The harm of eating citric acid on Passover without knowing it

With God’s help

Torah-Halakhic Opinion:

The harm of eating citric acid on Passover without knowing it

Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham

Higher Institute of Torah, Bar Ilan University

Phone: 052-3320543

The question

The Priner company marketed products that included citric acid, which was kosher for Passover by the Chief Rabbinate. A few days before Passover, it was discovered that there was concern that the citric acid was made from wheat starch and therefore contained gluten, meaning that there was concern that it would be prohibited from making leaven. The Chief Rabbinate announced that the kosher certification for the product had been removed, but some buyers purchased the products that were in stores and even used them during Passover.

As a result, a class action lawsuit was filed against the Perinir company for damages for the failure to eat chametz on Passover. Although the company claims that it ultimately turned out that there was no gluten in the product, it asked me for a halachic and Torah opinion on the extent of the harm involved in eating such a product, on the assumption (which the company claims is incorrect) that the product did contain citric acid made from wheat.

As will be explained, this clarification is not a standard halakhic clarification, and it also requires us to delve into various Torah and meta-halakhic questions.

Distinguishing between two types of consumers

The Supreme Court ruling (p. 68) distinguishes between two types of consumers that must be addressed:

• A person who ate the product without knowing that its kashrut had been removed.
• A person who did not consume the product due to the lowering of kashrut and did not receive compensation for it.

Our concern here is solely with type (1). The question regarding consumers of type (2) is not halakhic but economic-commercial, and as such is not a matter for halakhic opinion. Nevertheless, I will make a comment here regarding this type.

In sections 1-3 below, it appears that the product was actually kosher by the standards of regular kashrut, and therefore the consumers who did not actually consume it were misled by the Chief Rabbinate. Therefore, their complaint should be directed to it and not to the company.

Furthermore, after Passover, the product is permissible for use (at most, it is a mixture of the rabbinic leaven), and it does not have the law of leaven that was passed on during Passover. Therefore, in principle, they could use the product after Passover and no harm would have been done to them.

Beyond that, consumers who wanted to could return the product to the company and get their money back. If they did not return the product to the company, they cannot ask it for compensation for it (since the company could have used the product at least after Passover). Furthermore, if these consumers did not return the product to the company, even if due to lack of knowledge, the company is at most an indirect cause ("grama" in halakhic terminology) for them throwing away the product and not using it. Halacha does not stipulate an obligation to compensate for damage caused by grama.

Of course, all of this only applies to consumers of this type who did not attempt to return the product to the company and get their money back. If there were some who tried and the company did not compensate them, this is a legal-commercial question and not a halachic one, and the matter is left to state law and the courts.

Distinguishing between subjective and objective damage

As for consumers of type (1), the starting point is to distinguish between two types of harm that must be discussed: subjective harm – that is, the sorrow and hurt that a person felt when he learned in retrospect that he had eaten a product that was not kosher for Passover, or a product with concerns about leavening. Objective harm – spiritual harm that, according to the Torah-religious perception, was caused to a person as a result of eating such a product.

It should be noted that the term "objective" here may be confusing. Its meaning here is not measurable damage using objective scientific tools, of course, but spiritual damage (which is not measurable using such tools). The use of the term "objective" here is to exclude the subjective damage that exists only in the human mind, as defined above.

This distinction is important for our discussion, because we must distinguish between two types of situations here:

• A person who consumed the product and was not even aware that its kashrut had been removed.
• A person who consumed the product and learned afterwards that its kosher status had been removed and he ate a non-kosher product.

In case A, the question is solely objective: whether such a person was harmed, and how it should be attributed. There is no subjective harm, since such a person does not even know that he consumed a problematic product. In contrast, in case B, there are two types of harm: the objective harm described above, and in addition, the subjective harm, that is, the sorrow and hurt that that person felt when he learned that he had eaten leaven on Passover. With regard to consumers of type (2), this distinction is not relevant at all, since they did not consume the product. There is no objective or subjective harm, but, as mentioned, only economic-commercial harm.

The investigation here will be conducted in two stages, one after the other: Part A will deal with the investigation of the objective damage, and then in Part B an investigation will be conducted regarding the subjective damage.

The investigation methodology

Even in terms of the objective question (which will be discussed in Part A), this is a non-standard question, and therefore it is difficult to treat it as a purely halakhic question. Halakhic law deals with questions such as what is permitted and what is prohibited to eat, and it also determines in each case whether or not there is a prohibition, and if so – at what level (torah, rabbinic, custom, etc.). But here we are dealing with a different question: whether any harm was caused to someone who accidentally ate such food. This is not only a halakhic question, but no less a meta-halakhic, intellectual and Torah question, which is indeed related to and dependent on halakhic questions, but not only on them.

The subjective question (which will be discussed in Part B) of course depends on this clarification, but there is also the psychological dimension (how does the person who ate such a product feel, and to what extent is he harmed). This, of course, is not a purely halakhic question either.

Important note: To understand the opinion in general, it is sufficient to read Section 9 of Part A (which begins on page 21), and Part B, which is very short (and even in it, you can only read the lines that are highlighted and enlarged within the text).

• The question of objective damage

Order of inquiry

The question of objective harm is divided into two main parts: A. To what extent did the food violate a prohibition for which he is responsible (the question of guilt and the punishment he deserves). B. To what extent did he suffer spiritual harm from eating the thing.

This question should be investigated in the following order:

1. Is there a prohibition on eating citric acid on Passover?
2. If there is such a prohibition, what is its level (Torah or Rabbinic)?
3. Is this a sufficient or certain prohibition?
4. What is the limit of doubting a prohibition in Halacha?
5. In terms of assessing the damage, it is also important to clarify the nature of the prohibition on eating citric acid and leaven in general on Passover. Is this a gabra (subjective) prohibition or a hefza (objective) prohibition?
6. The question of the "stupidity of the heart" that exists in such eating.
7. Is eating without knowledge when the product has a kosher seal considered accidental, tampering, or rape, and what is the halachic significance of any such assumption?
8. The question of assessment and the non-apparent damage.
9. Is there a cause of action for such damage?

We will now discuss all of these questions, one by one. At the end of each section, a summary paragraph (in large font) will appear containing the main conclusions concerning our subject.

1-3. Is there a prohibition and what is its level?

Rabbi Suissa addressed these questions in his opinion. To be brief, I will first summarize his remarks that pertain to our case, and then add an important point that he did not touch upon.

Summary of Rabbi Suissa's words

• This is glucose that is separated from wheat starch, and it is mixed into these foods even before Passover in a very small amount (less than 1/60, which generally prohibits a mixture according to Halacha. This is the term "bitul beshis").
• In the prohibition of chametz on Passover, a special severity was stated, that "its proportion is something." That is, a mixture with chametz is prohibited even if the proportion of the prohibition in it is less than 1/60. Indeed, according to all poskim, this is the law of the rabbis, and from Torah it is certain that chametz is invalidated by sixty, like all prohibitions (see 216 (O'H. Si' Tamaz Ska'a who brought the first reasons for this.) AndFrom the city Name of the school andMB There, the Supreme Court ruled that when there are other parties to be lenient, one should be lenient according to the opinion of theQueries The Mikal is even more lenient and believes that leaven on Passover is invalidated by sixty percent, just like the other prohibitions.
• It is true that the poskim disagreed on whether what was mixed before Pesach in a lesson that is canceled is repeated and shaken on Pesach itself and is forbidden in some way. The main sources are cited in Rabbi Suissa in section 4 and I will not repeat them. According to the law, most poskim are lenient in this regard, but some have been stricter, and even in their system, one must be satisfied with whether their severity was also stated in the case of a wet-to-wet mixture, which is our case (see ibid.).
• He further added that there was a disagreement among the jurists regarding the prohibition that dried up and turned into "dust" (meaning that it became unfit for a dog to eat) and even took on a new appearance (its appearance and essence changed). Some believe that its prohibition has been abolished and will not be shaken again even if it mixes with food and together with it becomes fit for eating again, and other jurists disagree with them.

In conclusion, this is a prohibition that is at most a rabbinical prohibition. According to most opinions, it was abrogated before Passover and is completely permissible to eat. According to very specific opinions, it is repeated and shaken, and even in these it is not clear whether it is also a matter of wet and wet, as in the case of Didan. Therefore, this is at most a slight doubt about the rabbinical prohibition. And on the side of this doubt (for those schools that have a repeated law and shaking wet and wet), this is a prohibition that has changed its appearance and dried up like dust, and about which the poskim also disagreed.

If so, this is at most a question of doubt regarding the prohibition of the rabbis:

1. Assuming that gluten is forbidden by the Torah, there is still initial doubt as to whether there was even gluten in the product.
2. Even if there was gluten, it was nullified before Passover, and it is doubtful whether there is a law that can be reversed and shaken. Of course, even if there is a law that can be reversed and shaken, it is a rabbinical prohibition (because according to the Torah, it is nullified according to all opinions). Most systems do not have a law that can be reversed and shaken, at least in a wet-wet mixture. So this doubt is actually not a balance, but a majority opinion against a minority.
3. Even if there is a law that is repeated and shaken, there is doubt when it becomes like dust and becomes fit to eat again.

Summary

The rule is that even in a Torah prohibition when there is a doubt of two spicahs (two spicahs), there is no prohibition, and certainly not when there are three spicahs. What's more, this is a rabbinical prohibition, and even when there is one doubt, it is permissible according to the halakha to be lenient (=there is no prohibition against eating it).

The obvious conclusion from Rabbi Suissa's analysis is that this product should not be attributed any prohibition at all.

Additional note: Something that has a permit

There is, however, another point that Rabbi Suissa did not discuss, and that is the law of "something that is permissible" (=Dashilam). The Gemara (see Bitza 3:2-4:1 and parallels) states that if there is a temporary prohibition, that is, a prohibition that will become permissible again after a period of time, then during the time it is prohibited, various halachic permissives should not be applied to it, such as the rabbinic doubt of a quola and the nullification of a majority in a mixture. This is also how all the halachic jurists have ruled (see Rambam, Halacha 19:15-20, and Halacha Machalot Asurot 55:9-10, and inShulchan Arba'ah (Yod C. K. B. S. A. and many more).

This may change the picture that emerges from Rabbi Suissa's analysis. Although we have seen that in the question before us (a mixture of lemon salt) there is a doubt about the validity and invalidation of the majority, but since leaven is something that is permissible, there is room to say that it is not invalidated by the majority and its prohibition is not even in some way, and there is no room for leniency in its validity (even though it is a rabbinical prohibition). Therefore, one who ate this mixture on Passover violated a prohibition even if such a mixture is permitted under the regular prohibition.

Clarification: Chametz Kadshilam

The Rishonim and Aharonim differed on the basis of the law of Deshilam. Most of them (see Rashi Bitza, there, and many others) believe that the reason is that until one eats something forbidden, one eats it with permission, meaning that eating something forbidden is not permissible under these mechanisms if one can wait and eat it with complete permission after a while. But Ran Nedarim 55b wrote that it is because it is like a species of its own kind that is not nullified (the prohibition that is about to be nullified is also like a permission, and therefore is not nullified by another permission).

We should note that, for the vast majority of the jurists, the law of Deshilam is rabbinical only, and from Torah even a prohibition that has a permit is annulled by a majority. Although some have written that according to the Ran's method, this is a law of Deshilam, others have sided with him, saying that even according to his method, this is a prohibition of the rabbis. We should also note that according to the Ran's method, a distinction must be made between the severity of Deshilam regarding annulment by a majority and the severity of Deshilam regarding doubt by the rabbis. Regarding doubt, there is no room for this opinion of the Ran (it pertains only to questions of annulment by a majority. In the laws of Spikut, there is no difference between a species of its own species and a species of its own species), and therefore in Spikut it is clear that he also admits that this is a law that is based on the other Rishonim's opinion (until we eat with a prohibition, we eat with permission). Therefore, in Spikut, by all opinions, this is a law of the rabbis only. It should be remembered that in any case, this is a question of rabbinic doubt (since in a question of Torah, one must be stricter even without permission. Although a question of spicah can have implications even with respect to Torah law). In any case, according to the law, all the poskim have ruled that even with regard to annulment, by a majority, this is a question of rabbinic law.[1]

Now we must add that there are some jurists who have distinguished between a mixture of the same sex that is not invalidated and a mixture of the same sex that is not invalidated, even if it has a permissible substance.[2] Other poskim hold that even in a gender that is not specified, a deshilam is not nullified.[3] And in law he ruled inShulchan Arba'ah The Rabbi of the Jewish People, Rabbi Si' 2b SA, says that a sex of a different sex is indeed annulled in sixty. We should note that in our case we are dealing with a mixture of sex of a different sex (the prohibition and the permission are different things in taste and appearance).[4].

Is leaven a prohibition that has a permissibility? Apparently, yes, since it is permitted after Pesach.[5] But the rabbis ruled against eating leaven that has been eaten since Passover (although they did not rule so in the case of a leaven mixture, which is permitted to be eaten after Passover). We saw above that leaven is forbidden even in one respect, meaning that it is not nullified by a majority. Some of the rabbis explain this on the grounds that leaven is a deshilam, but not all of the rabbis agree with this.[6] The Ramban explains that when the Sages imposed a fine on chametz that had passed Pesach, they certainly did not intend to make it easier for it to be annulled, but rather to be stricter on it, and therefore, despite the rabbinic prohibition, chametz is a deshilam that does not become annulled. And in a mixture of chametz, it is permitted after Pesach, and therefore there is more reason to believe that it is regular deshilam.

Furthermore, regarding the methods that say that leaven is a deshilam, the poskim wrote that leaven is more severe than other things that they allow, since in other matters we saw above that the poskim were divided on whether a species that they did not specify also a deshilam is nullified in sixty, but with leaven, some wrote that according to all opinions it is not nullified, and they were strict about it, since the Torah said, "You shall not eat any leavened food."[7]

Indeed, some of the first ones disagree with all of this and claim that leaven on Passover is not a dishilm. The Rabbi explains this by saying that the bulk of the material in the dishilm that is not invalid is nothing but from the rabbis (as we saw above). And it seems that he is referring to the argument of "What do you mean by that?" From the Torah, even dishilm is invalid, and from the rabbis it is not permissible.[8] Others explain that leaven returns to its prohibition the following year, and anything that returns to its prohibition by itself is not a deshilam at all.[9]

Deciding on a citric acid mixture

If we return to our subject, we are talking about a mixture of chametz, and if it is a dishilm, then it should be prohibited from being eaten on Passover. This is of course according to the methods that chametz is indeed a dishilm. And according to these methods, a mixture of chametz of one kind and that of another must be discussed, and as we have seen, there is disagreement on this as well. According to the methods that chametz is not a dishilm, the usual laws of nullification apply here, and we return to the previous discussion by Rabbi Suissa, whose conclusion is that there is no prohibition here at all.

Both opinions are presented in Ramat Ya'akov, 12:44 (and some have also included the two opinions in U'ach, 13:39). See Report (See also the same in Chiddushim 633). We note that the bearers of the instruments inShulchan Arba'ah The judges there disagree on how to decide this.

It is clear that this is at most a dispute regarding the prohibition of the rabbis. First, all the law of deshilam is from the rabbis. Even for the systems that according to the Ran are from the Torah, we saw that it was said only regarding deshilam in tylut and not regarding deshilam in spikot. And here we have both a tylut (because it is a mixture) and a doubt, and in fact a spikot doubt: Is there a law that repeats and shakes on Pesach and does the prohibition that we dry out and make a new face revert to its prohibition, and another initial doubt is whether there is gluten in the mixture at all. As stated, deshilam in spikot, even according to the Ran's system, is only a rabbinical matter.

We find that here we have a doubt about the prohibition of the rabbis, and therefore one must also go to the conclusion. Furthermore, there are some of the poskim who wrote that the severity of the deshilam was stated mainly in case of doubt in reality, but in case of doubt in law, the deshilam law should be relaxed.[10] And according to this, in our case, when it comes to legal doubt, there is room for even greater leniency.

It should also be added that here we are talking about a question of spiqa (=ss) and not one question. And the poskim disagree on the question of whether in general, ss should also be made stricter in shilim. Another faction of Rishonim believes that ss is permitted in shilim, even when the prohibition is in the Torah.[11] Although there are those who believe that even the rabbinic prohibition of the Shilam is forbidden.[12] And some are divided and believe that the prohibition of the Torah should be made stricter in the Shilam, and the prohibition of the rabbis should be made lenient.[13] Finally, there is a disagreement in the SS regarding the Torah prohibition of whether or not it should be made stricter in Shilam.

Summary

First, let us recall that the company claims that there was no gluten in the product at all. According to the plaintiffs, there is at most a concern that gluten may be present in the product. Even if there is definitely gluten in the product, it seems that there is no prohibition on such a product at all. In order to reach the conclusion that it is nevertheless prohibited, we must assume a great many assumptions, each and every one of which is controversial: we must assume that there is a law that is repeated and shaken, and that leaven that was in a state unfit for dog food is repeated and prohibited in a mixture, and that leaven is considered a dishilm, and as such it is not nullified by sixty even in the case of a gender that is not its gender. All of these are principles of the prohibition of the rabbis, so that at most we are dealing with a multiplicity of rabbis.

The conclusion is that there is a very slim possibility, if any, of reaching the conclusion that there is a prohibition here. And even according to that, at most it is a question of a rabbinical prohibition, and according to the law, even a single rabbinical doubt does not constitute a prohibition. In fact, we could stop the discussion here and say that the product is simply kosher, and therefore the person who ate it was not harmed, certainly on an objective level.

To further strengthen the conclusion that there is no harm here, we will adopt from now on, just for the sake of discussion, the view (very problematic, as mentioned) that there is nevertheless a doubt about the rabbinic prohibition here, and we will examine even with this assumption how much harm can be seen in eating such a product.

4. The fence of a doubt is a prohibition.

As stated, this is at most a question of prohibition. For the purposes of the remainder, we must examine exactly what the definition of a question of prohibition is. It is not clear whether the prohibitions of doubt are within the scope of a regular prohibition or whether there is only a qualification here and not a substantive prohibition. Below we will see the implications of this question for the subject of the debate.

Fence of prohibitions on access

Halacha is well aware that the person who is obligated to it may find himself in situations of doubt, and it must give him instructions on how to act in such situations. The agreed-upon rule in Halacha is that the guidance depends on the nature of the prohibition in question. If there is doubt about a rabbinical prohibition, one can go to the kollel, whereas in doubt about a prohibition from the Torah, one must be stricter (see Bitza 3b and parallels, and in the poskim). Regarding the obligation to be stricter in doubt from the Torah, the Rishonim disagreed:[14] Maimonides and his followers believe that the obligation to be strict is only from the rabbis, but from the Torah one can go to the Kola.[15] In contrast, the Rashba and his party believe that the obligation to be strict is from Torah.

Explanation of the essence of the prohibitions of doubt

The Acharonites discussed the essence of the obligation to be stricter in the spikot. This is a broad and profound issue, and here I can only present the gist of the discussion by one of the greatest Acharonites, Rabbi Shimon Shekap (=R"sh), who discussed this at length in his book Straight hair In Chapter 1, where he expands and summarizes the various methods.

Let's start with an example. I have a piece of meat in front of me and I have doubts about whether it is pork or kosher meat. In such a situation, I am obligated to be strict (because the prohibition against eating pork is from the Torah). What would happen if I nevertheless relaxed and ate the piece of meat? Apparently, I have violated a prohibition, since the halakhah requires that I be strict in such a situation. I violated the prohibition of doubt from the Torah to the grave (which is itself a Torah prohibition according to the Rishba and a rabbinical prohibition according to the Rambam). And what if it was eventually discovered that the meat I ate was kosher, did I in such a case violate a prohibition? Apparently, yes. Although I did not violate the prohibition against eating pork, I violated the obligation to be strict in the laws of spikot. It can be said that I violated the prohibition of "entering the house of doubt," meaning that the obligation to be strict in situations of doubt is actually a prohibition against taking a halakhic risk of committing an offense.

In Chapter 1, Chapter 3 (Letter 31 in the Responsa Project edition), R. S. discusses this question and links it to the essence of the prohibitions of doubt: The question is whether this is a prohibition of "entering the house of doubt," that is, a prohibition against taking a halakhic risk, or whether there is only a warning here about the essential prohibition itself. He links it to the controversy between Rambam and Rashba that we mentioned:

And according to the Rashba, for every doubtful prohibition, there is an additional prohibition. That is, in addition to the prohibition itself, which depends on the reality of the matter, whether it has violated an offense or not, there is also an additional prohibition on it for what brings itself into the doubtful prohibition, and this additional prohibition is a certain prohibition. That is, even if he did not violate the actual prohibition, the M.M. has violated the additional prohibition that he violated the will of God that he brought himself into the house of doubt. And the Rambam does not include any additional prohibition on a doubtful prohibition that God did not warn him about, and the choice is given to the person who does it, if he wants to bring himself into the doubtful prohibition, he is permitted and entitled to it, but he must know that if he does not violate the actual prohibition, then he is free from any punishment. But if he violates the actual prohibition, he will receive his punishment either by divine law or in the court of law according to the appropriate law. There is no claim of rape or negligence in the fact that he did not know at the time of the act that he knew the doubt that he was reasonable, and both sides are possible and reasonable. And from the Revised Standard Version of the Law of the Doom, warning of doubt means warning is also liable to punishment in the law of the Doom.

He explains that according to the Maimonides, there is no prohibition against "entering the house of doubt," but rather the prohibitions of doubt are merely a warning against the prohibition itself. In other words, if it turns out that I ate pork, the prohibitions of doubt constitute a warning, and now I cannot claim that I was a fornicator or an accidental person. But the prohibition that I violated is the prohibition against eating pork. And if I did not eat pork, then there was no prohibition at all in my actions. Whereas according to the Rashba, he explains that beyond the prohibition against pork itself, the essence of the prohibitions of doubt is a prohibition against the very act of "entering the house of doubt." Therefore, even if it is discovered in retrospect that the meat was kosher, according to the Rashba, the person who ate it violated the prohibition against entering the house of doubt, since he took a risk that he was forbidden to take.

Later there he adds and summarizes (there at the beginning of the letter 34):

According to what is explained here, not all spikits were permitted according to the law of the Torah, but rather the Torah did not warn, and the doubt of the prohibition stands in its place, and whoever spares his life is certainly entitled, according to the path of the Torah, to withdraw from spiking a prohibition.

He claims that according to all the methods, it is clear that the laws of spikot do not permit the forbidden food or act itself. If I ate pork, then there must have been forbidden eating (accidentally, by force, or intentionally). The prohibitions of doubt only direct a person how to act in situations of doubt (whether he is permitted or prohibited from taking risks), but it is still appropriate for everyone to be stricter for fear that he will ultimately violate the prohibition (for even where the laws of spikot allow for leniency, or tell a person not to take a risk, the prohibition still stands). Therefore, according to Maimonides, the sages made it stricter and imposed on us an obligation not to take the risk, even though, in his opinion, the Torah itself permits it.

And in chapter 4 (verse 37) he makes it difficult in light of the concept we described above:

And I still haven't settled my mind on all the laws of spikkot, since we have explained and proven that the prohibition itself does not expire, how is it possible that the Sages or the Torah would allow a person to doubt a prohibition with a reasonable doubt and leave it to chance to stumble against the will of the Most Merciful, and also to fall further into punishment at the hands of Heaven or by the Law.

If the prohibition indeed stands and the laws of spikut only warn against rape (Karmambam), or forbid or permit a person to enter the house of a doubter (Karshaba), how is this possible? Is it conceivable that we would allow a person to enter a doubter and take the risk of violating a prohibition with open eyes?

And in the letter 30 there he explains:

And according to the Rambam, the issue is the same in all the laws of spikkut according to the Rambam's system, unless the Torah warns of an additional prohibition on a person's behavior when he has doubts about the actual prohibition, and in some of them the Sages also relaxed that he should behave in a way that is not right, because at a time when he does not know how to avoid a sin from the prohibition, only when he learns that he has committed a transgression does the sin and punishment renew and he is obligated to perform them, and according to the Shulchan Arash, even in cases of doubt about impurity in the Rabba, the Achaz joins in committing to perform them, both ascending and descending, and even without joining if he learns after a time that he has become impure, the Rabbani is obligated to perform them, unless he is considered to be wilful if there was a reasonable doubt that the clarification is available.

He explains that according to the Rambam, there is no prohibition on entering the house of a doubter (since, as we have seen, only if it is revealed to him in retrospect that he ate something forbidden is there a sin upon him) because when he is unaware of the prohibition, there is no prohibition upon him. The prohibitions of the Torah do not have an objective essence, and they depend on the consciousness of the person who transgresses them.

What happens in the prohibitions of the rabbis?

In the case under discussion, we are talking about a rabbinical prohibition. As we have seen, there is no obligation to be strict in a rabbinical prohibition. Therefore, in such a case, if a person ate something that was doubtfully forbidden by a rabbinical prohibition, he did not violate a prohibition at all, even if he learned afterwards that there was indeed a forbidden food or act. From the discussion here, it is proven that the entire debate is only about Torah prohibitions, but there is no problem with rabbinical prohibitions that were eaten in situations of doubt, even if they were eaten intentionally (which is not the case in our case).

Although this should be noted from the ruling on Shilm, which we discussed above. We have seen that according to most Rishonim, the aggravation of the rabbinic doubt regarding Shilm stems from the consideration that it is better not to allow a person to be lenient if he can eat the thing with complete permission. Therefore, the rule of shiksh rabbinic for kolala lakah is stated in this type of prohibition. Ostensibly, this indicates that in a situation of doubt about a rabbinic prohibition, there is a dimension of prohibition, otherwise why not allow a person to be lenient in a situation of doubt even if he has permission. In what way is it better for him to eat the product later with permission if he can also eat it now with complete permission?

But this claim must be rejected, since it is certainly possible that the Sages were considering a subjective consideration here. In order to educate us not to relax prohibitions, they tell us that we must also beware of situations of rabbinic doubt that are permissible to relax. Therefore, they tell us to prefer to eat the thing with permission and not to use the permission of a rabbinic doubt. And indeed, as R. Sh. argued above, if there were a dimension of true prohibition in a rabbinic doubt, there would be no room for the very rule that the rabbinic doubt is valid. Below we will see that in general, rabbinic prohibitions are apparently subjective prohibitions.

Summary

In our case, it is a rabbinical prohibition, and we have seen that in a rabbinical prohibition there is no obligation to be strict. Therefore, it is clear here that the one who relaxed did not violate a prohibition, even if he learned in retrospect that he did violate a prohibition. The entire discussion here is irrelevant in relation to him.

Furthermore, up to this point we have dealt with someone who intentionally violated the obligation to be strict in a situation of doubt regarding the Torah, or someone who intentionally ate something that was forbidden by the rabbis. But if someone does this accidentally, carelessly, or out of force, the conclusion is even more compelling that he did not violate any prohibition at all. This will be clarified further below.

5. Between the prohibition of gabra and the prohibition of hafza

When addressing the question of the harm caused by eating something forbidden, it is necessary to first distinguish between the prohibitions of hafza and the prohibitions of gabra. The commentators divide all halakhic prohibitions into two types: prohibitions of hafza are things that are inherently forbidden. Prohibitions of gabra are prohibitions on a person to perform an action or eat, but without determining that the thing itself is inherently harmful. We will discuss here whether the scope of the prohibition against eating leaven is a prohibition of gabra (a prohibition on the act of eating) or a prohibition of hafza (the leaven itself is considered an object of prohibition, and the physical pleasure from it is a forbidden result).

Rabbinic prohibitions and temporary prohibitions

The Gemara in Nedir 2:1 distinguishes between vows that are prohibitions of the hafza and oaths that are prohibitions of the gabra. It is customary to explain that when a person vows a prohibition against a particular object, a prohibition applies to the object itself, and this is what is called a prohibition of the hafza. The object changes spiritually and becomes forbidden like a pig. The prohibition on a person eating the forbidden object (the prohibition of the gabra) is a result of the object becoming forbidden. In contrast, when a person swears, he does not turn anything into a prohibition. The oath imposes a prohibition on him for some act or eating. This is a prohibition of the gabra (a prohibition on the person). The latter extend these distinctions to other prohibitions as well, and define two categories of prohibition: prohibitions of the hafza and prohibitions of the gabra.[16]

In the book Athwan Dauritha Rule 10 discusses the question of whether prohibitions that depend on time are gabra prohibitions. The reason for this is that prohibitions of an object are permanent prohibitions. If the object is inherently forbidden, it should not change over time. As soon as there is a prohibition that changes over time, it is probably a gabra prohibition, meaning that the person is forbidden to eat and must stay away from this object for a certain time, but the object itself is not inherently forbidden.

Later in the rule, he discusses the prohibitions of the rabbis, and there too he presents views that the sages do not have the ability to change reality itself, and therefore the prohibitions of the rabbis are also prohibitions of creation and not prohibitions of whim. One of the known sources for this explanation is theNatiyam C. Reld, who proved from the Gemara that one who inadvertently transgresses the prohibitions of the rabbis does not need repentance and atonement. The explanation of this is that if a person inadvertently transgresses the prohibition, then he did not know that the Sages forbade it. But the entire prohibition in the prohibitions of the rabbis is to rebel against the command of the Sages. A person who did not know that there was a command did not rebel against it, and therefore he did not transgress a prohibition. In a Torah prohibition that is a Haftza prohibition, even if the person transgresses inadvertently, he ultimately committed a forbidden act, but his guilt is diminished (because he did not know). But in the inadvertent rabbinical prohibition, there is no diminished guilt involved, but there is no forbidden act at all. Therefore, repentance and atonement are not required. We should note that although several later scholars have written as he has said, his words are not universally agreed upon.[17]

We note that in our case we are dealing with a prohibition on leaven, which is a prohibition that depends on time, and we have seen that it is at most a rabbinical prohibition. If so, there is something in the words of the akhorim that we have cited to raise doubt as to whether this is a prohibition of desire or a prohibition of gabra. We note that it is sufficient to assume one of the assumptions, either that rabbinical prohibitions are prohibitions of gabra or that temporary prohibitions are prohibitions of gabra, in order to reach the conclusion that desire is a prohibition of gabra. This in itself is already a sufficient doubt.

Laws of Sufficiency

We saw in the previous sections that in our case we are dealing with a doubtful prohibition. We also saw that regarding a doubtful prohibition, there are perceptions that the entire prohibition is on entering the house of a doubter, and this is precisely the definition of a gabra prohibition. A person is commanded not to take risks, but eating itself is not forbidden. So now we have another side added to us, because in our case we are dealing with a doubtful prohibition, and from this side too there is the side that our discussion is about a gabra prohibition and not about a heftza prohibition.

As is known, the Rabbi at the end of the Ashon chapter of Kiddushin discusses the failure to perform the ritual in a foreign country. What about the failure to perform the ritual in a doubtful prohibition that is not known to the failed one? Shas Shas.

The Prohibition of Leaven as a Historical Prohibition

Beyond the fact that the prohibition of chametz is a temporary prohibition, and beyond the fact that it is a rabbinical prohibition, and in fact a questionable prohibition

Although all of these are reasons to consider it a gabra prohibition and not a hefza prohibition, there is another aspect that specifically concerns the chametz prohibition.

In my article, what is the meaning of the hanshe and chametz on Passover?[18] I showed that at least the Maimonides very consistently refers to the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of sinew, both of which are historical prohibitions, as prohibitions of the gabra. I explained there that although these are prohibitions of the gabra that are generally perceived as an object of prohibition, the essence of historical prohibitions of the gabra is different. Leaven and sinew are not forbidden for their own sake, since we were forbidden to eat them only for historical and not essential reasons. Not eating leaven is part of the remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt, and not eating sinew is to remember Jacob's struggle with the angel. Therefore, the focus of these prohibitions is the action of the person and the object being eaten itself. The Torah wants us not to eat them, but not because there is something disgusting and obscene in them themselves, but because the act of eating them is obscene. I showed there several clear halachic implications of this perception, and I will not return to all of this here.

What comes to our attention is that the prohibition of chametz is a historical prohibition, and as such it is certainly also a prohibition of action on men and not a prohibition of desire. The chametz itself is not objectionable, and what is incumbent on us is the caution not to eat it.

Be careful with something sour.

In this context, it is important to add another implication of our conclusion. As is known, the Israelites are very careful about the prohibition of chametz, and even look for crumbs to burn and destroy. The Arizal writes that anyone who is careful about something chametz on Passover is guaranteed not to sin all year. Therefore, the Israelites were more strict about the prohibition of chametz than about other prohibitions. The Hidda also writes (in his book David's heart End of Chapter 10) On the way of the recommendation, that on Passover "the voices will cease."

The Torah itself already prohibits leaven with the words "not to be seen" and "not to be found," which we did not find in all the other prohibitions. It is prohibited both in enjoyment and in eating, and beyond that there is also an obligation to check and search for it, to abolish it, to disable it, and to burn it. We saw above (sections 1-3) that leaven on Passover is even something (it is not abolished by a majority or by sixty, as with other prohibitions in the Torah). What is the meaning of these additional strictures?

In light of what we explained above, it is clear that this is not about the severity of the defect in the leaven itself. This is about the obligation for a person to act to beware of the leaven and what it symbolizes. But there is no caution here about the damage caused to the soul due to eating something forbidden by Haftza (see the next section), that is, caution about the result. The obligation to be careful about something leavened is an obligation for a person to take actions of caution and avoidance, and not a consequential prohibition (in which, in practice, eating or enjoying something leavened is harmful to a person). As stated, leavened is not defective in itself at all.

We should note that even those who explain the severity of the cancellation and sufficiency of leaven in the law of Deshilam assume that it has no real severity beyond other prohibitions. Rather, they make it more severe because until we eat it under prohibition, we eat it under permission (see above in sections 1-3). Let us recall that we saw there thatReport He wrote that the gender-specific definition regarding the cancellation of chametz in sixties depends on the name of the thing and not its taste, and this is also an indication that this is not a prohibition of hafza but a prohibition of gabra.

To reinforce this point, we will add that many of the preachers, commentators, and even poskim have explained the reason for the prohibition of chametz by saying that it symbolizes the evil inclination. For example, a prominent poskim, such as Radbaz, takes it. In his responsa (Haggai 33:10), he explains the obligation to be extra careful with something chametz because in the midrashim we find that it is likened to the evil inclination (the light that shines in the dough). Once again, we see that there is no real harm caused by the something chametz. The act of being careful with something chametz is done for a purely cognitive purpose.

This is important for our case, since in our case, consumers were wary of the leaven to some degree, better or worse, since they bought a product that had a kosher seal on it. Even if they were wrong, they were not harmed, because they fulfilled the duty of care. The harm caused by the leaven itself is not in the prohibition of the gabra (see also the next section). And if they did not fulfill the proper duty of care by being satisfied with the minimal kosher of the Chief Rabbinate (not the Mehadrin), then this is not the failure of the factory (the perinir) but their decision, and therefore this is certainly not a cause for a tort claim against the factory.

Summary

We have seen that in our case we are dealing with a prohibition of leaven, which is a prohibition that depends on time, and we have seen that it is at most a rabbinical prohibition. We have also seen that it is a doubtful prohibition and not a certain prohibition. If so, in the words of the akhorim that we cited above, there is at least reason to raise strong doubt as to whether this is a prohibition of desire or a prohibition of gabra. We should note that it is sufficient to assume one of the assumptions, either that rabbinical prohibitions are prohibitions of gabra or that temporary prohibitions are prohibitions of gabra or that prohibitions of doubt are prohibitions of gabra, in order to reach the conclusion that desire is a prohibition of gabra. This in itself is already a doubtful doubt that leads us to the conclusion that leaven is a prohibition of gabra.

All of this even if chametz was a regular prohibition that depended on time. But finally we saw the uniqueness of the chametz prohibition itself, which by its very nature is a divine prohibition, even if we do not accept all of the previous aspects.

Our conclusion is that leaven is probably a gabra prohibition, according to most opinions. We also saw that the duty of caution in something that is leavened is also a gabra duty: we are obligated to be careful of leaven, but no one who ate it suffered any harm as a result of eating it if it was done under duress. The question of whether consumers were careful enough or not is certainly not related to what the factory did, and therefore in any case it certainly does not establish a tortious cause of action against it.

6. The question of "stupidity of the heart"

Maimonides IIM.O.N. The G.A. of the Torah, 25-26, and onwards, insist that the commandments of the Torah are not arbitrary. If the Torah commands something or prohibits something, there is probably a benefit/harm in that thing. This result can be in the world, in society, or in oneself, and this can of course also change from mitzvah to mitzvah. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman bfile Articles His article on the Teshuva goes one step further with this distinction, showing that every mitzvah or transgression has two aspects: the essence (benefit/harm) and the obedience/disobedience to the commandment. For example, if a person ate pork, he thereby violated the commandment of the Torah (this is the aspect of disobedience), and he also brought about some undesirable consequence (this is the consequence for which we were commanded not to eat pork. The essential aspect of the transgression). The same is true for the act of a mitzvah (a positive mitzvah). A person who puts on tefillin thereby fulfills the commandment of the Torah (this is the aspect of obedience) and also brings about the benefit for which we were commanded to put on tefillin (this is the essential aspect), in himself, in the world, or in society.

This brings to the surface two aspects that can be attributed to eating chametz on Passover, as in the case discussed: 1. Disobedience to the commandment not to eat chametz. 2. The damage caused to food, the world, or society by this eating. The question of the seriousness of the offense is what we have dealt with so far. We will deal with the question of the nature of the act of rebellion in this offense (whether it is forced, accidental, or intentional) in the sections that follow. Here we must examine the question of the essential consequences of the offense. We have seen that these can be in the world, in the person himself, or in society. However, since the subject matter of the lawsuit we are dealing with is the damage caused to consumers, the question of the damage to the world or society is irrelevant. The subject matter of this lawsuit is compensation to the plaintiffs for the damage caused to themselves. They cannot claim compensation for spiritual damage caused to the metaphysical worlds or to society in general. Therefore, here we must only discuss the impact of eating the product (and the chametz offense, if such was the case) on themselves. This spiritual damage is what is called in Torah literature "foolishness of the heart."

"Foolishness of the Heart": Primary Source

The source of these words is in the Midrash of Chazal on the verse in Parashat Shemini (Leviticus 11:34):

You shall not defile yourselves with any kind of swarming thing, nor shall you defile yourselves with them, nor be defiled by them.

The word "venetam" is written without an "alef", and therefore Chazal demands this (Yoma 39a):

Rabbi Yishmael taught: A transgression that defiles a person's heart, as it is said, "And you shall not defile yourselves with them and be defiled by them." Do not say, "And you shall not defile yourselves with them," but rather, "And you shall not defile yourselves with them." Our rabbis taught: (To) +the tradition of the Shas: [And]+ you shall not defile yourselves with them and be defiled by them. A person defiles himself a little - they defile him a lot, from below - they defile him from above, in this world - they defile him in the world to come.

The commentators explain that the foolishness of the heart is a type of spiritual filth caused to the soul as a result of transgression. For example, Rashi in Shem explains that transgression seals one from understanding wisdom. Our Rabbi in Shem explains that the foolishness of the heart prevents the Holy Spirit from indwelling a person.

We should also note that there are some commentators who explain that the foolishness of the heart is caused only by forbidden foods (this is the subject of the verse and the parasha in general) and not by all transgressions. For example, the Ramban, in the Book of Mishpatim (Exodus 22:30), writes:

And you shall be holy to me – the reason for this scripture, because up to this point he has mentioned the laws and warned against ugly things. And now when he came to begin with the prohibition of food, he began by saying, “And you shall be holy to me,” that it is proper for a person to eat everything that will live on it, and what is forbidden in food is only purity of soul, that you eat clean things that will not cause impurity and grossness in the soul. Therefore, he said, “And you shall be holy to me,” meaning that I desire that you be holy people because you will be worthy of My adherence to Me, who am holy. Therefore, you will not redeem your souls by eating abominable things. And thus he said (Leviticus 11:34–44): “You shall not defile yourselves with any creeping thing that creeps, and you shall not defile yourselves with them, and you shall be defiled by them, for I am the Lord your God, and you shall be sanctified and you shall be holy because I am holy.” And behold, creeping things are from the filth of the soul, and there is no abomination in them, but there is holiness in keeping them:

His words indicate that the foolishness of the heart (= "give birth to coarseness and coarseness in the soul") is caused only by food prohibitions, and in particular the eating of abominations and filth, which is the subject of the verse, and not by other offenses. Let us recall that in our case we are talking about leaven, which is a food prohibition (though not abominations and filth), and therefore there is room to argue that this question pertains to our discussion.

The controversy

It is apparent that it is possible to understand that every offense (or at least an eating offense) creates a result of stupidity of the heart in the offender. It is important to know that despite this article, this conclusion is not agreed upon by all commentators. This is not the place to go into detail on this intellectual issue, on which opinions have varied. I will only try to cite sources that indicate the different perceptions.

Prof. Yohanan Silman published a series of articles in which he cited sources for two concepts in Jewish thought regarding this issue:[19] Nominalism holds that the basis of the offense is the transgression of the law. Realism believes that this commandment has its source in reality itself. How would nominalists explain the Gemara passage quoted above? They would say that it is a metaphorical description, or that it is just one of several possible positions on the Talmudic issues themselves. For example, there is a Sage passage that states (Safra Holy Ones, Part 4, Chapter 9):

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says, "Why should a person not say, 'I may not wear a garment, I may not eat pork, I may not come to the nakedness, but I may not do anything, and my Father in heaven has decreed this for me, and I will set you apart from the nations, that I may be found to have renounced sin and receive the kingdom of heaven upon me:'"

It should be noted that the Midrash also deals with prohibitions on eating things such as pork (see also Rambam on this). Eight chapters Chapter Six).

Although there is no room here for a full halakhic ruling, and so we are seemingly left with these two opinions, there are also (not many) references by the poskim to this question.

For example, inShulchan Arba'ah Judge C. Pa. 67 ruled:

Kutish milk is like Yisrael milk, and according to the rabbinic tradition, one should not breastfeed a baby from a Kutish woman, if possible, an Israeli woman. Kutish milk is milk from a woman who is sick of the heart (Ran Pa'm in the name of the Rashba). Likewise, a nursing mother, even if she is an Israeli woman, should not eat forbidden things (Ashiri glosses). And so is the baby himself, because all of this is harmful to him in his old age.  

He suggests not breastfeeding a Jewish baby born to a Gentile mother because she eats forbidden foods and this dulls the heart. At the end of his remarks, he writes that this prohibition harms him in adulthood.

Is there a foolishness of heart in the prohibitions of God?

Some have written that stupidity of the heart is a result of eating forbidden foods, but forbidden foods do not cause stupidity of the heart. For example, theNatiyam C. Reld, who was mentioned in the previous section as the source for the fact that rabbinic prohibitions are gabra prohibitions, adds that this principle explains the Gemara, which states that if a person sees his rabbi violating a rabbinic prohibition, he should remain silent and let him commit the offense and only then ask him in order to learn. In contrast, in Torah prohibitions, the student is obligated to warn his rabbi so that if it is found that he is right and his rabbi was wrong, he will prevent him from violating the prohibition. From this it is suggested that there is no problem of foolishness of heart in rabbinic prohibitions because they are gabra prohibitions, and therefore there is no concern in the halakhic law that a rabbi who violates a prohibition will suffer from foolishness of heart.

Although theShch There, Sakko wrote about the words at the end of this halacha:

And so is the infant himself, as follows – meaning that even according to the rabbinic doctrine of the one who eats things forbidden by the rabbis, his father is not commanded to separate him, and as explained in the Book of Revelation, chapter 33, we were from Medina, but from the rabbinic tradition, they separate him because it harms him in his old age, dulls his heart and causes him a bad nature:

He claims that it is indeed not obligatory to exclude minors from prohibitions, since they are not commanded by the commandments. But eating a prohibition by a minor creates in him a foolishness of heart, even in the case of a rabbinical prohibition that will appear in him in adulthood. It seems that he also explains the foolishness of the heart differently from the closing off that we saw above in Rashi. He writes that it gives rise to a bad nature (probably cruelty, etc.). It is not clear whether in his opinion the rabbinical prohibitions are the prohibitions of a human being and yet they give rise to foolishness of the heart, or whether he believes that the rabbinical prohibitions are also the prohibitions of a free will.

theShch There in Saka (and so it is in16 Andflower There) adds another important point:

And the nursing mother will not eat even an Israeli woman, etc. – meaning that even though it is forbidden for her by God to eat forbidden things, she will not eat them for the sake of the baby, and if she is sick in a matter that requires feeding forbidden things, the father will not give the baby a link from her, but will hire another Israeli nurse for him:

We see here that in his opinion, even if one eats the forbidden food with permission (such as for the purpose of protecting one's soul), it still stuns the heart and causes harm. It is important to clarify that some Rishonim (see R.H. and see also Rashba, Meiri, Reason, Ritva and others, ibid., and Baran ez 25) on the issue in Ketubot 60 ez explained that there is a prohibition on sucking such milk, and it is proven that in their opinion there is no foolishness of the heart without a prohibition.

If so, at least according to theShch Even eating forbidden by the rabbis, and even eating that is done with permission, gives rise to stupidity of the heart, that is, causes spiritual harm to the offender. It is still unclear whether, in his opinion, the prohibitions of the Creator also give rise to this. According to Natiyam It seems not. As we saw above, the prohibition here is at most a rabbinical prohibition, and those who transgressed it inadvertently, and beyond that, the prohibitions of leaven are essentially prohibitions, even if when it is forbidden by the Torah and intentionally, it is nothing more than a prohibition of the rabbinate. Therefore, there is ample reason to say that, in all opinions, those who eat it did not suffer from foolishness of heart because of eating this product.

I also found that in the book Enoch the Younger This led to the latter disagreeing on the question of whether there is foolishness of the heart in prohibitions that depend on time. Opinion portals (which was brought inWays of repentance The Supreme Court (Supreme Court) believes that it is not, andFlowerbeds The perfume S. Kalach disagrees with him on this. As mentioned, prohibitions that depend on time are considered by many to be divine prohibitions.

Stupidity of the heart for an unintentional offense or rape[20]

As stated, the offense committed here was not intentional. In the following sections we will discuss whether it was accidental, rape, or tampering. In any case, it is clear that there is no blame on the food here. Where there is no blame on the offender, there is certainly room for the claim that there was no foolishness of the heart. Although we have seen inShch Even eating something forbidden while permitted (such as in a state of fasting) gives rise to a bad nature, but we have already noted that there are those who dispute this. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that theShch He did not intend to say that stupidity arises from the mere act of eating the transgression without guilt of the food. Perhaps his argument is that if it were possible to avoid it, then stupidity arises even when eating is permissible. But in situations where it is not possible to avoid it, even theShch He will admit that there was no foolishness of heart.

Rather than prolong it, I will give here a clear example from a great authority on this concept. In the Responsa energetic Husband's Son of a living manAt the end of the book, a part called "The The secret of truth, which deals with matters concerning acceptance and concealment. And here, there in chapter 5 he discusses exactly this question, and writes sharp and clear things:

Naturally, the Kabbalists are those who adopt the method whose transgressions cause the heart to become dull.Son of a living man In addition to being a very important decision-maker, he was also one of the greatest Kabbalists, and indeed he also held to this method, and yet he proves here with several pieces of evidence that what makes the heart stupid is the offense and not the thing itself that is forbidden to eat (= the Haftza). Therefore, he concludes that there is no stupidity of the heart for someone who committed the offense of rape when he is not guilty. And who is it that would come after the king to say that there is a stupidity of the heart for someone who ate a rabbinic prohibition of rape?![21]

The above is true regarding the prohibitions of Haftsa, which are as clear as the prohibitions of eating abominations and filth. If so, they are doubly true regarding prohibitions that are grave prohibitions. And after all, we are dealing with the question of eating a question of the rabbinic prohibition of chametz (which is essentially a grave prohibition, as we saw in the previous section), and all of this is accidental. If so, there is almost no doubt that there was no foolishness of the heart, and even if the plaintiff claims that there was, the burden of proof is certainly on him.

Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs prove that stupidity of the heart has arisen here, it is only in a situation where the food itself is at fault (for example, that he decided to eat under supervision and not in a hurry). If so, there is an argument here of "what is your mind": if there is fault on the food, then perhaps stupidity of the heart has arisen, but then it is his fault and he should not sue the company. If he is not at fault and he sues the company, there is no cause for the claim, since without fault, stupidity of the heart does not arise at all. Therefore, the CCP has no cause for claim here.

We will address the question of food's guilt and responsibility in the next section.

In a situation where there is an obstacle

Even if we go further and say that there is a foolishness of the heart in such an offense, it is a situation in which the perpetrator was tripped up by others and he himself did it unintentionally. Chazal state that the one who trips up his friend is subject to punishment under him (see Rashi Reish p. Matot). Furthermore, Maimonides Sohal Halaiim (and parallels in the rabbinical text Nazir and Tumat Met) writes that if Reuven tripped up Shimon and Shimon was in error, then Reuven is guilty. From this we see that when there is a troublemaker and the one who trips up is in error, the prohibition is violated by the troublemaker and not by the one who was tripped up. If so, a situation in which there is a troublemaker is less serious than rape. Even if we follow the system that rape is considered his act but that he is not at fault, an unintentional offense due to the tripping is not considered an act of the perpetrator at all, but of the troublemaker (as mentioned, according to Maimonides, he is also guilty for that). If so, it is likely that this is the case with foolishness of the heart.

Damage that can be repaired: the role of the answer

Continuing the same Gemara in Yom 31, we find:

Our rabbis taught: And you will be sanctified and you will be sanctified – a person sanctifies himself a little – he is sanctified a lot, from below – he is sanctified from above, in this world – he is sanctified for the world to come. The high priest said to them, “You are sanctified.”

We see that just as transgression defiles the heart, sanctification purifies it. Thus, Rashi explains that impurity and sanctification are opposed to each other:

They defile it a lot – they allow it to be defile a lot, and the most important thing is to read: Do not defile yourself with them, and if you defile yourself – you will be defiled.

And you were sanctified - a little, and you were holy - a lot, the one who comes to purify helps him.

The conclusion is that there is a remedy for spiritual damage, to sanctify oneself and repent.[22] Therefore, even if eating the product caused the heart to be dull, making atonement still erases this dullness of heart. Therefore, this is a damage that can be repaired by the damage.

According to Halacha, if Reuven causes Shimon damage that can be repaired, he is not obligated to pay him. However, if there are expenses involved in repairing the thing, Shimon is supposed to repair it, and in certain cases (which are not a crime), Reuven must pay him his expenses.[23] Although there is no point in going into this here, since there is certainly no expense in making amends. At most, those who eat should repent (and even that is not fully, since there is no offense in their act, but only to purify the foolishness of the heart).

And what about those who do not know that they ate the product or did not know that it was not kosher (if indeed it was not kosher)? Ostensibly, they have damage that has not been repaired and cannot be repaired, and supposedly they deserve compensation. This argument does not concern our discussion, since they will not receive compensation here anyway (this is a precedent-setting claim). But even beyond that, as we saw above, an offense committed accidentally or by force probably does not cause spiritual damage.

Summary

We have seen that there is a dispute as to whether in general, in offenses, there is a stupidity of the heart on the metaphysical-spiritual level or whether it is a normative matter. And even if there is a metaphysical stupidity, there is an aspect that it does not exist in all eating prohibitions, but only in those that are hefza prohibitions. And we have also seen an aspect that it does not exist only in the prohibitions of the rabbis and not in all eating prohibitions. And we have also seen a dispute as to whether it exists in the prohibitions of the rabbis. And even if it exists in the prohibitions of the rabbis, it must be discussed whether it exists in temporary prohibitions such as chametz (which, even when prohibited by the Torah, is a gabra prohibition). And even if all of this is true, when the offender is unintentional or has committed adultery, the living man determines that there is no stupidity of the heart in such a situation (see in the next section that in the situation we are dealing with, the consumers are adulterers or in the category of "engagers"), and we have noted that it is possible that the Shach also agrees with this.

We also saw that even if all of this is not true, when there is an obstacle, there is reason to make it even more lenient. And finally, we saw that even if all of this is not true and a foolishness of the heart is created, the person can correct it by repentance, and therefore the obstacle is nothing more than a sin that is exempt from payment, and in particular, the food did not have any expenses for the correction.

And finally, we saw that in light of all of the above, the eater cannot claim damages because of the "what's your mind" argument: if he is not at fault - he does not have a foolish heart. If he is at fault - then he cannot sue another for the foolishness that occurred through his fault.

And as for those who do not know that they have been harmed and will not be able to make amends in response, we explained that they are not the plaintiffs here. The compensation will not reach them anyway.

7. Is such eating accidental, premeditation, or rape, and what is its halachic meaning?

In halacha, we distinguish between different situations of unawareness of the prohibition, which determine different states of guilt and responsibility. The situations relevant to our case are accidental, forced, or tampering. These distinctions are important to our case because they can have implications for the question of whether the person who ate the product actually violated a prohibition. Regarding the offense of rape, it is generally believed that it is not an offense at all. Regarding tampering, as we can see, opinions are divided. In contrast, an accidental offense is generally perceived as an offense with reduced guilt. If so, these distinctions may determine whether society has indeed failed the person who consumed the product on Passover without knowing about the prohibition of chametz or not.

Accidental, tampering and rape

An error is a situation of lack of information, halakhic or factual. A person who accidentally lit a fire on Shabbat could have done so in two main ways (see Mishnah Shabbat 67b): A. An error in factual reality (he lit a fire because he did not know that today was Shabbat). B. A halakhic error (he lit a fire because he did not know that it is forbidden to light a fire on Shabbat).

And what if the person did not even know that he was starting a fire (it happened inadvertently while doing another action)? Here it is customary to define him as being careless.

onAGM Abba Ha-Zacharias Ch. 14:9 explicitly reiterates this threefold distinction:

Similarly, we find in Shabbat work that if one does not know that one is doing work, there is no prohibition, since the work of the mind is forbidden by the Torah, and one is not considered to be doing work even if the work is nevertheless done by one's hands, and only if one knows that one is doing work but says that it is permitted or forgets that it is Shabbat, then one commits a prohibition inadvertently.

The Halakhic Status of Inadvertent, Indecent, and Rape Offenses

In both cases of an error, the person is not seen as completely exempt. In certain cases, he must bring a sin offering for his error, and the offering atones for it. Many commentators (see, for example, the commentary of the Ramban, Leviticus 1:4, and the quotation from the Rambam's Mistakes, which is quoted immediately below) explain that the offering is brought because there is a dimension of negligence in such an error. He should have been more aware and investigated the halacha and the relevant facts. Some, however, explain that an error is actually a type of rape, and what obligates him to offer is because his failure in the error indicates that the heavens failed him because in the past he committed a sin intentionally and was not punished.[24] This is an esoteric opinion, and its logic is also quite questionable. It is unlikely that the heavens would trip a person up in sin. It is more likely that the heavens would punish him directly and not make him do something that God Himself does not want done.

In contrast to the accidental, rape is a situation in which the person could not help but commit the offense. In such a situation, he is not guilty and is exempt from bringing a sacrifice for his sin. For example, when a person is threatened with a gun to make him commit an offense, he is a rapist because he had no other choice (threat to life is a justification for the offense). An example that sharpens the distinction between accidental and rape appears in the law of an accidental murderer. A person who accidentally killed his friend is liable to exile. The halacha (see Rambam, Halacha, 1:1-4) distinguishes in this matter between an accidental close to rape and an accidental close to intentional, both of which are exempt from exile. The first because there is not enough guilt, and the second because there is too much guilt (then exile is not enough to atone for it).

These things are explained in the Rambam's Shegagot, 55:6:

If a man comes to his wife who is not in her period and sees blood during the time of the tashish, then they are exempt from the sin offering because it is the same as rape and not an error, because the one who is in error should have checked and carefully, whereas if he checked carefully and carefully with questions, he would not have come to an error and since he did not bother with demanding and investigating and then he must make atonement, but what is he to do, since she was pure and not in her period, this is nothing but rape, and therefore whether blood is found on her finger or on his finger, they are exempt, but if he passes by and comes to her near her period and she has a discharge and passes out before she sees blood and sees it during the tashish, they are obligated to offer it, because this is an error, therefore if blood is found on his finger, both are impure and are obligated to offer it, it is on her finger, if she immediately removed herself when the husband removed her and did not delay, both are impure and are obligated to offer it, and if she delayed so that she could reach under the pillow or under the coverlet and take a finger to check it and then she removed herself, both are impure in doubt And they are exempt from the sacrifice, and if she waited to get down from the table and wash her face, and then she touched herself and blood was found, her husband is clean.

And see also Rishba Shavuot 18:1, which specifies this from the Gemara there. The conclusion is that a person who has run away is someone who did not have the opportunity to act to avoid the offense (to check), and in this he differs from the one who is inadvertent.

Regarding the offense of rape, the perpetrator is not at all guilty. Therefore, the accepted view is that there is no offense here at all, since an offense has no meaning without the perpetrator's guilt. And would it be conceivable that heaven would come to a person with allegations about something he did without guilt?! Even those who formally define such an act as an offense, this is necessarily based on a disconnect between the concept of the offense and the question of guilt. Although it is still possible to discuss the metaphysical implications of the offense (=foolishness of the heart), but regarding this we saw in the previous section that in the offense of rape (in the absence of guilt) there is no foolhardiness of the heart.

In the case of a mesmerizer, we are talking about a person who was completely unaware of the act he was doing, such as someone who thought of raising the slip and cut the connected one (see Sanhedrin 62:2 and parallels, and in Tod'ah 'Neth'in, Shabbat 64:2). In such a situation, it is common to think that there is no offense here at all, since this action was not done out of the person's awareness and decision, and therefore it is not attributed to him at all. Ostensibly, this is a type of rape. Although the Reka method is known in his responsa (part of the Hapashim Teshuvah 8), where he claims that a mesmerizer is also considered a criminal like an ordinary mistake, but the Torah exempts him from the obligation to sacrifice. Regarding the issue of halakha, most of the latter rejected his words and wrote that it is completely permissible.[25] In any case, it is clear that the Reka does not see any real guilt here, and therefore there is certainly no foolishness of heart in the offense of meddling.

In contrast, an unintentional offense is an offense that requires a victim. We explained that it has a dimension of guilt, and therefore, in principle, we can speak of the stupidity of the heart that has arisen in the offender. Although we saw in the previous section that stupidity of the heart is unlikely to arise in this case either, as we will see here, our case is not an unintentional offense, and therefore this discussion is not at all relevant to it.

These distinctions are far from sharp. Furthermore, even the halakhic status of each of them is not entirely clear and agreed upon. But such an inquiry has no place here. What is important for our purpose is only the question of how to define an offense committed due to an erroneous instruction from a qualified scholar or a court of law. In our case, the product was eaten due to the rabbinate's instruction that it was a kosher product for Passover, and in retrospect it was determined that the instruction was erroneous. Therefore, we must examine what the ruling is for the person who committed an "offense" based on an erroneous halakhic instruction.

It turns out that even such a seemingly basic question is far from clear. Opinions on it are divided from end to end. In particular, it is not clear whether to define such a situation as rape, negligence, or tampering. Before we delve into this clarification, let us briefly comment on the law of tampering.

Dean is dealing with our case.

Although the simple definition allows for the identification of consumption of such a product in the absence of knowledge as a trade, in our case it is not clear whether the law of a trade can be applied at all. The rule is that a trade in milk and dairy products is liable because it benefits (see Sanhedrin 62b and parallels), meaning that in prohibitions that are based on eating or on a prohibited cause, the trade is also liable because it benefits. In our case, we are talking about consumers who ate the product, and therefore, seemingly, the law of a trade does not apply here at all.

Although in the case of Didan, we are dealing with a prohibition that is mixed with permission at a rate of less than one in sixty, and therefore it has no point. We have seen that on Passover, it is made stricter because of the severity of leaven on Passover, which is even forbidden in some way, but it is clear that in practice there is no benefit from the prohibition here, so it seems that the one who is dealing with the law "because he enjoys" should not be held responsible here.

Although this must depend on the reason for the exemption of the person dealing with it. We have identified two main methods for this:QOS AndK.A.I.:

• onK.A.I. Shabbat C. 3d wrote about the reason for exemption, arguing that the Torah only prohibited an action that the person knows he is doing. According to him, it seems that knowledge binds the action to the person, and therefore exemption concerns the action because it is not related to the doer. And what concerns milk and nakedness is obligatory, because pleasure binds the action to the person instead of knowledge. Again, I saw that he wrote inAbkhazia The Sabbath, the eighth day of the month, the fifthAthwan Dauritha Rule 24, p. 1. And according to this, as we explained, there is no pleasure in food (because of the small amount in the mixture), so the act should not be tied to it.
• onQOS The Hebrew Bible explains that in prohibitions that involve pleasure, it is a prohibition of consequence and not a prohibition of action, and therefore there is no exemption for the one who engages in them. According to this explanation, it is possible to say that in prohibitions of eating, even when there is no pleasure, the one who engages in them must be prohibited by the law "because he enjoys." However, there are several sources that indicate that prohibitions of eating and of cause are not necessarily all prohibitions of consequence (and perhaps this is the disagreement between the Rabbis and the Rabbis about whether they prohibited the pleasure of the throat or the pleasure of the intestines). Especially in light of what we saw in the section before the previous one regarding the prohibition of leaven, which is entirely a prohibition on the person and not on the object, it is difficult to see it as a prohibition of consequence. Therefore, according to the method of theQOS It is not the duty of the debtor here to judge the one who benefits.

We will also note that the prohibition of chametz on Passover does not require a sacrifice, and in such offenses (such as in the cases of those who are obligated to pay a levi'ah but are not obligated to pay a sacrifice), some poskim wrote that in this case it is not appropriate to say that the one who engages in such acts is obligated at all, since there is no punishment or sacrifice here. See Rav "Ha" Issur"i Biya" 112, which challenged the Rambam there when he wrote that the one who engages in such acts is obligated, and it was difficult for him to explain what he is obligated to do. And indeed inmm There, the Maimonides changed the version because of this difficulty, and wrote that it was a scribal error. According to their view, it is clear that even if someone engages in sexual intercourse, he is obligated to make a sacrifice (as in fornication) – the sacrifice is not brought for guilt and offense. If this were the case, then they would have to reconcile the Maimonides’ words (as inAs of today Ibid.) and to say that even in the case of the enemy, there is no victim, the one who interferes is a criminal and is liable to punishment at the hands of Heaven for his offense.[26] From this it is clear that they understood that there is no offense in the case of the one who engages in this, nor is there any obligation to pay a penalty, but at most it is the result of foolishness of the heart. And when there is a duty to pay a sacrifice, it also does not come for an offense. As mentioned, foolishness of the heart is also not present here, and therefore we are not left with any residual result of eating the product in question.

In conclusion, it seems that there is almost no doubt that there is no obligation here from the law because one enjoys, since the prohibition of leaven is an action prohibition, and in our case it is a mixture that has no taste and therefore there is no pleasure in eating. If there is no law here because one enjoys, then we are left with the prohibition of the metzebuh itself. We have seen that according to most of the akhirat, there is no prohibition in the metzebuh and it is a complete permission. And even those who see it as a prohibition (as the opinion of Reka) probably only have the obligation of atonement (cleansing and purifying the foolishness of the heart) and not guilt and delinquency, which does not create a result of the foolishness of the heart. And finally, we have seen that in such a situation it is not possible to see a prohibition from the law "because one enjoys."

Is all ignorance accidental?

In our case, it is a crime committed out of ignorance. Ostensibly, ignorance is the definition of negligence. But we must still ask whether every type of ignorance is necessarily negligence, or whether there will be cases in which we would treat it as rape or molestation (which, as mentioned, is also a type of rape). Such a situation is possible if the person's lack of information is completely not their fault or responsibility.

onTalmudic Encyclopedia A. 'Rape' (around notes 8-9) summarizes the matter and writes:

In general, rape is also rape of error, as they said regarding an oath: "I will rape your heart" (Shavuot 26a), or rape of forgetfulness or rape of sleep, or rape of temptation, as they said regarding a small matter: "A small temptation is rape" (Yevamot 33b), all of which come from a lack of knowledge and understanding.

We see that there is a lack of knowledge that it is rape and not an error, and the evidence for this is from Shavuot 26a, where we see that a person who swears falsely about something by mistake (because he did not know the truth) is considered raped and exempt from the obligation to sacrifice.

And indeed we find inWisdom DurationExodus 13:10, which says:

And so we also believe in this, the dechion of the derov is not a predation, again we do not feel like a minority, we walk in the majority, and again Even if one out of a thousand eats prey, it will not be considered a crime at all, just as if he did not eat blood, and it was found that he was deprived of eating it, and he did not transgress at all.…

And in this I explained the words of the Rambam, Laws of Leaven and Matzah, Chapter 5, Halacha 9: Because it is said, “And you shall keep the matzah,” meaning, be careful with the matzah and keep it from any sour side. Therefore, the Sages said that a person must be careful with the grain he eats on Passover, lest water come upon it after it has been harvested (until there is no leaven in it – as the saying goes). Therefore, one must observe “And you shall keep the matzah” throughout Passover. And great study is needed, as they said (Pesachim 40:1): With the oppression of Gentiles, a person fills his stomach (from them, provided that he eats an olive of matzah recently). And Baraki Yosef examined this. And according to what I wrote with Eti Shapir, Indeed, for every minority, there is no need to feel at all. But this is the case on all the days of Passover, where you will not do anything to avoid eating leaven, and again, because there is no need to feel at all, so if he eats, it is as if he did not eat leaven at all.Not so on the first night, when it is a mitzvah to eat matzah, if one of the rebbe has chametz, will you say that he ate matzah? Surely he did not eat matzah – there must be some reason for that, and for that, preservation is required.

We see that if a person relies on the halakhic rule that most animals are not carrion and eats an animal slaughtered by a certified butcher, and in the end it is found that the animal he ate was carrion, then this is not a transgression, and he is as if he had not eaten carrion at all. It turns out that this is also the case with someone who relies on the instruction of a certified rabbi and eats according to their instruction. Although some in the rabbi are mistaken that this is not a teaching because the instruction was given in error. But it seems that in reality, most of what receives a kosher seal from a certified rabbi is indeed permissible, and therefore the person who eats according to their instruction is certainly considered at least as someone who relied on the majority and did not commit any prohibition.[27] Furthermore, we found that Rabbi Sofek Dakidushin permits a person to be circumcised with a foreskin abroad, since the food is in doubt and a foreskin abroad is permissible (see also the book Listen carefully., Sha'a). So it seems that if someone who erred and ate by virtue of the law of majority, which is a permissiveness in all the prohibitions of the Torah, the eater did not violate any prohibition.

Although in some places it seems apparent that ignorance and the one who acts according to the teaching of the Torah are always in error and not forced. The first example is the ruling of the Rambam in the book of Mistakes, Vol. 3, No. 1, in light of the Gemara in the Horiyot, that an individual who acts according to the teaching of the Torah is in error and not forced (and therefore is liable for a sin). Similarly, the Rambam states in verses 55-6, regarding an agunah woman who married according to the teaching of the Torah that she is liable for a sin, meaning that she is in error and not forced. Likewise, regarding a baby who was taken captive, Rav and Shmuel differed on this issue against Riv"ach and R"l (see Shabbat 68 a"a-ab), and according to the halakhic rulings, Rav and Shmuel are liable for one sin for each type of offense. Therefore, even a baby who was taken captive is not considered forced but in error.

But all of this is very difficult. First, we saw that in the issue of Shavuot 26a it is proven that lack of knowledge is rape and not accidental. And it is also difficult to explain, because as we have seen, the definition of rape is a situation in which there is no guilt, as opposed to accidental, in which there is a certain guilt (due to negligence). When a person trusts an authorized person, it seems that he is not at all guilty. What could he have done? Ostensibly, when there is no negligence on his part, this should be a situation of rape and not accidental.

Although rape must be divided and defined as a situation in which the person was forced to commit the offense (and it is not enough that there is no guilt in it). And in ignorance, although there is no guilt, he has a choice in principle, since he could still not have eaten as long as he did not check for himself. According to this definition, there is room to see such a situation as rape and not as an accident. This is also implied by Rashi in Yevamot 57b, who wrote that a woman who married according to the Law was not raped because she had the right to wait ("May she be faithful") and not marry.

But this must be rejected, since in the issue of Shavuot 25, it is said that Rabbi Assi and Rabbi Ami swore about something they did not know, and they certainly did not have to swear and could have said their words without an oath, and yet the Gemara sees them as rapists. And the aforementioned Rashi himself proves this in every way, since according to him, this is not rape simply because the person could have checked or waited. But with us, the reality would not have become clear even if they had waited until Pesach, and therefore here it is clear that this is outright rape. Furthermore, even if a person wanted to go abroad to the sources that supply the raw materials to the Perinir factory and check for himself, they would not have let him in and would not have reported to him, and even if they had, they would not have the expertise to check the product's components. Ultimately, here, a person has no other choice and waiting would not have been useful.

What remains is only the explanation that he can not eat anything beyond what he has examined himself, and that he should not eat anything that he does not examine. And if he eats again, he is not considered a rapist because although he is not guilty, he has the option to avoid the offense (he is not forced to commit it).

This is of course a very far-fetched explanation, since in our time it is practically impossible not to eat anything that was not grown at home and not directly tested by us. But beyond that, in the issue of Shavuot 27 we see this in the interpretation. And in all the poskim whose words will be quoted below, it seems that even if they are strict with an individual who acted according to the Torah and see him as an accident and not as rape, it is only because there is truly some level of guilt in him. And if there is someone who sees him as a criminal even without this, then again it is clear that what he is referring to is not guilt and criminality in the conventional sense, but at most something that requires atonement (cleansing or purifying the foolishness of the heart). In the previous section we saw that the foolishness of the heart does not belong to our discussion.

Now let's look at some of the opinions of the poskim on this matter.

An individual who acted according to the Bible: A review of opinions and sources[28]

The Rema Avhaaz, 17th century, writes according to the Rashba's response (which was also cited inin me At the end of this sign):

But if she is forced to marry, or if she was ordered by a court of law in error and she married according to them, she is like a forced woman, and she is permitted to marry her first husband (Rashba's answer 1,0

If so, here we see that an individual who acted in accordance with the teaching of the Law of Moses is a coercion and not an error. In answer to the 10th question, the Rashba continues to discuss this matter and writes in an explanation that even a mistake according to the Law of Moses is a complete coercion (and his interpretation is from the Mishnah Yevamot 33b regarding its replacement).[29]

And he brought inThe sun was kind. In the second chapter of the book of the Law, the one who ruled that someone who acted according to the instruction of a sage is a forced one. In the third chapter, the one who ruled that someone who acted according to the instruction of a sage is a forced one. In the third chapter, the one who ruled that someone is a forced one is a forced one. Even if she is told to leave this and that, she can later return and marry any of them. However, he later doubts this because forced one is not important, since she could have asked a wiser sage or waited until it was clarified. Many other jurists wrote the same. However, their words imply that when it is impossible to be careful or wait, she is truly a forced one because of the instruction of a sage.

It should also be added what some later scholars wrote, that the wife forbade her husband so that she would be careful before marrying, since the permission to marry is based on the assumption that the woman is a good and faithful wife (this is what the Gra's commentary on the book of the Holy Prophet says in 2:11).Shulchan Arba'ah There is a section called Qa'ah, and so is it inThe triangle thread 13). Hence, in Alma such a situation is complete rape, and here the woman was made worse only to create the suspicion. Therefore, again, there is no need to learn from there to discuss the matter, because there is a claim on her that she will be careful or that she will wait until the matter is clarified, or a prohibition was imposed on her in order to create the suspicion precisely and precisely. But in a case like ours, we have already written that the person cannot check for himself and there is no reason to demand that he not eat until he checks, and therefore it is clear that it is completely rape.

We note that although in16 Name of the SCA andFatash The Ka'ad-Ka'a scholars commented on these Rashba and Rema, and questioned this ruling, and even cited that the Maharik and Radbz disagreed on it. They mainly commented on the ruling of the Par Elem that the Torah required the public to bring a sacrifice when they did so according to the instruction of the Yad. They also commented on the ruling of a woman who married according to two witnesses and the instruction of the Yad, that if her husband comes, she is forbidden from marrying the husband and the prostitute, even though she married according to the Yad. They see that she is not considered a rapist. But they also comment that this is only because the woman has a claim that she should have been careful or waited (see also B.S. (See Ka'b who wrote thus.) And so it is inMoses' Word (Amerilio) Ch. 1.4. That you are married according to two witnesses and a witness is something that can be proven and therefore it is not rape. But, as stated, for the defendant, all this does not matter anyway, since with us he has no possibility of checking and he is also raped by the reason of the16 And his team.

They also stated that if the instruction is not from the Greater Council, there is a claim to check with a Greater Council or wait for the Sages to weigh in and decide among themselves to permit it (see Penny Aharon C. H. F.In the name of God Presented inFatash Here is the Ka'd and Radbaz mentioned there inIn the name of God And more). But this also does not belong in the subject of discussion, since we have no other sages who will discuss this because it is a mistake in the facts and not in the wisdom of the teaching. And there is no way in the world for one sage to come and prohibit a product that his friend has made lawful. At most, here it will be rabbinical kosher and other rabbis will not make it lawful. But there is almost no situation in which others will say that something is chametz because the Chief Rabbinate made a mistake in the teaching. Therefore, the argument that the food should have waited for the discussion of other sages also does not belong in our case.

And really inDavid's House 2 Corinthians 16:6Novi From the report of C. Clave and W.Cedar trees The rabbis all wrote that the Rashba's law is agreed upon, and even the rabbis and the Radbaz did not disagree on it, and ruled similarly to it in the halakhic law. And so did the ruling inAs a result Glosses in me Letter T. W.Jacob's Return The Supreme Court ruled as the Rabbinate and wrote that although it should be made difficult, it is clear that he is right that what is done according to the teaching of the Jewish Law is complete rape. And the Supreme Court of the Jewish Law inBeit Meir Abba Az Susi 17:6Words of Life (Sanz) Ch. 27:6Benjamin border C. Sd. And everyone reasons that he had nothing to do, that is, he who has nothing to do is considered a coercive. As we saw above, in our case it seems that all opinions, even those who rule against the Rashba, would agree that he had nothing to do and therefore he is a coercive, and so on.

Also regarding a baby who was captured in Yaro, which was not a complete rape (because it had to be investigated)[30]Beyond that, in my articles[31] I have shown that the obligation to commit a sin of such an infant is based on ignorance and not on the act of the offense. The act of the offense itself is a complete rape and does not require a sin. In the case of a captured infant, it is a mistake in law and not in facts, whereas in our case it is a mistake in facts and there it is reasonable that a situation in which the lack of knowledge constitutes rape is considered actual rape (because there is no requirement for a person to know the facts beyond reasonable inquiry, but only to know the laws).

It is true that one should note the words of the Rambam in the book of errors, Pid 4:3, where he wrote:

If a court of law decreed that the Sabbath was over because the sun had set and they imagined that the sun had set and then risen, this is not a decree but a mistake, and anyone who did work is liable, but the court of law exempts them. Likewise, if a court of law permits a man's wife to marry because they testified before them that her husband died and then her husband came, this is not a decree but a mistake, and the woman and her last husband are liable for a sin for their mistake, and so on.

We see that even a factual error by the Jewish Court does not exempt the perpetrators from sin. A factual error is not a teaching, and therefore a Jewish Court teaching does not exempt the perpetrators. Although this involves errors that can be checked by any person, such as covering the sun. We also noted that with regard to a woman, she is obligated to check and be accurate before getting married. Therefore, there is no evidence from this that factual errors by the Jewish Court do not make the perpetrator of them a rapist.

And really theMLM There, the Maimonides was asked why he needed to say that this was not a teaching but an error, since Maimonides himself ruled according to the law that an individual who acted in accordance with the teaching of the Jewish Law is liable (see also MLM andFor military purposes There is a verse in the Book of Revelation. The same reason appears in the Book of Revelation regarding a married woman, and the commentators there (see For military purposes andMLM(They also raised the same issue there (and see the excuse of the war there and all the comments on it inThe key book (Frankel's commentary there). But according to our method here, there is no obligation on the doer because the judge made a factual mistake in something that is accessible to the common man and he had to check. Therefore, the Rambam needed a separate reason here. This is true regarding the covering of the chama and also regarding the married woman, who had to be precise and check, as above. But in our case, it is a factual error that cannot be checked by the judge at all, and therefore there is complete rape by all accounts.

Is rape a crime?

We have already seen that in most opinions, an offense committed by a person who is involved is not an offense at all. And even if there is an offense in this, it is a formal matter, but there is no guilt here. And even if there is a dimension of guilt (if we assume the unreasonable assumption that the consumer has a duty to check before he eats), the result is that the blame lies with him and not with the company, and therefore he cannot sue the company for it.

What remains for us is only to show that the crime of rape is not a crime at all. We saw this in the words of theenergetic which were brought up in the previous section, and in the words ofWisdom Duration which were brought here. To complete the picture, we will add here a few more sights: KOH Si' ah (which showed that although there is a prohibition before a blind person against stumbling a person into committing the crime of rape, this is not because the offense is a crime but because the stumbling is considered as if it was committed intentionally), and Chiddushei R. Meir Simcha BM 66 ab (which repeats what he wrote in the passage cited above fromWisdom Duration), Treasury House A. Rule 27 (which may even be considered as if a mitzvah has been fulfilled. Similar to what we saw in the previous section of the Masot) energetic Regarding the invalid tefillin. See also the response. Fruit of the field H"G Susi"i Kiz who elaborated on this. And indeed, Amoraim disagreed on this in Yerushalmi Kiddushin Pg 3, regarding Unsa as a man of David. And see also Blessing of Shmuel C. C. inscriptions and many more).

The accepted view is that rape is not a crime at all, and does not even require repentance and atonement. According to some views, even a mitzvah that was not performed is considered to have been performed. To prove this, we will present here some quotes from the most important rabbis of our time.

First, in the Responsorial Psalm Yaakov's Plot The Book of Proverbs 16 wrote about someone who bought tefillin from a sofer who is considered kosher:

It is simply a matter of a lot of money… who made a mistake in putting on tefillin and committed an unintentional sin requires atonement. Those who are obligated to make atonement need to make a sin offering… but in the case of a person who bought tefillin from a sofre, it is considered kosher. He is judged as a rapist, and does not need atonement... In our case, he committed an offense not accidentally, only in rape, so there is atonement..

And so it is in the Responsa. Mishnah Halachah Chapter 1, which discusses the same topic and writes:

There is no need for a reply at all… And the reason is that it is not a mistake for him not to put on tefillin, and he is obligated to atone for it, as for any mistake, but it is a compulsion and a compulsion, may God have mercy on him… And from now on, there is no greater compulsion for you than this, since the scribe is held to be under the presumption of kashrut, and one is faithful to the prohibitions, and therefore he is a compulsion and a compulsion, may God have mercy on him, because of the punishment, and he does not need a reply and atonement [and he elaborates on how he discussed the words of the above-mentioned Nob in this and settled his questions in the OA]…

Baha Salkinan and Baha Nachtinan, this person whose intention is to please God does not need atonement and repentance for the rape that occurred.

And finally, we will bring the words ofTsitz Eliezer Chai'G, Mark 6:

In fact, regarding the past, such as this, they did not transgress at all and were completely absolved of this, those who assume due to a lack of realistic knowledge and those who act due to a lack of halakhic knowledge are not considered to have committed a transgression, and they are further charged as if they had fulfilled the mitzvah with the blessings they made upon it as they should have done.

Although there are some differing opinions in Halacha,[32] But by all accounts, there is no guilt here. And beyond that, the burden of proof in a tort claim is on the plaintiff.

Is there a difference between small and large in this regard?

Some of the consumers of the product were minors who were under the age of mitzvot. With regard to minors, it seems that there is no offense at all. Will there be foolishness of the heart in them? Those who attribute foolishness of the heart to an offense will say that there is no foolishness of the heart here either. Furthermore, according to the halacha, it is ruled that a minor who eats carrion in the 14th century is not commanded to be expelled (see Rambam, 37:27, and many others). And several poskim have already written about this, proving that this proves that a minor's act is not a crime at all and does not make the heart foolish (see KOH C.E., K.H.I. Yevmoth C. 31, King's Hand The Lord Isob Pg., Terumah"d (Hebrew: חַבְּShch (Yod C. Pa. Sec. 22) cited in the previous section argues that although there is no obligation to prevent the little one from eating, this is a sign of foolishness.

But it should be remembered that in our case, this is a question of a rabbinical prohibition that depends on time. In rabbinical prohibitions, the Rishonim and Poskim disagreed on whether it is even permissible to feed a child with a prohibition with their hands (see Rashba Yevamot Kid 14a, and the ruling of the Rema Orach 36, compared to the author's conclusion there). Likewise, in prohibitions that depend on time, some Poskim wrote that it is not even permissible to feed a child with a prohibition with their hands (see MGA C. Rest S.A. andShabbat addition Oh, C. Shmag, end of S. G. W.Yad Ephraim There he wrote that this was also stated according to the Maimonides' method. Although he saw Glory to David C. Shmag Sqd.

As we noted there, it is highly doubtful whether theShch He himself says this also regarding the prohibitions of leaven, and certainly prohibitions that depend on time.[33] Therefore, even if someone were to draw the unlikely conclusion that there is heart failure in adult consumers, this is much less likely in children.

Summary

In our case, a person ate a product that had the Rabbinate's kashrut stamp on it and it was determined that it contained chametz (according to the assumption for the purposes of the discussion here). We saw that he could not have tested its kashrut even if he had wanted to. We also saw that it is not possible to order the entire public not to eat anything until they test it themselves. The role of the authorized kashrut institutions is to do this for us. There is also no option here to wait for another rabbinical court to test it, because the kashrut for this product is only given by the Rabbinate. Even if the person waits, the matter will not become clear on its own. Although he can be careful not to eat anything except things that he has tested himself, we explained that this is an unreasonable demand of a person in our day, and we proved from the issue of Shavuot that in principle there is no such requirement in Halacha. Therefore, eating such food can at most be considered rape or tampering, but not an accident.

It should also be noted that we are dealing here with the prohibition of the rabbis (see above, sections 1-3), and therefore, even if there is a dispute about this, it must be followed unanimously. And even for the systems that have a dimension of prohibition in this, because it is considered an error and requires a sacrifice, the prohibition of chametz does not require a sacrifice (even with leaven from the Torah, and certainly when it comes to the prohibition of the rabbis), and therefore there is no prohibition here. And even if we decide that there is a prohibition after all, it is only in the realm of foolishness of the heart and not a criminal prohibition with a dimension of guilt. We will discuss this later.

Regarding the matter of halakha, we have seen that if such eating is considered to be engaging in sexual intercourse, then there is rape and the rest is completely permissible. Every situation of negligence involves some kind of guilt, and here, as stated, there is no guilt. The question of the hypothetical possibility of not committing the offense is not relevant to most opinions for defining the case as rape. This is especially true when it comes to a factual question that cannot be examined (unlike the example given by the Rambam of the sunset, which we mentioned above). Therefore, the conclusion is that according to most opinions, the food in our case is completely forced. And even if an individual who acted according to the instruction of the Rabbis is guilty of sin, then apparently he is negligent and not forced. We have seen that this stems from the fact that he could have checked himself or waited. We have seen that this is not the case here.

We have derived from the words of the great rabbis that the offense of rape when they trusted an authorized person (such as the Chief Rabbinate) is a complete rape and there is no offense at all here and there is no need for repentance and atonement. Even if such an act can be formally defined as an offense, there is certainly no guilt here and therefore apparently no foolishness of the heart has arisen (see the previous section). And finally, even if there is negligence on the part of the rabbi (which we saw above is clearly not reasonable) that creates an offense or foolishness of the heart, then it is his fault and he cannot sue society for it. 

8. The question of assessment and the invisible harm

Even if we adopt for the sake of discussion the assumption that harm was indeed caused to consumers, this is metaphysical, not tangible, damage. No one is claiming that consumers suffered any physical harm from eating the product.

A tort claim for damage of this type has two serious problems according to the halacha: 1. It is not possible to estimate or quantify such damage. 2. It is “immaterial damage,” meaning damage that has no recognizable signs on the body of the damaged object or person. An example of this is someone who mixes unpasteurized wine (which is forbidden to drink and enjoy) with his friend’s kosher wine, thereby preventing the owner of the wine from drinking it or selling it. According to the halacha, even though the owner of the wine must now pour out his own wine, the person who caused such damage is exempt from paying (see Rambam, Laws of a Victim and a Harmful Person, 57:1, 6).Shulchan Arba'ah H.M. C. Shafa SA).

Damage that is not apparent is not damage (i.e., there is no tortious cause) according to Halacha. The Meiri in Gittin 40b explains this by stating that there is no confusion between damages toProhibitionsTherefore, damage resulting from prohibitions and not apparent is not considered damage. In any case, the law leaves it to the higher court to collect or punish the harmdoers in such situations.

Summary

The conclusion is that even if we reject all the arguments raised so far and assume that consumers were indeed harmed, this is the kind of harm for which compensation cannot be claimed.

9. Is there a cause of action for such damage according to halacha? Immaterial damage and the question of assessment

Summary and general picture

We will now summarize what we have seen so far in brief, in order to present the opinion on the objective damage in its entirety:

• In the case under discussion, we are dealing with a question of doubt about the prohibition of the rabbis. Since according to Halacha, even one doubt about the prohibition of the rabbis is not prohibited, therefore, in the end, there is no prohibition here.
• To the best of my halachic judgment, the Chief Rabbinate itself should have left the kashrut stamp on the company's products in effect even after the concern arose. In this, I completely agree with Rabbi Suissa's opinion in the Ḥavad he gave.

I can speculate that perhaps the time pressure before Passover did not allow the Rabbinate to examine things in depth when it received the new information, and it was the panic that caused it to quickly remove the kashrut. As mentioned, such a product meets the usual standard of the Chief Rabbinate, as Rabbi Suissa also wrote in his opinion.

It should be remembered what Rabbi Suissa wrote, that consumers did not initially want a higher standard, since they decided to buy a product under the normal supervision (not a mehadrin) of the Rabbinate, and not a product under any mehadrin supervision. Therefore, they certainly did not suffer any harm to the standards they themselves expected.

• Even if we decide for some reason that there is a halakhic prohibition on eating this product, we have seen that this is a gabra prohibition and not a hafza prohibition (meaning that the object itself is neither defective nor tainted).
• We have seen that such eating is considered "interfering" or rape. We have seen that according to the great jurists of our time and even before, an act committed through rape is not a crime at all, nor does it require atonement or repentance, and apparently does not cause stupidity of the heart. In particular, the prohibition of chametz, which is essentially a prohibition of the rabbis and a temporary prohibition, and in the case of Didan, also a prohibition of the rabbis. And this is apparently true for all opinions regarding chametz.
• Even assuming that there is an offense here, there is a factor that has failed the consumers (the company), and in such a case, the failing factor is considered the offender, not the consumer. Therefore, the consumers themselves have not been subjected to any offense. At most, in a higher court, they will settle accounts with the company, but there is certainly no basis for a tort claim by the consumers against the company. What's more, the company was negligent or coerced in this case.
• We have seen that it follows from this that not only is there no offense, but even perceptions that see offense as something that stuns the heart here have no metaphysical consequence (stupidity of the heart) for eating this product (doubtful, doubtless, the rabbinical prohibition, which is also from the Torah a prohibition against eating with complete force).
• Even if in such a case there is damage caused to consumers, the damage can be repaired by restitution, and therefore is not subject to action. Those consumers who do not know that they have eaten such a product and therefore cannot restitution in any way will not be compensated in accordance with the law, even if the company undertakes to pay.
• Beyond that, we saw that even if we adopt the unreasonable assumption that there is a dimension of guilt in eating the product and therefore there is a crime and/or foolishness of the heart, it is still not possible to claim damages for this:
• In truth, there is no harm at all because eating is a necessity and for all the above reasons.
• And if we assume that he was not a rapist and therefore committed a crime and suffered damage, then it is because of his own negligence. Someone who inflicted damage on himself due to his own negligence cannot sue others for something he suffered due to his own fault.
• Even if everything I said so far was not true, once this claim is founded on a multitude of assumptions one on top of the other, in tort law the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. He did not and cannot bear the burden of proof in this case. As we have seen, it is impossible to prove in any way that any harm was caused to the consumer here. On the contrary, we have seen that it is difficult to even conceive of a halakhic-Torahic construction that would justify the remote possibility of spiritual harm in this case. There is certainly no claim here that is sufficient to bear the burden of proof in tort.
• Furthermore, not only did the plaintiff fail to prove his case, but in the law of damages (and damages) in halakhic law there is a "kim li" law (see also Rabbi Suissa's opinion), according to which the defendant can defend himself by relying on any halakhic opinion, even an esoteric one. This is all the more difficult in a case where, as we have seen, the absolute majority of opinions in halakhic law are in his favor, so that if we want to adopt the plaintiff's position we will have to pile a lot of assumptions on top of each other, none of which are agreed upon or reasonable. There is no doubt that damage was not proven here, and almost beyond any doubt that there really was no damage here, and certainly not the fault of the company.
• Even if there was damage, it is not noticeable and there is no way to compensate for it. Halacha does not require payment for such damage.
• Even if we reach the (unreasonable) conclusion that an adult man or woman who ate the product committed a crime or foolishness of heart, this is even less likely in the case of minors. As we have seen, a minor act is not a crime, and regarding foolishness of heart, the opinion of most commentators we have cited (contrary to theShch(See end of section 7) is that there is no foolishness of heart in minors. Therefore, minor consumers (those who are younger than the age of obligation: 13 years for boys and 12 years for girls) should be excluded from this calculation in any case. Let us recall that we also supported theShch I admit that in such a case there is no foolishness of heart even in the adults (because they could not avoid the prohibition) and certainly in the children.
• Conclusion: According to the law, I can state with absolute certainty that there is no basis for a tort claim in such a situation. To the best of my judgment, this is a baseless claim that has no Torah-Halakhic basis.

The attitude of the law to the cause of a civil lawsuit: Such a lawsuit knocks the ground from under its own feet

We have seen that according to the halacha there is no place for such a tort claim. Let us now assume for the sake of discussion that according to Israeli civil law it is possible to sue on such grounds, does this change the picture? Ostensibly, the claim is being brought in a court of law and not in a halakhic-Torah court, and therefore the plaintiff can ask the court for compensation for spiritual and Torah damage suffered by him even if the halacha does not allow such a claim. The decision that must be made in the court is determined according to the secular Israeli legal system and not the halakhic system.

As far as I understand, this is also a mistake on the legal level, for two reasons:

• It should be remembered that the damage that is the subject of the claim, i.e. the cause of the claim, is halakhic-Torah. If according to halakhic law there is no damage, then it makes no sense to establish an obligation to compensate even under another legal system.
• Furthermore, if according to the law there is no cause of action in this case, then whoever does claim such damage and receives it in some form is considered by the law to be a usurper. But such a situation is clearly paradoxical: the plaintiffs' cause of action is that the defendant (the company) caused them to commit an offense against their will. For this, they demand compensation, and the implicit assumption is that committing offenses, even rape, is against their conscience and values. But as we have seen, this claim itself is an offense of usurpation. How is it possible for a person who is claiming compensation for having suffered an offense to claim this compensation in a way that is itself a halakhic offense?! In other words, if he does not care that he is committing offenses, then this removes the ground from under his claim. What is he seeking compensation for if offenses are not against his conscience and values? Accepting the compensation that the court will award him is itself a crime of theft from a halakhic perspective, and this will cause him much greater harm than eating the product that did not cause him any harm at all. I will mention that the crime of theft is the first thing for which people are sued in a higher court (see Sanhedrin 2:1 and parallels), and certainly much more satisfying than a sufika of a rabbinic prohibition.

The conclusion is that such a claim is unfounded on a halakhic level, and in my understanding its acceptance on a legal level is also based on absurdity of its own.

• The question of subjective damage

As stated above, subjective damage is the grief and hurt that a person felt when he learned that he had eaten leavened bread on Passover.

This subjective harm itself consists of two components: 1. The grief resulting from knowledge of the objective harm. 2. The subjective grief that can arise in a person who learns that he has eaten leaven without knowing it, even if our conclusion is that there is no objective harm at all in such a situation.

In Part A of the Havvad, we saw that there is no objective damage at all. In any case, the grief regarding the objective damage is the result of a lack of knowledge, and what should be done about it is to inform the plaintiffs that their grief is based on a mistake or ignorance, and thus alleviate it. It is still possible for a person to feel grief over having eaten leaven without his knowledge, even if there is no offense in this. And yet, since there is no offense in this eating, there is no room for such grief either. And it is certainly difficult to assert such a claim as a basis for a tort claim.

And beyond all this, the consideration raised at the end of the previous section, according to which such a claim is theft and therefore undermines the ground beneath itself, also applies here. According to the halakha, there is no place to claim such damage, even if it exists. The person who is suing him is probably not bothered by the fact that he is a halakhic offender, and in any case cannot claim that the offenses harm him and go against his conscience, and/or cause him grief.

Now let's move on to assessing the damage.

How many people are involved?

As I explained at the beginning of the article, the subjective damage exists only in people who bought these particular company products, know that they ate them on Passover, and heard that the Rabbinate removed the kosher seal that was on them, and it is important to them that the product be kosher. And even among these, not all have significant grief if this is not the case.

The main task is to estimate the number of people for whom this subjective damage is relevant.

1. In my estimation, of all the people who bought the product, a very significant portion are not very concerned about its kosherness for Passover. Most of the public buys what is on the store shelves.
2. Of those who are bothered by this, a significant portion do not even remember eating them on Passover (most people do not remember what kind of produce they bought for basic products like tomato paste).
3. In my experience, almost no one reads the Chief Rabbinate's updates regarding the removal of kosher. This is the case among all the people I know. Few receive these updates by email or see such publications elsewhere, and even those who do receive them do not read them. This is a list of businesses that most of us are not familiar with, so there is no motivation to read it.
4. Of the few who did read the update, all read it immediately when it was sent. No one reads an (non-personal) email or a newspaper ad the day after it is sent.
5. Therefore, even these few heard about the immediate removal of kashrut upon its publication. If they had already eaten the product, then it was eaten before Pesach and there was no problem. And if they did not eat it, they still had the option of returning the products to the store before Pesach. Those who did not return it probably did not care about kashrut or did not hear about it. Either way, such a person does not suffer any subjective harm.
6. After Passover, all the kashrut updates that were sent and published have already been archived or disappeared from computers. Almost no one reads an email a few days after it was received, and certainly not when it is a general, non-personal email.

The conclusion from all this is that the number of people for whom the subjective harm is relevant is zero. This would have to be a person for whom kashrut is very important (to the point that even a slight violation of the rabbinic prohibition on rape would seriously hurt his feelings), but at the same time he allows himself to buy products with ordinary, not fancy, kosher certification. That fictional person would also have to remember that he bought tomato paste made by Perriner. He also heard about the lowering of kashrut, but for some reason he only read about it about a week after it was announced (i.e., after the start of Passover). This hearing occurred only after he had already eaten the product, and therefore he could not return the products he bought to the store. How many such people are there? I doubt if there was one. In my opinion, there are no people who have suffered subjective damage. Their number can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

What is the level of damage?

Of the few people who can claim subjective damage, there are religious, ultra-Orthodox, traditional, or secular. Ultra-Orthodox do not buy products certified by the Rabbinate, certainly not for Passover. The same is true for national religious people whose religious obligations are as ultra-Orthodox (national ultra-Orthodox – Haredim).

What is the subjective harm caused to people when it turns out that they ate a product with a vague fear of a rabbinical prohibition, and that they ate it with impunity and without guilt? Let's remember that these are people who buy rabbinical kosher and probably don't pay much attention to kosher.

According to my acquaintance with these people, even the religious and devout ones among them (which is a fairly small minority), the sorrow that would have been caused to them in such a case is zero. It should be remembered that the Sages have already determined that God, blessed be He, does not come with complaints to those who sin without guilt. The Torah was not given to the ministering angels, and we can all fail, certainly in rape.

The only possibility is that God will come to them with an argument about why they bought with the regular kosher certification of the Rabbinate, which caused them to fail. But they must direct this argument to themselves. Their decision to buy products with the regular kosher certification of the Rabbinate was not caused by the company, of course, and therefore there is no basis for a tort claim against it.

In conclusion, even if there are some people who can claim subjective damage, in my assessment and from my familiarity with all segments of the public, the level of grief they experienced is zero.

[1] See Rashi Bitza 3:2 and B.M. 5:1; Todah 'everything gathered', B.K. 6:1, and Todah 'a penny', Meila 21:2; Rosh Nedarim Noach 21:1, d. 'everything'; R. Pesachim 29:2, Nedarim 55:1, and Shem Noach 21:1, sodah 'a meal for eating'; see also 16 Judge C. K. B. S. A. B.PMG In the spaces there they wrote that even for the Rabbi's taste this is a prohibition for rabbis only. And so it is written in the Responsa Hatas Chayid S. Raz, but in S. Tzo there he was satisfied with the matter for the sake of the R.; and so it is inflower C. K. S. G. and C. K. B. S. A. and more.

[2] See Mishnah Challah 3:11 regarding Tebal, according to Ran Nedarim 1:11, and also in Tod "Tebal", 7:7, 8:2; Rambam Prohibited Foods, 15:12 and Rabavad, in the conclusions there; and see Rashba's response, 1:13, 11:1, 12:1, 13:1, 14:1, 15:1, 16:1, 17:1, 18:1, 19:1, 20:1, 21:1, 22:1, 23:1, 24:1, 25:1, 26:1, 27:1, 28:1, 29:1, 30:1, 31:1, 29:1, 32:1, 21:1, 22:1, 23:1, 24:1, 25:1, 26:1, 27:1, 28:1, 29:1, 29:1, 30:1, 21:1, 21:1, 22:1, 23:1, 24:1, 25:1, 26:1, 27:1, 28:1, 29:1, 29:1, 29:1, 29:1, 29:1, 21:1, 21:1, 21:1, 21:1, 21:1, 21:1, 22:1, 23:1, 24:1, 25:1, 26:1, 27:1, 28:1, 29Tosha Kev A.

And see also the rulings of Toss Nedarim, 77, 191, which distinguishes between a deshilam in time (meaning that which is self-evident with the passage of time, as with us) that is not canceled and something that was permitted by some human action. Although E. B.PMG The mixed-up chapter of the Sop"b, which wrote that the word "Matosh" means that even a "dishil" is automatically invalid in its own right, and in later editions they corrected it in the rulings of the same word.

[3] Rif Chulin 57:17 In the case of a fatt of Shafaa with the roast, and according to the Responsa of the Rashba, 1:16, he agrees with his opinion; The Book of Truth To the Rev. Si. Teka (although by column Rabbi Si' 22 in the name of Ra't is the opposite. Some have written that he divides between the body of the prohibition, which is not invalid even in our gender, and its reason, which is invalid in our gender. See also column O.H. C. T.K.I.B.A. Ibid.); Rabban Sota, p. 7, d. 'Bendarim, p. 7, the vower from the green'; Toss, Rid, Nedarim, p. 7, letter 6; Responsa, Radbaz, 6, Teriz, and Aisha, 6, Tafz. And Mordechai Bitza, p. 1, letter 13, in the name of Rabi'ah, 6.B.A. Oh, C. T. Kig.

[4] See Report On the Shulchan Yod Si' 12b in Hadushim Sek'2b and also inI have been There is a section of the newspaper that wrote that here the name is the determining factor, not the taste.

[5] See Rambam, Forbidden Foods, 55:19; Ramban 2:11.Wars Pesachim PB; Yesh Chulin P"H Si' Paz; Deah 2 BRMA 2Shulchan Arba'ah Judge C. K. B. S. D.; 16 Skiing name; We will be together. C. Turtle.

[6] Ramban there, and Ran is of this opinion. And see the response. Torah of kindness C. K. brought several implications to the difference in the legal taste of leaven on Passover in some way.

[7] See Rambam and Ramban there, and Baran.

[8] Rabbi Pesachim P.B.

[9] Mordechai Pesachim, P. B. C. 133, in the name of our Rabbi Chaim Katz and Bitzah, P. A. C. 134; OZ The second is the "Sir Renu" in the Piyyut "God of the Spirits"; De'ah 1, Rm 1, 2.Shulchan Arba'ah C. K. B. S. D.; MGA C. Thames Sec. M.

[10] See flower O.H. C. 577 sec. 3; PMG In the opening of the book of the Hebrews, chapter 27; Responsorial Psalm Lion's roar C. C. and A. Responsa Reka C. Sa. V.Yad Avraham The Shulchan Yod Si' Ki who proved this from the words of the Rashba and the Ran in Nedim 44a, and so on. Need and renewal To Reka Resh, tractate of blessings. And so on. Full stones In the responsa at the end of Book 611, which explains this in the opinion of the Maimonides, 19:14, 18.

Although all of these speak of a rabbinic doubt, a prohibition. However, from all of their statements, we can learn that even in the SS in the Dauraita, one must be lenient in the rabbinic law. Beyond the general similarity that exists between a rabbinic doubt and a spikah, both of which the halakha instructs to be lenient, some commentators assume that the SS is itself a rabbinic doubt, since according to the system of the Rambam and his followers, the obligation to be strict in spikah is itself a rabbinic obligation, and when there is still a doubt, it is a rabbinic doubt and therefore there is no obligation to be strict in it (penny Ketubot 9 A.A. on the confession 'not necessary'; The Shas issues There, in the name of the Radach's Responsa, Beit Koach, Chapter 2, D.H. 'And Enad', and more).

[11] See Agreed 32255 R. Asher in Rabbi Meshulam; Rashba Bitza 3 A.B. and 2 B.Theology of the House Verse 4, Chapter 2, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and others. flower Rabbi Si' Ki Skamag, even the Rashba, held the same opinion; mm The Lord's Prayer, according to the opinion of the Rambam, and others. flower The name of the Rabbis is also forbidden in the Torah; the authorShulchan Arba'ah Attorney C. K. S., and W.flower There and in the light of the Gra"a Skalg; We will be together. Judge C. K., in the opinion of the Honorable Judge Bitza, PA.

[12] See Mordechai 7:33, "The name of our Lord Simcha is unclean," and so on. flower There in his mind that expands it further on a complete SS without mixture, and mixed in the thousand; Oh, oh Rule 25, Law 24, and Rule 26, Law 9, and so on. Shch Yod there Skano; in the responsa Radbaz Chb Si' Tariz it seems from the closing of his language that this is also a rabbinical prohibition.

[13] R. Bitza PA, 16 C' Ki S'K Ya Vflower There is a SCMG in his mind; MGA C. Taqig Sqd. According to the author,Shulchan Arba'ah Name SB; Author BShulchan Arba'ah The Book of Mormon, 577, 64, wrote that in the second book of Genesis, a ready doubt is permissible, and so on. flower The judge is there in his mind.

[14] The sources were cited at the beginning of the book. Listen carefully. And at the beginning Straight hairSee also Radal Ketubot 9 Eb and Responsa. penny C. 11.

[15] Although some have divided between a one-piece and a two-piece (see Listen carefully., Shemathah 1 and many more), but as I have shown (see my article The Essence of a Guilty Sacrifice, sickle 15, 567, and in my books The Spirit of Justice(Tam and Beit El Library, 2017) This is an incorrect division. Furthermore, in our case, we are dealing with a single-piece problem, since it is not known whether or not there is gluten in the product, and therefore all of this is irrelevant.

[16] See K.A.I. Nedarim 615, which brings about a disagreement among the Rishonim regarding the nature of all the prohibitions of the Torah, namely, whether the exceptions are the prohibitions of oaths (and the rest of the Torah prohibitions are the prohibitions of heftza) or the prohibitions of vows (and the rest of the Torah prohibitions are the prohibitions of gabra).

[17] Regarding the prohibitions of the rabbis, there has been much debate on this. For example, see B.K. 27, Todd "Vashmuel", 6.Source of life (His own book) C. 57 (who wrote the opposite of his words inNatiyam), and answers David's Fund O.H. C. 18 andBeer Yitzhak Abba Zechariah 33 Branches 1 and 3, 6Ein Yitzhak Cha"a Ab"az Si' 16 Branch 3 Letter 16-Ma, Torah of kindness Oh, C., not S.K.A., Abenz Abba Ze'z Si' Na Sk'ach, Osh Divorce, Pa"a 17 and HaL' Korban Pesach, Pa"d 42, 6Wisdom Duration P. judges on "do not turn away", andNahum's vision P"7 and K"A 38 655, 6Treasury House A rule 22 andGreedy devils System A, take a rule, andStraight hair Sha'a Faz, Sha'a Pi't, and the writings of Rabbi Shimon, Ketubot Si'a, and many more.

Regarding temporary prohibitions, there are fewer references, but see sources at the beginning of the sign inAthwan Dauritha himself.

[18] Michael Avraham, What is the meaning of the ganesh and chametz on Passover? – The historical origin of these eating prohibitions, and their implications for their halachic boundaries, Chinese KMG, 2006, p. 1.

[19] Yohanan Silman, Halachic Determinations Between Nominalism and Realism – Studies in the Philosophy of Halachic Law, Israeli Law 12, 575-576, p. 101-102. The above, Divine Torah that "is not in the heavens" – a typological clarification, Bar-Ilan Yearbook, 22-23 (Moshe Schwartz Book), Ramat-Gan Teshamach, pp. 261-268. The above, Commandments and Offenses in Halacha – Obedience and Disobedience or Correction and Depravity, Israeli Law 16, 1972, p. 147. The above, the basic norm in halacha in light of the issues of a foolish and small deaf person, Israeli Law 18, 596, p. 23.

For tangential discussions, see also the following articles: Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun, The Quest for Truth Versus Halachic Formalism, The path of religion and state, Amichai Berholtz (ed.), Beit Morasha and the Ministry of Education, Jerusalem 2002, pp. 195-214. David Haneshka, On the Legal Reality in the Mishnah of Maimonides, Chinese (92) Tsev, 1983, pp. 128-131. Prof. Moshe Zilberg, Chinese 44, pp. 10 et seq. As well as my article on the essence of concepts in Halacha and in general: Between Philosophy and Halacha, sent toentreeSee also Shai A. Wesner's article, Ontological and Naturalistic Thinking in Talmudic Law and Lithuanian Yeshivahs, and the sources cited there, as well as his doctoral thesis.

[20] See this in the book of my friend Prof. Nadav Shnerb, Angle beam, in his article on Parashat Shemini.

[21] And there, in the body of the Responsorial Psalm Ohacha 62, he recounted an incident in which he was a rabbi of Baghdad, and one day it was revealed to him by a messenger who had come to the city that all the tefillin that all the people of the city had put on for generations were not square enough. Their conclusion was that everyone's tefillin were invalid. He discussed there whether it was possible that all of them had not yet fulfilled the commandment of tefillin, and that they all had a "headscarf that does not put on tefillin." He proved from several sources that this is not so, and even though tefillin is a positive commandment, and according to the law, "one who is not forced to wear tefillin, here they are considered to have fulfilled the commandment of tefillin." This is a sensational innovation, but certainly, regarding the Levites among whom one is forced to wear tefillin, one must say yes, as he actually wrote in the answer cited above.

[22] For practical suggestions on how to correct the foolishness of the heart in the Hasidic view of Chabad, see the Lubavitcher Rebbe's article, Therefore Were the First Ones Called, 577. Appears on the Chabad Info website, issue 9, year 9.

[23] For a simple, clear and brief overview (but very preliminary of course), see Rabbi Aryeh Lichtenstein's article, Harm or Not?, on the website Hoshen Mishpat Institute, P. Ba No. 146, 13.1.2016.

[24] See Pearls from the Madrasa, Leviticus, p. 21, letter 8, meaning 'and the spring'.

[25] See for example, Lesson file Passover (and also inQOS 23), dew drops The end of the book is shortened. And so it proved.Blessing Abraham Bava Kama 26: (i.e., regarding the matter) whatAthwan Dauritha What and whatSource of life An opening to the sign Tala (which was cited in the Responsa Rek"a itself, which was disputed). We also discussed this inAnnotation file In the notes to Baba Kama, page 12, pages 11 and 12.Yoav's plot Cha"a O"ch 7. See also Ka"i Shabbat 33 and many more.

[26] See inAvi Ezri First there, andOsh P.A. Mahal Divorce 17, 6Lessons in memory of Father Marie Z"l Cha"a page 9 in the proofreading.

[27] See Pearls from the Madrasa Name the letter H.

[28] See all sources inThe repository of the judges Abba Zechariah 17:17, as well as a detailed discussion with many sources and methods in the book Pearls from the Madrasa, Leviticus, pp. 21 ff. (from Rabbi Chaim Leib ben Dov Eisenstein).

[29] Although he saw AGM Holy Scriptures and Purity, 1992, that even the individual pardon that he made under the instruction of the 14th is not due to rape. But he attributes this to the fact that he had to clarify.

[30] See Pearls from the Madrasa name.

[31] Regarding the case of a secular person being charged with a crime, Noon 25, April 2017, p. 9.

[32] See an interesting review in Rabbi Chaim Rapoport's article, Those Who Did Not Check Their Tefillin in the Month of Elul and Were Found Invalid, on the website Notes and explanations – Torah Tents, 7 Adar 5764, in the chapter "The First Method" where the author's opinions were presented Joshua's word andAbraham's play, named after.

[33][33] We note thatShch He himself divides between prohibitions that are time-dependent and those that are not, regarding the law of non-work that is not beneficial. See his remarks in Khum Si' Ra, which were also cited inBeit Halevi H.A. C. 15, p.