Shaari Giyor – On Violence and Good Intentions

With God’s help

Advances – 2011

More on the Renewed Conversion Controversy

(Following the article by Rabbi Yehuda Brandes, Akademo 21)

introduction

In his article, Rabbi Brandes describes the recent controversy over conversion, and there he addresses its roots. He begins with a very important distinction between the concern for the honor of a scholar (Rabbi Druckman) and the substantive debate on the issue of conversion itself. As I wrote in another article,[1] Indeed, the public debate on both aspects is lacking in distinction, and we generally do not hear the opinion of religious Zionist rabbis on the issue itself. This deafening silence (which is even more evident and felt in the face of the letters of protest that deal with the honor of Rabbi Druckman) suggests that on the substantive issue itself, Rabbi Druckman's position probably does not have many supporters.

Rabbi Brands' words

Addressing the substantive issue, Rabbi Brandes cites the position of the High Court judge, Rabbi Sherman, according to which the method that requires the acceptance of a complete commandment as a necessary condition for the validity of conversion is the exclusive position in halakhah. Rabbi Brandes compliments Rabbi Sherman's courage in expressing his position with great firmness, but claims that he finds no integrity or fairness in his words. Rabbi Brandes claims that there is a dispute regarding this aspect of the conversion process, and there are several respected poskim, including from previous generations, who have adopted Rabbi Druckman's method and waived the acceptance of a complete commandment as a condition for conversion.

There is a whole spectrum of such moderate halachic positions. Note 5 in the article mentions the book by Zvi Zohar and Avi Sagi, Conversion and Jewish Identity, which expresses the most extreme position, according to which there is no need at all to accept a commandment as a condition for the validity of conversion. Zvi Zohar reiterated this in an article he published even before the current controversy arose in the journal Another country, Issue 17, 2003. Just for illustration, we will present the quote in the subtitle of the article (p. 38):

The widespread perception that the court prosecuting a convert should be interested in the convert's motives and whether he will keep a commandment in the future has almost no basis in halakhic law. This is a halakhic innovation from the late 19th century, caused by rabbinical fears of secularization in Europe.

There are also intermediate approaches that are mentioned more in Rabbi Brandes's words, which do not require full acceptance of the commandment, but only partial (to one degree or another). All of these stand in contrast to Rabbi Sherman's claim that such halachic positions exist.

Although the conversion courts apparently assume that the requirement is full observance of the mitzvot, and therefore officially they set this as a condition for the converts. However, they learn how to speak properly before the judges of these courts, and the judges themselves turn a blind eye to the "clear estimate" regarding the majority of the converts (which they know well) that they do not intend to observe the mitzvot, and thus these conversions are made with a "wink."

Rabbi Brandes shares Rabbi Sherman's criticism of "wink conversions," as they involve blasphemy and the humiliation of the process, but in his opinion the solution is to establish a state-run conversion process to purely "Israelite" (and not to religious Judaism). In his reasoning, he says that in the past, full acceptance of mitzvot was required because the organizational framework of the Jewish people was based on the observance of mitzvot, but even then, observance of mitzvot was only an indication of joining the Jewish people. Since the situation is different today, in his opinion, one should convert to "non-religious Israeliness," meaning that conversion should be seen as a process of joining the Jewish people in a format that suits its organizational frameworks today, and observance of mitzvot is no longer the correct measure for this.

Rabbi Brands therefore recommends creating a conversion process that requires the observance of several main commandments, which would be integrated into a traditional lifestyle. Such a conversion would be more popular with immigrants, would reduce the blasphemy and deceit in the process, and would be more honest and straightforward than conversion as it is conducted today. Ultimately, it would also be a worthy addition to the Jewish people, even if not in the religious sense that was accepted in the past.

Rabbi Brandes claims that continuing the current policy or adopting the Haredi policy will lead to the formation of separate classes in the Jewish people whose members will not be able to marry each other, thus creating an extremely serious social problem. He concludes his remarks by saying that this is a test of the state rulings of the rabbis of Religious Zionism, which until now have not been able to oppose the Haredi dictates in this area either. In any case, not changing the policy will lead to the failure of the state path outlined by the rabbinical leadership of Religious Zionism in the past.

Is there really a legal opinion that states that one can waive the acceptance of a commandment upon conversion?

My first argument concerns the most extreme opinion on the moderate spectrum, that of Zohar and Sagya. Their position does not exist at all in Halacha. I am not aware of any poskim, from the Sages to the present day, who is willing to completely waive the acceptance of mitzvot as a condition for conversion. It is not for nothing that the "state" poskim also need the "wink" conversions, since they too are not willing to waive the acceptance of mitzvot (at least the official one) as a condition for the validity of conversion.

The quote from Zvi Zohar cited above indicates ignorance. The sources for accepting mitzvot as an essential part of conversion are found in their dozens throughout halakhic literature, starting with the time of the Sages. And, indeed, this is not a question of one interpretation or another, but facts that any beginning student who opens a halakhic and Talmudic book sees. In any case, it is clear that the presentation as if this is a 19th century invention is nothing more than a distortion.

Furthermore, even in the sources where this requirement does not appear, this does not mean that receiving a commandment is not essential in the conversion process. On the contrary, its absence indicates that the matter is so simple and basic that there is no need to mention it at all. For example, if someone searches for aTable set In the laws of purchasers, there is no explicit requirement that the donor and the buyer must intend to acquire or buy the object. Can we conclude from this that this requirement does not exist, or that it does not hinder the acquisition? Of course not.[2] The intention to acquire the object is the essence of ownership, and this is the basic premise of the law that transactions require intention. The actions are nothing more than an expression of this intention.[3] So, why is this requirement not mentioned? Simply because it is the body and heart of the act of ownership. The halakha discusses a person who wants to acquire or buy something, and deals with the question of what he must do to realize his desire. From this it is clear that there is no logic in presenting a halakhic requirement that a person have the intention to acquire, since all these halakhas deal solely with a person who has such an intention. The function of the halakha is to guide him on how to put this into practice.

The same is true for conversion. The essence of conversion according to the poskim, most of them, is the acceptance of the mitzvot, and the actions that accompany it are supposed to express and create it. The halakhic discussion naturally deals only with these actions, and not with intentions. By analogy with the question of the owners, it is also said here that the halakhic guidance guides those who want to accept the burden of Torah and mitzvot on how they can do so. It does not instruct us to want to accept the burden of the mitzvot, and there is no need for them to do so.

What is controversial anyway?

Indeed, one can find arguments regarding the necessity of an explicit verbal act that expresses the convert's intention to accept a commandment, in the conversion process. Although not all poskim agree that such an act requires and delays the conversion process (although this discussion is taking place long before the 19th century, of course). But this is about things that the convert should say with his mouth, and not about what should be in his heart. Those poskim who believe that there is no need for explicit acceptance of a commandment do not mean to say that there is no need for intention and desire on the part of the convert, but rather that there is no need for a verbal expression, an explicit expression of this desire.

Another debate is whether the convert needs to be aware of the full scope of the mitzvot that will be imposed on him as a Jew or not. Several poskim allow the convert to accept a partial mitzvot, as long as it is clear that the convert accepts the burden of a mitzvot, but he lacks information. If he does not know that he is forbidden to hunt on Shabbat, or does not know about the prohibition of slander, this is not necessarily a flaw in the conversion process. But if the convert announces in advance that he will not accept one or another mitzvah, to the best of my understanding all poskim agree that the conversion is not valid.

Changing circumstances over generations

It is important to understand another fact that stands in the background of the discussion. Throughout the generations, when a Gentile came to convert (with the exception of marital conversions, which I will discuss below), the rabbis had no reason to think that his intentions were not serious. After all, with his conversion, he entered a life of suffering, discrimination, and constant persecution (and sometimes even danger to life), and precisely because of this it was clear that such a convert intended to join the congregation of God's servants. Anyone who did so for a non-material reason was almost insane (we are also supposed to verify this, by informing him that Israel at this time was adrift and scattered among the nations, etc.). However, today, many of the converts came to the land, and even to the conversion studio, for various reasons. Some of them do so in order to integrate well and comfortably into Jewish society in the land, and others perhaps simply for immigrant rights. We have no indication that their intention was to keep the commandments and worship God.

Therefore, the assumption that every convert comes from pure motives is what has caused some rabbis to claim that there is no need to examine his motives (at most, converts should be informed of some of the mitzvot, so that they understand that they are accepting the burden of some mitzvot). This is not a halakhic approach according to which accepting the mitzvot is not necessary, but rather a realistic assessment that in practice there is no need to examine it. As mentioned, in the past there was a clear presumption that the convert did indeed come to fulfill the mitzvot, but such a presumption no longer exists today.

Therefore, whatever our opinion is on conversion to Israeliteness, or on joining the Jewish people without receiving a commandment, one thing is clear: the opinions of the poskim who waive these tests are irrelevant to the discussion. No evidence can be brought from them in any direction. The same is true regarding the acceptance of an incomplete commandment. The waiver of the acceptance of a complete commandment does not stem from the fact that it is not necessary, but from the assessment that if the immigrant accepts what he knows, he is presumed to also fulfill what he adds and learns afterwards. Therefore, all precedents are irrelevant to our discussion.

Marriage conversions

Another type of precedent that comes up in Rabbi Brandes' words is conversions for marriage, or conversions out of one interest or another that were accepted by various poskim throughout the generations. But here too, there is a disregard for the distinction presented above. When those poskim accepted converts, male or female, for the sake of marriage, they certainly did not renounce the acceptance of the commandments. At most, they understood that the acceptance of the commandments here is not done out of love for God but out of a desire to marry Jews. But the assessment was that this conversion definitely involves the acceptance of the commandments.

This is similar to the well-known halachic issue of "Taliyohu ve Zabin" (see Bavli Baba Batra 15-16, and in the commentators there), which deals with a person who was coerced by threats to sell some object. The law is that the sale is valid. The accepted explanation for this (see Rambam, Laws of Sale, 10, 1, and more) is that he does indeed have a desire to sell, even though this desire is fueled mainly by the fact that he does not want to suffer. The bottom line here was a desire to sell, and therefore the sale is valid.

The same is true for those who come to convert for the sake of marriage. The assumption throughout the generations was that Judaism means observance of the commandments. No one challenged this basic definition, even if not everyone observed minor or serious commandments. Therefore, the converting judges assumed that even if the converts came out of another interest, they would probably join the Jewish people and even observe the commandments, but they would do so out of compulsion (since this is what would allow them to live with Jewish partners). For most poskim, such a procedure is valid retrospectively, but not because the acceptance of the commandments is unimportant. Its validity stems from the fact that de facto there is an actual acceptance of the commandments here, but not from the proper motives. This is precisely why the halakha states that initially one should not convert in such a situation.

What Rabbi Brandes proposes is something else. In his opinion, if someone comes to convert out of some interest (joining a nation, wanting to marry, immigrant rights, etc.), we must forego accepting the mitzvot during the conversion process. The fact that today many converts and the Jewish public do not at all identify Judaism with halakhic obligations does not help this argument, and moreover, it only raises the problematic issues here. After all, we can no longer claim that even if the convert does so out of interest, he will keep the mitzvot (but not from the proper motives). Now the reasonable assessment is that he will not keep the mitzvot at all, since he never thought of doing so. If so, it is precisely the change in circumstances that Rabbi Brandes describes that is the most important reason not to forego accepting the mitzvot (certainly in his heart, but also in his mouth) during the conversion process.

I was quite surprised to discover the argument I wrote here with an important umpire, who is certainly not suspected of a lack of statesmanship, or of a lack of vision and courage. To do this, I only had to flip a few pages forward in that issue of entree And read the quote that Rabbi Benny Lau brings from Rabbi Herzog's response (see ibid., p. 103):

And know that although the law has been in place since the days of the Tanach, in which in retrospect everyone is a gentile, I have a serious concern about this, since in the past in Israel, the offender was despised and persecuted by his people, and therefore when a gentile accepted Judaism, even though the first reason that motivated him to do so was his own, he knew that his situation would be very bad in Jewish society if he did not behave according to the Torah. However, in our day, there are so many free people, and not only do they not have any difficulty because of this, but they even stand at the head of the nation and the communities, and therefore one has to feel that we do not really accept that he must keep the commandments, but because of the reason, he says to his face, but his heart is not with him… and therefore today the greatest responsibility falls on the rabbi to observe each case until his mind is settled on whether these people will truly keep our holy religion.[4]

Rabbi Herzog points out several important elements here:

1. There is no conversion without accepting the commandments (in the heart). What Sagi and Zohar call "the new invention of the 19th century" is a self-evident assumption in his eyes.
2. In the past, there were judges who accepted converts even without a declaration, and they certainly did not annul the conversion retroactively.
3. Marriage conversions were accepted only because, even if they were made for these reasons, the reasonable assessment of the judges was that they entailed a de facto acceptance of the commandments.
4. Precisely at this time, when there is no persecution of converts by Gentiles, and certainly no persecution by Jews if the convert does not observe a commandment, there is room to tighten the criteria.

It is important to understand that the tightening of the criteria proposed by Rabbi Herzog is not done here as an after-the-fact defense against trespassers, but rather as a matter of principle, for exactly the reason I wrote above. Therefore, even in the field of marital conversions, all sources from the past are irrelevant to the debate. This consideration is heard here from a scholar who was one of the fathers of state jurisprudence in religious Zionism, which Rabbi Brandes misses in his words.

What are marital conversions according to Rabbi Brandes' proposal?

By all accounts, even those who believe that conversion for the sake of marriage is valid retroactively agree that it is not appropriate to do so in the first place. As far as I understand the conversation, Rabbi Brandes and Zvi Zohar do not disagree on this. If so, why is conversion for the sake of marriage in the State of Israel better? Alternatively, what kind of conversion should not be accepted according to Rabbi Brandes' proposal? Is there any conversion that is not appropriate to do in the first place? Anyone who wants to convert, by definition, wants to enter the Jewish nation. And certainly anyone who wants to marry a Jewish woman, and is prepared to enter the Jewish nation for this purpose, is strictly living according to this proposal! Is there a state of belonging to the Jewish nation more than the desire to marry a Jewish woman and live among her brothers? According to Rabbi Brandes' proposal, anyone who converts for the sake of marriage was supposed to be welcomed with open arms (after all, this also prevents mixed marriages). So, why didn't the poskim throughout the generations think so? Why didn't they allow this in the first place (or at most in retrospect)?

We will examine how Rabbi Brandes proposes to interpret the sources that prohibit the conversion of wives from the outset. It seems that in his opinion this is only a pathological situation in which a man wants to marry a Jewish woman, but is not willing to live among Jews and as part of the Jewish nation. Nevertheless, the woman insists that he undergo a conversion process, and that unfortunate man is forced to agree to it against his will out of deep hatred for the people of Israel (also in the national sense, not just the religious sense, of course). As far as I understand from his words, this almost fictional case was discussed by all the poskim who dealt with the conversion of wives. Is this reasonable?

On conversion to nationalism without religion

On a theoretical-interpretive level, Rabbi Brandes' main argument is that, in principle, conversion is not the acceptance of a commandment but rather joining the Jewish people. Although in the past this joining involved the acceptance of full commandments, this was only an indication of joining the Jewish nation. But today, due to a change in the organizational framework of the Jewish community, the situation is different.

The debate on this issue is arising today because in recent generations an alternative has emerged that proposes defining Judaism in a purely national sense, without regard to religion and commandments. Therefore, the question arises whether it is possible to convert someone on a national level, without the halakhic level, i.e., to forgo the full observance of the commandments as a criterion, and focus only on the essence (i.e., the desire to join the nation).

It is important to understand that even if commitment to Torah and commandments is seen only as an indication of national affiliation, that is, not a requirement that stands on its own (and perhaps there are thinkers who have seen it this way), this does not mean that this criterion is not necessary, or that it is subject to change. There is certainly room to say that our nation is not a nation except in its Torah, and therefore it is an essential characteristic. It is impossible to join a nation without joining a religion, although it is true that those who are already inside are not thrown out even if they are raised in their obligations.

Furthermore, this definition of the conversion process does not meet the requirement of continuity. It is quite clear that it contradicts all the halakhic concepts that prevailed in the past and also the opinion of all the important jurists today (regardless of worldview). Therefore, there is no doubt that the burden of proof is on whoever claims this. Specifically, he must prove two claims: 1. That this is indeed the concept in understanding the conversion process. 2. That the indication of the fulfillment of a commandment can be waived (i.e., it is not necessary). These are two strong claims, and I did not see in Rabbi Brands' words evidence for either of them. As I showed above, all the precedents of their types that are presented in this discussion (marital conversions, the waiver that allows the acceptance of some of the commandments, or the waiver of the declaration of acceptance of the commandments) do not serve as evidence for either of these two claims.

Between Jews by birth and converts

Rabbi Brandes's remarks are based on the fact that the majority of the Jewish public has no connection to observing the mitzvot (certainly not in the religious sense), yet is considered a full-fledged Jew. Therefore, it is difficult to demand that converts meet higher standards than those held by the public that absorbs them.

But here too I disagree with the claim. There is a difference between the demands placed on someone who comes to "join the club" and the demands placed on someone who is already a member. Everyone understands that an Israeli citizen who engages in crime all his life does not thereby lose his citizenship, and at the same time it is clear to any reasonable person that a convicted criminal who wants to join and become a citizen will not be welcomed in any country. A brother or son who commits a crime is still a brother or son, but I would not usually voluntarily associate with a criminal, even if he expressed a desire to do so.[5]

On state rulings and national responsibility

It is not for nothing that most religious Zionist rabbis do not propose changing the conversion process and its criteria (even though this process leads them and us to the distortion and desecration of the name involved in the "wink" conversion process), since the state ruling to which they are committed (and I personally oppose it)[6]) holds exactly the opposite of what Rabbi Brandes proposes. It requires that nationalism not contradict halakhic commitment, since the religious-Zionist view – contrary to my view – even sees some identity between the two.

In passing, I would like to say that I do not understand why considerations of national and pan-Israeli responsibility lead anyone to the conclusion that the conversion process should be made easier. I understand the fear that two peoples will be created here, with separate Jewish registrations for each group and the prevention of intermarriage between the groups. But the "responsible" policy that Rabbi Brandes proposes is itself creating such a situation, already today. The conversions of this system are not acceptable in the Haredi world, and not only in it. Isn't this creating double registrations and preventing intermarriage between groups in the Jewish people? Where is the pan-Israeli responsibility in that direction? Are only the Haredi and Halacha obliged to compromise, but should nothing be demanded of the secular?

Inconsistency in the logic underlying the proposal

If it is indeed a matter of conversion to Israeliness and the process being disconnected from the indication of the acceptance of mitzvot that was relevant only in the past, I would expect that the procedure proposed by Rabbi Brandes would not refer to the observance of mitzvot at all. The convert would declare that he wishes to join the Jewish nation, and would be accepted even if he informed the committee that he had no interest or intention in observing any mitzvah, nor of leading a traditional lifestyle. I fail to understand, especially in light of his remarks above, why such halachic requirements seem appropriate to Rabbi Brandes for conversion to Israeliness. Does a convert who does not want to observe mitzvot not intend to join the people of Israel? Why not convert him as well?

And one must also ask: Does the average Israeli actually have these characteristics (observes certain commandments and leads a traditional lifestyle)? Apart from my general methodology on the matter,[7] I don't know if there is a large and important group of Jews in Israel (and abroad) who do not observe any mitzvah beyond what is reasonably wrong (i.e. only moral matters). So what is the ruling on someone who wants to belong to this group? Why not allow them to join the Jewish nation?

And in general, should such a conversion be conducted by courts and rabbis? And why is circumcision and baptism necessary? Don't all these requirements, which even Rabbi Brands does not propose to waive, prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that conversion has a distinct religious dimension that cannot be waived?

And from another angle. Rabbi Brandes himself (pp. 91-92) explains that the recent poskim (including religious Zionists) who disallowed conversions that did not include the acceptance of mitzvot were directing their remarks against Reform conversions, and not from a perception that full acceptance of mitzvot is really required. The question that arises is of course this: Why would that same consideration not disallow his own proposal? After all, it is very similar to theirs. Rabbi Brandes claims that the difference between Reform conversion and the conversion he proposes is that the Reformers uproot the system of mitzvot. So, doesn't their conversion confirm a desire to join the Jewish nation? Doesn't his own proposal uproot the halakhic dimension from conversion? Will an average convert keep more mitzvot than a Reform Jew? Again, there is an incomprehensible duality here, which on the one hand tries to adhere to the traditional line of mitzvot observance, and on the other hand proposes to give it up outright.

The logic of the proposal as a way of compromise

In light of this inconsistency, I do not understand whether Rabbi Brands sees his proposal for conversion as a good one in principle (in our current circumstances), or whether he is proposing a halakhic compromise that is supposed to solve problems. So far, I have argued against the validity of the proposal as an interpretation of the conversion process in principle. But even as a compromise, I do not see the logic in it. First, it is not valid from a halakhic perspective, and therefore there is no possibility of compromise here. Second, even from a tactical perspective, the logic underlying it is not clear to me.

It seems that Rabbi Brandes' proposal is based on the perception that Halacha serves the national idea and Jewish society in Israel. It is nothing more than a Zionist instrument, a tool from the toolbox of the Zionist movement. If a social problem arises, then in this case, because of factors that are not at all committed to Halacha, we must flex and change Halacha so as not to harm them and to solve the problems they have created. The Jewish Agency, and like it the government and its institutions, have been bringing here, as a deliberate policy over the years, tens and hundreds of thousands of Gentiles, and now the Halacha establishment must come and clean up the area of the results. The secular public in the country, which is as interested in Halacha as the snow was last year, demands to receive Torah legitimacy without lifting a finger to do so, and the task is upon us to comply with these absurd demands, otherwise we will be accused of causing the social problems that will arise. All this in the name of the sanctity of the destructive Zionist identification between Israeliness and Judaism.

This is an opening for the continuation of unilateral dictates by the state, and their imposition on halakhic law. We are expected to support every step the state authorities take, so that they can continue to do whatever they want without hindrance. Instead of letting the public deal with the consequences of the actions of its representatives, the rabbinical and halakhic establishment is supposed to sweep up and clean up the destruction they are sowing. This is a proven recipe for there to be no end to these actions.

Between citizenship and conversion

The necessary step in light of the situation that Rabbi Brandes describes, a step that I strongly support, is the separation of religion and state. An Israeli naturalization process must be defined, which will not be carried out by rabbis but by some public committees. This naturalization process aims to turn an outsider into an Israeli citizen, just as many other countries define themselves, but it is certainly not conversion.[8]

The naturalization process will have to be accepted by general Israeli civil consensus, and religious Judaism will be a part of it, but nothing more. Conversion must be left in the realm of halakhah to the halakhah experts, as it has always been. The correct and straightforward solution to the current problematic is not to empty the conversion process of its religious content, but to separate the civil procedures from the religious ones. An agreed-upon civil conversion process must be created, the products of which will not be Jews but Israelis. Even if religious Zionism does not fare well, burying one's head in the sand, or distorting halakhah and making it a plaster cast, will not change the situation.[9]

Retroactive cancellation of conversion

As stated, a clear distinction must be made between the criteria for the validity of a conversion and the possibility of its retroactive annulment. If it is indeed clear that at the time of conversion there was no intention to receive a commandment, almost all poskim (regardless of their political-ideological worldview) agree that the conversion is also retroactively invalid.[10] The big question, of course, is when can we know (if at all) what was in the heart of the convert. Rabbi Brandes did not address this question, and I touch on it only to complete the discussion.

This question is a difficult debate, and has sides here and there. It is clear that the real situation is that most converts (not all, of course) do not truly intend to keep the commandments, and this is clear to everyone already at the time of conversion. Many cite the words of the Maimonides in Hilchot Issurei Be'a, 3:17, that even if the convert transgressed against serious prohibitions after conversion, since he was circumcised and baptized – he is excluded from the rule of the uncircumcised, and his sanctifications are sanctifications, and so on. But even in this context, one must remember the reality and circumstances that generally prevailed in the past. In all generations, when a person converted – the reasonable assessment was that even if he did so for the sake of marriage, it turns out that he would keep the commandments. Therefore, even if he commits transgressions after conversion, it is still possible that at the time of conversion he did not intend to do so. When the Sages saw phenomena that occur after conversion, they did not necessarily conclude from them that this was also the intention at the time of conversion, and therefore he should not be disqualified retroactively. Here the rule "things in the heart are not things" applies. If the convert declared that he was doing so in order to receive a commandment, what is in his heart cannot change his status, unless there is clear evidence that this was not his intention at the time of conversion.

However, as stated above, the situation in our time is different, and this assessment no longer exists. Today, if we see that the same person is not observant of the commandments, the simple assumption is (although it is not certain, of course) that he never intended to observe the commandments. Therefore, even these unequivocal words of the Maimonides do not constitute evidence for the subject under discussion. This is another implication of the distinction in the change of circumstances that I presented above, and this time also with regard to the retroactive cancellation of conversion.

In general, I would like to say that my personal opinion is that it is impossible to annul a court action if we do not have clear evidence that it was flawed from the start (not just a flaw regarding the overall policy, which certainly exists here). But the point I wanted to make here is the lack of relevance of the discussion even on the halakhic level. For some reason, the halakhic arguments that are presented to justify this approach are some of them extremely shaky (and I am expressing myself in a gentle manner), and yet they are repeated and cited as the halakhic basis for the lenient approach without any comment or challenge to their validity. Rabbi Daychovsky, an important judge who also served on the High Rabbinate, who is known to hold a more lenient approach to the issues before us,[11] In a ruling he wrote on this subject, he cites two pieces of evidence that a conversion should not be retroactively annulled.[12] These words are used as a basis for an approach that denies the possibility of retroactively canceling conversions, although in my humble opinion, with the forgiveness of Rabbi Dychovsky, there is no substance in them.

Rabbi Daychovsky argues that in the matter of conversion, things in the heart are not things – even if there is clear evidence that this is indeed what was in the heart of the convert. One piece of evidence he brings is from the issue of Sanhedrin 37, where the Gemara states that in the law of souls it is impossible to accept circumstantial evidence (“estimated”), no matter how clear it may be, but only witnesses who are based on direct evidence. There, we are really talking about unequivocal circumstantial evidence (Reuven, with a sword in his hand, ran after Shimon and followed him into the ruins. Reuven emerges from the ruins and blood drips from the sword, and Shimon is found dead inside), and the only drawback is that there were no witnesses who saw the murder with their own eyes.

But the connection to the subject matter is very puzzling. In the laws of life, the Maimonides has already extended (see the beginning of chapter 20 of the Sanhedrin Laws) that circumstantial evidence should not be accepted. This is a special requirement in the laws of life, which is apparently learned from verses ("according to two witnesses"). What is the point of learning from this law for the laws of "things in the heart"? Do we learn that someone who does an act and has a clear estimate (i.e., things in his heart and in the heart of every person) of what is in his heart, should not be taken into account? After all, this contradicts all the words of the above-mentioned poskim (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, Raz, 4). If there were a special source for the fact that there is such a law in the laws of foreigners as well - great; but as far as I know, there is no such source. Even in the laws of testimony, regarding the laws of money, the situation is not like this. Circumstantial evidence is useful for the main law (see Rambam, Rosh Chapter 24 of the Laws of the Sanhedrin). If so, why should one study conversions for the purposes of life and not for the purposes of property? Is it said that the conversion process must be carried out before twenty-three judges in attendance, like in the case of life?

The second evidence (or argument) that Rabbi Dychovsky brings is that there are situations in halakha in which presumption creates reality, and therefore also in the case of gerot, when the presumption instructs to treat the ger as a righteous ger, it creates reality instead of the true reality. He brings an example from a situation described in the poskim, where women who were niddah used to wear special clothes, and any woman who wore these clothes was considered to be impure in the impurity of niddah. In such a case, the Ramban writes (see Tur ve Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah, 315), even if she is honest in saying that she did not see blood (and therefore she is not impure), she is obligated to perform a bath. Rabbi Dychovsky brings that according to the Ben Ish Chai, she even recites a blessing over the bath (even though she knows that she is pure, and apparently this is a blessing for nothing). He concludes that the presumption of impurity created by the clothes establishes the reality of impurity, and argues that this should also be the case with conversion.

But the ruling of the Ben Ish Chai is indeed a very puzzling ruling, and certainly no evidence can be brought from it. To the best of my understanding, we have not found anyone who requires a person to recite a blessing in a place that, in his own opinion, is a nullified blessing (and after all, the blessing does not delay purification, so the absence of a blessing does not harm the husband or any other party). The ruling of the Ramban, which is much less than a month, is also not simple at all. If the woman is faithful, why require her to immerse?! But in any case, even if we accept this method, a distinction must be made between her faithfulness to herself and her faithfulness to her husband and the external world.

But even if we accept these laws as clear assumptions, what is the point of discussing this? Is the presumption a substitute for reality from now on? Should we place a hope that we know with certainty to be invalid on the basis of the presumption of kashrut it had in the past? Except in very exceptional cases, presumptions are intended to instruct us how we should act in situations of doubt, and not to replace a reality that we know with certainty.

Furthermore, where is there any presumption in the conversion process that we are discussing here? In the time of the Ramban, there was a presumption that a woman who walked in such clothes was impure, and therefore there was an assumption that, despite her words, she was impure. But with regard to conversion, even if in the time of the Rambam and the time of Chazal there was a presumption that the intention of the convert was for the sake of Heaven, in our day the presumption, if it exists at all, is the opposite. If so, precisely in light of these things, even if there was substance in them, the law should have been that all conversions are invalid by virtue of the presumption that there is no intention here to receive a commandment, which changes reality (the act of conversion). The assessment of what is in the heart of the convert is an assessment of reality and not a law that came down from Sinai, and as such is subject to the discretion of every judge in every generation according to the circumstances.

Conclusion: Is it really just a power struggle?

I wrote above that I do not want to discuss here the disqualification of Rabbi Druckman and the judges with him, nor the rude statements of the members of the High Court. There is no doubt that these statements are inappropriate, and Rabbi Druckman is certainly a learned scholar of many deeds and rights. It is even clearer to me that he does his actions according to his best judgment, for the sake of the Jewish people and for the sake of God, and he certainly does not act out of any self-interest or malicious intent.

However, the picture I described shows that despite the good intentions, the bottom line is that the halakha is being plastered here, relying on precedents that have no substance (and I am talking mainly about the conversion to begin with, and less about the annulment in retrospect). This is presented to the general public as if there is a dispute between two equal parties, and this is very far from the truth. It is hardly surprising that in such a situation, pressure and distress are created, which give rise to inappropriate statements and reactions such as these.

Many see the "Haredi" criticism[13] An expression of irrelevant power struggles of the Haredim with religious Zionism. But this is not true. There is an ideological struggle here that has been waged between different sides over a very serious and painful issue. There is a struggle here, but not against religious Zionism (a struggle that is also legitimate in itself, although not at the expense of people's suffering), but against some extremely problematic fruits that stem from an unreasonable extremism of its perception. As mentioned, to the best of my understanding, most of the poskim (including the religious Zionists) agree with the position of the High Rabbinical Court on the substantive issues, and therefore they are careful only to protest the violation of Rabbi Druckman's honor and do not express themselves on the substantive issues. They may believe that it is appropriate to ease the conversion process for state considerations (sometimes to the point of deceit, and perhaps even a "wink"), but they certainly do not intend impossible simplifications like those made in the conversion courts, and certainly not those proposed by Rabbi Brandes.

The fact, which Rabbi Brandes also notes, that the statements of these dayanim are a departure from everything we have known up to now, in my opinion says exactly the opposite of what he concludes from it. The correct interpretation of these things is that this uprising is not against religious Zionism, and its purpose is not to single out the image of the religious Zionist scholars. I see here an uprising that expresses despair and protest (even if through inappropriate means) against an extremely problematic conversion policy, in which a small minority of scholars and dayanim have risen up, and in the name of responsibility for all of Israel – which they supposedly have a monopoly on – are imposing a very problematic conversion policy on us all, without bothering to create a real general consensus about it.[14] There is an almost violent takeover here (although certainly well-intentioned) of the gateway to the people of Israel, and it is no wonder that it provokes harsh reactions.

To the best of my judgment, the results of this policy will be the opposite of those hoped for by its proponents. I predict that it will encourage the separation between conversion policy and citizenship policy in the State of Israel, and in essence the separation between religion and state. Religious Judaism will understand that state considerations will lead it to completely empty Halacha of its essential content, and will establish its own non-state conversion systems, which will be friendly to the true convert (Ger Tzedek) and Halacha, but not necessarily to Israeli society as a whole. It is important to understand that part of the unfriendliness of the system today stems from the very fact that it imposes norms on the "converts" that they do not want, and therefore they have to hide from it and resort to methods of lies and deceit that lead to blasphemy. Anyone who comes to a private conversion system with honest and genuine intent will be treated with the same force as has been applied to converts ever since, and there is no reason why he should not receive the friendly treatment he deserves.

Such a lenient conversion policy, as well as the heated reactions of the members of the High Court, will ultimately lead to the abolition of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel and even to the abolition of the special conversion courts. This is the little light I can see at the end of this dark tunnel.

[1]        See First source, Musaf Shabbat, 24.7.2008. The article was written in response to Shlomo Fisher's article ('Emet Hashalom', First source(Shabbat Supplement, July 10, 2008) which will be mentioned below.

[2]        See Mishnah Bava Metzia 10:1, "He saw the offering and fell upon it," and the commentaries there.

[3]        Although some in yeshivot have "investigated" whether the act itself establishes ownership or whether it merely expresses intention, I am not aware of a halachic position that an act without intention is useful in conferring an object. At most, this raises the consideration of "things in the heart are not things," which means that the assumption is that what was in a person's mouth or actions is in his heart.

[4]              Response Isaac Hall, Even HaEzer, Part I, Section 21, 33.

[5]        I do not intend to compare someone who does not observe the commandments to a criminal. See my article on this, 'On the subject of a secular person being caught in a crime', Noon, 25, April 2006, p. 9.

[6]        See my articles "'The Third Way' or: On "Religious Zionism" Without a Hyphen", Noon, 22, Tammuz 5765, p. 131.

[7]        See my aforementioned article, 'Concerning the Fall of a Secular Person in a Transgression' (above, note 5), where I stated that there is no religious or halakhic significance to observing a mitzvot that is not out of faith in the giving of the Torah at Sinai.

[8]        See Nadav Shnerb's article, 'My people, my people, the trap of Israeli identity in the conversion crisis', point, 313, Av 5768, which emphasized the absurdity of the very idea of "conversion" to citizenship in the national sense, not necessarily in Judaism. See there at the end of Chapter 3.

[9]        See the articles "The Third Way" (above, note 6).

[10]       These poskim include Rabbi Kook, Rabbi Feinstein, Rabbi Auerbach, and many other poskim who are certainly not considered fossilized poskim or lacking a national and pan-Israeli perspective. See some sources in Shnerv's aforementioned article.

[11]       Although I don't think he expressed support for Rabbi Druckman's policy. His quoted remarks all deal with the question of retroactively canceling immigration.

[12]       I heard him bring these two pieces of evidence (and only them) in a lecture he gave on this subject at a conference at Bar-Ilan University (mentioned in the above articles).First source), and the words were repeated and quoted in Shlomo Fisher's article (to which I responded there). The words are very puzzling to me, and therefore I asked the Torah scholars who attended that lecture if I misunderstood them, and in their opinion there is no substance to the words either.

[13]       By the way, as I was told, it is simply not factually correct that the judges who participated in the above ruling are all Haredi.

[14]       Even if it is difficult to create a general rabbinical consensus, at least there was room for creating a partial consensus. And this certainly does not justify a forceful takeover. Ridiculous actions such as the establishment of the 'Sanhedrin', which also stem from despair over the functioning of the rabbinical establishment (which I also share), are suitable for small children, not for real scholars of Torah.

It must be remembered that the establishment of a Sanhedrin, and like it a policy of conversion, are not the business of the individual. These are public actions that have important implications for all of us, and therefore they must be done with broad general agreement. It is impossible for someone who thinks he knows what to do, and all the other leaders are not functioning – even if he is right about that – to act as if all of Israel is his private property.