With God’s help

Noon – 5765

(Discussion on property laws in the Kovno ghetto)

A few days ago, I was brought to your attention about an issue that appeared in the newspaper's Shabbat supplements. Yeted Neeman, concerning halachic rulings regarding assets in a catastrophic situation.[1] These matters are sensational, both because of the historical situation and because the discussion touches on the roots of human life, the laws of money, and the worship of God in general, and therefore their clarification is of great importance. I pray that we will not have to implement them.

May these words be a candle for the souls of the saints of the Kovno Ghetto, headed by the eminent Baal Abraham's Word (=DBA) His soul departed in purity in the ghetto (Sunday, 23 Adar 1, 5733).

A. The ruling of the Hadvar Avraham and Rabbi Sh. F. Gibraltar: General Description

The story begins with an article in Supplement F of the 2003 Constitutions, where Rabbi Yitzhak Elchanan Gibraltar (the author's name was revealed in subsequent issues), who was a child in the Kovno ghetto, tells the story of the Jews of Janova. The Lithuanian partisans murdered all the Jews of Janova, except for about three hundred and fifty who remained alive. The rabbi of Janova, the rabbi Nachum Ginzburg, author of Mekor Baruch, arrived in the Kovno ghetto, which itself was in a terrible state, and brought the partisans' demand to receive one hundred thousand marks as a ransom for the lives of the remaining Jews of Janova. In addition, after they were ransomed, they would join the Kovno ghetto (which in itself would reduce the chances of survival of those already there).

The Judenrat administration refused with understandable arguments (their donors, the fact that they were redeeming more than their dues, and other risks, etc.). On the other hand, the Gaon Baal DBA, the rabbi of Kovna, ruled that there was an obligation to give the money. It must be understood that money there was life, literally. There was a situation of terrible hunger, and life was in danger at every moment. The owner of theDBA Compare this to the issue of B.M. 62 A.A., where R.A. and Ben Patura disagreed:

Two people were walking on a road, one of them holding a pitcher of water. If they drink, both will die, and if one of them drinks, they will reach the settlement. Ben Petura taught: It is better for both of them to drink and die, and for neither of them to see the death of their friend. Until the Rabbis came and taught: 'And the life of your brother is with you' – your life comes before the life of your friend.

In the case of Yanova, the money is likened to the water's evaporation, and therefore according to the halakha of Daki'l, the money should not be given. However, despite this, the author of the Daba believed that this is a life in which everyone is subject to visible miracles at every moment, and in any case, God saves them only through miracles. In such a situation, the money must be given (see details below in the last chapter).

We should note that the ultra-Orthodox people of Kovno gave the pennies they earned in a last-ditch effort to save the Jews of Yanova (you have to read the description to understand what this entailed. The author suggests that perhaps it was thanks to this that they were saved). They joined the Kovno ghetto (except for their rabbi, who was murdered by the same partisans immediately after collecting the money, 14), and some were saved and survived, and even immigrated to Israel.

This incident is presented here as background for the continuation of the discussion. In the 2003 supplement Nitzvim-Wilach, the same author describes a discussion on the law of the property of those murdered in the ghetto. Most of the public considered the property of the murdered to be a waste, like a "sea trinket," even if the murdered had heirs outside the ghetto (if they had heirs inside the ghetto, the custom was to give it to them). In contrast, Rabbi Mordechai Pogramansky refused to use a coat from this property, even at the risk of death. The public's attitude is understandable, since there is no greater "sea trinket" than a situation in which there is an order from the Nazis to collect the property and register the inventory, with a prohibition on touching it, and whoever violates it is sentenced to death.

The author's father, Rabbi Shraga Feibel Gibraltar (whom the great scholars of Kovno attested to as the greatest scholar in Kovno, and as I understood from the end of the issue of P. Pinchas – see below – later a rabbi in Italy), had a different view of property. In his opinion, the concept of 'private property' expires in the ghetto. No one has ownership of money, even money that they owned before the war. The article contains a general justification for this view, and contains different formulations that are not necessarily identical:

1. A Jew in the ghetto, whom every Lithuanian child is allowed and even commanded to kill at any moment, is a 'killer', and the dead have no ownership of wealth. Life in this state is not like a person being led to the gallows, since he can order the division of his property, and there is also a chance that the king will commute his sentence.
2. In order to own money, you need a minimal way of life. If life is completely meaningless, there is no ownership of money, and money is meaningless.
3. Also appearing in the issue of P. Pinchas 5764 (not necessarily in this context) is the consideration that it is forbidden to enjoy a miracle, not only from the money saved but also from life itself.

As is evident from his words (especially in the article in P' Nitzavim), Rabbi Gibraltar believed that anyone could take another's clothes or bread. The implications regarding the ruling in the Yanova case will be discussed below in the final chapter.

However, the PJ apparently disagrees with what appears in the aforementioned P. Pinchas issue in his name, that he believed that if there are relatives in the ghetto itself, no one has permission to take the property. It is clear that this was the custom there, but it is not clear how this reconciles with the perception that there is no ownership there at all? It is clear from his words that this is not about the expropriation of the property as a public regulation for the time being (Madin al-Fakar 14, etc.). The wording also appears there: "According to his halakhic system, all ownership of the property in the ghetto will be expropriated except for what is in his possession." Again, Hazinan states that the expropriation is a matter of principle, and it applies only to what is not in his possession.[2]

In the issue of P. Pinchas, another consideration by Rabbi Gibraltar appears, that if someone stole money from his friend, it is as if he had murdered him, since the money there is the soul (which is the assumption at the basis of the parable of the two who walk in the desert). This means that what is in Reuben's hand is forbidden for Shimon to take from him, but not according to the law of theft but according to the law of murder. Perhaps this is also an explanation for the above distinction between what is in his hand and what is not in his hand (and will be explained below at the beginning of the next chapter).

It is worth noting that Rabbi Gibraltar (the father) applied his concept even after the war. When people who owed him money from before the war came to him, he refused to accept it from them, claiming that in the ghetto there was expropriation of ownership of money, and all encumbrances against him were forfeited. He accepts gifts only from the Lord of the World…

It should be noted that these articles are not halakhic articles, and the statements are presented in the course of a historical description, and therefore the halakhic reasoning is not clear and precise enough. A letter was published in the supplement P. HaAzino (Rish 2004, issue 2) that discusses the halakhic points, and rejects the ruling outright. Rabbi Gibraltar (the younger), in his response in the issue of P. Pinchas, writes that someone who was not there cannot examine and judge these halakhic claims. There are halakhic beliefs that cannot be explained to someone who has not experienced the situation himself. Personal experience creates immediate feelings regarding the requirements of halakhic in the situation in question, and especially in such an incomprehensible and unusual situation. Someone who does not understand and feel what a 'gabra katla' situation is, and what attitude and trust a person has in his own finances and soul in such a situation, will not be able to judge.

Therefore, it seems to me that the attitude towards these rulings should be as a type of testimony, and not as a regular halakhic ruling. As stated, only someone who has experienced the things can rule on them. Torah is something that has been learned (and even practiced) by someone. Therefore, although the claim about the inability to judge is correct (and one must read to understand to what extent), I am not exempt from trying to understand this unique testimony about that part of the Torah that was given only to them, and to learn it from them. Therefore, it is not surprising that we scrutinize their words here beyond what is customary to do with the words of another contemporary sage who rules halakhic in a normal situation. In the course of the discussion, the errors of the author of the above letter, in the commentary, who discussed the words as if they were spoken in the normal human situation, and not hers, will also be explained.

As stated, the discussion concerns the fundamentals of the laws of halacha, and therefore several points will be raised here, each of which requires clarification and clarification on its own. There is no space here, and therefore I will keep the discussion very brief (and sometimes I will only refer to the relevant points), and it is certainly not for me to decide on all of these. My purpose here is to present the main points and fundamentals of the matter as I understand them, and those greater than me will come and decide.

B. Possible understandings in the ruling of Rabbi Sh. P. Gibraltar

Let us first say that the narrator himself says (see P. Pinchas) that there is no clear source for his father's words from the rabbinical and poskim, but being in this terrible situation he felt that this explanation was correct. If so, it would be difficult for us to base his words on a simple halakhic foundation. On the other hand, a halakhic foundation that is in dispute also does not constitute a sufficient basis for such a ruling. Therefore, it seems that we must seek a new explanation, in light of which the law is straightforward. In this chapter we will offer some standard halakhic possibilities, in the form of investigations and tests of that "evidence," and it seems that this is not his intention. In the next chapter we will offer the new explanation that the Anad is the basis of his words.

First, we will try to clarify the distinction between property in his possession and property not in his possession. As we stated above, his intention is apparently not to divide according to the law of property, since ownership of the entire property expires in such a situation, but rather to divide according to the law of persons.

This division may be based on the perception that a person's property is a peripheral circle of his own ('in all that you have' – this is money). I have discussed this at length elsewhere, and with evidence for this, and so on.[3]

And according to Rabbi Gibralter, the distinction between property in his possession and property not in his possession is not a distinction in the laws of ownership of money. The division is between money in his possession that serves him (or could serve him) to save his life, and money that is not in his possession, and therefore is not useful to him. The money in his possession is part of him himself, and therefore taking it in such a situation is, in Rabbi Gibraltar's opinion, like murder. The money that is not in his possession is not considered part of him, and therefore only the laws of theft are relevant to it, but these do not exist here.[4]

It is possible that even if there is no general perception of the wealth as part of the owner's body, since the wealth in his hands in such a situation can be used to save his life, it is like a limb on which the soul depends, and therefore only in such a situation is it considered by the Jewish people as part of him. In any case, the one who takes it is like a murderer.

And according to the Jewish Law, the distinction between heirs who are in the ghetto and others also lies in this distinction. On the face of it, this distinction is difficult, since the halakha does not allow for the bequest of a part of the world (and as is known, regarding bequests to the poor and not to the rich, see Yerushalmi Paha, 5:1 and Rambam, Nedarim, 2:15, 6).AnciT (E. 'The Untouchable', s. 60). And according to us, it can be said that with regard to the heirs in the ghetto itself, they are part of it, and they too can be saved through that same wealth, and therefore, for them too, that same wealth was like an organ on which the soul depends. This is not a matter of the untouchable financially, but of the definition of the exploited body of which the wealth is the organ.

Although this seems difficult, since in this argument we implicitly assume that there is a relationship of inheritance, why are these people different from the other people in the ghetto? And it could be said that there is a metaphysical relationship between them and their relative, which is what causes the inheritance. The fact that they inherit their relative is itself based on a metaphysical connection between them. If so, this connection itself causes the unique 'inheritance' that we have noted here, that 'his' wealth, which is part of his body, can now save them and in that way it constitutes a part of them.

And of course, all of this is still far from a sharp definition, and here we have only pointed out a possible direction of thinking that requires further elaboration and refinement. We will now move on to suggestions regarding the understanding of Rabbi Gibraltar's ruling itself, that ownership of property expires in the situation prevailing in the ghetto.

1. The first obvious understanding of Rabbi Gibraltar's ruling regarding the expropriation of ownership is based on the law of 'gabra katla', which is apparently explicit in his words. According to the rabbinic law, when a person is considered dead, he cannot be the owner of property. Admittedly, this must be discussed from several angles.

First, the method of the Gerash regarding ownership after death is well known. Similarly, in the law of the use of inheritance, we find the understanding that the deceased is the owner even after his death.[5] And here in particular, why wouldn't the Jew in the ghetto be able to bequeath his wealth to his heirs, at least those outside the ghetto (whom he writes about as not having ownership of the wealth)?

And we must also discuss the case of someone who goes to kill in a ביד, or because of Mardin, or because of Tarifa, which are also called 'gabra katla'. And it is difficult, since we do not find in all of these a ruling on the confiscation of their property. It is true that a distinction must be made between all of these and the situation discussed, since in our case, even the property itself goes to ruin, while someone who goes to kill in the normal way can inherit his property (and so Rabbi Gibraltar himself wrote, adding that someone who goes to kill may have a small chance that the king will pardon him). However, this already leads us to the following understanding, as follows.

And there is also the matter of his refusal to accept repayment of debts he had from before the war. Why did he believe that he would not be entitled to them again after he 'came back to life', that is, after the war? Although it seems that this depends on the investigation of the latter concerning the resurrection of the dead (and the dead that Yechezkel revived, in the issue of Nida 61b), whether a person must sanctify his wife again, or buy back his property (see below).

More generally, it is necessary to discuss whether a person in the ghetto is indeed a 'gabra katla'. Here the questions arise raised by another of the holocaust saints in the Ninth Fort in Kovno (the fortress where the Jews were executed), the Grau 14 (who was murdered by Lithuanians about a year before the establishment of the ghetto), and the things described in the introduction Lesson file known). In Part B of QOS 28 He brings the words of Baal Terumah"d It discusses whether the wife of the prophet Elijah is allowed to go to the market. And the latter also discussed whether when he returns to life he will have to return and marry her, and also regarding similar situations in the resurrection of the dead.[6] Seemingly, in our situation, all of these questions, which are usually perceived as a guide to the Messiah, take on a practical nature.

It does appear that in the case of a man who is under the law, killing or marrying his wife will be forbidden, just as it would be for a normal person, and he will not have to re-consecrate his wife, since it seems that Rabbi Gibraltar did not intend for a literal 'gabra' to be killed, and so on.[7]

In any case, it seems that all of this is not a long way to go. First, this does not seem to be Rabbi Gibraltar's intention. Second, as we have already noted, if the person is a 'gabra katla' but the property is in its normal status, then in such a situation the heirs were supposed to inherit the property. And in fact, there is room here for a division opposite to what he himself made regarding the property of the murdered (in practice): heirs within the ghetto are also considered dead, and therefore they are not heirs, while heirs outside the ghetto are. As mentioned, the determination that here the property is also considered lost is already the next understanding.

2. A second understanding of Rabbi Gibraltar's words concerns the law of finances itself, this time from the law of despair. Although the intention is not despair of his finances, since Rabbi Gibraltar refused to accept repayment of debts from before the war, about which we certainly should not despair.

Therefore, it is possible to suggest that this is a person's despair of his life, which projects onto his attitude towards his property. Ostensibly, when a person despairs of his life, and even if he is not actually despairing, if this is a situation in which it is appropriate (statistically, not religiously) to despair, then it is like the rising of the sea and the flooding of a river. In such a situation, it is likely that his property is also considered abandoned. If so, it is possible that his intention is that ownership expires due to despair.

It should be noted, however, that if this is indeed Rabbi Gibraltar's intention, then what difference is there between having heirs in the ghetto itself and not? The S.S. has no ownership of the property at all. Perhaps there is only despair here about inheriting the wealth to heirs outside the ghetto, and not about the wealth that is still in his hands. And it is possible that this is also the basis for the division we saw above between wealth in his hands and wealth in the hands of others.

And it should be noted further,[8] According to the well-known Maimonides (P. 6 and P. 1 Magzilla, and not according to the Tochum, 6 R. 9 and Rosh), even the smallest of the sea's treasures is not a waste, and what is permissible to be taken is only out of desperation.

Beyond this, it is necessary to note the disagreement of the Rishonim regarding the question of whether despair over debt is beneficial. And also regarding despair over something in one's possession (and also regarding a deposit). See AnciT E. 'Yaosh' SKB notes 318-357, and also SKG there notes 434 et seq. Therefore, it is unlikely that Rabbi Gibraltar would simply say that due to despair the previous encumbrances towards him were terminated.

And the EOW is still inAnciT Notes 369-372, regarding a person's despair of his own body, which is not useful.[9]

According to 27, this does not seem to be Rabbi Gibraltar's intention, for he did not condition the law on someone who said that his assets were lost, or at least that he despaired, and in particular, some poskim believe that despair is not beneficial in debt. And in general, his words do not indicate that this was his intention.

3. Another understanding is that the property belongs to the Nazis by virtue of wartime conquest. And indeed, the first to dispute whether wartime conquest is an act of property in itself, or whether it merely causes despair. Consider, for example, Fruit of Moses (Kinyamin) C. 23, etc. If Dam is only a cause of despair, then there are the problems here that we saw in the previous commentary.

In any case, there is no doubt that this was not Rabbi Gibraltar's intention, since it is difficult to distinguish between when the heirs are in the ghetto or outside it. Furthermore, this law apparently does not apply to the property he had before the war, and to all the property after the war (when he 'conquered' himself and the money was taken back from them. See Shulchan Arba'ah Although this may have been related to the Babylonian and Jerusalemite dispute regarding the master's ownership of assets that the slave bought before they were sold,[10] And maybe a conquest that I am.[11] In any case, it is clear that this is not Rabbi Gibraltar's intention, as this is not a simple law. Furthermore, he did not write that the money belongs to the Nazis, but rather that it is as if it were abandoned, and there is no ownership of it at all.

4. Another understanding is that when a person is not in control of his own money, and in fact he cannot use it as he wishes, and in fact anyone can take it from him, then he does not own it at all. Here there is an assumption that ownership of money depends on the possibility of using it.

This assumption has been the subject of extensive discussion, and more. See my articles 'What is a Challot' (Noon B), andFruit of Moses (Buyers) C. B.[12]

However, this does not seem to be Rabbi Gibraltar's intention either, if only because it is not a simple law at all, and there are apparently many disputes about it (pbuh). Furthermore, even in the ghetto there are uses that can be made of the money, but at any time someone can come and take it. In the next chapter we will present what the barrer seems to mean.

C. Cost expropriation, versus the irrelevance of the concept of 'ownership'

From Rabbi Gibraltar's words, it seems that his intention is much more sweeping. His argument is that when there is no normal life, then there is no ownership of property at all. In such a situation, the concept of 'ownership' is irrelevant.

This option must be clearly distinguished from all the previous options. Previously, we looked for an explanation that permits the personal wealth of a particular person in a particular situation. Even options 3-4 in the previous chapter spoke of the permissibility of the wealth of a specific person in a specific situation (although there were several such people in the same situation, the discussion is about each of them). However, here the argument is that the concepts of ownership themselves do not exist in certain situations, and not just that a particular ownership has expired. The expiration of concrete ownership is the result of a situation in which the concepts of 'ownership' are irrelevant. In situations like the ghetto, concepts of ownership do not belong at all, and in any case, concrete ownership of assets does not belong either.

This explanation can be understood in two different ways, both of which may be correct (according to Rabbi Gibraltar's original intention, it seems more in the first direction, but the second could also be true):

1. It is understandable that the argument is about the concept of metaphysical ownership. When a person is not considered a living person in the usual way, even if he is not a real 'gabra katla', then concepts of ownership do not apply to him. Indeed, it is not that his ownership of his property expires (as in the previous possibilities), but rather that the concept of ownership cannot be attributed to him. He is likened (only from a legal perspective, of course) to an animal, or more correctly – to a small animal (which is forbidden to kill, but is not a legal entity in matters of ownership). In such a situation, it is also impossible to transfer his property to his heirs, since his property expires even though he is not dead. In such a situation, there was no death, and therefore there is no law of inheritance.

There is an assumption here that where there is no life in the conventional sense, concepts of ownership do not belong. Of course, we still need to try and define better what the criteria are that distinguish life that constitutes a legal entity from life that does not. In any case, if such a legal definition does exist, then it is likely that a person in the ghetto is a good candidate to be included in these criteria.

And there is still certainly room to discuss why after the Holocaust, when that person returns to live as a human being, and to be a legal entity for all intents and purposes, the debts that arose before the Holocaust do not return. It is not clear why Rabbi Gibraltar insisted that these debts expire without return. Of course, one can raise sides to this here and there, and these things are not unacceptable, and so on.

2. It is also possible to understand Rabbi Gibraltar's argument on the social level, and not necessarily on the personal level (as previously understood). According to this perspective, his argument is that in a situation where anyone can take the soul, or rob money, of any ghetto resident, the concepts of ownership have no meaning. And note, here we did not attach this to the situation of each individual ghetto resident, as in option A above, but to the general social (or anti-social) situation that prevailed there.

For example, a resident who goes out to be killed by robbers. He has no heirs, and he is about to die in a way that is not in accordance with the law and honesty. In such a situation, according to the first direction, his property is a nobody, but according to the current direction – certainly not, since the social situation is normal, and the problem is only his.[13] Let's explain this direction a little more.

As is known, the Gershish in the fifth chapter is from his book Gates of Honor, proves that the Torah's ownership laws are based on a legal layer, which is human-general. Only after society defines the legal criteria for determining and applying ownership, does the Torah come and apply the prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal', and other financial prohibitions, to infringements of ownership.[14]

In light of this argument, Rabbi Gibraltar's words can be understood as follows: When a society operates according to the rules of honesty and fairness, and establishes for itself certain laws, then these laws can serve as a legal background for the Torah laws that depend on ownership, including 'thou shalt not steal.' However, in a situation where a society operates improperly, its legal system has no meaning. And certainly even if they define something they call 'law,' it has no meaning, for just as according to Halacha, there is no validity for 'dina demalchuta' that is not decent, which some call 'dina dahmsnuta', and certainly not for the evil Nazi law, which is 'dina drochtzia' (the source of these words is in the Life of the Ramban 22:55, and many poskim have cited and expanded on it), so too does the Nazi law have no legal validity. Of course, legal experts have already established this (who, in light of the claim of the Rabbi, their words are relevant in this matter also on the level of Halakhah), that the Nazi law had no legal validity.

As we saw above, according to the HaGarsha, without a legal layer that operates in the background, there are no concepts of ownership. The conclusion that there are no concepts of ownership in a situation of living in a ghetto now becomes obvious.

It seems that there is a major innovation here, which is a significant step beyond the words of the Harash themselves. The main argument in this interpretation is that the Torah's ownership laws do not depend on an abstract legal system, but on a system that actually operates in a particular place. Therefore, where there is no legal system that actually operates, even if the proper rules according to which such a system should operate are known, the Torah's ownership laws will not apply.

And it seems that this depends on an apparent contradiction in the words of the Harash at the beginning of Shaar 5, and we will briefly discuss it. Beyond the evidence from the Shas and poskim that the Harash cites throughout the entire Shaar, the Harash at the beginning of Shaar 5 (in Barfa, and in Pb, where it says 'and we shall not be able to do so') raises two main theoretical reasons for his claim, and Z"l (in Pb, ibid.):

Just as the type of owner and the rights of the owner of property are a legal matter, even without the warning 'Thou shalt not steal', and as we explained above, it is in no way possible to say that the reason we attribute the object to Reuben is because Shimon is warned according to the Torah not to steal it from him. Rather, the matter is the opposite, that the prohibition of theft is after the matter is decided in the laws of the owners' boundaries.…

And even though at first glance it is puzzling, what necessity and obligation would a person have to do something without the command and warning of the Torah? But when we delve into the matter thoroughly, this matter must be understood. After all, the obligation and necessity to serve God and fulfill His will is also a matter of obligation and necessity according to the law of reason and cognition, just as it is an obligation and the enslavement of money is a legal obligation, which is obligated according to the ways of the owners.…

In these words of the Grand Rabbi, two main reasons for his claim emerge:

1. The prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal' is a prohibition against violating ownership. However, for this prohibition to have any meaning, we must first define the concepts of ownership themselves. Only after defining these concepts can we say that whoever violates them also violates the prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal' (in addition to the legal prohibition).[15]The Rabbis outright reject the possibility that the boundaries of ownership were conveyed together with the prohibition of "do not steal," both on halachic evidence and from explanation. We have not found such a definition anywhere, and everything was determined according to the opinions of the sages, who assess this according to legal fairness.
2. The validity of the obligation to obey the legal system exists even without a command. The Gerash's reasoning for this is that the validity of the obligation to serve God in general is also not derived from a command (since the obligation to observe a certain system cannot be an exception to that system).[16]

The first of the two reasonings can be satisfied with a theoretical legal system. That is, even if there is no legal system that actually operates, the prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal' can be defined on the basis of some theoretical legal system, which is defined by considerations of universal legal logic. However, the second reasoning, according to which there is an obligation to obey this legal system, does not appear to exist without a system that actually operates. Is the theoretical legal system legally binding also in the ghetto? In a turbulent, cruel, and bestial life as it was there, a legal system has no meaning, and there is no obligation to act according to it. If so, at the very least it follows that even if there is a theoretical universal legal system, in a situation of living in a ghetto there is no legal system that obliges us. Therefore, there is ample reason to say that the rules of halakha regarding ownership will not apply in such a situation.

To clarify the point, we will present one implication of this understanding. According to this proposal, where there is a demalkuta law that actually applies with respect to the laws of property, it will also determine the boundaries of ownership with respect to the Torah's ownership laws.

In other words, it is not the theoretical legal system that stands behind the prohibitions of 'thou shalt not steal,' but the real-actual system that is practiced in practice (of course, if it meets the basic rules of honesty). Although this itself requires clarification, and probably depends on various disputes, etc.[17]

D. Two additional implications

1. It is necessary to discuss whether the law of 'what a slave buys, his master buys' can be explained according to this principle. In our opinion, it can be said that the slave is not a legal entity, and is not part of society ('his injury is evil', see B.K. 4:1, and cf. Rambam recognizes P.H. 2), and therefore the concepts of ownership are not relevant in relation to him. And according to the 7th, it follows that the fact that a slave does not have ownership does not stem from the fact that ownership belongs to his master, but rather the opposite: since the slave is not the master's master and therefore is not a legal entity, then the concept of ownership is not relevant for him, and in any case his master is entitled to everything that he has (because he himself is considered to be the master's authority, and therefore is entitled for his master). According to the 7th, a gift must be discussed in such a way that his master does not have authority over it, which in our opinion is not appropriate to do so, and cf. Says Moshe C. 25 andNovels of Rabbi Shmuel Kiddushin C. H. S. K., and A. K. M.

Although all of this is only for explanation 1 above, which states that the problem is the situation of the individual person who is alive but not a legal entity. However, according to explanation 2, we have an overall social situation that is not proper, and this does not exist in a slave. And of course, even if both explanations above were correct together, it is still possible to say yes.

2. It is also necessary to discuss the ruling on all Torah laws that require ownership (and also laws that require monetary value). For example, the law of four species on the first day (which is "for you"), the law of slaughtering an animal (which is imposed on the owner), the sanctification of money (for which one must give a separate shar'), and more.

It is possible that we should discuss whether they are 'yours' or whether it should not be not his. It is possible that the expropriation of the concept of 'ownership' is different in this respect from the expropriation of the properties themselves. In a situation of expropriation of the concept, just as it is not correct to say that the four kinds of things are 'his', it is also not correct to say that the four kinds of things are 'not his'. The concepts 'his' or 'not his' do not exist in such a situation. And I am a lawyer in all this.

And the urban ('Urba Farah', above) that a similar example is found in the introduction to theHazo"a For the gold (Homim 316:2). We note that the Torah determines the value of various payments according to the currency that is issued in the country. If so, what will they do in a place where money has no value (for example, in a place where it is customary to buy only by barter). How will the laws of the Torah be fulfilled, such as the law of the rocks for the redemption of a son, and the law of the purchase of money, and more?

And in the name of S.The Prophet This is settled in several ways, and it seems that according to at least one of them, if there is no accepted currency then all these laws are void.

E. Mammon as a 'Kithon'

To conclude our remarks, we will comment on what emerges from our suggestions regarding comparing the situation to the case of two people walking in the desert with a water bottle.

As stated, the owner ofDBA He began his remarks by comparing the case of Yanuba to two people walking in the desert with a water jug, but the Rabbis ruled the opposite: the 'jug' must be given to save the Jews of Yanuba. As we have seen, Rabbi Gibraltar's opinion is that the 'jug' (= the money) does not belong to either of the two. Of course, this does not mean that it belongs to the Jews of Yanuba, but only that they have no ownership of it at all.

It should be noted that the issue discussed here was whether there is an obligation to give it away, or whether it is permissible at all, and not whether it is permissible for a Jew from Yanova to take it from a Jew from Kovna. Therefore, it is possible that the halakhic determination that the property is a pafkir is useful in the matter of whether it is permissible (but, of course, not obligatory) to give it away. For if the kiton belongs to Reuven, he is prohibited from giving it to Shimon, his previous refusals.[18] In other words, there is no justification here for the obligation to give the money, but there is a possible basis for permission to give it.

However, as we have seen, Rabbi Gibraltar believed that the wealth in a person's own hands, although not owned by him, is like his body (an organ on which the soul depends). Therefore, even if a person does not own the wealth, it would seem that he would be forbidden to give it away. Ostensibly, a person is forbidden to lose his life in order to save the life of his friend.

According to the testimony of his son (P. Nitzavim), Rabbi Gibraltar himself interpreted the teaching of theDBA (Unlike Rabbi Pogramansky, who was careful not to benefit even from the property of the murdered), and the late:

However, the ruling of the guru of the generation, Maran Gra"d Shapira zt"l (=hDBA), although there is no ownership of property in the ghetto and everything is empty, there is another law: 'You shall not stand for the blood of your neighbor'. – Terrible and terrible. If you can save a life with your own soul and stay alive, you must risk your life and save.

Apparently, there is room to understand the ruling on a purely halakhic level (this is how the aforementioned writer understood it, in P. Hazinu), and not as Rabbi Gibraltar did. Or because it is doubt versus certainty, and because of the methods by which a person is permitted to put himself in doubt in order to save his friend. Or it is said that where the two Jews are in doubt about the fate of a third party (not from thirst, but from the Nazis and the Lithuanians), then there is no law of 'your lives are in danger', since life probably will not be saved even if he keeps the kiton with him.

Although it is clear from the language of the article that Rabbi Gibraltar understood that the ruling was based on expanding the second direction: the need to be entitled to miracles, that only they would save the ghetto Jews from death in such a situation (and otherwise it would not help them even if they kept the money).

In this context, it is appropriate to cite here other similar rulings in the authority of the author.DBA (Issue P. of my laws), which forbade everyone in the ghetto from eating legumes in the cold and hunger until death, and forbade eating horse meat only for yeshiva members (as a member of the Jewish community for the rest of the community) even when their lives were in danger. According to him, the community must demonstrate a member of the Jewish community in order to receive miracles, which alone will save them in their situation. The author of the "Daver Avraham" said: "From the place where exemption ends, there the dedication of the soul begins." He said this, but he warned: "Not to lose the soul," and a hair's breadth distinguishes them.

As is known, theDBA He himself decided, while he was ill, not to join his son in America, but to return to his community in Kovno, and he was also the only one in the ghetto who did not remove his beard, and was even willing to be killed for it. See his son's introduction to S. DBA holiday.

If we are honest, then the meaning of this is that in a situation where one is in tangible danger of death, the normal halakhic rules are null and void. Not only does the concept of 'ownership' lapse, but many other rules as well.[19] As an illustration, let's imagine a case where a community lives in the midst of a literal fire (='the town is burning'). It is burning fiercely and consuming them every day and every moment. Even if there is some chance of salvation, is ownership of the property even discussed in such a situation? Do the rules of precedence apply in the midst of the fire?

Just as a background, let us recall the Toda's division 'Zarek', Bk. 17b,[20] They divided between a vessel that is on its way to the ground, which is the manna of Tabira, and shooting an arrow at the vessel.[21] The Jews in the ghetto are a baby thrown from the roof (with a slight chance of being saved, in a completely miraculous event, and a greater chance that someone else will come and catch them in the sword even before that). In the process of flying down, when the power of destruction is already within him and threatens to consume him, does he calculate the laws of fate and advance? Here the considerations are only what to do to win a miracle.[22] For this reason, this is the summary of the things that emerge from the "testimony" of the owner of theDBA (According to the commentary of Rabbi Gibraltar).

As mentioned, the community members listened to their rabbi's instructions (Issue F. in my Hukokuti: "Everything that the rabbi of Kovna said was holy of holies for us"). We note that, according to his son's testimony, in a similar incident that occurred about a year later, Rabbi Gibraltar took all his savings, 15,000 marks that he had accumulated with blood, sweat, and tears, through hunger, cold, and constant deprivation, and gave them to this purpose, and was left with nothing.

These are the words of the testimonies. And so far, investigations and tests, which were conducted by a single person (with the assistance of the anonymous doctor) who is not an expert, neither knowledgeable nor reasonable, and there will be no treasure in it. The lips of the saints will be bears, some of them in the grave and some of them that have turned to ashes and scattered everywhere, and their rights will be protected by the Awaki.

The end of a month that is spent happily,

And above the heavens, the month of mercy and forgiveness,

Here is the Yerucham branch.

[1] The subject was raised in a unique online forum called 'Stop Here Thinking', by an interesting Jew, who has a lot of experience in both learning and creativity, who calls himself 'Urba Farah'. I must thank my friend, whose identity I do not know, for the referral and the interesting conversation we had. May his keyboard be humming in his home when the words of Torah are spoken here in his name.

As a continuation of the mystery, I would also like to thank a friend who wishes to remain anonymous, who made his 'archive' available to me. I hope that my brief 'bibliographic research' has brought up the relevant sources. I will note that Rabbi Y. A. Gibraltar is about to publish a book on Lithuanian Jewry until the Holocaust, and perhaps additional relevant details will be added there.

[2] There also appears (in a later section) a question about whether there is a difference between a lien on a loan that has expired and a deposit. It is not clear from its language whether the intention is to provide whether, before the judgment, the deposit must be returned to the depositor (even though he is no longer its owner), or whether a deposit is also considered to be in his possession, and therefore he has ownership over it in principle.

[3] See my articles 'What is a disease?' Noon B. Also, in great detail in my article 'Concerning the obligation to pay for property that was damaged', in the file Israeli Laws – Tort Law, Shlomo Greentz (editor), Israel Legal Institute, Petah Tikva 2003. The subject will also be discussed in two chapters in the third book of the trilogy. Two carts and a hot air balloon, which will be published in Azah soon.

[4] It should be noted that even in the above-mentioned BM, the wording is that one has a kiton in his 'hand', and not that it is his, and Zela.

[5] In the law of use, see, for example, Fruit of Moses (Kenyanim) C. M. G. S. K., there is much to be said about this and his words there, and so on.

The Harash discusses this in several places in the "Kinyamin HaKinyamin", mainly in P"d and P"z there (in light of the issue of "after you", and in light of the division between "give" and "gain" in the Rif and Rashi Resh Gitin. See alsoKZVAH (See also Chapter 18, Chapter 2, which he proved from there, and in general).

A source for the assumption that there is ownership of the grave can be cited from the Maharama in Susi Ri in the name of the Rashba's answer (Cha. 35), which states that it is possible to provide the deceased with money in a matter concerning his honor or burial. And see also the same source cited by the Ghara, which cited a source from Sanhedrin 48 A.A. regarding the permissibility of the deceased (and in fact this appears in the answer itself).

[6] And consider this, for example, PIAMS Sanhedrin P. 10:1 (He will return in the day of resurrection and live with his relatives). The main ones Fourth article, P.L. energetic (to the husband) Son of a living man), Ch. B., in the section 'Secret of the Righteous', C. B. Tsitz Eliezer Hatz. 6:24, and Hatz. 6:9.

A Rabbi regarding the husband's obligation to bury his wife, according to the poskim, if he digs her grave, he must return to her grave even a thousand times, since she is his wife until the resurrection of the dead. See crossword puzzle 2nd 3rd 11th 6thFatash AH"Z 6. Pt. 9 SKA. And in truth, in the Ishtaah of Tala'i there are wives after death, who apparently disagreed on this point between Thos Biyvamot and Thos Bab, and the Rambam and the Ramban (see A vessel of desire Rish P. Amor S.K.B. and P. Vaygash S.K.A. who came to this in detail).

[7] And it is possible that the discussion of ownership depends on whether death permits or death does not terminate ownership, since here the person died but there was no specific event of death. The Grav discusses this there, and it should be expanded on much further, etc. In any case, with regard to money, it is clear that only the second possibility exists (death does not terminate ownership, and death does not terminate ownership), and therefore the possibility exists.

[8] See AnciT P. 'The Fool' around notes 26-30.

[9] And it is interesting that the author discusses this.Abraham's Word Himself, in the KH (which came out before the Holocaust), C. 11, Sec. 4.

[10] R. KZVAH C. R.M.T. SKB, and W.Miloai Hoshen Name Note 110.

[11] And there is also room to link this to the issue of giving to someone who is not in the world (a fetus), and it should be rejected, and so on.

[12] It should be noted that the law of ownership of an isuhan is not necessarily evidence, since the prohibition of enjoyment is a prohibition directed by reason, and we are dealing with rights, which are part of the laws of the law of the law. Although the law states that there is no ownership of the prohibition of enjoyment, it seems that in a situation where a person does not have a substantive right to use it – a KOH that he does not own.

[13] I added a condition that he goes out to kill someone who is not honest, because if it weren't for this, even for an adult who has no heirs and is dying, we would have to say that he is a pauper, and also according to the first explanation.

The above-mentioned 'Urva Farah' was made difficult for me by the slave of Rabbi Yehuda Handua (Kiddushin 22 So'ab), who was a resident with no heirs who was dying. And according to my words, the slave should have been released to freedom, or to be given to Mr. Zutra, automatically, even without a property deed. True, according to our addition here to the KM, since he died at the hands of Heaven, and did not go out to be killed illegally. In such a situation, he still has legal status, and his property is not a nobody, even according to the first explanation above. The reason for this is that in a normal situation, he can give his slave as a gift, even if he has no heirs, and therefore he has a connection and rights with him. And perhaps there is also a chance that he will recover (similar to Rabbi Gibraltar's above-mentioned comment regarding a person who is dying). However, in the situation discussed, it is not possible to give a gift or bequeath, since the entire situation is not under control, and does not allow this.

[14] For a detailed, though not entirely accurate, discussion, see Avi Sagi's article, 'The Religious Mitzvah and the Legal System – A Chapter in the Halachic Thought of Rabbi Shimon Shekap', knowledge 35, 5755, pp. 99-114.

[15] His words clearly indicate that the legal level is not only a definition of ownership, as the background to the prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal,' but also has an independent normative meaning. Whoever violates it violates, in addition to the halakhic prohibition of 'thou shalt not steal,' also a legal prohibition. The implications of this point are found in the articles 'The Problem of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Whole and the Dilemma of the 'Defensive Wall'', Noon 14, Aviv 5763. There I pointed out that Rashi's approach in Bek 60:2, that a person is forbidden to save himself with his neighbor's money and pay, is necessarily based on such a view (and also in my remarks in Bar-Rag, where I noted that although all the Rishonim disagree with Rashi on this, their words also clearly indicate a similar principled view).

[16] This is also known in the philosophy of law, where many have insisted that the duty to uphold the law cannot be included in the law, but rather that the law itself must be upheld?! See, for example, in Chaim Ganz's book, obedience and refusal, Kibbutz Hameuhad, Tel Aviv 1996 (see ibid. at the beginning of Chapter 1, p. 21). And see also the third book in the trilogy Two carts and a hot air balloon, which will be published in Azah soon.

[17] And my friend 'Urva Farah', the above-mentioned, challenged my words from the Gemara. The words of the Harash are based on the question of the Gemara (BK 46b): 'Why did he call me Sabra? He said: "Whoever hurts me, I will make my heart melt."' And according to the words of the HaGal, the Ukimi could have established a situation in which he called for a situation in which there is no actual legal guidance. And it can be easily resolved in several ways.

First, some of the early writers wrote that the conclusion would also be derived from the verse (this is the same in Yerushalmi, ibid., and see also Rashi Gittin 48 Soab and Pni, ibid.). Furthermore, the commentators wrote that when a plaintiff claims a lie (see Ravid the Golden Exodus 24:14, i.e., "He shall approach them"), or when the plaintiff has a majority (according to Samuel) in their favor (see Chai' Ha-R'Abad, ibid., 6).Beit Neeman Room 12, letter A). And according to Sumachus, it is difficult in general, since they disagree on the explanation (see The key book (L.B.C., Frankel edition, ibid.), and Acmal.

[18] This is my assumption here, and it follows from the plain language of the Gam that in 23:3 there is a prohibition against giving another person to drink. However, according to Shaykh HaTos, who disagrees with Rambam and believes that it is permissible to kill for other offenses (except for the three serious ones), it simply seems that it would be permissible here as well.

[19] As a result, the questions from the previous chapter lose a little of their meaning.

[20] And this is similar to the Ramban at the end of the booklet. Dina Degrami, which divided between when the harmful thing began its action and when it was caused.

[21] Although, as is known, inKZVAH Si' Sha'ts Ska'a believed that the Rosh disagreed with Thos' on this, and that it is not necessary, and that the words are ancient.

[22] Although here too, one should note the disagreement among the jurists as to whether it is permissible to use a miracle (not relevant here), or to pray for a miracle (see AGM O.H. Ch. B. C. 111). And especially if it is permissible to commit a transgression in order to be saved through a miracle. See this inIn the name of God Yod Si' 55:2-3. And I remember that they brought evidence for the permission of King David saving the world from the flood that destroyed it by erasing the name (Shu'ar 52:2).A collection of Talmud commentaries (Maqut 11:1, and must be rejected in light of what the commentators there differed about whether there was any prohibition in this at all.) And I also remember that there was an incident with the owner of theDesire of Solomon, who strictly forbade traveling to the Rebbe of Belz on Shabbat so that he could pray for a dangerously ill person, or give him an amulet (and I did not find one. See also The thousand is full., O.H. 318). And perhaps some in question argue that this is a 'crime' of risking oneself to save another.

And it seems even more so that in the case of a discarded baby, when the power of death is already at work within it, it is not intentional. The prohibition against committing a transgression in order to be saved by a miracle is when the world is acting as it is, and there is only danger to some person. However, here many Torah principles are violated, and the conduct is completely different. In this matter too, a word of caution should be extended, and so on.