Regarding the conviction of a secular person for an offense

Noon – 5766

Rabbi Michael Avraham

The failure of a non-observant Jew to commit a crime is a very topical issue that arises in several contexts. It is of course related to the question of attitudes toward secular people in general, but not only to them.

The accepted assumption is that there is a clear prohibition against tripping a secular Jew. For example, many people are careful when crossing the road on Shabbat, so as not to cause the driver to stop, thereby violating the prohibition of turning on their stop lights.

There are several responsa (see, for example, Minchat Shlomo 1:33; Igrot Moshe 1:13) that deal with treating a secular guest to food, even if he does not recite a blessing. There, the question is different, as there is a side that is lenient because of the blasphemy and hatred of religion (or religious people) that can arise due to such behavior, Isa.

There are several references to holding a bar mitzvah for secular people, which usually involves desecrating their own Sabbath and that of their guests (see, for example, the articles of Rabbi Ronen Lubitz, Tzohar 20, Rabbi Eliezer Simcha Weiss, Techumin 19, and Rabbi Yona Fodor, Techumin 18). These discussions deal with the question of his failing for his own sake, since failing may bring him closer to a life of Torah and mitzvot, and enhance his Jewish identity. The same is true of inviting secular people to synagogues, which involves traveling on Shabbat.[1].

As stated, the basic premise of all the clarifications is that the prohibition of 'before the blind' also applies to secular people, and the discussions revolve mainly around questions concerning the limits of the prohibition of 'before the blind', and their application in these cases.[2].

Reading these references gives rise to an intuitive unease. We ignore the fact that we are dealing here with a person for whom commandments and transgressions are not part of his world. My feeling is that the stumbling of a secular Jew into transgression should be discussed on a more fundamental and deeper level than the boundaries of the prohibition 'before the blind'. My initial intuition is that a secular person is not at all transgressive, and therefore his stumbling should be examined not only in terms of the question of whether the stumbling commits a transgression, but also in terms of the question of whether he can be stumbling at all. Can a secular person even commit transgressions?

The discussion involves addressing several serious issues in halakhic law. Due to the brevity of the platform and the breadth of the discussion, I will not be able to do so in detail, and therefore I will content myself with proposing a possible path based on reasonable assumptions (although not always agreed upon, and certainly not necessary). My goal here is not to prove my claims, but rather to attempt to show their possibility according to halakhic law. Or in another way: to find a halakhic rationalization for the above initial intuitions. The approach proposed here is not common among poskim, but it is Torah and we need to study it.[3].

A. The starting point: the prohibition 'before the blind'

The Torah forbids us from causing another person to stumble in a transgression, as it is written: “And you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind.” The prohibition also applies to the children of Noah.

The prohibition of 'before a blind man' deals with a stumbling block. The basis of the prohibition is not that the other person committed a transgression, since this is forbidden in the Torah in the context of the transgression in question. The basis of the law of 'before a blind man' is that if I have caused someone to stumble in a transgression, I myself have transgressed a prohibition. Let us illustrate the points: Some of the jurists wrote that a person does not transgress 'before a blind man' if the stumbling was done verbally.[4]In such a case, the exemption does not stem from the fact that the offense may not be committed, but rather it is a formal exemption for the one who obstructs. The one who obstructs will be completely forbidden, since the offense will be committed. My causing and responsibility for the offense is also clear. Nevertheless, there is a side among the jurists that the one who obstructs will be exempt. They argue that the prohibition 'before a blind man' is a prohibition for the one who obstructs, and it does not necessarily depend on the question of whether the one who obstructed committed or not.

Although beyond the formal boundaries of 'before a blind man', it is clear that such a person caused an offense to occur. Therefore, it must be made more severe because of 'afrashi mai'sura'[5], even if I have a formal exemption from the 'before blind' rule.

Another note on the matter of 'before a blind man': In certain cases, the halakhic guidance regarding wicked people is: "Fight him for wickedness and he will die." Some have written that he must be made to stumble in transgressions so that he 'dies' in his wickedness.[6]. Ostensibly, such an offense 'punches a hole in the ship' of all of us. How is it permissible for a person to cause an offense and the creation of spiritual damage in the world, just because the perpetrator is wicked? Some have argued so because of the law of 'aphroshi mai isura'. Chavat Yair (C. Kamb) wrote about this: "And whoever goes up to my illness for a long time with this - a skilled physician will be called." In any case, the conclusion is that the offense 'before a blind man' is not a consequence of the fact that an offense was committed in the world, but rather is an offense between a person and his fellow man towards the one who has been wronged. For this reason, when there is a wicked person, there is no obligation towards him not to make him wrong.

On the other hand, the latter have already written[7] To prove that the offense of 'in front of a blind man' is an offense that has a dimension between a person and a place, otherwise we would not be obligated to it towards non-Jews (who are not your 'neighbors' at all). From this arises an opposite view, according to which the offense does not create a problem only for the person who commits it, but in the world itself, and therefore we should minimize as much as possible the offenses committed in the world.

If so, it seems that there is a frontal contradiction here in the question of whether the duty is towards the one who is being thwarted or towards God and His world. Ostensibly, the only possible solution is the perception that the thwarting of evil does not cause harm in the world, but only to the evil one himself, and towards whom we are not obligated by the commandments that apply between man and his fellow man. On the other hand, in the case of a righteous person, and even a Gentile, who fulfills his duties, we do indeed have an obligation to prevent harm, if not towards him (since he is not at all 'your neighbor'), then in relation to the spiritual harm to the world itself.

If we are honest, then the conclusion is that the transgressions of a wicked person are not transgressions in relation to the world. He cannot harm the world, but at most harm himself. Why do his actions not harm the world? It is possible that this is in the sense of 'no man forbids anything that is not his.' The Torah does not give a person the power to harm others when he does so intentionally.[8]And I will be happy with this.

C. Is a secular person guilty of an offense?

We have seen that an evil person, although commanded not to commit transgressions, has lost the power to cause spiritual harm to the world. His actions are not a complete transgression. What about a secular person? Our assumption is that he is usually not evil, and therefore, ostensibly, the duty between a person and his fellow man to prevent him from committing transgressions still stands. But here another angle arises.

Maimonides deals with the laws of a resident alien, and writes (2 Kings 8:11):

Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to do them – then he is one of the righteous among the nations of the world, and he has a share in the world to come, and he is the one who accepts them and does them because the Holy One, Blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah, and we were informed by Moses our Rabbi that the sons of Noah were commanded to do them before, but if they do them because of the will of God, then he is not a resident alien and is not one of the righteous among the nations of the world, nor (viii. 13) but one of their sages.

The words of Maimonides indicate that one who observes a mitzvot because of his own conviction, and not because God commanded Moses to observe them at Sinai, is not a resident alien or one of the righteous among the nations, but at most one of their sages. In our language, we say that this person is wise and moral, but his actions are not mitzvot. The essence of the matter is that observing a mitzvot requires a commitment to the Torah from Sinai. Observing a mitzvot in any other way has no religious value, and is probably not considered a religious act at all (an act of mitzvah).

Although Maimonides' words deal with a resident foreigner, some of the latter have also applied his words to a regular Jew.[9]And in explanation, things are simple: It is not appropriate for someone who does not believe in the commandment to fulfill a mitzvah.[10].

Let's look at this from the opposite angle. Maimonides listed the commandment to believe as the first commandment in his list. And some commentators have taken issue with this.[11]: How can one command someone to believe, when faith is a condition for being commanded? Without faith, there is no fulfillment of a mitzvah.

This statement does not concern the disagreement among the poskim about whether mitzvot require intention. Even for the rabbinic authorities, mitzvot do not require intention. This is derived from the fact that a Jew's mitzvah act is apparently done for the sake of a mitzvah. Similarly, some poskim wrote that if there is a contrary intention, or an intention not to go out, then there is really no mitzvah act here, and even for the rabbinic authorities, mitzvot do not require intention.[12].

The conclusion that emerges from this is that a person who does not believe in God and His commandments is not capable of keeping the mitzvot. Although it is necessary to discuss the question of whether it is possible to apply to him the principle that the Gemara brings in Kiddushin regarding a wicked man who sanctified a woman in order to be completely righteous, delaying his Kiddushin because "perhaps he contemplated repentance in his heart." If so, perhaps when he puts on tefillin, a thought of faith passes through him, and his act is considered an act of mitzvah. But apparently, this is an estimate that must withstand the test of probability. If there is no probability that such a thing will happen (in those situations where there is indeed no probability), it is truly difficult to assume that this Sage ruling can be applied to him as a kind of halakhic fiction.

An example of this is the case of a person who is completely alien to religious matters and who is only attending the Torah because his son has become a Bar Mitzvah, or as a type of folkloric ceremony, Jewish culture, etc. In such a case, the matter is nothing more than a blessing in disguise.[13].

Now the question arises as to what the mitzvot do not do. We have seen that a person who does not observe Torah and mitzvot out of detachment is not capable of fulfilling a mitzvot. But wouldn't his transgression also be a transgression? Regarding the mitzvot requiring intention, it seems simple that there is a distinction between doing and not doing, and while doing requires some degree of intention, not doing does not require intention.

But above we divided between the law of mitzvot requiring intention and the one being discussed. Mitzvot requiring intention is a controversy that exists within the world of those who observe the mitzvot. There and only there does one discuss a principle such as "stamma lishma". But in the realm we are dealing with, it seems reasonable to not divide between doer and non-doer: a person who is not capable of performing a mitzvah because God, the Blessed One, and the commandments are not in his world, will also not be capable of transgression. And in the example we gave above: and if Maimonides had appointed a non-believer for someone who does not believe, we would hardly have difficulty in finding a place for appointing such a non-believer? It seems that belief in the mitzvah and its commandments is also required with regard to non-believers.

To remove any doubt, although the matter is simple, I will add that there is certainly an obligation to try and turn the hearts of children back to their fathers, and to "return these erring children in the ways of peace to the firmness of the Torah" (as Maimonides says, 3:3). Our words here are spoken only in relation to the meaning of their actions while they are still in this state of 'erring'.[14].

D. Discussion in light of the imposition of a sin offering for a 'captured infant'

From what we have said so far, it appears that a person who does not believe at all is prohibited from performing acts that have halachic significance, whether a mitzvah or a transgression.

If we wish to examine the halakhic foundations of the matter, we must resort to the laws of 'wicked', 'convert', or 'captured infant.' With regard to wickedness, we have already seen its status above, and we have stated that the ordinary secular person does not fall within the scope of wickedness. With regard to a convert, too[15], it is necessary to discuss the question of whether a secular person in our day has the law of a 'convert' (since here there is no conversion in the national sense, but only in the religious sense, and even in this he is usually considered a rapist and not a regular convert who is referred to as an intentional convert). As stated, ostensibly the secular person found in our day falls within the halakhic bounds of a 'captured infant'. If so, it follows from our words that a 'captured infant' is also not subject to offenses.

However, this claim itself is apparently disputed between Tannaim and Amoraim in Tractate Shabbat (68:1), where Rav and Shmuel disagreed with Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about the ruling on a captured infant regarding the issue of sins for his transgressions.

The opinion of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish is that he is considered a coercion, and therefore is completely exempt from sin. However, the opinion of Rav and Shmuel is that a captive infant is liable for sin for any type of offense he commits.

And here is the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, apparently, exactly as we said above, that a baby who is captured is a rapist, and is not considered a criminal at all. Although the question of whether there is a prohibition in their stumbling must still be discussed, since even stumbling a person into the crime of rape, according to some of the poskim, is a matter of "before the blind."[16]. That is, according to Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, it is not necessary to conclude that there is no prohibition of stumbling into a transgression by a secular person. Although he himself is a fornicator and did not transgress a prohibition, and therefore perhaps there would not be a law of 'aforushi maisura' here, but we ourselves can transgress 'before the blind'.

The NAFKM is in situations where there is no formal prohibition of 'before the blind'. We have seen that in such situations it is still necessary to discuss whether the law of 'aphroshi mai'sura' remains, meaning the obligation to ensure that offenses do not multiply in the world. But with regard to the ruling that there is no offense on the part of the one who is being punished, there is no problem at all.

All of this is said about ordinary rape. However, it is reasonable to distinguish between a captured infant and a rapist. An ordinary person is subject to transgressions, and therefore perhaps even when he commits the offense of rape there is an obstacle here. However, an captured infant is not an ordinary rape. There are no transgressions or commandments for him at all. If so, it is possible that for him, the entire Alma would not have a prohibition "before a blind man," even for systems that have such a prohibition even for the offense of rape.

But all of this is only according to the methods of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. Halacha rules that the Rambam, in accordance with the opinion of Rav and Shmuel (see Halacha Shagagot 2:6, and Ibid. 7:2), states that a captive infant must bring a sin offering for every type of offense he has committed.[17].

Although here we must discuss what the offense they committed was, and this concerns the understanding of the imposition of sins in general. In our opinion, the sin for which the sinning is brought is the ignorance of knowledge. The actual commission of the offense is nothing more than a condition for the imposition. And evidence of this is that when a person commits 100 offenses of the same type in one ignorance, he must bring only one sinning. Why only one sinning? Simply – because the sin is the ignorance of knowledge, but if this is not expressed in practice (no offense was committed), then the ignorance does not require atonement. However, if one offense was committed, it does not mean that the same person committed the same offense several more times. He sins only in his lack of knowledge. The imposition of several sins when several types of offenses are committed in the same ignorance stems from the fact that such a situation is considered several ignorances and not one ignorance.

We will clarify the novelty of our words. It is common to think that there is no obligation for a sin of rape. However, when the sin is unintentional, there is an act of transgression. However, in order to make a sin obligatory for atonement, guilt is required, and the guilt is the lack of knowledge. According to this, the sin is not the unknown, but the act of the transgression. In contrast, according to our words here, the lack of knowledge is the transgression for which a sin is brought. The act of the transgression is required only as a condition for the obligation of the sin.

As mentioned, if the understanding were that the lack of knowledge is only a condition for liability, but that what is required is the act of the offense, we would have to impose a sin penalty for every act of offense.

The exemption in rape apparently stems from the fact that the act committed in rape does not relate to the perpetrator, and in any case the condition for charging sin (that he commit an offense) was not met.[18]And in the case of a baby who is captured, according to Rav and Shmuel, the act does indeed apply to him, but he does not know it. Therefore, such a baby is considered by law to be an accident.[19].

In any case, it emerges from our words that the offense in the case of sins is due to ignorance, and the act of the offense is only a condition for being charged with a sin. Therefore, when a secular person commits a sin, there is no problem with that, even if we trip him up, since his act is not considered a sin at all. As for the obligation to commit a sin, this is brought about by the offense of ignorance, and we did not cause this to happen to him. That person does not know the law in question (like all other laws), and another act of sin by the same ignorant person does not increase or decrease[20].

In conclusion, we should note that we are dealing with offenses such as desecrating the Sabbath, or eating without a blessing, and there is no doubt that every secular person has already committed such offenses thousands of times in his life. Therefore, in the case of a Kahai Gavana, by all accounts, one additional act neither increases nor decreases one's rank.

There was room here for another permissive argument: If a person commits some offense hundreds and thousands of times (such as breaking the Sabbath, or eating without a blessing), one more time has no meaning.[21]Likewise, for someone who is driving on Shabbat, the caution not to go down to the crosswalk so as not to cause him to be stopped, which is an additional prohibition, does not seem logical in the interpretation. Although I have not found an explicit source for this interpretation, except for the puzzling law cited in the poskim regarding 'before a blind person' in the plural in twos.[22].

For example, in the Letters of Moses (Och. Ch. B. 35), the Mahritba (Avoda Zara 14:2) and the Meiri (ibid. 6:1) discussed the issue of selling an animal to a gentile when there is concern that he will be punished, that if he has another animal, there is no prohibition in this. And they asked why there is no prohibition in this, since after all, it causes another prohibition to be committed? And on this they both wrote: "Although it is possible that he (= the obstacle) multiplies the prohibition – they do not consider it." And he saw there other poskim (it seems that this is the great majority of them) from whom it is understood that by multiplying the offense, one does not transgress 'before a blind man'.

And apparently the explanation for this is incomprehensible. After all, he is ultimately tripping him up with a prohibition, and what good would it do if he had committed another prohibition even without it? And in our opinion, things are consistent, since when a person is already engaged in a prohibition, there is no reason to trip him up by adding another prohibition of the same type, and I am a rabbi in this regard.[23].

E. Two additional sources from the Poskim

We will give here two examples from the rulings to support our words:

1. Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch, in Responsa Ovadot ve HaNhagot (p. 358), permitted inviting guests to Shabbat even if they were to travel by car for the purpose. His reasoning was that this does not hinder them, since he is acting in their best interest. He gave the example of a doctor who operates on a patient in order to cure him, but in the process of operating, he harms and injures him. The permission is because the act as a whole is for the patient's benefit, and therefore it is not at all considered a misdemeanor. If so, the same is true in Didan's case, in that causing him to travel on Shabbat is not at all considered a desecration of Shabbat, since it is done in his best interest, and perhaps he will come closer to the firmness of the Torah as a result.

And Rabbi Weiss made it difficult for him in his aforementioned article (in Chapter 3), that after all, traveling is a complete desecration of the Sabbath, and what else can be done to cause a Jew to desecrate the Sabbath, even if it is for his own benefit. And it is not like a doctor who does so for the sake of surgery is not called a traveler at all (and certainly the patient himself agrees to this). On the other hand, with regard to traveling on the Sabbath, the invitation does not make the travel an act that is not a transgression.

Although later in the discussion (Chapter 6) we will present the argument "He violated one Sabbath so that he would keep many Sabbaths," and it seems that we are making such considerations regarding Sabbath desecration. But in the context of the matter under discussion, it is very far from saying so: there is great doubt whether he will come closer to Judaism as a result of this, and to what extent. And how is it permissible to cause him to violate the Sabbath for this purpose? Therefore, Rabbi Weiss rejected his words.[24].

We can also add a difficulty to his words, and say that even if there is indeed no prohibition "before a blind person" here, and the one who obstructs is not a criminal, why is it still permissible for him to help increase crimes in the world, when, on the part of "those who are forbidden from traveling on Shabbat," he is obligated to prevent him from traveling on Shabbat, and certainly not invite him.[25].

However, in light of what we have said here, the things are absolutely correct, and this in several ways: (1) After all, that person's act is not a transgression at all. In any case, there is no fallacy here, and therefore it is incumbent upon us to bring him as close to the Torah as possible. And even if the act is a transgression, he has certainly already traveled on Shabbat many times in the past, if so, he is already obligated to pay a sin offering for that. (2) And beyond that, there are thousands of prohibitions in the travels he makes, and he will probably do so on this Shabbat itself (even if he is not invited, he will travel to other places), so the quantitative consideration we brought above also intervenes here.[26].

The different reasons can lead to different consequences in the case where I invite someone to my house even without trying to bring them closer, but simply out of a desire for a friendly visit, or when there is a fear of desecration of the Name if I do not let them eat without a blessing. According to our reasoning that this is not a stumbling block and not an offense, such an invitation is also permissible. According to Rabbi Sternbuch, it seems that it is forbidden, and only when the invitation is for the benefit of the guest is it permissible. It seems that even when the invitation is intended to prevent desecration of the Name, it is forbidden, since this is not for the benefit of the guest, and in any case there is harm to him. And indeed, in the responsa of Harrash Auerbach and Harrash Feinstein, who discussed giving food to a person who does not bless, they dealt with it mainly from the point of view of the fact that he himself is being made to stumble in the prohibition of hating Israel and Torah-observance, and less from the law of desecration of the Name.[27].

2. Rabbi Feinstein, in the Responsa Letters of Moses The above (O'C 13:13) discusses the question of whether it is permissible to offer a guest food when it is known that he will not recite the blessing.

In his remarks there (section 6), he discusses the question of whether a blessing from someone who does not believe is considered a blessing at all. He states that the name of God in the blessing of an apocryphal heresy is similar to a Torah scroll written by a man, and therefore there is no blessing here, as it is a blessing without a name and kingdom.

And it turns out that Rabbi Feinstein is dealing specifically with a person who is an apostate, that is, someone who knows his Lord and rebels against Him. However, a 'captive infant' who does not know at all who is being blessed and does not believe in the Creator of the world and His commandments, and for him it is clear that his blessing is not a blessing at all, not only because it lacks a name and kingdom, but even from the point of view of the intention of the words, which does not belong to him at all.[28].

Ultimately, he argues that it is permissible under the law for him to recite the blessing, since he will bless the one who gives him the food knowingly and commands him to bless God. Furthermore, he argues that perhaps he contemplated repentance in his heart (like the wicked man of the Temple, "so that I may be perfectly righteous," in the issue of Kiddushin mentioned above). However, a captive infant, who does not believe and does not know at all what is being said, seems unable to recite the blessing to God. Furthermore, the chance that he contemplated repentance in his heart during the blessing is completely negligible, and is inferior to an apostate who knows his Lord and rebels against Him.

We note that the issue of the Grand Rabbi Feinstein depends on the question of the intention of the words in the blessing, and no evidence can be brought from this to the question of whether he is included at all in performing mitzvot or transgressions. On the contrary, the Grand Rabbi's assumption is that he is included in transgressions, and there is a principled prohibition against him of 'before the blind'. It is true that even in this case the assumption is only because we are dealing with a heretic, and not with a baby who was captured, and Zela'a in this.

And here (section 9) the Rabbi directly discusses the question of whether there is a prohibition 'before a blind man' regarding a person who is considered to be raped, such as a baby who was kidnapped. In the course of his remarks, he argues that since that person does not even know that he is committing a prohibition, he is considered raped and there will be no prohibition on the one who hinders him. He also cites several sources for his words, and himself is content with this. We will expand on this a little in the next chapter.

F. The reversal of the image of 'before the blind': He who stumbles his friend enters under him into punishment

We have found in several places that the one who hinders his friend is subject to punishment.[29]When a person commits an offense because of me, if he is mistaken and I am intentional, the offense is considered as if I myself committed it. This picture presents the prohibition in a completely different light, and perhaps the opposite of what we have seen so far.

This can also be seen from another angle. We are commanded to violate Shabbat in order to save the soul of another person. The reasoning in the Gemara is, “I violated one Shabbat for him so that he would keep many Shabbats.” On one side of the scale are the Shabbats that the other person will keep, and on the other side is the one Shabbat that I will violate. Why should the scales be tipped in such a situation? From this we learn that the sages made a kind of overall balance, the determining consideration for which is the amount of Shabbat observance in the world in general. A person is not supposed to make his judgment solely from his own perspective, but from the perspective of the overall balance.[30].

One of the implications of this is the stumbling of a person into an offense in such a way that the stumbling person himself does not commit the offense. For example, when the stumbling is accidental, or forced. Ostensibly, if he is forced, then from his perspective, no offense was committed here, and therefore we would say that there is no stumbling here either. On the other hand, if we perceive that the offense is imposed on the stumbling person, then the order is completely reversed: Perhaps if the stumbling person is forced, then the stumbling person himself committed a complete offense. This is not an offense of 'before the blind' but the same offense in which he stumbling his companion. Whereas in a situation where the stumbling person is not forced, then the offense relates to him and not to the stumbling person, and the stumbling person at most passes over 'before the blind'.[31].

As an interim remark, we note that in any case our previous remarks are still valid regarding the obligation to 'exclude from prohibition.' If the secular person is not capable of committing an offense, then even if I can transgress 'before the blind' when I trip him up, it is clear that there is no obligation to exempt him from prohibition (since he does not commit a prohibition at all).

Now we will return to the words of Rabbi Feinstein (Sec. 9) quoted at the end of the previous chapter. If we carefully examine his words, it appears that his intention here is exactly as we have said. He claims that the prohibition "before a blind man" does not apply to a baby who has been captured, not because it does not meet the limits of the prohibition of "before a blind man", but because there is no obstacle here. The "baby", who is not aware that he is committing a prohibition, has indeed not committed a transgression at all.

It is not entirely clear whether he also says this for the views that there is a prohibition "before the blind" in rape, or whether he is discussing this in itself. If he says this even for those views that there is a prohibition "before the blind" also in the offense of rape, then for these views the prohibition exists for the perpetrator even when the perpetrator has not committed any crime at all. If so, why does such a prohibition really exist? Apparently because the perpetrator's crime is imputed to the perpetrator's responsibility. However, all of this is only when there is a crime named for her, and this may even exist in rape. But in a baby who is captured, who is not at all aware of the prohibition, there is no crime at all, and in any case the perpetrator has not committed anything either. In other words, alongside this, it seems that his claim is that the crime of a baby who is captured is not similar to the crime of a regular rapist. And these are our words, that in the case of a "baby" we are not talking about an exemption from rape, but rather he is exempted from committing any commandments or crimes.

The Rabbi brings from the Mishnav (67:11), who wrote that if the guest is poor, and what he does not bless is not because of his wickedness but because of a compulsion that he cannot bless, then the commandment of charity has not expired and it is permissible to give him food without a blessing. And it is clear that it is forbidden to give a poor person to eat something that is forbidden, even a rabbinical prohibition, even because of the commandment of charity (see Shabbat 127:2). But it is proven that in the case of compulsion, there is no transgression, and there is no "before the blind" in this.

Further on (section 10), he concludes that one can be lenient when there is some reason (such as etiquette or by virtue of fulfilling the commandment of charity). And according to us, it would seem that perhaps one can be lenient even without any reason at all.

But in fact, it seems that none of this is necessary at all. First, the Rambam's words about dressing his companion are controversial (see Kasam on Atar, and other sources. In general, the latter have been exhausted in finding their source). Second, in the three places in the Rambam it is clear that his words are only meant for a situation in which the one who causes trouble feeds the one who causes trouble with his hands (Reuven clothes Shimon with his hands, or defiles him). If so, this is not meant for every situation of failure according to the law 'before a blind man', but rather it is an independent prohibition on a situation of direct and active failure. However, most of the cases we are dealing with are not situations of direct failure but rather a duty of caution that he does not fail. Even giving food is not necessarily a direct situation, since although in the case of 'before a blind man' this is indeed failure, there is no actual feeding here for the purpose of the prohibition that the Rambam renewed.

G. Who is a 'captured baby': between knowledge and commitment

In the words of Rabbi Feinstein there (section 10), he comments that even if the poor person does not recite the blessing even when told to do so, and even if he knows that Jews who are observant of the Torah and mitzvot recite the blessing over food, and even if he knows that it is an obligation for everyone, he must still be given. And the reason is that he is still considered a rapist, since "he does not consider it an actual obligation."

Arguments are often raised about many secular people who are not captive infants, since some of them know little about halacha. However, in the words of the AGM, we see a great foundation: knowing the information is not a guarantee that a person is not a rapist. Knowledge of each person's obligation to observe the commandments is also required. Even a professor of Jewish studies, who knows all halacha, from the most simple to the most serious, but from his point of view this is the subject of research about an ancient culture, can still be considered a 'captured infant.'

This explanation is certainly correct. It is the awareness of the obligation that is important, not the knowledge of dry information. Someone who did not grow up in a home that observes Torah and mitzvot is almost always a 'captive baby.' He has no serious present ability to keep the mitzvot, without any dependence on knowledge, and therefore the fact that he does not keep them is a complete rape. Therefore, we conclude that even such a person does not belong in keeping the mitzvot and in transgressions.

This consideration raises many questions about contemporary discussions on the issue of attitudes toward secularists. Many cite various halakhic sources, but do not compare them with contemporary reality.

We saw above about the consideration "perhaps he contemplated repentance," which is not at all clear that it is also applicable today. Is there a reasonable concern that a person who grew up without a shred of commitment to Judaism will suddenly repent while reciting a ritualistic and folkloric blessing over food, or while putting on tefillin, or during his son's aliyah to the Torah in the synagogue? Even if so, it is not at all clear that this can be directly deduced from sage sources that establish such determinations. These questions are estimates of the human soul, and therefore they concern an assessment of reality, and this changes in each generation according to time and place. The babies who were taken captive that Rav and Shmuel, or Maimonides, spoke of were not considered by them to be actual rapists (at least in terms of the obligation to pay a sin). Is this also true today? Are they not at least as permissible today, or as rapists due to a lack of information? Information (or awareness) about commitment is also relevant to this decision, which may not have been so common in past generations. In general, I would like to note that it is very difficult to treat a secular person today as an accident, whatever the reason for the sages in the Talmud treating a baby who was captured in this way.[32].

Summary

We have proposed a halakhic direction according to which the failure to commit an offense by a non-believing Jew does not constitute a 'blind man'. The basis of the matter is not in the terms of 'blind man', but in that that Jew is not guilty of an offense at all. The main reasons lie in the perception of the possibility of that Jew committing acts of religious significance, and also in the fact that what is required for unintentional offenses is the disappearance and not the act itself.

The things are indeed new, but it seems that the intuitive explanation leans towards them. The reader will see and judge.

[1]    See, for example, the article by Rabbi Chaim David Mimran, Tzohar 5.

[2]    Some argue here from the perspective of "he who leads him to evil and he dies," meaning that if someone is evil and chooses to be a criminal, there is no prohibition against tripping him. This discussion also deals with the limits of "before a blind man." I have assumed, as is the majority opinion of all poskim, that an ordinary secular person is not "evil" (see the article by Rabbi Elisha Aviner, Tzohar 3, and others), and therefore this ruling does not apply to him.

[3]    Editor's Note (E. A.): This kind of claim is found in the words of Rabbi Yisraeli (right page, page 3), who wrote in the opinion of the Shach: “In the case of intentional sin, there is no obligation to make a provision except when it is in our power to prevent him from committing the offense altogether; However, if this is only a one-time occurrence, and he continues to commit the offense at other times, there is no obligation to dismiss him.". But he himself (p. 10) wrote in the opinion of the authors of the Torah (Shabbat 3:1, 5:2), "Even with regard to those who are subject to the law of 'converts who desecrate the Sabbath,' there is also a... commandment of salvation, And this is salvation, that we are reduced to sin.".

     Author's answer: The question of converts is a different one, as they are generally considered to be miscreants, and therefore any offense committed by them is a gross offense (see below the quantitative consideration that we will briefly mention in the name of the rabbi). Here we are dealing with sorcerers who are close to rape, and see more on this below.

[4]    According to Shadi Hamed, edited by HaVo, 22, 22, and in the aforementioned article by Rabbi Weiss, he cited this as a branch. See also in the book 'Pleni Aivur', by Rabbi Yitzchak Eliyahu HaCohen Adler, published by Bnei Torah, 27. This is a rather puzzling method, as Rabbi Weiss also writes, but it still constitutes a good example of formally exonerating the perpetrator even though his guilt is clear and complete and even though a crime has been committed.

[5]    The obligation to exclude a person from a prohibition, even when I do not prevent him from doing so. For its source, see the Talmudic Encyclopedia, entry "Afroshi Maisura."

[6]    According to the Talmudic Encyclopedia, entry "He was kicked to the wicked and died."

[7]    See, for example, Devarot Moshe, Shabbat 32:2 and Igraot Moshe, above, sec. 9.

[8]    Instead of that evil person committing an act that is bad for others (such as murder), there is no doubt that we will have to prevent it from happening to him.

[9]    See the sources cited in the Frankel edition's key book on this law.

[10] According to this view, it is difficult to understand why the Rambam says this specifically in the context of a resident alien. It is said that such a situation is more likely to arise in a resident alien than in a Jew. Furthermore, the commandments of a resident alien (the seven commandments of the children of Noah) are intellectual commandments. It is precisely in such commandments that there is a likelihood that the person will fulfill them due to the overwhelming power of reason. Perhaps it can be said that only in such commandments does the Rambam claim that that person is one of the wisest of the nations (meaning that his actions have moral value, even if not religious).

[11] According to Ramban in his conclusions there.

[12] By B.H. and M.B., O.H. C. Ta'a, Sec. D.

     Is a contrary intention, or an intention not to leave, detracting from the lack of intention of a secular person? There are sides to each direction, and in the light of the evidence, it seems to the court that the secular person detracted from the Tefi.

[13] This kind of question is discussed in the Letters of Moses (O"C"H"H"C

     Another example concerns the pioneers, who were completely strangers to everything holy, and therefore there is no reason to see them as fulfilling the mitzvah of settling the land by "engaging." In the case of a person who alienated himself from his duties and tradition for various reasons, one must consider that his actions would indeed be mitzvahs, since he knows the things, and perhaps belongs to them.

     Here the question of the status of an enclave belief arises. Ostensibly, there is room to see every Jew as a believer within himself, and therefore whenever a Jew observes a commandment, he does so out of the belief hidden in his heart (this is the very reason why some have wanted to read the Maimonides' words above as applying only to a resident alien, and not to a Jew).

     However, it is difficult for the rabbinic court to see room for such an interpretation, since mitzvot and laws are examined in the conscious test chamber. No one can judge what is in a person's heart, and therefore this is also not important for the halachic meaning of these mitzvah acts. A person's actions should be judged only on the basis of his conscious intentions, and things in the heart are not things.

     See my article in Bezhar 22, where I pointed out that religious Zionism examines things through the deep ideas that underlie them, and not through their concrete appearance. The same is true with regard to this issue.

[14] On the contrary, the very fact that they are not wicked but complete rapists increases the obligation to bring them closer to the Torah. After all, they do not have the knowledge necessary to decide. And because they are not wicked, our duties towards them remain the same.

[15] Regarding the prohibition of 'before a blind man' in a convert, see Shach Yod Kenna, section 6 and in the aforementioned book 'Before a Blind Man', at the end of page 115. Although there too, the discussion seems to be from the perspective of our obligation towards them, while our discussion here is from the perspective of whether there is an act of transgression at all (of the secular, whether he is slandered or not). It is clear that from the perspective of the prohibition of slandering a convert is less severe than a secular, but from the perspective of the act of transgression, a convert is more severe than a secular, since a regular convert knows his Lord and rebels against Him, and certainly a transgression pertains to him. In contrast, a captive does not know anything, and therefore we support here that neither acts of mitzvah nor transgression pertain to him.

[16] See, for example, in the book 'Before the Blind', 11th chapter, 1, and more below.

[17] And the commentators have already noted (see the sources cited in the key book of the Frankel edition on the website) that the Rambam himself, in the book of Maryam 3:3, wrote that infants who are captured are like rapists, and a rapist is exempt from sin. However, it seems that his intention is that they are like rapists ("about"Forcible," in the imagination), but their actions nevertheless require a sin.

[18] What about rape of ignorance? Here there is room to raise two types of permission: ignorance itself is not a crime. And beyond that, even if ignorance is a crime, the act is not considered his act, since it is rape in relation to him. Indeed, the poskim disagree about the obligation of sin in rape of ignorance, and in Rambam itself there are huge contradictions in this regard (see Hala Shavuot 3:11, and Isa 1:13, where it is proven that 'saying permitted' is exempt from the sacrifice, and in contrast in Hala Terumot 5:8 it is proven that it is intentional, and in our Hala Shegagot 2:6 and Isa 7:2 it means that it is as if he were an accident that requires the sacrifice, and in Hala Memariam 3:3 it means that a baby who is captured is as if he were raped, and in Hala Moretz 6:10 it is written that he is not an accident in the matter of exile) and so on.

[19] It is not clear why the lack of knowledge of such an infant is not outright rape (especially for those opinions among the rabbis that lack of knowledge when it is impossible to know is rape. That is truly a 'skilled doctor' in their eyes, as the aforementioned owner of the farm, Yair, puts it)? Was it necessary for that infant to know that there is Torah and mitzvot, and to come and learn them on his own? It is possible that all of this is only the law of the states of sin, but still for the purpose of being considered criminals, they are like rapists in every way.

     And the words of the Gra Wasserman in Kovetz Ma'amerim are well known, who writes that every gentile should know that such a wonderful world that was created has a purpose, and therefore there is a demand on him that he should go out and find out what the purpose of the world is, and come and learn about the seven commandments of the sons of Noah. And all of this is a very great urge.

[20] The latter were accurate in the words of the Rambam in the book of errors, that a baby who is captured must bring a sin offering for every type of offense mentioned in the Torah. And seemingly the things are puzzling, after all, who would assume that he has actually committed any such offense (after all, as we saw in them, he must actually commit an offense in order to be obligated, and the lack of knowledge is not enough)? And in Maginei Shlomo (Shabbat 68:2) he wrote to Bar that there is a presumption that during the years of his life he has committed all types of offenses, at least once. According to this, there is no reason to fear that he will fall into sin, since it is presumed that he has already committed it and he is already obligated to make a sin offering for his lack of knowledge. And these are our words above.

     However, in reality, things are puzzling, because why assume that every such person ate blood or milk? And what if he is a vegetarian? (Indeed, in the section 'Shabbat Shel Mi', Shabbat 68:2 in the Tosafot 45, and he is obligated to bring the Magini Shlomo, and reject his words). Therefore, if it were not for Demistafina, the Rambam would have a new explanation, and according to Anad it seems correct in the interpretation. We have seen that the obligation to commit a sin comes from the lack of knowledge. However, the lack of knowledge in a captive infant is actually one: ignorance of the obligation to observe the mitzvot in general. With regard to an ordinary person who does not know several offenses, we treat each lack of knowledge as a separate mistake. But with regard to a baby who was captured, the lack of knowledge is from a single root, and so on. Theoretically, we should have held him accountable for all the offenses he committed, since only one sin was lost from him (like a situation where Shabbat was lost from him and he committed the same offense several times). And see "Whose Shabbat" there, which he brought in the name of the Magi Solomon, and in this he agreed with him, and in the words of Moses mentioned there.

     Although according to the law we rule that he is liable for a sin offering for every type of transgression. And the explanation of the matter is found in the Deuteronomy of Moses, Shabbat 68, that this ignorance is considered as if he did not know all the transgressions (since they are divided and continuous). Although the basic knowledge is one, in the end all the mitzvot have been lost from him. On the other hand, someone who has lost one mitzvah and has transgressed it several times, this is only one ignorance, even with regard to the implementation stage.

     However, if indeed all these omissions have one root, then the fact that he committed many offenses of all kinds prevents him from being held responsible for all of his ignorances, a sin for every type. He was found guilty of not knowing the whole Torah, and therefore he is responsible for every type of offense, even though it is not clear that he committed all of them. All of this is a great innovation, and he is successful in this.

[21] On a similar matter, see the dispute of the Rishonim in Yoma regarding slaughtering a sick person on Shabbat (whether it is better to slaughter him, which is one severe prohibition, or to feed him meat, which are many minor prohibitions). See also the words of Mahari Engil, in Lekha Tov, 315, who discusses the question of whether quality determines quantity or not (he opens the discussion of that dispute). Also in Illumination 9 in my book Two Carts and a Balloon. All of these deal with the relationship between quality and quantity. Here we are dealing with a slightly different question: Is changing quantity by a small amount considered to be causing an offense, or should every offense be the addition of a different quality rather than a quantitative change? See the editor's note above (p. 3) from the words of the Rabbi Yisraeli, and my response.

[22] See Rabbi Weiss there, and in the book 'Before the Blind', C. H.

[23]  The Afiki Yam (Chapter 2, 35-6) discusses the essence of the obligation of sin, and proves that according to most opinions, the obligation of one sin is not a law for sins but for the offenses themselves (that one who commits two offenses while one is absent has committed only one offense). On the surface, this is exactly as we say. However, his formulation there is that the two acts are joined into one act, and not that the obligation is on the absentee. Some of the evidence does indeed teach this (for example, Ran Benedir 17:1 and Ritva Makot 20:1), and some does not.

     We would like to point out that even according to his wording, there is still room for our opinion, since the Supreme Court states that even in the case of repeated failure, this is a single offense, and therefore there is no additional offense here. Although according to this wording, failure in multiple cases should be discussed in shiurim, I have cited above the opinions of the poskim who are lenient in this regard (the Agram, and the Ritva himself, who is the author of the method presented in Afiki Yam).

[24] It seems that Rabbi Sternbuch is only concerned here with the aspect of the obstacle. He did not claim that there is no offense here, but what bothers him is the offense of the inviter's obstacle. And in this regard, he argued that if the invitee benefits, then his invitation is not the act of the obstacle. In other words, there is an obstacle here that the invitee fell into, but the inviter is not a criminal and is not considered to have fallen into this obstacle (similar to what happens in the case of 'before a blind man' in speech, as mentioned above, where there is also a failure but no obstacle). Once again, we see here a view from the side of the obstacle only, and ignoring the aspects of the other person, namely the multiplicity of offenses and the aphrodisiacs of the isura. We will immediately offer an explanation that also solves this problem.

[25] And in this way, all the cases cited by Rabbi Fodor in his aforementioned article, in which we commit a minor offense in order to prevent a major offense (see also the book 'Pleni Aivur', 320), should be made more difficult. But here, there is not even any certainty that it prevents future offenses (on the contrary: the chance is quite slim).

[26] Beyond all of this, it is certainly likely that this trip will take the place of another trip that has no value, and therefore it only changes the destination and does not actually cause a desecration of the Sabbath. This consideration indicates that this is not a problem of aporushi from isura, but at most 'before a blind man' (meaning a problem with the obstacle that caused the offense, but there is no obligation to prevent the offense of the one who was hindered). However, where one intends for his own benefit, there is also no 'before a blind man', and therefore this is permissible.

[27] They assume that the discussion is about the question of whether it is in his best interest or not, within the limits of the prohibition of "before the blind." See also the NAFKM on this (for example, at the end of section 5 in the Letters of Moses).

[28] As we noted above, there are aspects according to which a captive infant is inferior to a heretic and a convert (in terms of belonging to the commandments and transgressions and intentions), and there are aspects according to which he is lighter than him (in terms of his sins and the obligation towards him).

[29] According to Rashi and Ramban, Reish Parashat Matot, and Rambam, the end of Halacha, concerning a man who dresses his friend as a prisoner, and many more. However, it is not entirely clear that the source of this law is 'before the blind'. Neither Rashi nor Rambam mention it in their statements. In any case, for our purposes, it is important that there is a halakhic prohibition of this type, regardless of its source.

[30] And I have observed the law of the law that "one does not say to a person a sin so that your friend may be justified," and so on.

[31] According to Rambam there and in parallel.

[32] In this regard, see also my response to Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun's article in 'Akademut' 11.