With God’s help

Meishram – 5765

One of the central tools in the study of theology is 'investigation.' In yeshiva terminology, this usually refers to the examination of a certain law, intended to determine which of two explanations for it is correct.[2] Such a scholarly inquiry assumes that there are two possible sides to the explanation of the law in question, and we must examine which of the two is consistent with the data. A basic assumption implicit in this type of inquiry is that only one of the two explanations is correct. In this article, we will attempt to examine this assumption itself. In other words: we will examine the proposition that there is actually a third explanation, which is the correct one, and which is constructed as a logical connection of the two previous explanations.

There are several fundamental investigations that constitute a cornerstone of Yeshiva scholarship. As we will see, in each of them the investigation itself, and also the question we ask here, may take on a slightly different tone. We will begin the discussion with one of the best known of them: the one that requires financial damages.

A. The person liable for the damages

The Investigation of the Achroniks and the Dispute between the Hazo'a and the Hanni

The latter discuss whether a person's obligation to pay when his property causes damage arises from negligence in safeguarding, or whether it is derived from the very fact that his property caused damage. We note that for all intents and purposes both conditions are required: that the harm be caused by his property (or under his responsibility, at least in some sense), and that there be negligence in safeguarding. The question being investigated is which of them is the main one, and which constitutes only a secondary condition for the obligation.[3]

There are several halachic implications that are presented as derivatives (nep"m) of this investigation, but for the most part this connection can be rejected. One of the most obvious of them is the question of who bears the burden of proof in cases of doubt. On this matter, the PNI and the Chazo"a disagreed.

The Chazo"a B"K C"7 Sk"7 20 that the burden of proof is on the harmer. He is the one who must prove that he kept it properly in order to get rid of it.[4] On the other hand, the Hebrew Bible, page 56, says in the Gemara Lima Tehihui 20 that the burden of proof is on the damage. It is incumbent upon him to prove that the owner did not take proper care, since he came to extract money from the harmer.

Some of the latter understood that this dispute depended on the above investigation.[5] A person who believes that the burden of proof is on the harmer probably believes that the moment his property causes harm, he must pay. Although he can get away with claiming that he kept it properly, this is an exemption claim, and therefore the burden of proof is on him.[6] In contrast, the plaintiff believes that the burden of proof lies with the damage, and apparently in his opinion the mere fact that it is known that his property caused the damage is not a compelling reason in itself. In order to prove an obligation to pay, he must also prove that there was negligence in the safekeeping. Therefore, the damage is incurred by the plaintiff, and the burden of proof lies with him.[7]

If so, according to recent explanations, it follows that the method of the Chazo'a is that the mere fact that the property was damaged requires payment, and that proper care only exempts. And the opinion of the Panni is that negligence in care is what requires payment, and the fact that it is property is a condition for the obligation to care to be imposed on him.

An apparent contradiction in the opinion of the Supreme Court

And here we find in the Refinitiv BK 24b that introduces a very wonderful innovation. The Gamma there states that if a friend's dog is slain by his friend, the slain person is exempt. And regarding the owner of the dog, the Gamma there discusses whether to hold him liable or not. And here the Refinitiv there writes that, in addition to the fact that the owner of the dog is also exempt from sinning, then this ruling is true even if the slain person is the owner of the dog himself (and the latter have already wondered about it. See in the 'Otzar Misharei Talmud' here, note 99, and inAyelet Hashachar On a website). A Rabbi who also in the book of the Book of Revelation, chapter 57, explained this in two languages, in Rashi below, chapter 53b.

And these words of the Phani and the Chazo are truly miraculous. If a person does not guard his animal and it causes harm, he must pay. And if a person harms his animal and causes it to cause harm with his hands, he is exempt. Apparently, you have no greater crime in guarding than this. After all, if a passive crime (failure to guard) requires payment, then an active crime (covering up) is a simple one that must require payment.

In other words: If a person kills his friend's dog, then there is a party to exempt both from payment. The victim is the one who committed a crime in custody, but the bad dog that causes harm is the owner's property (therefore, the owner was forbidden to keep it). Each of the parties has one binding parameter, but in order to be liable, we need the two parameters mentioned in the above investigation (that there is property and that there is a crime in custody). However, when the victim is the owner, then that person meets both conditions. If so, what is missing to be liable?

It seems that in order to understand this surprising innovation, even if only narrowly, there is no choice but to assume that the one who is obligated to pay damages is the fact that his property caused the damage. Alongside this, it can be said that there is an obligation to compensate for the property (the animal or beast) that caused the damage itself, but such obligations are transferred after they are created to the owner of the property that caused the damage.[8] If so, we must discuss whether the dog itself (and not its owner) is obligated to compensate for the damage in this case. If it is, then we will transfer it to its owner and require him to pay.

The court apparently understands that the dog itself is exempt, this is because someone drove it, and it is not he who is at fault, but the owner. He was driven by someone else, and therefore he himself is not liable. However, if no obligation to pay arises for the dog, in any case there is no obligation that will pass to the owner. Although the owner is at fault, he is only the cause of the dog's damage, and therefore on his part (i.e. from the law of a person who causes harm) we have no option to hold him liable. On the other hand, no obligation arises on the part of the dog, since he was driven, and therefore we also have no option to pass on the obligation to the owner from the law of the property of the harm. For this reason, the court exempts the owner. As mentioned, the Chazo also raises such a side.[9]

Now we must return to the aforementioned dispute between the PNI and the Chazo'a on the issue of the burden of proof in cases of doubt. There we saw that the Chazo'a's approach is that the obligor is the very fact that his property caused the damage, and negligence is only a condition for liability. Therefore, the ruling here is consistent with his position there.[10] However, the PNI's method is that the one who is obligated to pay for his property that was damaged is the negligence in safeguarding it, and therefore the burden of proof is on the damage. However, here it is necessarily proven that his method is that the one who is obligated to pay is the very fact that his property was damaged. And apparently the PNI contradicts his teaching.

Solution to the contradiction: giving up dichotomies

The obvious solution to this problem is that the method of the court is that both parameters are required for the payment of the tortious party's property: both that the property will cause harm and that there will be negligence in maintaining it. It should be noted that such a method completely satisfies the above contradiction. Regarding the burden of proof, even if both things are necessary, it is clear that the burden of proof is on the damage, and even if only one of them is missing, it has not been proven that the condition of negligence in maintaining it, which is also required in order to be liable, has been met. On the other hand, regarding a person who bet his own dog on his friend, there we understand that the liability is on the dog that caused the harm, and such a liability does not arise at all, and therefore the owner who bet is exempt.

We emphasize that the logic behind such a system in pecuniary damages is very clear. The fact that the property was damaged is required to establish a liability on the animal that caused the damage itself (as we have seen, this is a liability on the dog). However, when we want to transfer the liability to the owner, this requires justification of negligence in care on his part. So, both conditions are required, but each has a different role from the other.[11]

And it is clear from the above why, according to the PNI, no liability was created for the owner who let his dog loose. No liability was created for the dog itself, because the condition that the dog would cause harm through its own "crime" was not met. In any case, even if the condition of negligence in care was met, the condition that allows for a transfer of liability to the owner, then here no liability was created for the dog at all, and therefore there is nothing to transfer to the owner. For this reason, according to the PNI, the owner is exempt from payment.

The above investigation assumed that these two conditions are required to hold someone liable for damages to his property. He must be the owner, and he must be negligent in guarding. We saw that according to each side in the investigation, both conditions are required, and the question was only which of them is the primary and which is the secondary. If so, the same basic logic that led to these two conditions appearing in the investigation at all can also lead to both of them being equally liable. This is the starting point for the question that we will ask later: If so, why did we really assume that only one of these two sides is correct, and only in retrospect, due to constraint, are we willing to accept a position that sees both as conditions of equal status? In other words: why did we even see a problem with the respondent's position?

Before we move on to discuss the general methodological question, we will look at an example in which the PNI itself does not accept such a connection between two sides of an investigation.

B. It is enjoyed and there is no shortage of it.

In the issue of B.K. 20a, there is an example of a 'yeshivite inquiry' that is made almost explicitly in the Gemara itself. The Gemara discusses the case of a person who trespasses in his neighbor's yard without the owner's knowledge, whether he is obligated to pay the owner of the yard or not. There are several possible cases to discuss. When the yard is up for rent ('kayima la'agra'), then the owner of the yard is found to be 'missing' from the encroachment. When the tenant needs housing and cannot find a place for free (he is 'gabra da'vid la'miga'), then he is defined as 'enjoying'.

The hesitation can be presented in the following way:[12] In the case of 'it benefits and it is lacking' it is clear that the intruder must pay. There are two conditions: there is a benefit for the tenant, and there is also a disadvantage for the owner. And in the case of 'it does not benefit and it is not lacking' it is clear that there is no obligation to pay. There none of the conditions are met. However, it is necessary to discuss whether in the first case one must pay because the owner of the yard is lacking, or because he himself benefits. The implication that the Gemara directly discusses is the case of 'it benefits and it is not lacking'. In this case there is a benefit but there is no deficiency. If the obligor is the benefit, then in this case too we will oblige the intruder to pay. However, if the obligor is the disadvantage of the owner of the yard, then here he will be exempt (since there is no disadvantage). This is a classic example of a yeshivah investigation conducted in the Gemara itself, and in this case the Gemara itself is formulated in such a 'final' manner.

Already in the former, and certainly in the latter, one can see different formulations of the hesitation, and as mentioned, they also deal with the question of whether this is indeed the Gemara's hesitation at all. However, in light of the above (on the issue of the dichotomy of the investigation into what requires payment of damages), it is interesting to see the words of the court on this issue. We will examine this specifically in the fourth case, which was not discussed at all in the G.M.: 'It does not benefit and it is lacking.'

In theory, we rule that it is a benefit and that it is not exempt. Ostensibly, this is a conclusion that the one who is liable for payment is not the tenant's enjoyment but the owner's disadvantage.

In the Tod "Hebrew "This is not a benefit" on page 20a, they ruled that in the situation where there is no benefit and there is a deficiency, the tenant is exempt from payment (the RIF and its group disagree on this). It seems that what is required is the benefit and not the deficiency. However, in the PIZ it is not clear why we rule according to the law that there is a benefit and there is no deficiency, it is exempt. After all, if the benefit is what is required, we would have to make him liable here, and as Mushnat.

And here is a passage in the Tosafot that discusses this. He formulates it as a doubt regarding the case of 'it benefits and it is lacking', why the invader is obligated to pay. From the Tosafot system it follows that the disadvantage alone does not require payment, and from the halachic ruling regarding 'it benefits and it is not lacking' that exemption implies that enjoyment alone does not require payment. The passage writes as follows:

And he insists on saying that because he enjoyed it, he helps to charge him for it for the deficiency, even though he is the cause, two explanations are added to charge him, even though in any case it is not binding. But he insists…

If so, the PNI refuses to accept a solution that suggests that two parameters, each of which is not sufficient to charge, be combined to create a payment charge.

Ostensibly, this contradicts his position, as it arises on the issue of the factors for charging the damages. Above, we saw that there he assumes that the two parameters, each of which is insufficient to charge, join to create a charge for payment.

We should note that although the Panni himself offers a different solution to the issue of 'it benefits and it is not lacking' (and he links the issue to the question of the 'sodomite'). However, several Rishonim and Achram take the very path rejected by the Panni, namely that the joining of the two factors is what is binding. For example, Rabbi Shimon Shekap in Shiuri BK 319-20 suggests in the commentary on the above-mentioned opinion of the Toss that the binding is the enjoyment, but there is a condition that there will be a disadvantage. In other Rishonim, it seems to be the opposite, that the binding is the disadvantage, but there is a condition that the deficiency will benefit.

Ostensibly, these are solutions of combining two different parameters to create a charge. However, if we look at the words of the commentators, we will discover that there is apparently no real combination here. Each commentator chooses a dominant parameter that requires payment, and treats the second as a side condition. For example, the Harash in Da'at HaTos claims that the obligor is the pleasure, but there is a condition for the charge that will be a disadvantage.[13]

It seems to me that a more careful study of the issue and the commentators reveals that there are nevertheless those who do not intend such a combination, but rather a combination in equal status, and I would like to expand on this.

C. The problem of the dichotomies of yeshiva investigations

So far we have seen two investigations, in both of which the basic assumption was that one of two explanations is correct. Then another possibility arises, that perhaps a third explanation, which is in some sense a combination of the first two, is actually the correct explanation. This is an expression of the general question we posed at the beginning: Why is the simple assumption that the investigation is dichotomous?

It seems that there is still a difference between the two examples cited above. With regard to the obligor in financial damages, the investigation could be formulated in a more dichotomous manner: whether the obligor is the negligence in maintenance or the ownership itself. In this formulation, there is an 'investigation' here in the sense described above: which of the two explanations for the law is correct. However, a more correct formulation was presented above, according to which the two components (financial damage and negligence in maintenance) are present in each of the two explanations, and the question is which of them is the main obligor and which is only a side condition. In this formulation, the investigation is not exactly of the classic type, which of the two explanations is correct, but rather which of the two components in a given explanation is dominant and which component is side. Many of the yeshiva investigations are precisely of this type.

So, the examples given above represent two different types of inquiry. However, ultimately, even the second (more precise) formulation of the inquiry into the obligor in pecuniary damages creates two competing explanations: 1. The obligor is the obligor who caused the damage and there is a condition of negligence in safeguarding. 2. The obligor is negligence in safeguarding but there is a condition that it be pecuniary (I only have to safeguard pecuniary). Now this becomes an inquiry in the usual sense, asking which of these two (complex) explanations is the correct one.

However, it seems that despite the similarity, there is still an implication for a difference between the two types of inquiry, and this is precisely in terms of the alternative proposal that we are examining in this article. The proposal that there is a third explanation that is the correct one, which is a combination of the two dichotomous explanations, is not valid in investigations of the second type. In the non-dichotomous formulation, the complex explanation is not a simple logical combination of the two simple explanations, but the creation of a third explanation, different from the previous two. Instead of having a dominant component and a side component in the creation of the claim, or an explanation is proposed according to which both components are dominant. This is not a simple logical combination of the two initial explanations.

On the other hand, if the inquiry was about who the determining component was in terms of liability (as the court understands the issue of benefit and disadvantage), then the suggestion that the determining parameter is a combination of the two components (the benefit and the disadvantage) was a simple logical connection of the two sides of the inquiry.

It is true that even in the non-dichotomous formulation there is a problem of a similar family, since there is a question as to which component is binding (and the other is only a side condition), and the alternative proposal is that both are equally binding. In other words, there is a dialectic here, except that it concerns not two explanations but two components in the explanation. Between the two components there is a structure similar to that of an inquiry of the first type: initially we assume that only one of them is binding, and then we propose that only both of them are binding. We will return to this point below.

D. 'On the side'

There is a question that seems very similar to the one discussed here: the structure of the sermon measure known as the 'side stage'.[14] To this extent, we learn a new law from two known laws. Each of them alone cannot teach us the additional law, since each teacher has a special quality that is not present in the one being taught (which creates a contradiction), and therefore we learn it from a combination of the equal sides of both.

This structure is related to several levels of the subject under discussion. First, the method of learning itself combines two factors that neither of them can work on its own, and derives the result (=the renewed law) from the combination of the two. However, beyond that, this method assumes a logical assumption that seems very problematic. The question is why it is not said that it is truly impossible to learn the renewed law from the combination of the two teaching laws. If each has a special feature that does not allow the conclusion regarding the renewed law to be drawn, then why is it not correct to interpret the same way also the learning from both teachers together. Ostensibly, it is possible that the law in teacher A depends on its unique feature, and the law in teacher B on its unique feature. In other words, why do we assume that the law is created from the equal side of the two teachers, and not from each of their unique features separately. If the law is created from each of the unique features, then in the renewed case that is not characterized by either of these two features, the law cannot be learned regarding it.

The obvious conclusion is that every law in the Torah stems from only one reason.[15] By the very structure of the 'side stage' we implicitly reject the possibility that a particular law can arise from any of two different reasons. Ostensibly, there is a source here for the assumption that underlies the yeshivah inquiry that there are no two explanations for the same law.

However, on the face of it, this is not true. The case of 'what is the reason' is logically different from the case of the sitting inquiry. In the question of 'what is the reason' we examine the possibility that a certain law will be derived from each of two different reasons. That is, there are two different factors, each of which separately can determine the same law. Such a possibility is indeed ruled out by the rule of 'what is the reason'. However, in the question of the reason, we examine a different possibility: although there is a single explanation for the given law, why do we assume that it contains only one of the two relevant components, and not both.

In other words: the 'side-stage' problem deals with the question of whether to unite the two explanations (perform a logical OR operation between them), and our problem deals with the question of why not to cut them apart (perform a logical AND operation between them). In the 'side-stage' we ask why there shouldn't be two possible explanations, and here we ask why both explanations shouldn't be necessary together as one comprehensive explanation that will explain the law in question.

If we were to ask why we should not think that both disadvantage and pleasure alone can cause a positive outcome, this would be a problem relevant to proof from the "side stage."[16] However, here we ask differently: why wouldn't both be necessary?

In fact, the study of 'what is the side' seemingly leads to the opposite conclusion. Even when it seems that a certain law has two different explanations, we immediately look for the equal side in both, that is, some combination of them that is what causes the law. If so, why don't we also assume in Yeshivah investigations that the combination of the two components/explanations, or some equal side between them, is the correct explanation.

In a previous article (Straighteners b) I argued that the principle of 'on the other side' is not just an interpretive rule relevant to the interpretation of the Torah and the Bible. We saw there that it is a more general form of halakhic thinking. When there are two halakhic components, we can combine them and create a third concept, which is composed of both, and draw halakhic conclusions about it. We saw there examples of constructing a new craft from the combination of two different ancestors of the craft on Shabbat (roqq as the combination of a transfer of a da'a in a rabbi and a zora). If so, here too, it would seem that we should have done the same thing and assumed that if there are two components relevant to the problem, we should combine both and create a complex explanation.

E. The problem of simplicity and elegance in the philosophy of science and halakhic interpretation

At first glance, there seems to be a universal problem here. A theory with one component is simpler than a theory with two components. In other words: the simpler explanation seems more correct to us. This is a general form of human thinking, and not necessarily a characteristic of halakhic thinking. This is what is called in the philosophy of science 'the problem of the elegance and simplicity of the scientific explanation (theory).' It will be seen below that the identification between the problem of dichotomy and the problem of elegance and simplicity is not so simple.

Simplicity and elegance in the philosophy of science

The problem of simplicity in the philosophy of science asks: Why do we really assume that the simplest explanation is also the correct explanation? In the context of the natural sciences, the question of simplicity and elegance has puzzled the philosophy of science for several generations. There are countless ways to generalize any given set of experimental results into a general theory. Philosophers of science ask themselves two questions in this context: 1. Why are the generalizations we choose really the simplest (what is the criterion for simplicity). 2. Why is the simplest generalization really the correct generalization (what is the connection between simplicity and truth).[17]

For this reason, and several others, many philosophers of science conclude that a scientific theory really has no content beyond the collection of facts it includes. The theory is nothing more than an elaborate description of the collection of facts, and all theories that fit this collection of facts will be equally correct. The theory is a tool for human thinking, not a deeper acquaintance with the world. According to this approach, the theoretical entities defined within the framework of the theory are nothing more than fictions that allow for a convenient description of the world, and not existing or real entities.

According to this, it is clear that choosing the simple and elegant theory is the obvious choice. Not because it is the most correct, since all theories are equally correct, but because it is the most convenient. If there is no difference in truth between the theories, why not choose the simplest and most convenient to use?!

According to this line of thinking, even theoretical explanations of halacha do not reveal anything about the nature of halacha, or the Torah, but rather are tools that our thinking uses to organize the entirety of halakhic phenomena (the various halacha, or opinions on halacha). In any case, there is no room for questioning why we choose the least complex explanation. This is the explanation that is most convenient to use, and therefore we choose it. Such an explanation does not constitute an argument about halacha, but rather a tool for us to grasp it. To the same extent, we could have used any other explanation (see below around note 23, where we rejected this possibility).

In the second part of my book Two Carts and a Hot Air Balloon (On Science, Religion, and Myth) I show that this approach in the philosophy of science is fundamentally flawed. The fact that scientific theories are confirmed by experiments after they are put forward leads to the rejection of this proposition. However, the difficulty still remains: why is there a connection between simplicity and elegance and truthfulness?

In my aforementioned book, I showed that there are two fundamental options for solving the problem: 1. The conventional approach, according to which there is indeed no connection between simplicity and truth. According to this approach, theories are claims about us and not about the world. It is possible that simplicity is not really a concept that can be clearly defined, and perhaps it does not exist at all (although, this is not necessary according to this approach either). 2. There is such a connection, and it stems from a compatibility that exists between us and the world. According to this approach, simplicity means compatibility with human ways of thinking (as mentioned, this can also be agreed upon by those who hold the previous approach). What fits these ways seems simpler to us. Truth stems from a compatibility between the way the world operates and our ways of thinking. What is simple in our eyes correctly describes the world. This is how the Creator of the world and man intended it.

Simplicity and elegance in Halacha

As mentioned, we also find similar references in Halacha. Like all human thinking, it also seemingly assumes a connection between simplicity and elegance and authenticity. We will now look at some examples of this.

The first example of this is the common rule in the Beit Midrash regarding the interpretation of disputes over Tannaim and Amoraim: "Those who are not averse to dispute do not interpret."[18] This rule states that there should be no more disputes between the disputing scholars than necessary. In our theoretical negotiations, an explanation that leads to two disputes between the parties is rejected in favor of an explanation that bases the dispute on a single principle.

According to this rule, a halakha can be deduced from the words of one of the parties to the dispute, even from one for whom no halakha has been ruled. The assumption is that if the principle being taught is not related to the explicit dispute between them, then even his bar palugta probably agrees with this point. Anyone who wishes to reject such a precision would have to show that the conclusion does depend on the principle in dispute between the opinions (i.e., that it is not independent). In halakhic negotiations, it is not possible to reject such a precision solely on the basis of the claim that it is based on the words of a sage whose opinion has not been ruled as halakha.

For example, one of the many, the Ran on the Rif in Tractate Yoma (page 4b in his pamphlet, in the book 'Vegreshinan'), cites a reply from the Rav regarding a patient on Shabbat who was determined by a doctor to eat meat and had only carrion, which is not kosher. The question is whether to slaughter an animal for him on Shabbat, which is a very severe prohibition, or to feed him carrion, which is a milder prohibition. The Rishonim disagreed on this question, and some of them wrote that he should be fed carrion because it is a milder prohibition. The Ran argues that a live animal should be slaughtered for him, since although the prohibition of slaughtering on Shabbat is severe, it is only one prohibition. In contrast, in the case of eating carrion, there is a prohibition on every ounce of meat that the patient eats.

The latter learn from the words of the Ran the principle that eating several shiurs of forbidden food requires several punishments (a punishment for each shiur). This is despite the fact thatOn the table The words of the Rabbi have not been ruled out as halakhic. See, for example, in the book Lesson file, by R. Elchanan Wasserman, Tractate Bitza Ot Mach, and in the book Yom Kippur Addition, to Maharam N Habib, tractate Yoma, page 11, dated 1911, and many more.

As stated, the reason for this is that the dispute between the Ran and the other Rishonim did not revolve around this question (at least that is how the commentators understood it), but rather over the question of whether quantity determines quality. Therefore, regarding any point that is not related to the fundamental dispute between them, it can be understood that there is agreement. Therefore, halachic conclusions can be drawn from it, even from the words of someone whose opinion is not decided on halachic grounds.[19]

As is known, it is not the way of the sages to deal with their own rules of thinking. However, we find a direct concern with the problem of simplicity and truthfulness, which is attributed to Rabbi Chaim of Brisk. Rabbi Chaim's formulation is closer to the formulation of a comprehensive principle of thought. I found a written source for these things in the book Torah of Life, which cites from the Torah of Beit Brisk, and thus he writes there:[20]

Maran Ha-Gar"ach zt"l used to say that when there is one question in a subject, one answers one question, two questions two answers, three questions no longer three answers, but one must give one excuse, and that is: "We are not studying the subject correctly," because the multitude of difficulties proves that something fundamental is not understood in the subject, and then the excuses will no longer be of any use, but the subject must be studied from the beginning.

And he brought evidence for this from the book of Hagiga, page 3b: “Our rabbis taught: What kind of fool is he? He who goes out alone at night, and finds himself in a cemetery, and tears his cloak…

He is always said to be a fool, and he is said to be in the cemetery, so that an unclean spirit may descend upon him. If he only spends the night in the cemetery, perhaps he does so so that an unclean spirit may descend upon him, and if so, he is not a fool. And he who goes out alone at night is said to be a man of thoughts. Since he is lost in thought and distracted, he tore his covering, and if so, he is not necessarily a fool. Since he was a fool to all, he was like one who struck an ox, a donkey, and a camel, and became a target for all.

We learn from the Gemara that the first and second time they make an excuse for why they did so, but the third time there is no excuse. Because instead of giving three excuses, it is better to give one excuse, and that is that this person is necessarily different in essence from others, he is a fool.[21]

For a similar argument, see also Rabbi Kook's book, Lights, in the 'Seeds' section, in the section called 'The War of Opinions and Beliefs.' The Rabbis point there to the generality of a phenomenon as an indication of its truth.[22]

These are all examples of what is known in philosophy as the principle of ‘Occam’s razor.’ This principle states that we do not make more assumptions than we are forced to make. In other words: we choose the simplest explanation, the one that contains the fewest number of assumptions, or components.

In the next chapter, we will see an application of the above discussion to the philosophy of science, to understanding the ways of Halacha. We will discuss there whether simplicity is a criterion for understanding Halacha itself, or whether it is a fictitious tool of the learner designed to organize for himself the entirety of Halachaic phenomena.

F. Application to the dichotomies problem

In light of what was said in the previous chapter, it seems that the criterion of simplicity and elegance of the explanations is one of the parameters that determines the choice between the various explanations.

It is important to note that Occam's Razor, in its common formulation, states that one should not make assumptions beyond what is required. This is an explanation of the rule that arises from the 'side stage'. If we do not have a strong constraint, we are not inclined to assume that two different explanations can lead to the same law. Every law arises from only one factor.

However, as we saw above, the problem of dichotomies is different, and perhaps the opposite. What is at issue here is not the adoption of two explanations, but rather the adoption of one explanation that is two-component. The number of assumptions offered in the non-dichotomous option is no greater than the number of assumptions in the basic explanations. Each of the explanations is based on a single assumption. The question is only how many components will be included in this single assumption.

The razor principle does not provide a direct answer to this question, since it deals only with the criterion of the number of premises. However, the criterion of simplicity and elegance seems applicable to this question as well. If we understand that a one-component premise is simpler than a two-component premise, then the criterion of simplicity will lead us again to the dichotomous conclusion.

If so, the problem of dichotomies can also be understood in the same two ways we saw in the previous chapter: either dichotomies are just an efficient and convenient working assumption, or simplicity is a criterion for truth.

If indeed the dichotomy is just an efficient working assumption for us, then we begin our search by examining the simple explanation. If we find such an explanation, we are satisfied with it, even though it is not necessarily true. It is better and more convenient than the complex option from our point of view.

It seems that this option is not relevant in the context of halakhic interpretation. The reason for this is that in halakhic law, each such explanation has a nefm. Perhaps it is not possible to decide between the two options (the simple and the complex), but in such a situation we would have to be sufficiently strict in the Dauraita and sufficiently lenient in the Drabnan, or use the other rules of decision in spikot. The fact that one explanation is simple, if this is not an indication of its truth, cannot allow its adoption into halakhic law.[23]

Therefore, it seems that within the framework of Halacha, we are forced to come to the conclusion that the simpler explanation is also the truer one. As we saw above, the explanation for this is that there is a correspondence between our intellect and Halacha. God created our intellect, and He expects us to interpret Halacha through it. We have no other tool. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that our conclusions are the correct interpretation (at least from our perspective. This is not the place to discuss the meaning of Halacha truth in general, and the question of 'this and that'. See a little later on this in the P.H.). We have insisted that simplicity of an explanation means correspondence to our ways of thinking, and therefore a simpler explanation means an explanation that is consistent with our ways of thinking. And if there is a correspondence between the Torah and the human intellect, then a simpler explanation is also a more correct explanation.

If we did not accept this argument, we could ask a much broader question: What is the justification for the assumption that what we conclude with our intellect is indeed the will of God? Such a question can be asked not necessarily in relation to the problem of simplicity and truthfulness, but in relation to the entire form of human thinking. Therefore, it seems clear that a necessary assumption is that the conclusions that emerge from our halakhic-Torah thinking correspond to God's will for us. If so, the same is true with respect to the criterion of simplicity of explanations.

G. Simplicity criterion: 'neighborly' and 'temporal' composition of concepts

The criterion for simplicity

So far we have dealt with the question of the relationship between simplicity and truth. However, as we have seen, in the philosophy of science another question arises: what is the criterion for simplicity? In the context of Didan, it can be asked as follows: Why is a two-component theory (one explanation that includes two parameters) really less simple than a one-component theory (an explanation that includes one parameter)?

The 'simple' explanation in the second investigation is that the cause of the payment charge is only the pleasure. Another 'simple' explanation is that only the disadvantage is the cause of the charge. Why is the explanation that both pleasure and disadvantage cause a financial charge less simple? Here too, there is one factor, but its description in language seems more complicated. However, it is difficult to offer a clear logical basis that would explain this criterion of simplicity. As mentioned, Occam's razor refers to a structure that contains more premises as a more complicated structure. However, here the number of premises in each of the three explanations is the same (one premise). If so, why is the explanation that contains a complex premise not as simple as the other two?

For example, is the explanation that a certain act was performed by a person who is wise and high, less simple than the explanation that the same act was performed by a high person. The fact that the explanation requires more components to define it, does not necessarily mean that it is simpler. Apparently, this is a problem of language and not necessarily of substance.[24]

Weather and neighborhood assembly

Here a distinction is required between two types of combination of the various components, and for this purpose I will use terminology drawn from the teachings of the Rogchober (author of theEncryption decryption).[25] If the combination is truly 'conjugative', meaning it creates a third essence that is merged from both, and therefore in principle it would be justified to attach one term to it in the language, then the fact that we use the combination of two components (linguistic and essential) to describe it neither elevates nor detracts. This is a purely linguistic phenomenon. However, if the combination is 'neighboring', meaning the two components are neighbors to each other, and do not merge into one new essence, then the new explanation is less simple, not only on the linguistic level but also on the essential level.

Presenting the relationship between the two components as a structure of a dominant component and a component that constitutes a side condition is itself constructing a structure that links them to a new, third essence that includes both. The assembly of both in the same position is usually interpreted as a neighborhood assembly, and therefore it seems less simple to us. However, if the assembly of the two components in the same position can also be interpreted as the creation of one new structure, the result of a moody and not neighborhood combination, then a complex explanation that includes such a combination would also be possible.[26]

The same is true for constructing concepts from atomic concepts (as was done in my articles onStraighteners b). If the concept created is a third concept, and not a neighboring combination of its two predecessors, then it can be created. If not, then we must look for an equal side to both concepts, which is the cause of the law in question. This is the difference we saw there between 'on the side' and 'conceptual construction'.

Application to the two above investigations

Now we will try to apply what we have raised so far in relation to the two previous investigations.

With respect to the investigation into the person liable for payment of financial damages, we have indeed seen that the PNI itself proposes a model that combines the two components (ownership and negligence) in the same category. However, we have also seen that both are necessary to create the liability. One to create the liability on the harmful animal itself, and the other to transfer the liability to its owner. In such a situation, the combination creates a single path, and is therefore no less simple than the basic proposals that emerged in the initial investigation. If the two components were required together to perform the same function, and we did not find a distinct role for each of them, then this would be a neighborhood combination, less simple, which we would have to reject.[27]

The innovation of the PNI is not methodological. He does not try to claim that complex explanations can be adopted and that one should not choose the simple ones. His claim is that sometimes the complex explanation is no less simple, and therefore it must also be taken into account when posing the fundamental alternatives in the investigation. In the investigation into the person liable for financial damages, there are three simple alternatives, not two simple ones and one complex one, as one might think (and as may exist in other investigations), which is why the PNI is willing to adopt the complex option.

With respect to the investigation of the person who is obligated to pay benefits, the court itself refuses to accept that the combination of benefits and disadvantages can and will cause what each one separately cannot cause. Apparently, the court does not see that this combination creates one, third concept. That is, in his opinion, this is a neighborhood combination and not a temperamental one, and therefore it is not a simple explanation, and he rejects it as unreasonable.

It should be noted that he rejects this explanation even though he has no evidence for it, and in fact he himself sees that such an explanation is indeed very much implied by the Toss. He prefers to offer a renewed, and perhaps less simple, alternative that involves the principle of the virtue of Sodom in the laws discussed in the Sogiya.[28] This position is against the opinion of the other commentators who understand that the issue deals with ordinary legal law, and not with a meta-legal principle like the virtue of Sodom. In any case, it is clear from this that there is no contradiction in principle in these words of the Panni. Even on the issue of the one who is liable for financial damages, he is not willing to adopt a neighborhood composition of explanatory elements, but rather, his claim is that this is a temperamental composition. Here, when the composition is neighborhood, he rejects it outright.

We mentioned above the Gershish that explains in the Toss that indeed the pleasure is what causes the obligation, and the disadvantage is a condition for the formation of the obligation. If his intention is that the absence of a disadvantage is a principle of exemption, we have come very close to the previous one. It seems more likely that the Gershish intends that the disadvantage is also a positive and not a negative condition, that is, it is a condition for the formation of the obligation and not that its absence exempts from the obligation. If so, a composition has truly been created here that is apparently neighboring. Why would two factors be required to create a financial obligation?

It seems that the Gerash claims that here there is a structure of a composition of two factors in the same status, and that each of them does not have a defined role (unlike in the proposal of the PNI), and in 27 a third concept is created here, that is, there is a temperamental composition here. According to the Gerash, the conversion of disadvantage to pleasure is apparently the criterion that requires payment. What requires payment is the process, and not either of the two extreme states.[29]

H. General implications: 'These and these are the words of the living God'

Maharal and Rabbi Tzadok on 'These and Those'

The Maharal and Rabbi Tzadok's view on the issue of "these and those" is the living words of God, holding that all human truths, and halakhic truths in general, are partial. The overall divine truth is the assembly of all of these into one complex structure.[30] It seems that the source of the matter is the only place in the Shas where the meaning of the claim, "These and these are the words of the living God," is directly explained. In Gittin 6b, Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Eviatar disagree regarding a concubine on the hill. Rabbi Eviatar says, "A fly found her," and Rabbi Yonatan says, "Nima found her." The conclusion of the matter is that with the Blessed One, "These and these are the words of the living God: A fly found her and did not observe, Nima found her and observed." From this, the Maharal and Rabbi Tzadok apparently derive their theory that the combination of the two opinions creates the complete truth.[31]

Application to theoretical investigations

The question that arises in light of what we have said so far is: Is it possible to build from these theoretical investigations, which are presented as dichotomies, a complete system that includes all their sides? Ostensibly, like any dispute between opinions in halakhah, here too it is possible to generalize the two polar opinions and create from them a more complex and true position.

However, this is not so simple. The structure consisting of the combination of the alleged opinions is supposed to be their temperamental composition. However, if there is indeed the possibility of temperamental composition between the two sides of the investigation, then there is no justification for the investigation itself. As we have seen, in a situation where there is temperamental composition between the two sides of the investigation, we must actually examine three sides: A, B, and the composition of both. Therefore, the generalization is not a composition of the two fundamental sides but a simple adoption of the third side.

We will demonstrate this with regard to the inquiry about 'it is enjoyed and it is not lacking'. One side is that the one who is obligated to pay is only the enjoyment. The other side is that the one who is obligated to pay is only the disadvantage. If there is indeed a possibility of combining these two, according to the opinion of the Gerash (and not according to the Pni), then combining them will simply give the opinion of the Gerash. If so, where does the Pni enter into this combination? Is there a combination between the Pni and the Gerash?

From the perspective of the Maharal and Rabbi Tzadok, we must come to the conclusion that there is indeed a higher integration here.

As we have seen, there is a side for which only the pleasure requires payment. There is a side for which only the disadvantage requires payment. There is a side that combines both and states that both are required in order to require payment (the Gersh). The generalization of the peace of mind in this context does not mean the position that both together require payment. This is merely one of the positions in the investigation itself. The meaning of the generalization is that there is a side for which only the pleasure requires payment, and there is a side for which only the disadvantage will require payment, and there is a side for which both require payment, and all of these together are true sides. The structure of the total truth contains the temporal combination of all explanations, not the temporal combination of all components..

In the same way, it can also be understood in the investigation into the matter requiring financial damages. There we saw that the investigation is conducted at the level of the components and not at the level of the explanations. The court adopts a third explanation that includes a combination of the two components. However, as we have seen, this is not a generalization (= a simple logical combination) of the two explanations. Such a generalization is found only at the level of Divine truth. It cannot appear as a party to the investigation.

Halacha and thought

The conclusion is that the generalization of 'these and those' is found on a non-halakhic level. Halakhic asks itself who is obligated to pay. There are three possible answers to this question. In practice, we as humans must decide on only one of them as halakhically correct. Among the options, there are differences in halakhic and practical application, and therefore the generalization is not applicable on the halakhic level. However, on the intellectual level, we as humans can also understand that there is a generalization that includes all of these options together, as aspects of one overall structure. This structure is a composition of all of these options (and not of all of the components).

The conclusion is that the realm of thought allows for higher integrations than halakhah. However, it seems that they cannot be reached without the halakhic investigation that is carried out in simple logic. Only after the dichotomous clarification can a full, higher generalization be made, which will include all the possibilities that were exhausted in the study of the Ḥayyim. The investigation exhausts both possibilities, and this is a necessary condition for carrying out integration between them (in a dialectical process).

The inclusion option

Now the question arises whether humans can make such a generalization. There seems to be a logical contradiction here. If we say that both components are required to create a monetary obligation, this is a logically simple statement. The generalization of the statements: 'Pleasure causes a monetary obligation' and 'Disadvantage causes a monetary obligation' is not at all problematic. It can easily be said that both are required to create the obligation. In fact, logically, this is the complex sentence: 'Pleasure causes a monetary obligation and also a disadvantage causes a monetary obligation', which does not seem problematic (it is just less simple, and as is well-known). However, the generalization of the two explanations (and not the two components), i.e. the logical combination of the two polar statements: 'only Pleasure causes financial burden.only A disadvantage causes a monetary charge', leads to the complex sentence: 'It is true that only pleasure (and not disadvantage) causes a monetary charge, and also only disadvantage (and not pleasure) causes a monetary charge.' This is a clearly contradictory sentence!

'The Unity of Opposites'

At this point, the average learner tends to pull out the trump card of the 'unity of opposites.' With God, opposites can dwell together, since He is above logic, etc.

In my first book (see the twelfth chapter)[32] I have already argued that the unity of opposites approach is derived from medieval Christian thought (Nicolaus of Cusa). Furthermore, I showed there that it does not constitute a real solution to any problem, since we speak of it as humans. Even the claim 'in the sight of God, the above sentence is correct' cannot be asserted in human discourse. At least we, if not God, are subject to the laws of logic, and therefore in our language the above sentence means nothing. As I stated there (in the name of Rudolf Otto), such a statement is usually an expression of intellectual laziness.

Back to Logic: Two Types of Contrast

Therefore, if we wish to understand, and certainly if we wish to adopt, the position of the Maharal and Rabbi Tzadok, we must examine this composition according to the rules of ordinary human logic.

And it turns out that this problem does not exist at all if we pay attention to the fact that contradictory sentences do not always contain a logical contradiction. In moral philosophy, a distinction is made between conflicts of art (conflicting beliefs) and conflicts of duties and desires.[33] When two beliefs are incompatible, then when we embrace one we necessarily reject the other. But this is not true of desires. When I want to eat something, and on the other hand I don't want to eat it (because it is unhealthy), both desires are present in full force, even though in my actual behavior I have to choose one of them.

The same is true with respect to duties (where we discuss moral duties). When there are two conflicting moral duties, choosing one does not necessarily negate the obligation to the other. Although here too we must decide (this is what happens in every moral dilemma), this does not negate the validity of the other obligation.

Pikuach Nefesh rejects Shabbat, but this does not mean that there is no value in keeping Shabbat. Both values are valid. Halacha establishes obligations for us. When there are two conflicting obligations, we must decide between them in practice, that is, to rule on Halacha. However, both are still correct on the ideological level.

To the same extent, the halakhic ruling between different explanations does not mean the negation of the truth of the rejected opinion. In halakhic language, it can be said that the halakhic ruling makes the rejected opinion "rejected" and not permitted.[34]

From another angle, it can be said that there is a view from which it follows that a monetary obligation can only arise from pleasure, and there is a view from which it follows that a monetary obligation can only arise from disadvantage. For example, the desire to eat a food in terms of its taste leads to the preference of certain foods. On the other hand, the desire to eat it in terms of its health benefits leads (necessarily, unfortunately) to a reluctance to eat those foods, or to a preference for other foods (in principle). From each view, there is one truth that seemingly contradicts the other, but the combination of these two views is not a logical contradiction.

When looking at the conflict in this way, it is certainly possible that humans can also make this generalization, and not just God. There is certainly no need to reach the unity of opposites.[35]

There is no room here to expand on this further, and let the wise man be wiser still.

[1] Article by Rabbi Avraham Blidstein, From the desert of a gift, P. Nasa 5599, issue 78, has already discussed this matter. And it is he who inspired me to continue to deal with it.

[2] Rabbi Zvin, in his book Personalities and methods, brings up that Rogchober often speaks of three sides of the law, and not two (as has been customary in yeshivas since Rabbi Chaim). Although the name of the discussion is about the term 'two laws', which means the combination of both sides of the investigation, and not about deciding and choosing one side from among them. Often the process is dialectical: after presenting two (or three) sides that are the subject of the investigation, the conclusion is that they are all present in the context in question. It will be seen below that even when this occurs, the basic intuition is that one must first examine the possibility that only one of them is correct. See more on this in the section below.

[3] See my article on this, 'Concerning the obligation to pay compensation for property that caused damage', in Israeli Laws, Shlomo Greentz (editor), Israel Legal Institute, Petah Tikva 2003. In note 2 there I briefly discussed the problem of the dichotomy of the investigation, which is the subject of discussion in the present article.

[4] And again in the Skich, who discussed this and brought evidence from the Gm. 69b. And see also in the article of Rabbi Chaim and the Hab.Israeli Laws The above discussed this and rejected his view.

[5] See, for example, the novellas of Rabbi Shmuel (Rozovsky) in Bk. 31, and more.

[6] Although the Rosh Yeshiva Hirani, in the words of the Chazo"a, does not mean so. From his language there, it seems that the burden of proof is on the harmer because of the assumption that damage simply occurs due to the fault of the owner. Therefore, if the owner claims that there was rape, this is not the simple situation, and therefore the burden of proof is on him. And indeed, this is clearly stated in his language there, both in the Sek"z and the Sek"ch, as stated well. For our further consideration, the opinion of the Panni is mainly important, and the opinion of the Chazo"a was presented only as an opposing possibility, in order to clarify the understanding underlying the position of the Panni. Such a position can be regarded as a side that arises according to Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky, and not as the method of the Chazo"a himself.

We note that according to this explanation in the HaZu'a, the question of the head of the Ora in Yevamot 64:2 will be discussed, which the Rishonim in Yevamot there, 2011, found difficult in Yevamot there, where the halakhic

It should be noted, however, that both the Ḥazū'a and the explanation in these first verses are based on the halakhah of the ki'al that a ḥazaq does not take money from the holder, and even a rabbi (which is better than a ḥazaq) does not take money from the holder. If so, it is seemingly difficult to see why estimates, such as the one that the damage does not occur without the owner's crime, or the one that determines that an ox that goesuges a Ḥazaq is a moed, take money from the holder?

It can be said that in these cases, assumptions define a hold and do not exclude a known hold. A hold does not exclude a known hold, but when the hold itself depends on this estimate, here it is possible for the assumption to exclude a hold. Although I wrote a second paragraph: Where does it say that the estimate determines a hold and where are the normal hold rules taken into account?

Therefore, it seems to say more than that. Indeed, wherever we state that such assumptions exclude a holder (or determine the holder), it is only because even without this estimate there is no holder. Only in situations where there is no holder is the assumption which determines the holder. Of course, we must now ask why in these cases without these estimates there is no holder.

Let us return to the aforementioned Khazo'a, and see this in his case. According to our words, it appears that according to the Khazo'a method, it is not really the tortfeasor who is held, since the estimate would not have been sufficient to extract from him. The reason for this is that in any case, the Khazo'a apparently does not understand as it used to be that negligence is what obligates payment, since the tortfeasor was held and the estimate would not have been sufficient to extract from him (or to make the damage a tortfeasor). If so, the reason why there is no tortfeasor in torts is probably because according to the Khazo'a, at least there is a party for whom the fact that he caused the damage is what obligates payment. Only against this background can the estimate determine that the damage is the tortfeasor, and as a matter of law.

And the above-mentioned recent scholars were not entirely wrong in their understanding of the prophecy, and I agree with them more.

[7] And one should also somewhat reject the attribution of the opinion of the PNI to the side that negligence in maintenance requires payment. Perhaps it can be said that although negligence is only a condition, the SUS is also required in order to oblige the person to pay. Therefore, as long as it is not known that he did not maintain properly, the damage is still the one that is responsible and the burden of proof is on him. The latter, who understood in the PNI that negligence in maintenance is the one that requires payment, apparently assume that the condition of negligence in maintenance is a condition of exemption and not a condition of liability.

Although such a formulation already brings us closer to the position that both parameters are required equally, it is not clear why negligence is considered one-sided.

Although it is very clear that a negative condition cannot constitute a primary condition for the law to apply, there is perhaps room to see a positive condition as a secondary condition for application (at least if it is not the only positive condition). We will discuss this in more detail below. See also below in note 13.

[8] See the detailed explanation of this in the above articles.

[9] It is clear that even after this explanation, there remains a huge, and not at all necessary, innovation in the words of the defendant. Even if one understands that the fact that the owner caused the damage is what requires payment, it still seems more reasonable to hold the owner of the dog who drove it responsible. If so, it is clear that this is a narrow ruling even according to the understanding that the obligor is the fact that the owner caused the damage. However, it is clear that without this understanding, if the obligor was the negligence in guarding, there would be no room at all to exempt the owner who drove it. Therefore, it is clearly proven by the defendant that the obligor is the very fact that the owner caused the damage (and not the negligence in guarding).

[10] Although see the comment of the Rosh Yeshiva cited above.

[11] See my above article, where I detailed this two-step process in the formation of the charge, and proved its existence.

[12] According to most Rishonim, this is an incorrect reading of the Gemara, but it is undoubtedly an investigation that the commentators make of each of the sides in the Gemara itself (regarding each of the two sides of the doubt). Therefore, for our purposes this is a useful and sufficient abstraction.

[13] In the terms of the above NEPM, it is stated that if there is doubt whether the tenant benefits, the burden of proof will be on the landlord, but if there is doubt whether the landlord is absent, the burden of proof will also be on the tenant (since the absence of a disadvantage is a waiver, and not that the disadvantage is binding. See note 7 above, on the difference between a positive and negative condition in relation to liability for financial damages).

[14] See my book, Two carts and a hot air balloon – On Judaism and Postmodernism, Bethel 5772, p. 404, as well as additional aspects in the second part, which will be published in the near future. See also my articles In straight lines In, and inNoon Tu.

[15] See the discussion in my book, mentioned in the previous note.

[16] And regarding this, if we were to find a common basis (an equal side) for disadvantage and pleasure, we could indeed conclude that each of them can cause a financial obligation. In fact, the common basis that exists in both is what causes it.

[17] The very feeling that we choose the simplest of options is hardly controversial in the philosophical world, but it itself is not simple (!) at all. There are theories that seem complicated, and it is difficult to argue that they are the simplest. It seems to me that in all cases there is some intuitive sense of simplicity, but the criteria for it are not always uniform.

[18] I have not found explicit formulations of this rule (at least in this language) in the early literature, but it is clear that it forms the basis for many halachic discussions already in the Talmud and Rishonim. For an explicit formulation, see the Responsa. True doctrine C. K.N.H. means 'all this', and in the Responsorial Psalm A stain on David Chaiv'd 316, meaning 'indeed, again', and in the Responsa of the Maharsdam, Chach'am 34, meaning 'and to ask my name'.

[19] It should be noted that the dispute between the Ran and the Rishonim could have been explained precisely on this basis, whether one incurs a penalty for every shiur eaten. However, this explanation requires additional assumptions (regarding the commentary on the Mishnah Makot 21a), and therefore it is rejected because it is more complicated. See the novellas of the Ri Migash on Tractate Shavuot 22a (and also in the novellas of the Rashba where he discusses his words), where he seems to raise the possibility that even when one eats several shiurs, one is only violating one prohibition. Although, even if this is his intention, this is apparently a singular opinion in halakhic law.

[20] Torah of Life, edited by Y. Hershkowitz, Eretz Israel (publisher and year of printing not specified). The above-quoted material is found in the booklet 'Limmud HaTorah' printed at the end of the book, on page 95.

[21] In fact, there is a rule of presumption here that is accepted in several halakhic contexts. An ox that is gored three times is considered to be gored (this is the example given at the end of the quote). And more generally: if something happens three times, even if each time we could have a good independent explanation for it, we assume that there is a single element behind the three occurrences.

A well-known discussion of this issue is found at the beginning of the third chapter of Tractate Baba Batra, which discusses the three-year lease (a person who holds land for three years is considered its owner and does not need to provide proof of this), where it is discussed whether this lease also comes from the same family (see, for example, the book Jacob's communities, See R. Yaakov Yisrael Kanievsky, Taharat, section 44). The discussion was inspired by the comparison in the G.M. of this assumption to the assumption of the bull of the month (mentioned above), regarding which the Rishonim (the Maharam of Rothenburg and Rabbi Peretz) disagreed as to whether it is an assumption that indicates (about the nature of the bull) or creates (the bull has a nature to strike). On this matter, see the column Orach Chaim, end of section 14.

It is necessary to discuss what caused Rabbi Chaim to bring evidence specifically from the aforementioned Hagigah, and not from all these direct sources that deal with khizah, and there is no room here to elaborate on this.

[22] For further details on this issue, see Rabbi Yosef Kellner's book, Pluralism, pantheism and generalities (the criterion for truth, the criterion for morality), Midreshet Netzarim, Elul 576. Also see the booklet A decade of leaves, Yeshiva Hesder Yerucham, Elul 5763, pp. 36 ff.

[23] For the view that theoretical study does not reveal the inner face of Halacha but rather creates such a face, see Haim Navon's article inentree H. In contrast, see my articles inentree ninth'.

[24] See on this point in Enlightenment 10 of my first book, where I insist that simple concepts can be described in a complicated way. The simplicity of the term is not necessarily proportional to the logical simplicity of the concept that the linguistic term describes (in the language of analytic philosophy: the 'color' of the term).

[25] See Northern decoder, to R.M. Kasher, in the eighth chapter, for a discussion and demonstration of this distinction.

[26] In the aforementioned article by Rabbi Blidstein, he reaches a similar conclusion. He calls this a living (=organic) structure that contains these two parameters. According to his conclusion, these two are its characteristics, and the explanation does not require the two characteristics but the existence of the structure itself that they characterize.

[27] There is a situation where the combination of the two concepts creates a third concept, and it is clear that only it can cause the law in question. Here too, it is possible to combine two components in the same situation. See Explanation 10 in the aforementioned books, and at greater length in the second book.

[28] Ostensibly, according to the razor principle, this is less simple. However, the court apparently understands that there is no problem of simplicity here either, since each component has a distinct role in causing the obligation. The pleasure is what causes the financial-legal debt, and the disadvantage reduces the side problem of the degree of sodomy. Therefore, every result has a single-component factor, but the result is complex, and therefore the factors contain two parameters.

This is a very similar structure to the structure he himself proposes with respect to financial damages. There too, we saw that ownership defines liability and negligence allows the liability to be transferred to the owner. Therefore, not only is there no contradiction in the words of the pnni, but in fact in both places he says something very similar.

[29] The distinction between the process and the extreme states it passes through is discussed at length in my articles 'Zenon's Cross and Modern Physics', in inspection Mo, Jerusalem will be abandoned. For a detailed halachic context of this distinction (regarding the granting of a divorce), see my article in the weekly page of the Department of Basic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, p. Ki-Tza Tashna. See also Aro 7 and 31, in my aforementioned books.

[30] For Rabbi Tzadok's position, see Night shards, Bnei Brak 1967, p. 18. And according to the Maharal, see The way of life, pp. Ranah-Rant, andThe Exile's Well, pp. 20-21.

[31] The Rosh Yeshiva emphasized this in the general lesson on the controversy between the B'Sh and B'H regarding 'how we dance.' His argument was, contrary to the prevailing perception, that there is no contradiction between truth and peace. Peace is the highest and most correct truth. Peace between opinions creates a structure that is the composition of all of them, and thus truth is created. Peace is from the root of peace.

[32] See more in my articles 'What is a disease?'Noon on.

[33] See in this regard Moral dilemmas, Daniel Statman, Magnes, Jerusalem Teshana, pp. 36-38.

[34] And the editor is alert to the places in Halacha that indicate a relationship of 'permissibility' between two values. However, even there it is clear that neither of them is invalid. For example, regarding public impurity, opinions differed as to whether it was permissible or rejected (see Yoma 6b and Sanhedrin 12b and parallels), yet it is clear that the negative value of working in impurity is not invalid. Therefore, it seems that there is no contradiction from there to the subject of the discussion.

[35] See my articles 'What is a disease?' Noon B, where I rejected Daniel Weil's claim (in a note to his article in logic A). Weil claimed that in every statement of 'two laws' there is a logical contradiction. The formulation there is slightly different, since the problem is different. However, in any case, I have shown that the concept of 'two laws', which is itself an apparently contradictory generalization, is exactly the kind we are discussing here, and here people manage to do it without a problem (see there the logical explanation for this).