beginning of the performance of the mitzvah itself.

Kosher is a mitzvah written in the Torah.

This discussion is indeed given new force in cases where there is an explicit mitzvah in the Torah about kosher. There are several examples of this, some of which are discussed in the tenth root of the Rambam (and see my article on the tenth root). For example, circumcision (if the mitzvah is to be mixed, then the act of circumcision is kosher for which there is a mitzvah in the Torah), as well as the lighting of candles, which is ostensibly kosher for lighting, and yet the Torah commands it. And perhaps also the mitzvah of fruitfulness and multiplication, for those who perceive it as a mitzvah of consequence (see my book On the path of commandments P. Tazva).

Of course, one must distinguish between the cases. The commandment to light the candles is considered a mitzvah in itself. Therefore, even if we are talking here about preparing for the main value (lighting the candles), the halakhic definition here is a definition of a full positive mitzvah. Only the idea is the idea of kosher. On the other hand, there are cases (such as making incense: "Take some drugs" and so on. See the root of the tenth) in which the mitzvah is the burning of incense, but the preparations for it appear explicitly in the Torah. They do not have the status of a real mitzvah (it is not considered and is not treated as a real mitzvah), but it is a kosher act that the Torah commands to perform. This is in contrast to blowing the shofar, where we did not find a Torah command to perform the shofar, and therefore the act is a kosher act that is not written in the Torah. As we have seen, the making of the sukkah is also interpreted by the Sages as a kosher act that the Torah commands to perform.

Engaged in a mitzvah

We find in the halakha that even one who engages in the kosherization of a mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah. Mitzvah-bearers, such as those who go to redeem captives, are exempt from the mitzvah (see Sukkah Sukkah 10b, and also ibid. 25-26 and more). One who goes to redeem captives engages in the kosherization of a mitzvah, and yet is exempt from the mitzvah. Ostensibly, this is evidence that the kosherization of a mitzvah is the very beginning of the mitzvah, otherwise why is the one who engages in it relieved of the mitzvah?

But this should not be taken as a necessary argument, since it is possible that someone who is engaged in the kosherization of a mitzvah is only considered to be engaged in the mitzvah itself. When someone who is engaged in a mitzvah is faced with two mitzvahs, he must decide which of the two to engage in, that is, the discussion is about which mitzvah precedes its companion. It is possible that it could be said for this very reason that if he has already begun engaging in one of them, it is considered the first, and therefore it precedes its companion. But it should not necessarily be concluded from this that engaging in kosherization is engaging in the mitzvah itself.

In other words, if we had not exempted him from the second mitzvah while he was engaged in the first, he would have lost the first mitzvah (because without the kosher, it would not have been fulfilled). If so, what postpones the second mitzvah is the fear of the abrogation of the first, and not the mere engagement in the koshering of the first mitzvah per se.

Although some of the first ones believe that the one who engages in a mitzvah is exempt from the mitzvah even if he can fulfill both. For example, the method of Baal Arm light (Hebrew: Sukkah 69:29), cited in the glosses of Asherah (Sukkah Chapter 2, end of 66:6) and inThe ways of Moses (O'H 1944, 7) is that even if it is possible to observe the second without any pressure to observe the first, it is still rejected in the face of the first. The Ran, who is a little stricter (Hadushi of the Ran on the Rif Sukkah, 11 in the pages of the Rif, 25 and 15, and who is he), still believes that even when it is possible to observe both, the first rejects the second, unless it is possible to observe the second without any hassle.

According to these early methods, which believe that the exemption is also a condition that allows one to fulfill both, it is much more difficult to understand how engaging in the kosher mitzvah rejects a second mitzvah. Here it is no longer possible to say that what rejects the second is the very fulfillment of the first (because without kosher it will not be fulfilled), since here the first will be fulfilled even if one fulfills the second. The very pursuit of kosher rejects the second mitzvah. From this it seems that the perception arises that indeed kosher is part of fulfilling the mitzvah itself.

Word devices

A similar phenomenon can be found in the Tannaim controversy (Mishnah Reish, Chapter 1, Circumcision, Shabbat 11:1, and in the Gemara ibid.). The Tannaim disagree on the question of whether circumcision instruments postpone Shabbat or not. There too, one must discuss how the instruments also postpone Shabbat if engaging in them is not the same as engaging in the mitzvah itself? Indeed, there too, one must reject in the same way: after all, if we do not perform the instruments, the mitzvah (circumcision) will not be performed, and this is what postpones Shabbat.

Although it is apparent that this depends on the dispute between Re'a and Re'a Demila, whether the postponement is merely a reason that it was not possible to make the kashrut a day earlier. However, for most poskim, if he did not do it a day earlier and could have done it – the kashrut does not postpone Shabbat for Re'a, even if in such a situation the mitzvah itself would be nullified. It is apparent that this is not a postponement due to the mitzvah, but rather the kashrut itself that postpones. Perhaps there is room to say that this is a fine that is not in accordance with the principle of the law.

A thought that is rejected in the coals of time

We also find in the Gemara's issue in Yom 44b, which is concerned with whether an impermissible thought that is considered when lighting the coals for incense is also invalid (and the commentators there differ as to what is impermissible: the incense itself, or the coals):

Calculate what is the cutting of the coals? Mitzvah instruments as a blood mitzvah, or not. Draw. 

The burning of coals is certainly a mitzvah instrument. From the very wording of the doubt, we see that the Gemara was clear that the burning of coals is a mitzvah kosher, and the question is whether an impure thought is also impure when engaging in the mitzvah kosher, just as an impure thought is when engaging in the mitzvah itself.

At least for one side of the doubt, the one that holds that the thought is invalid even when the coals are lit, it is clear that the perception is that the kosher of the mitzvah is literally the same as engaging in the mitzvah itself. If the kosher of the mitzvah were devoid of any halakhic status, there would be no room at all for doubting that an impure thought would invalidate it. Here we can no longer reject this as we did in the previous examples, and attach it to the mitzvah itself (the incense of incense), for if we had not invalidated the kosher, then the mitzvah would have been performed according to its halakhic nature, and there is nothing here that harms the mitzvah itself.

Although, as we can see from the Gemara issue before us, the doubt was not resolved, and the issue was settled in a draw. If so, it is difficult to draw any evidence from this to support the conclusion discussed. However, according to the version of the Rabbis, and the Maimonides also ruled, according to the law, thinking at the time of lighting the coals is invalid. If so, at least according to their view, it follows that according to the law, the kosherness of the mitzvah is considered the beginning of the existence of the mitzvah itself.

Lighting Hanukkah candles and honoring father and mother

In reply to the book Fertilizer donation, he discusses the law of lighting a Hanukkah candle on Shabbat Eve. The question is the following:[4]

Question: Is it permissible to light a Hanukkah lamp that has been extinguished and is not needed? If it is extinguished on Shabbat before the Sabbath, then it must be lit from the day it is needed, whether or not it is needed?

Explanation: As is known, according to the law, we rule that once a Hanukkah candle has been extinguished, it is not necessary to relight it. However, on Shabbat Eve, the situation seems to be different. On Shabbat Eve, we light the candles before sunset, while the usual rule for lighting them is (according to the author) 1944) To light at the time of the stars, to light a lamp in the sky from the moon.

Now the question arises regarding a candle that was lit on Shabbat Eve, which, as mentioned, was lit before its time, and it went out. On a regular day, a candle that has been lit does not need to be lit again, but here, if the candle went out before Shabbat began, then this occurred before the mitzvah was fulfilled, and therefore, seemingly, by all accounts, it should be obligatory to relight it.

And here is how the owner writes: Terumah"d:

Answer: He sees that he does not need it even as a rabbi.

Surprising answer: Husband Terumah"d He claims that there is no need to relight the lamp on Shabbat Eve either. Now he himself raises the obvious difficulty:

And yet, it is written in Mordechai that the mitzvah of the Hanukkah candle is from the end of sunset onwards, meaning the coming out of the stars and not before, because of the fact that the candle is lit in the holy place, from which I will not be able to light it. And so the main mitzvah of the Hanukkah candle is not at the time of lighting it while it is still day, but rather in the delay in lighting it after dark, which is the fulfillment of the mitzvah. And therefore we could say that if it is extinguished before the beginning of the fulfillment of the mitzvah, it is necessary.

Here the candle went out before the mitzvah was fulfilled, and how can it be said that there is no need to light it again? And the author explains this. Terumah"d so:

Although it is customary to light a Hanukkah candle from the day of Akab"u, and even though I have a mitzvah, then we have a reason for this because in a matter after the cheshiva, it is a kosher mitzvah. As the Tosafots explain, the kosher mitzvah is to honor a father and a mother by hearing their words in the Barish Yevamot /page 6, a"a in the D"a, where he slaughtered a ripe fruit for me, I have a mitzvah until after the time that he feeds it to his father. And even though I have a mimra, the dalidachi 100% of the keret in it.

He proves that the lighting is a mitzvah kosher from the fact that even on Shabbat eve, blessings are recited over the lighting, even though the mitzvah has not yet been fulfilled. It is not clear what he means by his words here? It is clear that this is a mitzvah kosher, but ostensibly he wants to prove that there is an actual mitzvah fulfillment here, and not just a mitzvah kosher. That is, in his opinion, the kosher that is necessary for the fulfillment has the law of a part of the fulfillment. This seems to be his intention: such an introduction has the status of a mitzvah kosher in the sense of beginning the fulfillment of the mitzvah (as opposed to a distant kosher, such as the division of the trees of the sukkah according to Rashi, which does not have such a status).

He also proves this from the words of the Tod "Shechen" on the issue of Yevamot 6a, who write in the name of the Rabbis that the kosher commandment of honoring a father and a mother rejects is not one that contains a keret. Although, as we saw above regarding the issues of rejection, it is difficult to provide unequivocal evidence regarding the status of the kosher commandment, the author Terumah"d Understand that the postponement is because the kosherness of the mitzvah is already the beginning of the existence of the mitzvah itself.[5] It turns out that this is how he will also understand all the issues we raised above.

We note that it is possible that the Rabbi is following his own method here, since we also saw in the issue of Yoma that he believes that the kosherness of a mitzvah is the beginning of the existence of the mitzvah itself.

husband Terumah"d The section ends with the following conclusion:

The fulfillment of the act of making kosher is considered a mitzvah as the mitzvah itself, and for this reason we bless it. And to say that it is not necessary to do so, there is no need for it, since the mitzvah of making kosher has already begun.

His conclusion is that the kosher of the mitzvah is considered the fulfillment of the mitzvah itself, and therefore a blessing is recited over it. From this he draws the far-reaching conclusion that if the candle goes out again, there is no need to light it again on Shabbat Eve. Although the time for the mitzvah has not yet arrived, once we have lit it, the very fact that there is kosher of the mitzvah indicates that the mitzvah has already been fulfilled.

We note that the innovation of Baal Terumah"d Contains two different components:

• The completion of a mitzvah has the status of the beginning of the fulfillment of the mitzvah.
• If a person fulfills the kosher of the mitzvah, he has completely fulfilled his obligation, even without a trace of the result (of course, we are only talking about mitzvot that concern the action and not the result, such as the Hanukkah candle, which the Jewish Law says according to the halakha, "If it is extinguished, there is no need for it").

It is important to understand that the second innovation is not a necessary conclusion from the first. It is certainly possible that the Rambam and the Rabbis, who perceive the kosherness of the mitzvah as the beginning of the fulfillment of the mitzvah, would still require us to light a Hanukkah candle on the eve of Shabbat. Despite their agreement with the first innovation, they can certainly reject the second innovation of Baal Terumah"d.

What is the meaning of the second innovation? It also seems to concern the concept of mitzvah kosher. It would be appropriate to say that mitzvah kosher has a halakhic status, and has a dimension of fulfilling a mitzvah, but it is not considered to be a real part of the mitzvah itself, and certainly not its complete fulfillment.Terumah"d We see that he perceived the lighting as the fulfillment of the mitzvah itself. In the mitzvah of action, a person who has performed the kosher of the mitzvah has fulfilled his obligation. In his opinion, he has performed the required action and thereby fulfilled the mitzvah.

It is possible that he is referring only to the mitzvot in which the act imposed on us is only the kosher (we can light a candle, but the fact that it is lit is a result that arises from our actions anyway), even though the mitzvah is the result. After all, lighting is the kosher for it to be lit, but we cannot have it lit without lighting. His first innovation is true in all kosher, but his second innovation is true only in such koshers.

The tenth root

The discussion of the kosher qualities of a mitzvah written in the Torah begins in the Rambam at the root of the tenth. He writes there that the kosher qualities of a mitzvah are not enumerated. But his reasoning is given in two different languages:

The tenth root is that it is not appropriate to enumerate the introductions that are for one of the purposes. Sometimes there will be commandments in the Torah. These commandments are not the mitzvah, but they are introductions to performing the mitzvah, as if it tells how that mitzvah should be performed.

This similarity is said (S.P. Amor) and taking a salad, etc., because it is not worthy of being counted as taking a mitzvah sela and making it a mitzvah bread. But what is counted (M.A. 27) is indeed what is said (Teruma 25). Here the mitzvah is indeed that there should be bread always before God, and then it describes how this bread will be and what it will be made of, and it says that it will be semolina and there will be twelve challahs.

And on this path itself it is not appropriate to mention it, they said (Rapha Tezva), and they took pure olive oil for themselves, but it was mentioned (Ma'a 25). They said (ibid.) to light a lamp always, and this is the benefit of the lamps, as explained in Tamid (Saf"3 and in Piyam). And on this path itself it is not mentioned, they said (Rapha Tezva), take for yourself spices, but it is mentioned (Ma'a 28) the incense of the incense every day, as it is written in it (Saf"3 Tezva), in the morning in the morning when he lighted the lamps he would burn them, and when Aaron raised the lamps, etc. This is the mitzvah that is mentioned. And they said, take for yourself spices, an introduction to the commandments, which is to explain how this mitzvah is to be done, and what this incense is to be. And likewise, take for yourself perfumes for the head (Rapha Tezva), it is not mentioned, and indeed it is mentioned (Ma'a 33) the commandments that commanded that high priests and kings and holy vessels be anointed with the anointing oil described.

And in this way, suppress everything that resembles it until what is not worthy of including it does not multiply in you. And this is our intention in this root. And it is an explained thing.

And indeed, we remembered him and reminded him of it because many have already made mistakes in it as well. And here are some introductions to the commandments with the commandment itself in two commandments. As it will be clear to anyone who understands the origin of the parashits that Rav Shimon Keira, the late, and all those who followed him, are among those who remembered the parashits in their numbers:

The highlighted formulations seem to point in two directions: the first indicates that there is no mitzvah here at all. It is a neutral act, and therefore there is no place for it to be included in the list of mitzvot that deals only with mitzvah acts. But the second reasoning implies that kosher is also a mitzvah, and that what is not listed is only because it is included in the main mitzvah (which it establishes), and therefore it should not be listed separately in a separate mitzvah. Of course, all of this discussion is only about the koshers that are written in the Torah itself, since the Maimonides' method is that what does not appear in the Torah should not be listed at all.

We will give one example of this from the words of the Rambam himself. The Rambam, at the beginning of the book The Temple Instruments, states that making anointing oil and incense are positive mitzvot, and he said:

PA 51: It is a commandment to make anointing oil that will be ready for things that require anointing with it, as stated, "And you shall make it a holy anointing oil," etc.

PB 51: Incense is made every year, and its making is a positive mitzvah, as stated in the verse, "And you shall take for yourself spices," etc.

husband Writers' envy On the tenth root, the Rambam's words are complicated by his words on this root, that making anointing oil and taking incense are not positive commandments but only kosher commandments, and they should not be mentioned because they have no halakhic status. And here we see that the Rambam sees them as actual positive commandments.

husband Writers' envy There, he explains it this way:

And the excuse for this is that the beginning of the mitzvah is the same previous act that is necessary for it. Since it is impossible to fulfill the mitzvah as its correction without it, it is included with the mitzvot. Accordingly, those introductions and suggestions that we mentioned are parts of the mitzvah, and only the fulfillments of the mitzvah will be taken into account, which are the purpose of the commandments stated in them…

He explains that making the oil and incense are also mitzvot, since they are the obligatory kosher for the mitzvot of anointing and incense (and in particular, they are the necessary kosher, as stated by Toss Shantz, cited above). As we have seen, according to Maimonides, the conclusion from the issue of Yuma is that the obligatory kosher is part of the mitzvot (in this sense Maimonides agrees with Baal's first innovation). Terumah"d). If so, what the Rambam is arguing with this root is that they should not be given an independent status, and not that they are not positive commandments. The Rambam sees this root as part of the principles of classification and classification, and not as part of the category of actions that are not a commandment at all. The kosher of the mitzvah is not included because it is included in the mitzvah, and not because it is not a mitzvah at all. The Rambam here follows his own method, as we saw above also with the method of the Rabbis.

 

Conclusion regarding building a sukkah

Above we saw several possibilities in understanding the meaning of building a sukkah. Some see it as a neutral act (necessary), and some see it as a valuable act that is not a mitzvah. Others see it as a real independent mitzvah. From our discussion here, another possibility arises: building a sukkah is not a mitzvah nor is it a neutral qualification for the mitzvah of living in a sukkah, but rather it is part of the mitzvah of living in a sukkah. We saw that this is the Babylonian interpretation that building a sukkah "is not the completion of a mitzvah."

The dichotomous view leads us to assume that kosher is part of the mitzvah itself or that it is a neutral act. But in the article on the tenth root, I explained that at least according to the Rambam's method, it follows that kosher written in the Torah has the status of a "half-mitzvah." There is a kind of fulfillment of a mitzvah in it, but it is still not part of the performance of the main mitzvah. An example of this can be drawn from the law of half a lesson, at least for the views that kosher is an independent mitzvah and not an exception to the other mitzvahs.

The things said here are because, at least according to Chazal, building a sukkah is kosher as written in the Torah, and therefore there is room to see it as part of fulfilling the mitzvah itself, or half a mitzvah. However, this is not necessarily said about all ordinary kosher.

D. Kosher for the purpose of a mitzvah and kosher for the act of a mitzvah.

Back to the definition of the Grach

This argument brings us back to the words of the Grach that we saw above. The Grach explains that according to the Rambam, the kosher of the sukkah mitzvah is also sanctified, since what determines the sanctity is the act of the mitzvah and not the hafza per se. He refers to the walls as kosher of a mitzvah that is part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah (without which, sitting in the sukkah is not a fulfillment of the mitzvah). Therefore, in the Rambam's opinion, there is sanctity on the walls and not just on the thatch. Therefore, in order to define sanctity according to the Rambam as also applying to the walls, he finds himself forced to give up the relationship between sanctity and the hafza of the sukkah and he attaches it to the act of the mitzvah. This of course deviates from the simple explanation that the law of sanctity is the law of the hafza of the sukkah, especially since, simply speaking, we are dealing with Torah law that is learned from the celebration offering (see Bitza 31), and not a law specific to its mitzvah, which is the law of the rabbis that concerns the act of the mitzvah.

And here, according to our method, this may not be necessary. We can remain in the simple view that holiness is a law in the object of the mitzvah and not in what is used in the act of the mitzvah, as defined by the Grach, and at the same time remain in the simple view that the walls are only the kosher for the shelter and not the essence of the sukkah. And yet we can say that the walls are considered a minor part of the sukkah itself, just as the kosher for the act of the mitzvah is considered a minor part of the act itself.

In other words: the relationship between the kosher of the Haftza and the Haftza itself is similar to the relationship we saw between the kosher of the Mitzvah and the Mitzvah itself. Here we abandon the dichotomous view that accepts only the two polar possibilities, either the individual is the body and the essence of the thing or the individual is something external to the essence of the thing. Just as the kosher of the Mitzvah is not the act of the Mitzvah itself nor is it something external, but is a bit of a Mitzvah or half a Mitzvah, so the kosher of the Haftza is not really the essence of the Haftza nor something completely external to it, but rather a faint part of the body of the thing. The kosher of the Haftza is a faint introduction to the act of the Mitzvah, which already contains some of the Mitzvah itself, although it is not its essence. Similarly, the kosher of the Haftza (the sides) is branched off to the Haftza itself (the thatch).[6]

Is it also required for the hafza kosher to be written in the Torah?

Regarding the kosher of a mitzvah, we saw that, at least according to the Rambam's method, all of this can be said only where the Torah itself commands the making of kosher. And what about the kosher of the hafza? It is possible to say here too that only the kosher of the hafza written in the Torah will be considered part of the hafza itself. But in truth, this is not necessary.

First, there is a fundamental difference between optional kashrut and mitzvah kashrut, since with regard to the mitzvot of the Rambam's system (in the second root), only what is written in the Torah for the Hadith can be considered a mitzvah from the Torah. Even a halacha that is taught in a midrash according to his system is not considered a mitzvah (see ibid.). In any case, it is clear that even optional kashrut cannot be considered an obligation from the Torah if it is not explicitly stated in the Torah. But with regard to optional kashrut, there is no such necessity, since there we did not find a distinction between what is written in the Torah and what is not written in it, although perhaps there is reason to believe that this would be the case.

Let us explain this briefly. Ostensibly, the matter depends on the question of whether the words of the sages were spoken in a haphazard or a haphazard manner (see Athwan Dauritha Rule 10 and many more). It is still worth discussing, even if the words of the sages were spoken in the spirit (they do not have the power to renew reality), perhaps their sermons are according to the Torah, which is arbitrary and not according to the rabbis, or perhaps this is not the case (especially according to the Maimonides' method in the second root, sermons are like the words of scribes).

It is important to understand that the law of the sides of the Gemara in Sukkah 6b is studied by the Midrash and the LBM (which is based on two and is based on the Tafach). And the Rambam's method is that the LBM is also according to the words of the scribes.[7] Therefore, it is necessary to discuss whether the law of the walls is kosher as written in the Torah or whether it is like unwritten kosher (because it is learned from a seminary), and then the possibility of seeing it as part of the sukkah's hafza depends on the question of whether it is written in the Torah to say yes or no.

[1] The laws of the material and the method of construction are stated only on the thatch. The invalidity of a stolen sukkah is not explicitly stated whether it is also stated on the sides. The same applies to "make it and not from what is made."

[2] See Or Israel For the R.I.S., the article "Law and Justice" what he learned from this is to study Torah in order to know and not in order to observe.

[3] See also Yerushalmi Berakhot (P. 152) and Yerushalmi Shabbat (P. 152), where it is stated that the Rashbi would not stop studying the Talmud even to fulfill a mitzvot. Regarding this, the Yerushalmi asks: "And not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai who stops building a sukkah and making a lulav." From this too, we can learn that this question is according to the Yerushalmi, that the mitzvah is building a sukkah. However, the commentators there explain that the intention is to sit in a sukkah.

And see the response. Tribe of Levi, Ch. C. S.D., which is divided intoIn the name of Jehovah In understanding the Jerusalemite.

[4] As you know, the questions in the Responsorial Psalm Terumah"d They are the author's own.

[5] on1944 There is a caveat that this is because it is not possible in another matter (see Hagiga 2). At first glance, it seems that only in the 23rd century is the kosher of the mitzvah as the mitzvah itself. However, it seems that his intention is that only necessary steps are considered in the general kosher of the mitzvah, but the kosher of the mitzvah is always considered part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah itself.

Some have explained that this law is valid on the eve of Shabbat because already at the time of the regulation, the Sages knew that every Chanukah there would also be at least one Shabbat, and the regulation on the eve of Shabbat was in advance based on this. Therefore, on the eve of Shabbat, this is the actual time for fulfilling the mitzvah, since the original regulation was amended so that on the eve of Shabbat, the time is before sunset. It is true that, by the very law that blessings are recited upon lighting the lamp in the name of God, it is not possible to prove that the mitzvah has a status, since it can also be explained in this way, but in the language of the1944 It is clear that this is not what he is aiming for, but as we said above. And see all this inAnciT On 'Hanukkah'.

[6] Although according to this, it is unclear why the other prohibitions of the thatch do not apply to the sides due to the same narrowing. And the Tz'al says that the law of holiness applies to everything that belongs to the sukkah's contents, while the other prohibitions pertain only primarily to the sukkah, which is the thatch. Of course, each of them must be discussed separately, and I will conclude with the Tz'al.

[7] We will not go into all this here. See more about it in detail in my book The Spirit of Justice.