Notebooks on matters of faith

Israel: Regarding the five notebooks: What prevents me from saying that since the prophecy ceased, there has been a divine regression upward? Or that He decided for some reason to take a break or a vacation. As a rule, the prophets prophesy in terms of “automatically”, soon, redemption and world correction will come. Someone who read these prophecies 1500 years ago would not have imagined that the range would extend to 2016, meaning that the possibility of a time break or regression or “a prolonged concealment of face of several thousand years” – is not unreasonable. One can certainly draw a reasonable situation as follows: God made a covenant with Israel so that they would bring morality to humanity. He continued with prophets and revelations, allowing humanity to reach a certain ”spiritual maturity”, when He saw that we were on the right path morally – Turn to dealing (in quotation marks) with Earth in a parallel universe. He is not interested in us for the next ten thousandths of a second. Why should I be obligated to a covenant after so many years of “zero response” from heaven? (Regarding the Maimonides”s theory that the observance of the commandments must be because there was a Mount Sinai ceremony, I am not clear why the Rabbi portrays the entire halakha as being in line with Maimonides. The fact that he was not confronted about this assertion means nothing. Maimonides made a host of theological assertions in the Mishnah Torah without evidence.) —— Most of the mitzvot do not seem to be related to this. These are requirements that are probably not related to the state of the world. 2. For me, Maimonides is merely an illustration. I would have said this, I understood it, even without him writing it, and I would have continued to advocate it even if there were those who would have explicitly confronted him about it. Therefore, it does not really matter to me if there are those who disagree with him. I am not ruling on laws here according to different Rishonim methods. Why did I call it Sabra? ——————————————————————————————————— Israel: 1. Is it strange that the rabbi says that they do not seem to be related? Maimonides actually shows how most of the mitzvot are related either to leaving paganism or to holding the hand of the weak in society. We have pretty much abandoned paganism in the last thousands of years, and the weak – at least in Western society – are not hungry for bread. (By the way, why do I focus on Western society – because it is a society that is always interested in improving) 2. I can equally be obligated to observe the mitzvot because it strengthens my connection to the chain of generations and tradition —— There is no point in keeping the commandments. 2) God makes such a covenant with us because He feels like it, not necessarily to elevate us morally; Judaism's contribution to eliminating paganism and strengthening morality in the world is merely a by-product. 3) This is a unilateral commitment on our part, not an agreement. God can disappear or be “not involved” – and we are obligated because we made the commitment. 4) There is no intrinsic value in keeping the commandments out of “voluntariness” (because he does not feel obligated to this ancient covenant) or out of respect for tradition. Why I wasn't convinced: 1) There are a significant number of commandments in which one can see the essential and moral content, therefore there is a point in keeping these commandments at least even without the covenant (it is true that it is possible to "overlap" in the NIV. 2) It seems reasonable to me that the final product (i.e., a more moral person) gives us an indication of God's purpose. 3) Of the countless places in the Bible that indicate that God plans to be involved, there is no hint of "disappearance" on the order of thousands of years. In my opinion, our obligation is subordinate to God's obligation. (By the way, this is not my innovation, the Gemara in Tractate Megillah did understand the Bible this way, "hence a great deal of reference to the Torah"). 4) There is considerable value in observing the commandments out of volunteerism or respect for tradition, the value of community. “Do not withdraw from the public”. ————————————————————————————————————————————— Rabbi: This summary is very flawed, both in the presentation of my arguments and in the counterarguments. 1) Indeed. Although I would correct that this is not a covenant but our commitment to the Creator. The mutual dimension does not seem necessary to me. 2) Absolutely not true. He has other goals, not necessarily moral ones. But it is certainly possible that he had such goals as well. In any case, it is clear that it is not “because he felt like it”, arbitrarily. 3) See 1. But even if it is mutual, his side is not necessarily involvement in the world. As I wrote to you, his commitment was not to intervene in the world. 4) I would correct that there is no religious value, nor is there any intrinsic value. At least some of the commandments have moral or other value (national identity?). But religious significance certainly does not exist when they are done for foreign motives (in a busybody). For example, keeping the Sabbath of the “One of the People.” Why was I not convinced: 1) Indeed. Exactly as I wrote. So what were you not convinced about? The thesis you put in your mouth? 2) How do you know that the product of the Torah is a more moral person? Where did this assumption emerge? And since the indication was dropped, the conclusion was dropped as well. 3) This is not a disappearance for thousands of years, but a final disappearance. The world has improved and is standing on its own two feet. Like a child whose parents stop giving him a hand. There is no connection between a great deal of knowledge of the Torah and the obligation being tied to his involvement. I really did not understand what you were trying to say here. Did you understand? 4) Indeed, exactly as I corrected you in section 4 above. In conclusion, you put in your mouth things that did not convince you, and then you partially repeated things I said and presented them as your own arguments. Strange. Another part is simply not true and even seems incomprehensible to me. ————————————————————————————————————— Israel: The ”mudaa rabba” – at least according to Rashi”s interpretation there, is that we have a good excuse (before the Holy One, the Day of Judgment) why we did not keep the mitzvot. We did not keep it because receiving the Torah was under threat (Taliva and Yahav, armed robbers). “Love of the miracle” during Purim – made our ancestors feel that there is an active involvement of G-d in the world and that He is preventing a Holocaust, there is reciprocity and therefore they agree to take upon themselves the observance of the mitzvot. Sorry that the Rabbi does not see the slightest connection but for me it is elementary. ————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— Rabbi: The excuse that receiving the Torah was under rape is indeed a good excuse. It nullifies the contract. But why does this have to do with the question of God’s involvement in the world? Even if I accept your interpretation (which is perhaps possible but far from necessary) that Israel’s appeasement stemmed from the miracle performed for them (meaning it was performed in exchange for the miracle and not just inspired by the miracle), still if you go with the Sages who said that on Purim, Israel ratified the contract with God, the Sages also say that this was only possible because there was a great deal of promise at Sinai. After Purim, there is no possibility of canceling again. But this whole midrash about them keeping and accepting is of course not a historical description but a legend. By the way, as far as I am concerned, Purim was not a miracle at all. ————————————————————————————————————————————— Israel: I am not going into the question of whether it is possible to cancel or not to cancel. According to my interpretation of the Gemara, the source of authority is the mutual contract. It is true that this is a legend, and it is true that there was no miracle here, but the sages of the Mishnah and the Amoraim who discussed the issue saw Purim as a gathering and intervention of God in this world (before the Megillah, they bless "He performed miracles", and also the language of the sages who fixed "on miracles" in the prayer). And again, a legend is not halacha, but it is completely meta-halachic, the legend can teach us about the theological view of the sages. What to do, from their words it means that without this intervention - there is no theological justification for a full obligation to fulfill the mitzvot. —— Without the contract, there is no legal obligation, but there may still be a substantive obligation (regardless of the commitment and signing of a contract). Such is the social contract that is presented as the basis for moral obligation. And would it be conceivable that moral obligation is a purely legal matter? When there is no contractual obligation, perhaps God cannot make claims, and it is still certainly plausible that going beyond His commandments is not a right act. It is also clear that the Sages saw Purim as a kens, but the Sages have no sufficient basis for this. I spoke about my view on the matter. In addition, the hypothesis that according to the Sages, our obligation is against the miracle is your hypothesis. Possible but absolutely not necessary. Let me elaborate a little. After all, even if we go by the contractual concept, it is clear that the contract that God signed with us is not in His interest. If He needs something, He can obtain it on His own. Therefore, this signature is probably intended to ensure that we behave in a way that is right for us or for the world. Therefore, it is very likely that even if the contract does not obligate us for one formal reason or another, it is still right to act in the way it requires of us. However, if we do not do so, he has no claim against us by virtue of the contract. But he has a claim against us by virtue of it being the right thing to do. ————————————————————————————————————————————— Israel: It is completely clear to me that it is “right” to act according to the Torah. I am not concerned with what is right, but with commitment. I find myself thinking about what I would do in “extreme cases,” for example: Would I surrender my soul? Can I accept Maimonides’ example that whoever does not believe in what he believed is among the heretics and heretics? Would I not desecrate the Sabbath in order to save Ahmed, who was hit by the wave? All of these are questions that depend on total commitment. I am unable to derive commitment from “what is likely to be the right thing to do”. I have not escaped doubt —— In many cases I also find a possible halakhic path that aligns with my perceptions, but even if I didn't, I make decisions about my steps, and no one else (including the Maimonides, and even Moses our Lord). For example, saving a Gentile on Shabbat is a complete halakhic obligation in my opinion, even in the works of the Torah. I wrote about this in Akademut (at the end of my article: Is there an 'enlightened' idolatry?). The fact that the Maimonides said something doesn't seem really important to me. So he thought so, and I disagree with him. In philosophical principles, he was too dogmatic in my opinion, but he is a product of his time and the ancient Aristotelian way of thinking on which he was educated. —— There is not a shred of semantics here, and the identities you wrote here are simply incorrect. I claim that religious obligation is correct, but not total. The law of gravity is also correct, but not total, since everything should stand the test of criticism. Nothing is certain. Why do you think these claims are the same as the claim that there is no obligation or even that it emanates from it? Long live the great difference. You need the status of Mount Sinai to tell you what is true. Would you know how to put on tefillin or redeem a sheep's sin offering on your own? Where did these statements come from? What is the connection between them and everything that has been said so far? ————————————————————————————————————— Israel: Tefillin and sheep's sin offering are pieces of information in the Torah, the status of Mount Sinai and the entry into the covenant did not come to provide us with information but to establish obligation. Let me clarify my question: If all I need is 99 percent obligation - I can establish this by respecting tradition and wanting to belong to the observant. Why is it necessary to establish the obligation on the revelation at Sinai? —— See my fourth notebook on this. ————————————————————————————————————— Israel: My basic argument: A. The status of Mount Sinai is presented (in various sources) as the status of signing a mutual contract. B. Assuming that it is a mutual contract and that it was signed under duress, it has no binding force. C. Conclusion: Mount Sinai does not require the observance of a commandment. Now I examine how the rabbi's answer is relevant to the binding force: You wrote (my comments in parentheses): “The purpose of the revelation at Sinai is first and foremost the command. Without it, we would not know what God commanded. ” (Even if we knew what He commanded, what is the binding force?) “Moreover, without the revelation, even if you wanted to belong, there would be nowhere to belong. ” (So what? Because it is beneficial for me to have somewhere to belong, does that have binding force?) “Those people you want to belong to, why do they do all this? How does this process begin? In revelation. The Holy One commands, and from that comes the commitment.” (good for them, excellent, they have certainty, shame on them. It still doesn't create binding force for me.) “As a rule, respect for tradition is not a commitment but your decision. It's like being moral because someone likes it or because I want to be like them. It's not moral behavior, not because of its content but because of the motivations that create it. ” (After I decided, I have a certain commitment to my decision. We have already agreed that no commitment is total. ) “The same goes for religious commitment. This should be considered slavery (see Rambam 1:7, 3:6). ” (If acceptance is – we will accept, etc. ) “See this in my fourth notebook. ” ———————————————————————————————————————— Rabbi: As stated, we are repeating ourselves over and over again and I also see contradictions (or changes of direction) in your arguments. I will also summarize my comments in relation to your summary, and if there is nothing new, I suggest we end here. The fact that the contract was signed under duress is a sage legend. In my opinion, it should not be taken too seriously (not because of the sages, but because it is a legend). And if you still take it seriously (I don't know why you cling so devoutly to the sages here), continue with the repeated acceptance in Shushan, after which, according to the sages, the claim of awareness is nullified. And in general, if you demand the possibility of a greater awareness of the contract, you can do so even without the argument of coercion. Provide a greater awareness that the Holy One did not fulfill His obligation (that is what you claimed) and therefore the contract is null. This has nothing to do with coercion or greater awareness. I did not understand why you suddenly switched to a different claim. In any case, I have already stated my opinion on this (that He did not commit). I have repeatedly explained that there is a binding force for a divine command. Revelation is necessary so that we know that it is a command and what the content of the command is. Why is it binding? Because of the same commitment to what my Creator commands me. If you do not accept it, then to your health, but what does all this have to do with revelation and its meaning. I asked about joining out of respect for previous generations, I said that it explains your joining and not their commitment. Without commitment, there is no worship of God (like Ahad Ha'am). So basically it's about you wanting to join in the nonsense that your ancestors did. I'm not arguing about sentiments and feelings, that everyone should do whatever nonsense they want to do. What I'm claiming is that it's not worship of God but a personal whim (completely legitimate of course), and even more so that it certainly doesn't make revelation unnecessary (and that's what you claimed). When you decide to do something out of respect for previous generations, the problem is not that the commitment is not total, but that it's not a religious commitment at all. When I decided that I like to eat apples, that doesn't mean I have a commitment to eating apples. What's not clear about that? I've also said that more than once. It's not acceptance but philosophical analysis, and therefore there's no need to accept but to understand. If you see eating an apple because you like apples as a commitment, I have a feeling that it's not an argument but simply a lack of understanding of the concepts in question. Religious work and obligation is the performance of the mitzvot out of submission to the commandment. One who does them out of a whim or for some other purpose does not thereby fulfill the mitzvot. And this is not because of Maimonides, I would say this even if it were not written there. It is simple logic.

Yishai: The claim that morality is not the goal because it is only the correction of society (p. 11) assumes that morality does not also include an obligation to worship God. Many thinkers have disputed this assumption, and supposedly if morality requires us to thank those who have done us good, it also requires us to thank God (later in the book you criticize the argument that bases the obligation of obedience on the obligation to thank, but this is not about the obligation of obedience, and it is possible that God's goal is for us to thank Him, so that there is no need for a command or obedience at all), and one can of course think that the obligation of worship is an axiom. One can argue against this that our creation is not good for us, but I think most people prefer to be created. Beyond that, someone who believes that creation was a bad act of God, it is not clear to me why he is obligated to the morality that was created by that same God. In addition, the argument for this purpose is based on the personification of God, and if so, one can also ask about the content of the commandments – is it plausible that God created the world so that pieces of leather could be placed up to the hand and head or that branches of trees could be shaken? Of course, we can say that we do not understand Him, but then it is also possible that He created the world solely for morality and we do not understand Him. Regarding the argument that if there is a reasonable purpose, it is reasonable to conclude that there must be a revelation (p. 12). As mentioned, many thinkers thought that the purpose of worship could be deduced on its own. Although the details are not known, the details are also unknown regarding morality. You assume that morality was not revealed in the Torah, and if so, God left us alone to discover morality, and so He can leave us alone to think about how it is appropriate to thank Him. In addition, one must ask what the revelation helps with – if one needs to wear tefillin, which is very useful, what does it help me if there was a revelation following which I wear Rashi’s tefillin? This is true of any revelation that requires interpretation, and since every revelation requires interpretation, it is true of any revelation. One can of course argue that the revelation said that we should trust human reason, but for that we did not need a revelation. In addition, if we are talking about Judaism, it says that for thousands of years there was no revelation, and this seemingly contradicts the argument that there should be a revelation. One can argue that there was an unknown reason for the delay in the revelation, but if there are unknown reasons for the delay, then it is certainly possible that the revelation has not yet occurred. In other words, this argument can lead to the conclusion that there will be a revelation at a finite time, but not that this time has come. On page 13 it is said that if there was a revelation and it requires the details, then there is no need for reasoning. This is true if we have proven it absolutely. If we have only brought evidence of the probability that there was a revelation, then it is possible that the details of the revelation will be evidence to the contrary. Torah scholars think that its content provides evidence to the contrary, and if so, the discussion should be conducted with the weight of evidence for each side. In addition, it should be mentioned that if the fact of revelation is based on personification (if He created, there must be a purpose), then apparently the content should also meet this rule, as I wrote above. On page 22, after analyzing what exactly revelation is through Kierkegaard's ideas, the assumption suddenly comes that it is also the report about the Children of Israel. Is this what has passed through tradition? I think not. What has passed through is that there was a revelation and the perception of the revelation was certainly not similar. Tradition does say that they heard with their ears "I am the Lord," but not that they had an inexplicable certainty that it was God. According to Maimonides, for example, the point is in the miracles that occurred that the possibility of trickery regarding them was ruled out. So, in the 12th century there was no tradition that said there was a definite revelation to 600,000 people, but that a miracle happened to them. It would be interesting to examine when we find Kierkegaard's ideas, which are supposedly those that were passed down in tradition thousands of years ago. If these are ideas that are not found in the Scriptures, it is difficult to attribute them to tradition. Regarding the evidence from a miracle. First, the discussion suddenly deviates from revelation to a miracle, and it is not entirely clear whether we are trying to prove the existence of a revelation or a miracle. Second, a miracle seems to me to be very undefined. That is, it is easy to define it as an event that occurs not in accordance with the laws of nature, but the problem is that the laws of nature are unknown. When Thomson discovered that alpha particles return from the gold surface contrary to scientific theory, he did not think it was a miracle, but formulated a new theory. A scientist who observes the Red Sea splitting in two would act in exactly the same way. Proof from a miracle is actually proof of the god of the gaps from Coda 2 on p. 33 is puzzling. Monotheism in the Torah is indeed an innovation, but does innovation prove anything? Innovation is indeed a unique point, but it is clear that we do not explain every innovation in revelation. The question of why the idea arose at that particular time is just as difficult as the question about any other idea that arose at a particular time. Furthermore, there may be a connection between the emphasis and the content – it is possible that the assimilation was relatively good because the content was monotheism. Perhaps because monotheism by its nature has a tendency to be domineering. Perhaps because monotheism is true and therefore accepted by many. Point 3 on p. 34 is based on a lack of familiarity with the world of Mesopotamian laws. In order to decide between the alternatives, one must know them! Point 4 there assumes that the alternative is a “conspiracy,” but that is a straw man. The alternative is developmental. In any case, the blessing in the sixth year is of course irrefutable, and it is almost impossible to find the claim that the seventh of these rabbis does not exist because of the blessing. This is especially true if the author did not think that his words would ever come to practical examination. The whole on pp. 41-43 is presented as evidence of a metaphysical role for the people of Israel. Revelation cannot be proven from this. Even if we assume a God who did not reveal himself, he created a world in which a people would be created and a Torah would be created with him. The fact that something has a role does not at all mean that it must be informed of it. For example, Judaism gives a role to foreign kings who harm the people of Israel without those kings knowing about it. The author's weakest point (to put it mildly) is dealing with the alternative of natural assimilation of a myth. Ultimately, after we have convinced ourselves that revelation is possible, and that we should not accept the daily news that categorically rejects evidence, we must examine whether there really was a revelation, and specifically whether there was a revelation at Sinai. We have two main alternatives: tradition and research. The author does not present the claims prevalent in the research at all, so of course she cannot deal with them. Of course, this also means that the research evidence for its claims is not presented. Of course, the discussion requires a book (not to mention books) in itself, but it is impossible to choose the possibility of revelation without examining the second possibility, especially since the people who are engaged in intensive research on these matters believe that the evidence shows that there was no exodus from Egypt and that the Torah was not composed by a single author. The evidence comes from the fields of archaeology and philology and requires familiarity with these fields and a thorough knowledge of their part that concerns the matter. —— 1. I don't deal with what thinkers write. I write what I think. Putting pieces of skin on the head is probably done for some purpose that I don't know what. But as for morality, I have ideas about what it is for. Therefore, it was not similar. 2. As mentioned, I don't deal with what these or other thinkers wrote. The human mind interprets revelation, and this really doesn't make it redundant. Just as a judge interprets the law, and this doesn't make the legislator redundant. The delay is not such a strong problem. God waited until the world matured and reached a state where it could be commanded. There is an evolution of history. You assume an exaggerated temporal symmetry of the world (by the way, the law of conservation of energy in physics is derived from the symmetry of the world to the time axis). I didn't try to predict when the revelation should occur. 3. That's true. Everyone will make their own considerations. I already addressed your previous comments above. 4. I didn't understand what revelation is according to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard was just an example. He himself claimed something different from what I claim, as I explained in my words there. He is talking about the rigidity of logic and I am offering a logical explanation. 5. Here it seems to me that there is a misunderstanding of my words. Revelation is attacked because it is a type of miracle. The argument of a miracle of a day is usually directed against the traditional arguments of revelation. I do not remember that I brought evidence from the miracle. I brought evidence from revelation. The evidence from revelation is not based on the fact that it is a miracle but on the fact that God revealed Himself and told us all sorts of things. The attack is that it refers to the revelation of the covenant and therefore claims that the tradition about it is unacceptable. That is what I was talking about. 6. This difficulty joins the other arguments to create the picture. Certainly not every innovation is based on revelation. 7. Indeed, I am not familiar with the world of Mesopotamian laws, but what does it mean? If you find laws like these there, it means that they too originate from some ancient divine revelation or that I will find a reasonable (interesting or substantial) explanation for them. Here, to the best of my understanding, there is no such explanation. 8. Points 3 and 4 are a MM argument. One talks about assimilation and the other about conspiracy. The fact that it is difficult to test is true, and there is still no reason to assimilate testable claims and trust you so that the recipients will be naive enough not to check. 9. You are using the metaphor a bit recklessly. If Israel does not give these kings any role. It interprets their actions in a certain way. It is not like someone who wants to assign a role to someone else, how can he expect them to do so without informing him of this?! 10. The study assumes that there was no revelation and does not reveal this. Indeed, I do not present the claims in detail, since that is not my purpose. I present a general picture without going into various details. Such a discussion is distilled into an essay in itself, and indeed I am not versed in that literature. Everyone will do their own research. When I want to deal with the research claims, I will indeed have to study it. And it is true that I have quite limited confidence in that research genre, and this is one of the reasons why I am not well-versed and do not invest the much time needed to study it. Whoever is not satisfied with the things, let him be respected and learn and formulate a position. To the same extent, I assume that various researchers have not dealt with philosophy and other things that are necessary to formulate a general position on the matter. Each presents his perceptions and his and yours will be discussed. ———————————————————————————————————————————————— Yishai: I will continue the discussion only on some of the points: 1. The point is that I do not know what the purpose of putting on tefillin is, just as I do not know what the purpose of morality is. The point is that it seems strange to me to say that God created the world for morality as much as it seems strange to me to say that He created it for the wearing of tefillin (to be honest, the possibility of morality seems more plausible to me - I can think that He created the world to be good and for that it needs to be moral, but I don't see any theory that explains why He wants us to wear tefillin). 9. When I make a washing machine, I assign it a function without telling it about it. If God wanted a people to make His name known in the world, He would have needed a mechanism to do so and there is no need to tell it about it. After all, the world did not hear about it only from the Jews but also mainly from the Christians. It seems pretty clear to me that the rest did not have a revelation, but it is certainly plausible to me that this was planned by God. My suggestion really was not that the task was assigned to the people of Israel, but that it was their function without it being assigned to them, just like a washing machine. 10. The study does assume that there was no revelation, but it makes no assumptions about other relevant questions (one can always be accused of making assumptions, but I am talking about overt assumptions). When the study asks how many authors the Torah had, what its purpose was, and when it was composed, it does ignore the possibility that it was given in a revelation at Sinai, but it is willing in principle to accept that it was given by Moses at Sinai. Its evidence tips the scales that this is not the case. One can even take things for which knowledge of the study is not necessary, such as the contradictions in the Torah - if I had proof that the Torah was given in a revelation, then I would have no problem resolving the contradictions; but a priori I expect divine revelation to be coherent. The fact that there are quite a few contradictions in the Torah is, for me, evidence that it is not divine. Similarly, in the archaeological field, if millions of people were in the Sinai desert for 40 years, it stands to reason that there would be a significant find there. The fact that there is none is evidence that the story of the Torah is not true. In order to choose a thesis that will explain the reality of the Torah, one must examine all the evidence, and the author examines only evidence in favor of it. This is the methodology of those who repent (you yourself mock creationists [and their opponents] for only bringing supporting evidence) and not of those who are trying to ascertain the truth. —— God created us as creatures with free will (in my opinion. I am a libertarian), and apparently He wanted them to consider in their minds what to do. It was not enough for Him to program us in the right direction. In this we are different from washing machines. When you create creatures with discretion and free will, you probably want them to choose the right path. You do not achieve this by programming, but by instructions and commands. You need to tell them what is expected of them and then let them carry it out according to their own discretion and decision. I really do not understand your discussion about the Christians. They told the world about our revelation. And we told them. So what is the problem here? Beyond that, the revelation to us was not a peace offering to tell the whole world. The world does not need to put on tefillin. I also do not see why you assume that God decided or even knew in advance that the Christians would be here, and that they would spread His revelation in the world. 10 This discussion enters into the question of the authenticity of the Torah. I think I wrote in the booklet that I do not assume this in a blanket way. It is certainly possible and probable that it had later additions and perhaps also edits. What is important to me is only that there was interaction with the Almighty. What its exact content was I do not know and it is also not very important, and at least not necessary for the discussion. Any part of the Torah that you think I have hidden, for my part you will decide that it is late. And did I write differently? The tradition that has come down to me is the least bad way to carry out the tasks assigned to us at Sinai. I have no doubt that there were disruptions along the way and many errors crept into the Torah and certainly into the Toshveh. What has come down to me is not very similar to what is given there (see the interview I gave to Yair Sheleg in the supplement Portrait of Makor Rishon, under the title “The Rabbi and His Reversal”, and I even got angry about it later). But this is what came to me and my working assumption is that for now this is what I have to maintain until the disruption of some detail is proven and then it can be abandoned. I have no better way to know what God wants from me, and of course He Himself should have taken this into account. If He gave only partially and did not want me to interpret it or add to it, He would say or prevent this process that was just expected to happen. In one sentence, I say that my commitment to a particular law is not conditional on the assumption of its authenticity. By the way, this is a major reason why in my opinion research is not very important for this principled discussion (beyond the limited trust in these disciplines that I mentioned earlier. The arguments you raised here, such as the lack of findings from the stay in the desert, are in my opinion clear examples of this disciplinary weakness. Really weak arguments). I will elaborate on these things in more detail in the next two books that were mentioned here on the site in the introduction to the notebooks. This notebook is just an opening for a theological discussion that will come in the next two books. There I will detail what I wrote to you here and much more. —— You are confusing the question of whether the thing itself is understandable or not (and here it is clear that morality is more understandable than tefillin) with the question of how likely it is that this thing, understandable or not, is an end and not a means (and here it is very likely that morality is not an end, but tefillin I have no way of knowing. And if God gives it, then I assume that it has goals in the body). 9. Your comparison is really strange. Man is a creature that has freedom of choice (in my opinion. I am a libertine), and if God created such a creature, then he probably did not think of programming it to do something. After all, for a programmed object, it would have been enough to create a deterministic machine. So we are supposed to carry out our actions for the purposes imposed on us out of consideration and not out of programming. But now how will we know what to consider and where to go? It is only reasonable and expected that there will be a revelation in which these things will be said. What is this and washing machines?! The chatter about Christians is really incomprehensible to me. First, you assume that God knew in advance that they would spread the revelation in the world. And where do you get this from? Have you ever met him and he told you? I actually tend to think that he did not know that there would be such people, and he certainly did not know what they would do. These are actions that were done by human choices, and there is no reason to assume that God knew them in advance (it is impossible to know them in advance, if they are the result of free will). Second, the fact that Christians spread the revelation that was made to us only means that the mission was accomplished. Indeed, the revelation to us did the job, even if through Christians. What is wrong with that? Maimonides even writes this (that Christians and Muslims are means for spreading the monotheistic faith). And third, why do you assume that the mission assigned to us is to spread the revelation or to make His name known in the world? The mission is to fulfill a commandment. Our forefather Abraham made His name known even before the presence of Mount Sinai. 10. I will preface this by saying that you are here entering into the question of the reliability of the Torah. For me, the commitment is not conditional on authenticity. My goal in this notebook is not to prove that the Torah was given at Sinai, but to argue that it is likely that there was some interaction with God in which He assigned us tasks. That's all. If you come to the conclusion that there is a contradiction in the text (without the possibility of resolution, of course), then you can certainly say that it is a late addition, a disruption, and the like. And did I say anything else? It is certainly plausible to me that the Torah as it has come down to us, and will certainly be preserved, has undergone changes over the generations, and there are often disruptions. Incidentally, this is a major reason why I do not attach much importance to research (beyond my limited trust in these disciplines, as I wrote to you earlier. The difficulties you brought up, such as the lack of findings in the desert, are quite weak, and therefore here is an example of the disciplinary weakness I spoke of). I have no interest in clarifying which part of the Torah is late and which is not, because I do not assume and do not see any need to assume that everything is from Sinai. My commitment is to what has come to me, because it is the closest I can think of to fulfilling the commandment from Sinai, even though it is clear to me that there are many errors. I have no better way of knowing what was there. Therefore, I also uphold what is not authentic, unless I am convinced that it is a mistake, or something completely improbable. Incidentally, these things are planned to be detailed in the two books I mentioned on the opening page of the notebooks on the site (this also appears in the interview conducted by Ami Yair Sheleg, for the supplement of Makor Rishon's Portrait, under the title “The Rabbi and His Opposite”, and I even got caught later for being a heretic). This notebook does not deal with all these issues. Regarding your methodological comment that the things look like a speech by a repentant person, my intention in the notebook was not to be polemical or to prove anything. I present the picture there as I see it, and why in my opinion there is room and reason for religious commitment. Discussing all these arguments is beyond what the author was supposed to do. When a person presents his position, he does not need to bring everything that has been written and all the counterarguments, but only those that are important for clarifying my own position. To the best of my judgment, the position presented is reasonable and coherent, and that was my goal here. That is enough for me. —— After all, it was created itself, so it is unlikely that it is the purpose of its own creation. A purpose is some lack whose fulfillment is the purpose of the action. But according to the view you propose, don't create it and it will not go wrong. If we return to your favorite washing machine, do you think that creating a machine so that it functions as a repair is reasonable to see it as an end in itself? —— ——

Oren: Hello Rabbi, I read booklet 5 on Shabbat and I have a few points to address/ask: 1. On page 5 you quoted a source from the Rambam regarding the Righteous Among the Nations. There is a well-known correction there that should have been the words “except from their sages” at the end instead of “and not from their sages”. 2. You wrote on page 5: “He who keeps all the commandments because he sees G-d as his God and is obligated to Him, but in his opinion the commandments are human intuition (his own or that of others), that is, he is an apostate at Mount Sinai, his commandments have no religious value”, according to which it follows that before Mount Sinai it was not possible to be a religious person. But the words of R’ are well-known. Nissim Gaon in his introduction to Shas: “All the commandments that depend on the understanding and the oblation of the Lord, are already binding on them from the day that God created man on the earth, upon him and upon his seed after him for generations to come”. 3. Page 29-30 (The issue of finding the Torah scroll in the days of Josiah) 3.1 You wrote: “If there was truly forgetfulness here, what is the place for the scorn and anger and punishments that God Almighty imposes on Israel?! ”, it can be said that forgetfulness stems from disdain for studying Torah and its memorization and disdain for passing it on to future generations, and this is why the scorn comes. 3.2 There is a known mechanism in the transmission of myths that concern mass revelation, and it is the use of the element of “forgetfulness” Or a “mass plague” or other inventions due to which the tradition did not pass on widely but through a single person who survived the difficult event or found a book, etc. There is a famous lecture by Rabbi Lawrence Kalman that comparatively analyzes the revelation myths of the various religions and their plausibility (see link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEg_Oys4NkA , the entire lecture is relevant but in case you don't have time to watch, at minute 55:30 there is a section that demonstrates a mass revelation with a mass death that immediately follows it, which negates the plausibility of the mass revelation). On the surface, it seems that this case (the finding of the book in the days of Josiah) undermines the plausibility of the continuity of tradition in a similar way to an event of mass death or forgetting of the narrative of the mass revelation. 3.3 You also wrote there: “In the verses it is described that their fathers did not listen to the voice of this book” and you wrote that this is evidence that they knew about the book and simply did not obey it. But it can be argued that Josiah wants to present matters in such a way that the fathers did not obey the book in order to bridge the gap between the fact that there is no tradition of observance of the commandments by the fathers and the narrative that appears in the book (that the people of Israel were commanded to observe the commandments). In other words, Josiah is supposedly lying about the fathers who did not observe the commandments of the book intentionally, even though they really did not know about the commandments. In this way, Josiah manages to establish the credibility of the continuity of tradition, while excusing the obvious question that there is no existing tradition. 3.4 You also wrote: “Why don't they just throw the book in the trash?! ”. It can be argued in the answer that they did not throw it away for the same reason they did not throw the Quran or the New Testament in the trash (i.e. if there is a charismatic leader and certain circumstances, a large group can be convinced of almost anything – see delusional sects that arise every morning). 3.5 According to Rad”k's commentary on 2 Kings, chapter 22, verse 8: “Hilkiah the priest found the book of the law of the Lord’ and he opened it and read it and gave it to the king's scribe, who brought it to the king, who would read it and see how they had forgotten the Torah that prevents all the evil deeds that were done in Israel”. It seems that the entire Torah was forgotten (contrary to what you wrote, which is about disobedience and not forgetfulness). 3.6 A possible explanation I thought of for the issue is that although a Torah scroll was found, it was not stated that it contained any sensational discoveries regarding the great miracles that God performed for the people of Israel in the past (the Exodus from Egypt and the presence at Mount Sinai), but rather that perhaps “new” commandments that had been forgotten were found. In other words, the framework story of the Exodus from Egypt and the presence at Mount Sinai was not renewed here, but was probably known from before – and this is what is important to us when we examine the continuity of tradition (as you wrote on page 32). 4. On page 34 you wrote that the other religions (except Christianity and Islam) do not present alternatives that contain serious and reliable reports of revelation. From what I know, the tradition of Hinduism is not so far-fetched. They have a kind of oral Torah that was passed down from generation to generation for many years until it was put into writing. The Torah itself was apparently received in revelations to individuals. 5. Regarding the section on “additional considerations”: 5.1 In this section you detail events that appear to be “supernatural” and that God had a hand in, and from which we can learn that the Jewish religion is the correct one. But in response to Eitan’s question about prayer, you wrote: “Today, this has changed, and providence has also disappeared (and, to be precise, it has not become hidden, but rather does not exist).” How does this fit in? 5.2 I remember that your perception of the State of Israel is as a purely secular institution. How does this fit in with the move you present that the renewal of nationalism and the establishment of the state teach about a “supernatural” event from which we can learn about the correctness of the Jewish religion? After all, such a perception is supposed to lead one to a line of thinking similar to that of Rabbi Aviner, that the State of Israel is the throne of God in the world, etc. 5.3 You wrote about the fulfillment of the vision of the prophets in the return to Zion, but it can be argued on the other hand that there were many other prophecies that did not come true. It can also be argued that prophecies of this type tend to fulfill themselves (because the people strive to fulfill these prophecies). 5.4 You wrote about the renewal of nationalism, language, and the establishment of the state as an exceptional event, but it can be argued that there were many other states that arose in the 19th-20th centuries and that this was a period when many peoples tried to achieve independence (known as the period of the "Spring of the Nations"). 5.5 It seems to me that it is necessary to mention in this section also the wars of Israel, some of which appear to be events in which God intervened. 6. On page 36 you wrote: “After we have come to the conclusion that there is a God and that it is likely that He will reveal Himself and that there was indeed a revelation at Sinai and that there was a Torah given to us that played some role in it.” The underlined part seems out of place. It is impossible that we have come to an intermediate conclusion that there was a revelation at Sinai, when this is precisely the conclusion that you are trying to establish (a kind of desired assumption). 7. On page 37 you wrote: “It is even possible to argue that there is no right or wrong here, and that every person and society should act according to their tradition. But as mentioned, I do not belong to the postmodern discourse, and therefore I am making a different argument here.” I think it is possible to argue, even without postmodern frustration, that God can reveal Himself to different groups of humanity throughout history and demand from them the observance of commandments in different versions. Isn’t that so? 8. On pages 40-41 you define a new term: “ethical facts”. This term responds to the naturalistic fallacy and the gap between facts and moral/religious duties. But it seems that this new term also ultimately relies on intuition and common sense. If so, why not bridge the aforementioned gap directly using intuition and common sense without going through the auxiliary term of “ethical facts”? 9. On page 42 you wrote: “The picture I described, according to which there is a correlation between the habitat and the ideological product, can have only two interpretations: 1. Faith and heresy are both products of programming. We have no way of knowing who is right. 2. One of them is right and the other is wrong. The error is, and only is, the product of educational programming”. I can offer a few more intermediate options that seem more plausible to me: 3. Faith and apostasy are both products of programming. But we still have a way to know who is right through independent and critical thinking. 4. Faith and apostasy are both, for the most part, products of programming. In every group there is a minority that thinks independently and is able to decide its own path. 10. On page 46 and also on page 47 you quoted the quote from Iruvin 13:2: “It is better for a man not to be created than for a man to be created.” But the exact quote is: “It is better for a man not to be created than for a man to be created.” I once heard an explanation that the use of the word “comfortable” and not the word “good” or “better” indicates that the creation of man involves leaving the creature’s comfort zone, just as marrying a woman and starting a family involve leaving the comfort zone, but in terms of looking at the long term, it is better for a person to be created than not to be created (only that there is discomfort in this). This is at least a possible explanation. In this context, it is worth mentioning the statement in Tractate Berakhot 17:1: “Whoever does not for the sake of his name, it is convenient for him not to be created.” This implies that whoever does for the sake of his name, it is actually convenient for him to be created. Similarly, in Yerushalmi (Berakhot 1:5) Rabbi Yochanan said of the one who learns not to do that “it would be convenient for him if his place were turned over on his face and he did not go out into the world.” This means that the one who learns in order to do, it is actually convenient for him to be created. 11. On pages 50-51 you brought up the total requirement of the Torah that goes as far as sacrificing one's life. But this requirement seems absurd to me, since it is clear to everyone that it is impossible to reach a sufficient level of certainty regarding the laws of sacrificing one's life (for example, a person can ask himself whether the situation he finds himself in does not require sacrificing one's life at all, and even if it does, whether the sages have not correctly ruled on these laws, and even if so, whether Judaism is wrong, etc.). As an example, one can imagine a jihadist suicide bomber on his way to an attack and having skeptical thoughts about the obligation of the matter. Wouldn't it make more sense for him to examine more deeply the total obligation of jihad? In fact, this examination will almost never yield a sufficient level of certainty to the point where it would make sense to sacrifice one's life for it. In other words, I argue that it is illogical to sacrifice one's soul for ideas about which you have no very high level of certainty, and from this I argue that perhaps God understands that this is the case and therefore does not expect us to sacrifice one's soul in such situations. 12. On page 53 you wrote: “A minor also buys his creation in this way from the Torah, even though the minor generally has no possibility of carrying out acts of acquisition”. But Maimonides in the Laws of the Lulav writes: “And it is not given (the lulav) to a minor, who buys and does not give to others from the Torah, and it is found that if they return it to him, he does not return it.“. How does this work out? General comments: 1. It seems to me that reference to the Karaites, Reforms, and Conservatives is missing. 2. I have a few additional arguments that might be included in the booklet: 2.1 The very fact that man, since the dawn of humanity, has engaged in all kinds of ritual work shows that man has a natural inclination to worship (which God probably instilled in him), and it is likely that God would want to utilize the "ritual function" that He instilled in us in the right way by transmitting information about the correct form of worship. 2.2 If the formation of a narrative of mass revelation is a natural occurrence that occurred because of lies/disruptions/old wives' tales, it would be expected that a similar narrative would be repeated throughout history, but since it was not repeated, we can conclude that there is an "unnatural" event here. (In the spirit of the verse: For ask now of the former days that were before you, since the day that God created man on the earth, and of the end of the heavens, and of the end of the heavens, whether this great thing was done, or whether it was heard to be so) 2.3 The existence of commandments that are not beneficial to society (if this is a conspiracy intended to constitute a kind of social contract, there is no reason to include the waving of the lulav). 2.4 The existence of verifiable biblical statements (in the conspiracy, one tries not to create verifiable points) such as the Shemitah: And I commanded my blessing upon you in the sixth year, and you shall make the ingathering for three years. Pilgrimage: And no one shall covet your land with your burnt offerings to appear before the Lord your God three times in the year. 2.5 The religious innovation of the Jewish religion in relation to other religions at that time shows that it is true, because if it were not true, it is likely that its creators would have tried to resemble other religions (polytheistic, God is not abstract, etc.) I also wanted to attach two links to Rabbi Kalman's videos that you could perhaps refer to from the booklet: The first video deals with the process you established on pages 34-35 (additional considerations): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6k1jHAYtbI The second video deals with the rational basis for the fact that even a resident of the land is from heaven: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4OzkVQte6g —————————————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Thank you for all the comments. This is not the type of material I am used to working with (seminar matters “values”). I have corrected it as I will detail immediately, and I will send you the corrected file later. 1. Indeed, this is the more correct formula that I use. I corrected it. 2. Indeed. But the concept of commandment was born at Mount Sinai. This is the change in the work of God that was created there. Until Mount Sinai, there was no observance of mitzvot but rather the doing of good deeds (sages and not Hasidim). Even the fathers who observed the Torah did not do so as commandments and doers, and these were not mitzvot. The concept of a “religious person” in its modern sense did not yet exist. Then everyone was Christian (religious experiences and morality). It is true that even after Mount Sinai, everyone must observe what comes from reason, and this can be understood in two ways (which are apparently disputed in the internal and success in blessings controversy): A. This is not a mitzvah but a good deed. But good deeds must also be done. B. It is a mitzvah because there is a commandment (where?) to do what comes from reason. I used to think in B, today I am quite convinced in A. 3. Page 29-30 (The issue of finding the Torah scroll in the days of Josiah) 3.1 Well, then why did your soul forget and there was a previous tradition? The punishment should be imposed on the forgetful and not on their children who no longer know anything. 3.2 The question is whether this is more reasonable than adopting the traditional thesis. I did not claim certainty. If the people accepted the tradition that there was a book and it was forgotten, in my opinion it is more reasonable to adopt the tradition and not the thesis of assimilation. This may harm credibility, but in any case it is not something absolute. 3.3 This can be said. But whoever brings evidence from the Bible that there was no continuity in the tradition cannot bring evidence from there. This is a possible interpretation, just as it was before we saw the story of finding the book. My claim is that this story does not change my relationship to tradition, whatever it may be. 3.4 This is not similar to the Quran, since the tradition of the Quran or Christianity does not claim that there was a book that was lost. My argument is that if I am told about a book that was lost or about a revelation that was forgotten, they should have thrown it away. The question of the charismatic leader is what is up for discussion here. I cannot rule it out, but only show that it is not the preferred option, and that the story of finding the book does not significantly strengthen it. Those who accept the possibility of a charismatic leader who sells secrets will accept it, and those who do not, do not. The story here does not matter in this matter, if they accept it then they interpret it that way, and if they do not - then no. 3.5 Why do I owe anything to the Radak interpretation? By the way, it is not clear to me from its language that it is about everything. It is about all the bad deeds they did, but perhaps they did some good deeds. 3.6 It is indeed possible. 4. As far as I know, it is not about religion at all. It is a mystical method, and in principle I have no problem accepting it. Beyond that, I am not aware of any tradition that speaks of mass revelation in Hinduism. Who was revealed? There are personal experiences of various enlightened ones. But perhaps I do not know enough. 5. Regarding the part about “additional considerations”: 5.1 Indeed. But it used to be. Beyond that, such events may also occur today, but they have to be clearly evident for me to say that there is a divine appearance here. The assumption is that today events occur naturally. See more below. 5.2 The question of whether this is a supernatural event (meaning that there is divine involvement in it) or not is open to me. The motives of the founders of the state were secular (part of the spring of nations). And yet the occurrence of such an unusual event shows the uniqueness of the people who bring it about and the tradition they carry with them. I clarified this in two footnotes. 5.3 It can indeed be argued. Therefore, it is just an argument that joins the other arguments. “It can be argued” This is exactly the argument against which I refined the meaning of the set of arguments in comparison to examining each of them separately. The question of the prophecies that did not come true requires a more systematic examination. I did not do it (how many there were, and who they are, and is it clearly clear that they did not come true or will not come true). 5.4 I wrote section 2 before I saw your words here. See there. The exceptions are not the establishment of a state but an awakening after a thousand years of exile, the establishment of a language and institutions out of nothing, the gathering of exiles and the forging of a single Israeli society, and democracy and a proper regime. I clarified this in two footnotes. 5.5 Indeed. Although, I think most of them are not very unusual in terms of the balance of power (not even the War of Independence. See the books of Uri Milstein the provocateur). 6. I corrected the wording. After a tradition about a revelation at Sinai has come down to us, events repeat and confirm it. 7. Indeed. I corrected it to two claims. 8. Because intuition and common sense cannot bridge this gap alone. Suppose a person says that he has an intuition that Australia has exactly one million inhabitants (assuming that he has no knowledge). This has no meaning, because he has no way of knowing how many inhabitants there are there. In order to accept the intuition, one must present a basis that allows one to believe it. The problem with the truth of an ethical claim such as “You shall not murder” is not that we have no way of knowing whether it is true or not, but that the concept of truth is not applicable to it at all, because there is nothing to compare it to. Therefore, we must start with the fact that there is something to compare it to, and only now can we say that intuition makes this comparison. 9. It is clear that ”always” here does not mean for all people. No one disputes that in both groups there are people who act this way and some who act differently. You mean p. 43. I clarified that in a footnote. 10. An unlikely interpretation in my opinion. Noach means what he would want for all ranges. I did not open a full discussion on this, because it is a sidetrack. The Mimra was also brought up in passing. Therefore, I do not think it is worth adding the Gemara in the blessings. 11. I agree psychologically, not philosophically. Psychologically, someone who is not completely convinced may not sacrifice his soul. But factually, in Halacha, there is a requirement for sacrifice, and it can only be established on a sufficient basis. The claim that God may not expect this sacrifice is a claim that I may examine in future books (Or Hadash al Zion). 12. You are introducing me to the question of a different opinion from Kanah, on which the Rishonim differed whether it is beneficial in a small way from Torah or from Rabbinics. I did not go into these details here, since I am satisfied with the discussion of the methods that it is not beneficial from Torah. What's more, there is also a dispute about whether the property of a rabbi is beneficial to the Dauraita (which could explain the Maimonides even if Katan does not buy from the Dauraita at all). General notes: 1. I added a section at the end of the second part. 2. I added it at the end of Chapter 4.

A:
I read some of the notebooks - they are very interesting and it will take me time to go through them more thoroughly – and I wanted to address [maybe I will also respond there later] the response you received about the notebooks from ”Abram El-Hevri” the owner of the blog “Eretz El-Hevri” whom you also know from yourself”H.

Avram El-Hevri wrote to you smugly that you have a “mission” from him to engage in academic biblical research and that without knowledge in the field your entire method “falls” and doesn't even begin

You wrote to him in a tone that seems apologetic that you haven't dealt with the field because it's impossible to deal with everything, etc. And I wanted to say that you can rest assured and you have nothing to apologize for or feel guilty about not being involved in the field.

Although studying the Bible is not my main occupation, since I did have several courses in the history of Israel that dealt with the biblical period and because out of personal interest I have read and still read articles and materials on the subject from time to time in order to become familiar with the subject, etc. I can certainly formulate a position that does not come from ignorance on the subject and I can tell you that, contrary to what Abram the Hebrew said, it is really not “as if shouting” And this is a field full of unfounded hypotheses that are stated as absolute facts, hypotheses that are clearly built on agendas at a level that is very difficult to hide, and the archaeological research that accompanies the study of the Bible does not provide much factual evidence.

As with everything, in this field there are sometimes interesting, original and important insights, but most of it is what I wrote to the author. The questions that arise from it about faith and tradition are usually not as strong as they are made out to be, and for this reason it is not a major challenge facing the public of believers, and it surprises me to be honest that the issue still bothers people after having exhausted the means to deal with it decades ago.

I did not detail here the reasons for the statements I made. I can happily give examples if you wish. I just wanted to clarify the point and explain that there is nothing to be done about it, or to feel a disadvantage or a feeling of missing out due to not engaging extensively with the subject.

Avram El-Hevri is a doctoral student in the Bible who is ”poisoned” about the subject that he sees as the gospel of the generation and he feels a real passion for the mission of “spreading the light” about the matter and he shows almost personal anger at those who are not interested or who do not accept the study of the Bible as Torah from Sinai and because he is so deeply emotional in the field it is difficult for him to see that there are those who are not interested in it or who are not as eager as he is

That is the matter and therefore you have nothing to feel sorry for

I hope I raised
———————————————————————————————————
The Rabbi:
A. Hello. In the meantime I have read a little about the matter (as part of writing the second book in the trilogy). It seems to me that you are too dismissive of this field (although I also think that its importance is being exaggerated). There is good evidence there for dividing it into certificates, but on the question of the time of writing each certificate, I think the situation is much more speculative. In any case, thank you for your words.
—————————————————————————————————
A’:
For nothing, I am always happy to help. I do not think that my disdain is exaggerated - I do not know what exactly impressed you about the so-called “certificate theory” but from my impression, it is very unconvincing evidence, completely speculative, and let us not forget the problem of the “negligent editor” which makes this theory very difficult as a whole, and this is in addition to the fact that its specific arguments are not as strong as I wrote. As I wrote, I do not claim that there is nothing in the field of biblical research worth considering and clarifying - like almost every field, it consists of interesting things that are worth studying, but also full of a little mumbo jumbo – What, for example, did concern me in this field more was the archaeological issue and questions such as how it is that such a great and resonant event [“Then the champions of Edom were terrified, the rams of Moab will seize on trembling, etc.”] like the Exodus or an empire on the scale of the kingdoms of David and Solomon have not yet found clear archaeological confirmation. Of course, I dealt with the subject and studied it as much as I could, and I developed an opinion on the subject, and I found an answer that would satisfy me. And what I want to say is that I do not simply disregard it, and the fact that parts of biblical research that I did find interesting to deal with and that raised questions in me took up space in me [I even once gave a Torah talk on the subject of the Exodus in archaeology during the Seder] But I do not think that this is a subject that is so difficult and challenging - even in the things that did raise questions in me – and certainly not in something like the words of Abram the Hebrew to you, without which “everything does not begin at all” -As I wrote, he is very "poisoned" about the subject and greatly exaggerates its importance and the challenge it supposedly poses to our beliefs regarding the 2 things I mentioned here about the issue of the Exodus in archaeology and the fact that the field of biblical research is laden with "opinions in research" that are clearly not free from ideological agendas. I bring you here a link to an article that is very worth reading, most of which deals with the question of the Exodus in archaeology and ends with a discussion of the second topic as follows: http://mida.org.il/2015/04/02/%D7%9E%D7%99-%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%97%D7%93-%D7%9E%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%A0%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%94-%D7%99%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%A6%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D
———————————————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
Interesting. Things are known. It's like in evolution where many are biased or outright liars.
———————————————————————————————————
A’:
Indeed, an interesting example of how biblical research topics are discussed with much more ideological fervor than research is the debate over the Ipvar Papyrus. It seems to me that this papyrus is of more interest to the Protestant “repentance” organizations from the “Bible Belt” in the United States than to the scholars, and to distinguish it from the “repentance” organizations here in Israel, “Hidabrot”, etc., for whom this papyrus is “a great treasure trove” And on the other hand, atheist organizations will make every effort to prove that this is not a papyrus about the Ten Plagues and the Exodus from Egypt. Sometimes it's just amusing to see that when you do a Google search for the aforementioned papyrus, more than references to academic studies, you find references to websites of recanters and atheists who are arguing about it. What is this papyrus that is the subject of such heated debate? : https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A4%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%A1_%D7%90%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%95%D7%A8
————————————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
I know. I think it started with Velikovsky.
————————————————————————————————————
A:
Indeed, Velikovsky seems to have started this with a lot of people, especially in the “dialogue” organizations and the like, who are enthusiastic about Velikovsky and his books. He very briefly says that his method needs a lot of study and he makes far-reaching claims that we should be careful about - that all the dating accepted by researchers of ancient Egypt is 500 years behind schedule, etc. - and of course, on the other hand, not to dismiss them just because in the world of research he is considered a “red sheet.” Personally, I personally get along very well with the question of how they didn’t find direct archaeological evidence for the Exodus, etc. Even without Velikovsky's thesis, among other things, my opinion is the same as that of Rabbi Dr. Berman in quite a few of the things he wrote in the article from the link I provided, plus a few other things. What is true is what was mentioned in Rabbi Berman's article, that he described one of the familiar ways of believers who are embarrassed by the matter, to see the Exodus from Egypt as a non-historical story but an allegory and a story with a spiritual message rather than a documentary one. This is an option that is not acceptable to me at all. And Rabbi Berman wrote there - who also does not accept this way and his entire article from there on starts from the premise that this is a historical story that the Torah tells us - that the entire Torah is built on the fact that this is a real story [and I will add to his words that there are not only religious implications in this matter but even very real commandments related to the land of Egypt and the Egyptian people - the prohibition to reside in Egypt and not “You shall not abhor an Egyptian because you were a sojourner in his land”] and as he said there, there is much to expand on and add to.
———————————————————————————————————————
The Rabbi:
His article is certainly not without problems. For example, the claim that 600,000 is a typological number (a thousand is a unit and not necessarily a thousand individuals) is certainly not true. The Torah gives a detailed count of the tribes and sums it all up and comes to 600,000. The numbers of firstborns and Levites have already been addressed in several places.

Yod:
Hey Micah
In the fifth notebook I quote

It follows from this that someone who keeps all the commandments because he sees God Almighty as his God and is obligated to Him, but in his opinion the commandments are human intuition (his own or that of others), that is, he is an infidel at Mount Sinai, his commandments have no religious value.[1][1] I will not go into the question here of what of the totality of the commandments was given at Sinai. I will deal with this in the next two books.
————
But as stated, these are the words of Maimonides, why do they obligate me?
And if there was no Mount Sinai and the commandments that the Israelites accepted for themselves were from an explanation (an explanation from the Torah, right?) or from prophecy over the years, is that not good enough?
The entire attempt of the Maimonides to explain what was at Mount Sinai is an attempt to see if it is appropriate for what was (if it was) where did the Maimonides come from?
—————————————————————————————————————
The Rabbi:
Regarding the Torah reasoning, I have just now written a comprehensive article on this subject. See the articles page “On the Torah reasoning and its meaning”. In addition, the Torah reasoning gives the content of the matter, and yet without a commandment there is no actual Torah mitzvah here (for example, no punishments for it).
Beyond that, the Torah reasoning cannot create the principle that there is no such thing as Torah reasoning without it. After all, if everything is torah reasoning and there is no evidence, then what is the meaning of the term “Torah reasoning”?

These words of the Rambam in my opinion are a simple explanation (and an explanation from the Torah, as is known). His words do not bind you. The truth binds you. Therefore, I do not ask that they accept it by virtue of the Rambam's authority, but by virtue of the fact that it is the truth. A person does not perform a mitzvah because he decided that this was the right thing to do (I discussed this in the fourth notebook. The existence of a valid source for morality and the status of the commandment).

In order for there to be a commandment here, there needs to be a mitzvah. Mitzvahs that the people of Israel decide to keep just like that do not have any meaning as a mitzvah. Who commanded? Whom are they obeying? It is at most a good deed (if at all), but certainly not a mitzvah. This is what the Rambam writes, that it has value (from the sages of the nations of the world) but not religious value (from their followers).

If a mitzvah was accepted by virtue of prophecy, this is distilled into two aspects: 1. Who said that there is such a thing as prophecy, and that its content is binding? It is written in the Torah, but it itself was given in prophecy. 2. Who said that the prophet truly received from God and not a fantasy? It is not for nothing that the Torah gives us tests to test a prophet. Did this itself (= the prophetic passages in the Torah) also come in prophecy? Jesus and Muhammad were also prophets who brought commandments to their people.

None of this means that all the details were given at Sinai, as I noted there. But there must be a situation in which there is some interaction that establishes the concept of commandment and commandment. Then interpretations and expansions can come from explanation or in prophecy.

Daniel:
Hello Rabbi, in reference to infinite regression, you wrote, "An infinite chain of explanations is an escape from explanation and not an explanation. We only say there is an explanation and do not give it." Isn't an argument about a concrete infinity as a solution also an escape from explanation? In the sense of "it's an infinite column all the way down"
—————————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
Hello Daniel, it's better to start a new thread.
I argued in my words that there is no concrete infinity, so where in my words did you see an argument about a concrete infinity as a solution?
Beyond that, one must distinguish between an infinite column and an infinite chain. An infinite column may be something that is not defined to the end (this is the problem with infinity in general), but in an infinite regression of explanations (a chain) there is another problem beyond the definitions of infinity, and that is that there is no presentation of an explanation here, but only a statement that there is an explanation. Note that this problem does not stem only from the fact that it is an infinity, but rather from the fact that it is an infinity of links that hold each other together. This is not the case with an infinite page.

Moriah: Hello, Your Honor. Regarding the cosmological proof as formulated in the second notebook, Assumption A: Everything we have experience with must have a cause (or cause). Assumption B: Things of this type exist (the universe, us, or any other object). Conclusion: There must be a reason for the existence of these things. Let's call it X1. On the surface, one could argue that Assumption A is wrong. The energy and matter of the entire universe have no cause. In fact, all we have experience with is just mass and energy in all kinds of guises, so we are used to saying that the mass and energy in a certain guise are caused by the mass and energy in the previous guise, but in fact it is not a cause and effect, it is mass and energy that have changed guise. —— One could argue that for some reason they have no reason, but I think this is a very new claim, and therefore the opposite assumption seems much more reasonable. When we make generalizations, there is always speculation and it is always possible to say the opposite. Thus we assume that the laws of gravity that we have known on our planet are also valid on the moon or in other galaxies. But maybe not? After all, it is certainly possible that it is only here. But what? We make a generalization, and whoever wants to qualify it has the burden of proof on him. As long as it is not proven otherwise, masses behave the same everywhere. The same goes for the causes of all mass and energy. ——————————————————————————————————————— Moriah: If I understood correctly, the cosmological argument is based on the assumption that “everything we have experience of must have a reason”; and therefore we conclude that the universe also has a reason. Why assume that everything must have a reason? (Sorry if this sounds like a stupid question to you, I am trying to understand a point that is not so clear to me). —— I understand that from a physical point of view, everything we have in the universe is mass and energy in all kinds of guises, meaning that a table is mass and energy in table guise, a tree is mass and energy in wooden guise. If this is more or less correct, I will continue to the next stage. From our experience, we know that if there is a table, it means that there was a carpenter who wanted to build a table and wood, and that is actually the reason for the table. But calling it a reason is not accurate. The truth is that the table was preceded by mass and energy in another guise = carpenter and wood, who converted their guise into a table. In other words, it is not that everything has a reason, but that every mass and energy in guise X was preceded by mass and energy in guise Y. We cannot extrapolate from the change in the form of mass and energy to the existence of the mass and energy itself. —— If a particle or some other object is created in front of your astonished eyes, assume that there was a reason for it. Therefore, it is likely that the formation of matter (mass and energy) also has a reason. There was a big bang, probably something caused it. By the way, the bang is not the formation of matter but only a change in its form. Therefore, if you want, think of the bang as a normal change in the form of mass and energy that was then compressed and began to expand. ——————————————————————————————————— Moriah: When a sound is heard behind me, it is also just a change of mass and energy (as far as I understand, I am not a physicist.) If a particle or object is created in front of my eyes, then I will know that there was mass and energy here that changed their form to the current particle or object. I accept that the assumption that everything has a reason is intuitive, but I want to argue that it is wrong. If I understand correctly, it is actually induction, everything we know has a reason, so the world also has a reason. This assumption seems correct, but it is not. We do not know that everything has a cause. We only know that every mass and energy in a certain way was preceded by other mass and energy. Similarly, with regard to the Big Bang, the Big Bang was a transformation of mass and energy. Thank you very much for the time that the Rabbi dedicates to me. —————————————————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I do not fully understand where we are stuck. As I explained, it is clear that this is not about certainty, but only about probability. The question is, what is more likely in your opinion: that everything has a cause or not. Are you claiming that it is more likely that there are no reasons for the formation of the universe? On what basis? My logic says that formation has a greater necessity for a cause than for changes in form. The processes of change are less dramatic than the processes of formation. Alternatively, let us adopt for the sake of discussion your thesis, that it is more likely that there are no reasons for the formation of things, so it is not clear that changes in mass and energy always (if at all) have a cause. After all, this is just an assumption of rational thinking, and it has no evidence of any kind. Therefore, it can also be argued just like the broader assumption. So why do you assume that in shape changes, it is true that everything has a cause? And what about shape changes on the moon or in other places and times? Why did you decide to stop the causal generalization specifically in shape changes? I added that even according to your theory that there is causality only for shape changes, the bang was only a shape change and not a creation, and therefore the question arises regarding it as well whether it had a cause and what it was. In other words, the causal chain of shape changes that leads to us is also infinite, unless we assume that it has a beginning without a cause of its own. You can refer to the creation itself as the first shape change (as you decided, completely arbitrarily, regarding the example I gave of a particle created before your eyes, that it is only a shape change and not a creation). I do not see a significant difference between them, and if anything, then the creation is more refined by a cause than the change as stated. ———————————————————————————————————————— Moriah: The rabbi does not understand my intention. I will try again. Our intuition says that everything has a reason. I agree. Now I want to examine this intuition with cold logic. It seems like an induction that we do naturally and even unconsciously. In our experience, we have always seen that everything has a reason. I want to say; no, it's confusing. It seems like a reason, but it's not a reason. Nothing has a reason. There is also no reason for changes in the form of mass and energy. There are laws, not a reason. We know that mass and energy in the form of X will always change to the form of Y. And so we call it a reason. That means that we know what is happening, we don't know why it is happening. That's why I think the word "reason" is confusing because it makes us think that it is about "why" when it is about "what". When I ask a scientist why water on a fire gets hot, I actually want him to tell me what the physical process is in heating the water. After this analysis I did, it turns out that cause = the previous form of mass and energy. So let's reformulate the assumption at the basis of the cosmological argument, instead of “Assumption A: Everything we have experience about must have a cause (or cause). ” We will be precise: Assumption A: Everything we have experience about must have a previous form of mass and energy. It seems to me that when we formulate Assumption A like this, and as I explained, this is the exact formulation, the whole argument falls apart. Thank you very much —— A description of it would say that a body moves in some way when there is another body of mass M at a distance X from it. This is the law of gravity. But the theory of gravity is not satisfied with the law of gravity, that is, with the description of the movement and the circumstances, but also states that there is a gravitational force, that is, there is a physical force that causes this movement. No one has seen this force, and yet every physicist believes that it exists. And why? Because this movement must have a cause, and the force (or there is something that causes the force. In physical terminology: the “charge sources” of the force) is the cause. For this reason alone, it is possible to justify investing billions of dollars in particle accelerators that search for gravitons (the particles that carry the force of gravity). And again, you can deny this and say that you do not believe in the existence of a gravitational force, but human intuition and rational and scientific thinking do assume it. Not only that, but these assumptions are usually realized (we find the force particles. In the electromagnetic field, they have already found the photons. In gravity, not yet). The changes in form that you are talking about describe a transition from one form to another, that is, a chain of states. But science believes that these changes are caused by something that is outside the picture of these successive forms. There is some hand that changes from form A to form B (like the force in the case of gravity). In short, it is also about the "why" and not just the "what". The warming of water is not just a description of a process, but involves theoretical entities that operate and generate this process. It seems to me that denying the assumption that everything has a reason and not just a description is a denial of one of the most accepted and universal assumptions that each of us has. Usually, believers try to explain to atheists that science deals with the “what” and the Torah or faith explains the “why.” And neither does it. This is a mistake. —————————————————————————————————— Moriah: If causality is an a priori assumption, then indeed my claim is invalid. I will do my homework. Regarding the force of gravity. What is science looking for? If I understand what you are saying, science is still looking for more basic mass or energy that changes its form to the force of gravity. Are the sources of charge not either mass or energy? The rabbi wrote, “I think that denying the assumption that everything has a reason and not just a description is denying one of the most agreed-upon and universal assumptions that each of us has. There are quite a few scientists who claim that there is no reason for the formation of the world, apparently it is not so agreed-upon and universal. ———————————————————————————————————— Rabbi: The very assumption that there is a gravitational force and not just the law of gravity indicates causality and not just changes in form. It is not some basic mass and energy. It is assumed that there is such a force because otherwise things would not move towards each other. The sources of charge are the masses themselves (they exert the gravitational force that attracts other masses). What I wrote that science is looking for are gravitons, which are the particles that conduct the gravitational force. How do we know that there are any at all? Almost no one denies this assumption, but they want to qualify it with respect to the formation of the world. This is exactly where the cosmological and physico-theological evidence comes in, which says that if there is an assumption of causality, it is illogical to just exclude something from it. —— Obviously, you won't find a scientific discovery that isn't matter or energy. That's why I brought up the example of the force of gravity, which isn't found in this sense, but in the inferential sense. By the way, energy (as a type of entity) wasn't found either, but rather its existence was inferred. And in principle, neither was matter, because just because we see it doesn't mean there's something there. It's also possible to stimulate the neurons in the brain so that you "see" whatever I want. It's all inference and common sense. Anyone who doubts this will be left with nothing. Please and happily. ——————————————————————————————————————— Moriah: Continuing our correspondence on the principle of causality, someone told me that there was an experiment that contradicts the principle of causality. I couldn't understand the experiment because it's loaded with complicated (to me) concepts in physics. The experiment is: Delayed choice quantum eraser I assume the rabbi is familiar with the experiment, does it indeed contradict the principle of causality? —— If we say that in quantum – in the micro, there is no causality, then there is no need for a cause for the universe because the universe began from a micro that does not need a cause and all the rest of the development of the universe already has a cause. ——

A:
Shalom Rabbi
I'm in the middle of reading your notebook on the subject of the physico-theological proof, in the part that talks about evolution.
1) What laws are you talking about that are responsible for the progress of evolution? And that they refine an explanation for their very existence? Because natural selection is not a law of nature, it's simply a mechanism. As soon as there is a reality and there is a level of adaptation to reality on the part of the creatures, the more adapted will remain at the expense of the less. I don't see any “law” here that refines an explanation for its existence.
2) I understand that looking at the chance that life will be created compared to the chance that it will not be created at all, it seems hopeless. But can't it be argued that the universe was created and destroyed an infinite number of times, and we are the successful case? That is, in one case among an infinite number of attempts that we were not exposed to, all life and we were created. Which eliminates the admiration for the low probability. Is this a valid claim?
Thank you
—————————————————————————————————
The Rabbi:
1. The laws of nature. Natural selection occurs entirely within the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. If they were different, there would be no natural selection and no living beings would be created. I think I explained it there.
2. It can be argued, but here we claim that there were countless different universes with different creatures, none of which we have ever encountered. So is this a simpler theory than the theory that assumes there was a creator? After all, this theory assumes the existence of countless different and strange creatures without us ever seeing any of them. Whereas here we assume the existence of one creature that we have never seen. The argument of simplicity is decisive in favor of the second theory. Otherwise, every successful or improbable case can be explained in this way (perhaps there was a demon who did it).

Yitzhak:
Hello,
From your words in notebook 3:

If the light beam, or a quantum particle, behaves as if it were moving towards a goal and not because of a reason, and in particular it is clear that they do not have the ability to decide whether or not to move towards this goal, it is reasonable to think that there is another factor that drives them and uses them for its own purposes. It wants the light beam to move in the fastest path, or for the particle to move in a way that minimizes the functionals that control its path.

This may be what you meant and I just didn't get it from your words, so I will phrase the question in my own words: We call quantum processes (specifically to which of the eigenvectors the complex wave function will collapse) random, since (not only do they exhibit a certain random distribution in multiple measurements but also) the wave function itself represents a probability of being found (as evidenced by the experiment of a single particle through 2 slits). Still, this decision occurs somehow. The fact that it corresponds to a certain distribution in multiple experiments (which in the above example differs from a pair of Gaussians and presents a sink of wave interference) still does not change the fact that some mechanism collapses the wave function. The person who believes in providence would say that there is definitely an example here of a mechanism, a thread, that the Creator left within creation that allows this intervention.

My question or request is whether you could summarize your statement on the subject since I did not fully understand from reading your words (in which you refer to it by imposing it on one perception or another, and less directly).
Thank you,
Yitzhak
——————————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
Hello Yitzhak, I refer to this in a slightly different context in the chapter on quantum mechanics in the books on the science of freedom. The discussion there is where the intervention of the human will in physics occurs, but the logic is very similar. My argument is that quantum theory does not help us in this matter, because the intervention of will, human or divine, makes the collapse something non-random. The distribution is dictated by the wave function, but if human or divine will determines where it will collapse, then this distribution is incorrect.
And more generally, free choice (like divine intention) is a third mechanism: neither randomness nor determinism. And as for your question, there is nothing that ”collapses” the wave function. It is a random process. At least that is the accepted view, until they find an explanation through a theory of hidden variables.
————————————————————————————————————
Yitzhak:
Hello and thanks for the answer.
If I understood correctly, the problem with the collapse being determined by divine intervention is that then the process ceases to be random. However, in my understanding, this randomness only expresses our inability to point to the mechanism and its adaptation to a certain distribution. It is true that this is not the same as macroscopic processes (where their statistical nature is only because it is difficult for us to trace all the factors, and therefore we are satisfied with a statistical moment or two, but the process itself is deterministic). At the quantum level, the wave itself indeed represents a probability of being at a certain point. But how can we send, in the absence of knowledge of the aforementioned collapsing mechanism, the hypothesis that it is due to a third party, as above? In other words, if the reason for defining the process as random is that the distribution of the collapse of the superposition of the wave functions into the eigenvectors corresponds to a certain distribution – (in addition to the difference compared to the macro, where this is really not determined until the moment of collapse, and is not just unknown to us) – Why are we so committed to semantics that we claim, “But then it’s not random?” How can we reject a possibility on the other side of the equation? And that the fit of multiple experiments to a certain distribution contradicts (at least that’s how I understood you) the possibility of such a mechanism?!

Of course, I’m not making a definitive claim here, but from your words I at least understand that such an assumption would be (not only unproven but actually) in contradiction to the findings, and I would like to understand why.
Many thanks,
Yitzhak Bernstein
——————————————————————————————————————
The Rabbi:
Peace be upon you.
Quantum theory describes the distribution of collapse for each of the states in the superposition. If there is divine intervention, then the collapse does not occur according to this distribution. A distribution describes a random process (unless there are hidden variables, in which case it is like using statistics in the macroscopic realm). After all, God intervenes according to His own considerations, that is, according to our actions and His needs in managing the world. You are not suggesting that these considerations coincide completely with the absolute value of the square of the wave function in the situation in question. In other words, according to your suggestion, we were supposed to discover in an experiment that the wave function does not describe the results in a given set of experiments. Its statistical meaning would be ruled out.
Therefore, I also do not accept the claim that you are not claiming certainty but rather such a possibility. If you accept quantum theory, there is no such possibility. This is no different from intervening against the laws of gravity or other laws of nature.
—————————————————————————————————————
Yitzhak:
Hello,
Thank you for the clarification, I understand your point.
However, on the merits of the matter, it seems to me that there is a somewhat far-reaching logical leap here:
1. Just because He did not intervene at every possible point (in this case in the few experiments that were performed and were sufficient to confirm these distributions) local intervention cannot be ruled out. I also did not try to claim that He changes the result everywhere in a way that deviates from the distribution described by the square of the wave function (the probability). Especially not according to His Honor's method on the subject of providence, which he explicitly claims is not in every detail. Here too, there is no reason why 99.9% of things the Almighty does indeed distribute the collapse in a way that *distributes* in a certain way, as if it were random, and in our view, in the absence of the mechanism, there is no problem describing it as such.

2. I would like to argue that we don't even have to go so far as to say that the distribution is only in 99.9% of cases (and therefore in the laboratory we did not detect it, but when it was time to intervene we would detect an anomaly). After all, if all distributions of a nature that we call random are based on multiple measurements, it is easy to compensate for one another. Anyone can write down a completely deterministic measurement series and ensure that it is distributed randomly in terms of the mean, the variance, and in fact up to any moment that is chosen. How can you rule out (the possibility of) its intervention by virtue of the improbability that even after that the statistics will fit a certain distribution?

I would appreciate your response.
Thank you,
Yitzhak Bernstein
—————————————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
As I wrote, local intervention is certainly possible. And it does not disprove quantum theory. This is also true with respect to the law of gravity or any other law. You could always say that our measurements only deal with cases where there was no intervention (which is the vast majority). So what's the point of getting into a discussion about quantum mechanics for this? As mentioned, there is no difference between intervention in quantum theory and intervention in any other law of nature.
Above all, we don't see the result of the intervention (the percentage of healing among religious people or worshipers, etc.). So why even assume that it exists?
——————————————————————————————————
Yitzhak:
As for the question of why we assume that providence exists, of course I'm not trying to prove it from quantum mechanics or social statistics. There are quite a few explicit references to providence and intervention in the written Torah (“None of the diseases that I put on Egypt I will put on you, for I am your healer”, “If you walk in my statutes … and I will give you your rain in its season, etc.”, and in fact every possible mention of reward and punishment) is a promise of some kind of intervention. If I am convinced that the Torah is from heaven, then these references are the reason to believe that providence exists. And if you answer me that perhaps it was only in the past and not in our day, I also do not pretend to say that it is visible to us at every step: If we stick to the example that His Eminence gave regarding medicine, then even if the percentages of patients being cured are similar, it does not necessarily mean that the percentages of patients in general are similar, and even if so – perhaps maintaining the percentages of patients the same despite the eating habits of a religious world – They are already an expression of providence (jokingly, but the idea is understandable).
In any case, I feel that on this issue it is less important that we reach an agreement since the disagreement between us, in my opinion, is about the interpretation of the findings in the field and the manner of relating to them – in the sense of the validity of the findings and conclusions and what generalizations are legitimate to make from them.

On the other hand, I would be happy to linger and discuss your question as to why such intervention refines quantum. Here the answer is clear to answer:
1. A local change in the laws of gravity means that now at a given place and time the force of gravity is not proportional to the product of the masses and inversely proportional to the distance squared. On the other hand, the collapse of the superposition to a given eigenvector (on my assumption that it occurs due to the intervention of the Creator) does not contradict any existing law that we know of because *we do not currently understand this mechanism*. Of course, in the absence of the need to assume (in light of what is written above) providence, there is no reason to prefer creative intervention to randomness (although we do not have a phenomenon without a cause in the rest of reality). However, if we assume providence (and you do not have to agree with me on its scope): do you not agree that assuming intervention in the above collapse (about its causes, we already have a lack of understanding (expressed, for example, by inherent ignorance when trying to measure, as formulated in the uncertainty principle) leading to the assumption that there is no deliberate hand) – is a much more reasonable assumption than, for example, a local-temporal breaking of the laws of gravity? (In the sense that it does not contradict a theory but only an interpretation regarding the distribution factor, from ”random without a cause” to ”determined by the Creator”)?

Also in its simplicity, by the way, in the sense of unifying in one explanation the physical mechanism of a miracle? In the words of Professor Gutfreund of the Hebrew University (in a lecture on thermodynamics when I was still a young student): “There is no physical reason why the table should fly up now, the reason is only statistical!” After all, such an intervention can unify under a simple mechanism and explain in one simple explanation many miracles in Scripture. In your article that you sent me, published in “Bedad”, you claim that the preference for the simple explanation is not just a psychological tendency but much more, and you even gave hundreds of halachic arguments (often strong) in the sense that according to the Torah it should also be preferred.
I would appreciate your comment!
Shabbat Shalom,
Yitzhak Bernstein
———————————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
1. I disagree. I have already explained that this is not a question of the mechanism but of the result. If quantum theory determines any distribution, then intervention is an exception to the distribution determined by science. And so we have returned to local intervention in the laws of nature, which is possible regardless of quantum theory. Even if it is possible for the table to fly up, this should happen with absolutely zero chance, and any intervention will deviate from the distribution determined by quantum theory. And certainly if we are talking about everyday interventions and not exceptions (and we have already agreed that there is no point in discussing exceptions). What's more, you are introducing quantum phenomena into the macro world (this is also statistically possible but does not happen in practice).
I repeat myself over and over again, and I think that this has been exhausted.

Y’:
Hello Rabbi Michael,
(Maybe I should say Rabbi..)
I am in the middle of reading your fascinating article in the fifth notebook (page 44). And two small comments:
Regarding the response to the words of the philosopher David Hume, you wrote at the end of the matter that it is easy to fall into and prefer “probability over reasonableness, and calculation over thinking”. From the presentation of the things in your conclusion, it is possible to understand that there is indeed a practical contradiction between the two in this matter, probability versus reasonableness, and calculation versus thinking. But I didn't understand why, and that the probability that an entire people distorted an experience, intentionally or not, and transmitted it so accurately to the next generation to the point of readiness to surrender their souls, and in addition to all the logical arguments that you yourself made there, about the likelihood that the distortion would be about a monotheistic belief that did not exist at all at that time, and many other arguments that further reduce the probability of any distortion, so that in my understanding it becomes even smaller than the alternative that a miracle occurred and there was a revelation, especially in light of your words that revelation is not impossible but only rare.
Bottom line, in my opinion the obvious conclusion should have been that from a probabilistic and computational point of view, the acceptance of the status of Mount Sinai based on the testimony over the generations is more probable. And not just from an intuitive and reasonable point of view.
Perhaps that was also your intention. Or perhaps I do not understand the concept of probability and calculability correctly. Correct me if I am wrong.
Secondly, your argument there regarding the need to say that there was a revelation, even if only for morality, is not sufficiently explained and in my opinion there is room for expansion for the average reader. Why not say that after we have reached the conclusion that the purpose of the world is for something external to the world, then this purpose is our choosing goodness and morality itself for its own sake. Which is indeed also true according to the Torah, to the best of my understanding. And according to this seemingly secular argument, there is no need for revelation because it is apparently understandable by human reason.
Sorry for the length,
I would appreciate your response.
———————————————————————————————————
The Rabbi:
Greetings, Rabbi.
1. This is what I called probability. After all, you cannot quantify the chance of a miracle. You can only say that it is probable and not that its probability is such and such. On the other hand, an event in which a people invents a tradition is a natural event that belongs to history. It also has examples. Therefore, there we can talk about probability. And hence it is a question of probability versus probability.
2. The need for God for morality is explained in the fourth notebook in the book. My assumption is that the notebooks are interdependent.
Shabbat Shalom.
———————————————————————————————————————
Y’:
Another small question, the claim there that from a theological perspective it is difficult to accept the claim of Christians and Muslims that God replaced us, because God does not change His mind, but apparently from our parasha this is hidden from the verse “And God comforted us, because He made man on the earth and it grieved him to his heart”.
————————————————————————————————————————————————
The Rabbi:
Good question.
Indeed, there is some challenge to the argument here, and yet such a dramatic change without telling us anything about it (except in a dubious revelation to one person) sounds unlikely to me.
I would add that the change also did not come about as a result of any particular sin (at the time of Jesus' birth, I cannot think of a particular sin that would justify such a change), in contrast to the flood generation where one can see the reason for comfort. Although on second thought, the birth of Jesus and the formation of Christianity occurred around the destruction of the Temple, and perhaps this is an indication of God's change of heart and the replacement of His messengers. And good luck.

See 1 Samuel 15:29: And Israel also shall prevail: he shall not lie, nor be comforted: for he is not a man, that he should be comforted:
And likewise in the parsha of Balak (Numbers 23:19): There is no God, that he should lie, nor a son of man, that he should be comforted: he hath spoken, and shall not do it: he hath spoken, and shall not perform it:
If so, the Torah itself testifies that he does not go back on it, and the verse in our parsha is 29:1. In any case, one must see something unequivocal to be convinced that he did indeed comfort.
—————————————
10:
Bed”d

I saw a nice answer in Abarbanel about the apparent contradiction between the verses:

First, I say that even in the Book of Samuel itself there is such a contradiction between the verse you cited above, and the verse that appears a few verses earlier, where the Lord says to Samuel: “I comforted you because I made Saul king”

The Abarbanel in Samuel suggests that the comfort of the Blessed One is not from Himself but from the recipients. In both cases, both in Genesis and in the words of Samuel, we are dealing with people who sinned and as a result, God Almighty consoled them for what they had done as part of the results of the free choice He gave them in the world, but if the matter had depended solely on Him, He would not have wiped out humanity in the flood and would not have stopped the reign of Saul.

(He explains in Genesis that this does not stem from a lack of knowledge, God forbid, but that the Torah spoke in the language of humans, and the change of actions is perceived by humans as consolation and repentance for the first act).

On the other hand, Samuel's words to Saul, "The everlasting Israel will not lie," speak of God Almighty on His part and His eternity that He does not change His mind (such as continuing the reign of Saul and abolishing the reign of David as Saul wanted), because He does not have the will and conclusion, and His decisions are eternal on His part. And so in Balaam's words, "No man is God, that he should lie, nor a man that he should be comforted." The meaning is that Balak would not just change his mind to bless the people of Israel through Balaam (unlike Balak who thought that if he offered sacrifices before him, he would change his mind and agree to put a curse in Balaam's mouth).

Are there any objections?

Rabbi:
I didn't understand the answer. He comforted or not. What does it mean to be comforted from our perspective?
————————————–
Y’:
The statement that God is not comforted refers only to the situation in which there is no disadvantage on the part of man in his free choice.
That is, man, by choosing evil, can supposedly cause a change in God's decisions. But without this, God will never change His decision. This is how I understood his words.
Perhaps we can compare this to a man who wants to pour a glass of water for his friend, but the friend drops the glass and breaks it, in which case the man will certainly not pour it into the air. And to a viewer from afar, it seems that he regretted pouring it. But the change did not stem from him, but from the recipient.
———————————–
Rabbi:
This is actually similar to what the Maharl suggests in the introduction to the mighty acts of God regarding miracles. These are laws that were enacted in advance in creation along with the laws of nature.
Thus, Abarbanel claims that God has established predetermined laws and that He does not deviate from them. However, these laws themselves determine that what will happen to us depends on our actions. In fact, God's actions depend on what happens in the world. But in the world, everything is deterministic except for man's choice, so in fact what can change God's mind is only the choice of people. Thus, the He established in advance the law that if people sin, they must be destroyed (the generation of the flood and the flood), and now the destruction depends on them and not on Him. As they explain regarding the answer to prayer, that it is not a change in it but that there is a fixed law that if a person prays, he receives and if not, then he does not. And according to this, the word “comfort” is borrowed, and in fact it is a result of our actions. God truly never comforts.
It is certainly possible, but from the perspective of the Creator I see two problems here:
1. It is a language barrier. It is not called “comfort”. It was already determined in advance that if we sin, we have no right to exist. So why not present it this way: And God saw that we had sinned and decided to destroy us. What was wrong with this simple formulation that is less confusing. After all, the anthropomorphisms are intended to clarify things that are difficult for us to understand or illustrate to us (like the hand of God and the like). There is no problem here in understanding the truth (that the decision is a response to our actions and not consolation) and I do not see why such language should be used. After all, such “consolation” also occurs in humans. On the contrary, this humanistic language does not contribute to understanding but rather confuses us because it makes us think that He was comforted for His actions like humans.
2. Beyond that, in our parsha this interpretation seems a bit problematic. After all, here there was first “regret” for having created man (in light of his sins), and then regret in the opposite direction for wanting to destroy them and a promise not to do so again. According to Abarbanel’s suggestion, He determined in advance that if man sinned, he had no right to exist and would be destroyed, and in addition, He also determined in advance that if He wanted to destroy them, He would repent and not destroy them (otherwise, in His thoughts after the flood generation, there would be regret in the opposite direction). This is a bit strange.