The boundaries between sacred and profane in the library

Beer – 2010

Brief reflections (relatively 🙂) following the arrangement of the library in the Be'er Midrash

Torah and Wisdom

Since ancient times, sages have understood that there is value in studying fields that are not traditionally classified as 'Torah'. Maimonides already speaks of the path to love of God, writing thus (Hal. Yesodei HaTorah, 52:2):

And this is the path to His love and fear. When a person looks at His great and wonderful works and creations and sees in them His wisdom that has no value or end, he immediately loves, praises, glorifies, and desires a great desire to know the great Name, as David said, "My soul thirsts for God, for the living God." And when he thinks about these very things, he immediately recoils and fears, knowing that he is a small, lowly, dark creature standing with a small, insignificant mind before the innocent, as David said, "I will see Your heavens, the work of Your fingers. What is man that You remember us?" And according to these words, I explain great principles from the work of the Lord of the worlds so that they will be an opening for the understanding to love the Name, as the sages said about love, "From this you know the One who said and made the world."

So, it seems that studying the sciences leads to the love and fear of God. Certainly, these two are important values in the world of Torah and Halacha, and therefore it is clear that engaging in them cannot be called 'abrogation of Torah.' Does this mean that these are 'Torah'? This is not at all clear.

For example, even engaging in a livelihood justifies not studying Torah, meaning that someone who engages in something for a living certainly does not nullify Torah. On the other hand, it would be difficult to justify a claim that engaging in a livelihood is studying Torah. It is possible to say from this that engaging in a livelihood is a mitzvah, but it is not reasonable to claim that it is actually studying Torah. The same is true for any engagement in a mitzvah (since Torah is nullified for every mitzvah that is broken).

The conclusion is that even if we find that some activity is valuable, and even if it is a mitzvah, this does not necessarily mean that it is Torah study (there are 32 other mitzvahs in Halacha, apart from the mitzvah of studying Torah).

Although intellectual engagement in various fields of knowledge is a more likely candidate (than earning a living) to be included in the term 'Talmud Torah', as we have seen, this is not necessarily derived from the words of Maimonides.

Indeed, the Sages themselves see great value in wisdom, and even appreciate those who practice it, yet they are careful to distinguish between Torah and wisdom. Their famous statement (How sad!, Buber, section b):

Queen and her sons among the nations, there is no Torah. If a man says to you, "There is wisdom among the nations," believe it, "And I will destroy the wise from Edom, and understanding from the mountain of Esau" (Obadiah 1:8). There is Torah among the nations, do not believe it, as it is written, "Queen and her sons among the nations, there is no Torah."

These things are even expressed in Halacha. We read (Berachot Noach, p. 1):

Our rabbis taught: He who sees the sages of Israel says, "Blessed is he who shared his wisdom with those who feared him." The sages of the nations of the world say, "Blessed is he who gave of his wisdom to flesh and blood."

That is, whoever sees a wise man among the wise men of the nations bestows a blessing upon him, and sees this as a gift of God's wisdom to flesh and blood. This ruling is also brought to Halacha, inShulchan Arba'ah Ohh Si' Rachd 56-7, although for some reason today it is not strictly observed (see a lesson from 2001 on the 'Yeshiva' website online, by Rabbi Melamed: 'Seeing Strange People and Creatures').

If so, the apparent conclusion is that other wisdoms are indeed valuable, and are even part of the wisdom of God, yet they are not Torah. This is the distinction between 'wisdom' and 'Torah'.

There are interesting halachic disputes among the poskim regarding the law of blessing a Jewish scholar whose wisdom is in other areas of knowledge (a Gentile scholar who is wise in Torah wisdom apparently does not exist at all according to Chazal, and at the very least, there is a prohibition against teaching Torah to a Gentile, and therefore it is clear that they did not issue a blessing for him). Some hold that one should not bless him at all (see the Responsorial Psalm). Mishnah Halachah, Hat"5 Si' Ad, and see there all the curses and insults he brings down on the heads of Jews who waste their time on nonsense like physics and so on. And in contrast, see in the book Fear of Isaac On Chanukah, see article 9, which says so, but for other reasons, and without curses.), and there are those who hold that the blessing that is recited over Gentiles should be recited over him (The Greatness of Elisha(Rak'ah 14:8), and some hold that they bless him with exactly the same blessing that is bestowed upon a sage in the wisdom of the Torah (Responsorial Psalm 11:11). Awakening to the answer, A, S; and Responsorial Psalm I will walk in your truth. 14, a).

It is found, therefore, that the controversy over how to relate to external wisdom finds interesting halachic expression.

Is there really a difference?

Now we can add that the Rambam himself, in the framework of about three chapters in the Basic Torah, just after the aforementioned introduction (on the path to loving and fearing God), details in great detail several principles of science (of his time, and he even involves physics and metaphysics there), and apparently he sees these as actual chapters of Torah, and not just means to love God.

And at the end of those chapters he writes the following (Hel. Yesodei HaTorah, p. 45-13):

10. All these things that we have spoken about in this matter are like a bucket of water and are profound things, but they are not as profound as the matter of the first and second chapters, and the explanation of all these things in the third and fourth chapters is what is called the Bereishit Acts, and thus the early sages commanded that these things should not be taught in public, except to one person who is informed of these things and teaches them.

11. And what is the difference between the matter of the Merkava and the matter of the Genesis, since the matter of the Merkava is not taught to even one person, even if he were wise and understood from his own mind, the beginnings of the chapters are taught to him, and the matter of the Genesis is taught to an individual, even though he does not understand it from his own mind, and he is informed of all that he can know about these matters, and why is it not taught to many, since not every person has the broad knowledge to obtain an interpretation and explanation of all things concerning their Creator.

12. While a person contemplates these things and recognizes all creatures, from angels and gnomes to humans, as similar to him, and sees the wisdom of God in all creatures and all creatures, he increases his love for the place and his soul thirsts and his flesh strives to love the place, blessed be He, and he fears and is afraid of its lowliness, poverty, and lightness, as he evaluates himself as one of the great holy bodies, and as one of the pure forms that are separate from the bodies that are not connected to the body at all, and he finds himself to be like a vessel full of shame and shame, empty and lacking.

13. And the four chapters of these five commandments are the ones that the early sages called A Pardes, as they said, four entered the orchard. And although there were great men of Israel and great sages, not all of them had the power to know and attain all the things about their creator. And I say that it is not fitting to walk in the orchard except for one whose stomach is filled with bread and meat, and bread and meat are for knowing what is forbidden and what is permitted, and so on, from the rest of the commandments. And although these things were a small thing the sages called them, for the sages said a great thing about the act of the chariot and a small thing about the beings of Dabei and Raba, nevertheless they are worthy of being preceded, because they settle a person's mind first, and furthermore, they are the great good that the Blessed One bestowed upon settling this world in order to inherit life in the world to come. And it is possible for a man and a woman with a broad heart and a narrow heart to know everything, small and great.

The conclusion is that Maimonides sees these topics as the foundations of the Torah, and in his opinion they are more important than the study of the Torah in its classical sense (halacha and issues of the Shas). Some have understood this from his words in the introduction to his book. The strong hand The whole point of writing this book is also intended to shorten the path for those who deal with Halacha so that they can learn the 'classical' Torah (= Halacha) quickly, and not avoid dealing with the truly important things. Although this conclusion is not necessary, and that's okay.

The source of the Rambam is in the Gemara (Sukkah 28:1 and parallels), which says:

It was said about Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai that he did not leave aside the Bible and Mishnah, Talmud, laws and legends, Torah grammar and scribes' grammar, easy and difficult and equal decrees, periods and gematria, the conversation of the ministering angels and the conversation of demons and the conversation of palm trees, the parables of the washerman, the parables of the foxes, a great thing and a small thing. A great thing - the work of a chariot, a small thing - the beings of Dabei and Raba. To fulfill what is said in +Proverbs 8+: To instill in those who love Yes, and to fulfill their treasures.

In other words, the act of the Merkava is the big thing, and the Halacha (the entities of Abaye and Rava, the Torah in the 'classical' sense) is the small thing. And this is why Maimonides brings his surprising interpretation that the act of Genesis is physics and metaphysics.

And in the opening of his book Teacher of the ConfusedMaimonides even goes further and states with higher resolution:

And we have already explained in our Talmudic circles the generalities of this matter and enlightened him on many matters, and we have mentioned in them that the act of Genesis is the wisdom of nature, and the act of the Chariot is the wisdom of God. And we have explained them, and not in the Chariot in particular, unless he was wise and understood from his mind, and we are given the heads of chapters, in which case you will not ask me for anything but the heads of chapters. And even those heads are not arranged in this article, nor one after the other, but are scattered and mixed with matters other than what we ask him to explain, because my intention is that the truths be reflected from it and then they disappear until you do not dispute the divine intention (which is not worthy of dispute) which is that the special truths in its attainment disappear from the multitude of the people, said the secret of God to those who fear Him. And know that natural matters also are not worthy of being revealed by learning a little about their beginnings, as they are about it in the explanation. And you already knew that the late Rabbi said, and not in the act of the beginning of the years. But if any man explained all those matters in the book, it would be as if they were preached to thousands of people. And for this reason, those matters were also brought in the books of prophecy in parables, and the wise men spoke of them in riddles and parables to continue along the path of the Holy Books, because they are matters between them and the divine wisdom, a great closeness, and they are also secrets of the secrets of the divine wisdom. And do not think that those vast secrets are known to their purpose and end to any one of them, not so, but once the truth will dawn on us until we are considered a day, and then nature and customs will make it disappear until we return to a dark night close to what we were at the beginning, and we will be as if lightning would flash upon him time and time again, and it is in a night of intense darkness.

That is, Maimonides interprets the 'act of Genesis' as physics (=natural wisdom), and the 'act of the chariot' as metaphysics (=divine wisdom).[1]

Where, then, does the line between Torah and wisdom pass? If indeed all science is Torah, and perhaps even to a higher degree than Torah in the classical sense, then where does the line pass? What is wisdom that is not Torah? I will try here to offer a suggestion that has occurred to me. I have no evidence for it, but I have a strong feeling that it is correct.

Introduction to the proposal

The source of the proposal that will be presented below is the feeling that there is a distinct Torah importance to the study of philosophy. Furthermore, many books of thought are nothing more than philosophy expressed in Torah language and tools (as we saw above in the Rambam). Regarding the banal question of whether there is a 'Jewish philosophy', I tend to think that there is not. There is no philosophy at all that is painted in one specific color or another (of course there is a 'philosophy of the _,' which defines different areas of discussion, depending on what is filled in above the line). There is correct philosophy and there is incorrect philosophy. An incorrect philosophy, even if it is Jewish, is incorrect. And correct philosophy, even if it is not Jewish, is still the correct philosophy. Therefore, 'Jewish philosophy' is synonymous with philosophy (=mine).

Are books of thought, like Teacher of the Confused or The Book of the Khazar10, which present the thoughts of the sages of Israel, are 'Torah' in the full sense? It seems problematic to me. And again, a feeling: these books seem to express positions that were in the minds of the authors, and not an interpretation of the Torah that we received in the tradition from Sinai. Some of them do not even refer to the sources, but even if they do, the sources are more of an illustration than an actual source (see 'Mahar"l'). But not everything that was in the mind of a Jewish sage is Torah. Are the medical books of Maimonides Torah? It turns out that they are not. Are the medicines that appear in the Gemara itself Torah? It turns out that this is not the case either (some of them are apparently not true at all).

The subject of these books is philosophy. The tools are human-philosophical (often learned and drawn from Gentiles). The fact that the author is a Torah scholar is no guarantee that the work is 'Torah.' So why is a philosophical book important, like Critique of Pure Reason (=Lahgar Kant), is it not a Torah book? What is the difference between it and Holy Lights, or Teacher of the Confused? Perhaps the author's intention (was it intended for the sake of serving God and clarifying faith, or simply for the sake of wisdom). But why does it matter to the reader what the intention for which the book was written was? Ostensibly, what is important is the content, and in this, as mentioned, there seems to be no essential difference. Is Aristotle, who forms the basis for a significant part of the book of the 'Teacher', more holy than Kant? So why does someone who uses Kantian philosophy create less 'Torah' than someone who deals with Aristotelian physics and metaphysics (which is probably also less correct. At least in the scientific field, what the Rambam calls 'the act of creation', let me elaborate on that)?

Suggestion: Difference between Torah in Haftza and Torah in Gebra

There is a feeling that the identities of Dabay and Rabbah may be a small thing, but they are a 'relic of Torah.' This means that anyone who studies them is studying Torah given from Sinai. It is not his intention to claim that everything that appears in the book The ends of the breastplate, or the Rashba's innovations, were given to Moses at Sinai. But these books were written with the feeling that they were books of interpretation. The first and the last who deal with halacha do so with a feeling of nullification towards the material they study, and even when they create an original and new interpretation, it is done with a deep feeling that this is the interpretation of the word of God, and this is what is written in the Torah before us, or the one that we received orally in the tradition. In contrast, the books of thought do not arouse such a feeling in me. There it is thought, original or less original, intelligent or less, correct or less correct, but there is not the continuity that is required for this to be considered a continuation of the Torah that we received at Sinai. It is a new creation, as if from nothing.[2]

I know two stories about great men of Israel who vowed in times of trouble not to engage in legends, because engaging in them involves speculation, and people are generally not oriented toward the truth. This is how the author describesJoshua's face In its introduction, and as I think I heard about the rise from Maychit as well.

So, there are things that are given the title 'Torah' because they reflect the image of the Torah that we have today. This is, of course, a completely different image than the one it had when it was given, but it is still the most faithful incarnation of the Torah that was given there in our conceptual and intellectual framework today. This is what characterizes the Torah in its classical sense. In scholarly terms, we can say that it is 'Torah in the absolute sense,' that is, Torah in an objective sense. Regardless of worldview, opinions, and methods of study. All incarnations of the Torah that we received from Sinai are Torah. If a person studies these books, even if he does not agree with their way of thinking, he is engaged in Torah. There is certainly no abrogation of Torah here.

On the other hand, there are other parts of the Torah that are not a faithful incarnation of the Torah we received. They were not made with the intention of interpreting that Torah, but rather they express primarily the original creation of great people at different times. There is a divine revelation made through human beings (see, for example, Shalom Rosenberg's book, It is not in heaven., on the ongoing revelation). In scholarly terms, it can be said that this is 'Torah in Gebra' and not 'in Haftza', meaning that it is Torah in a subjective sense. To those people who created it, and to the learners who connect to those works, it is Torah. But if there is someone who does not connect to them, reading them is a waste of time (or abrogation of Torah).

And what about importance?

This may be the reason (beyond the well-known technical reasons) that the yeshiva world focuses on Torah study in the classical sense. This is despite everyone being familiar with the words of Maimonides quoted above. The reason for this is that there is complete confidence there that this type of study is Torah study and not the abrogation of Torah. Furthermore, in these areas, lessons can be set that are suitable for everyone, since even those to whom the particular form of study in the specific yeshiva does not speak are still learning something valuable, they are engaged in Torah.

Does this mean that the study of the fields of thought is less important? Absolutely not. Rather, its value is subjective. For those who study these fields and are enriched and built from them, they are a 'big thing,' while the identities of Abaye and Rava are a 'small thing.' But for those who are not built from this study, there is a nullification of Torah here, and it is not Torah at all for them. This is what we said: Torah in a subjective sense.

Consequences: Back to the library

Up to this point I have continued the initial way of thinking, which emerged from philosophy and its Torah importance. And what about literature, or other fields of knowledge that can build a Jewish-Torahic human form? I believe that the same is true in relation to these works. Any field of knowledge that can be included in the subjective concept of Torah (='Torah in the flesh'), as long as the learner is indeed built from it, and his Jewish perspective (e.g. 'Jewish philosophy') is enriched by it. But there is no Torah here towards others.

And what about the place in the library? Should the secular books be separated from the sacred, or should they not be? In my library, they are mixed terms (under the influence of a visit to Rabbi Lichtenstein in Jerusalem). But it is possible that in a public library, such as a yeshiva, there is room for such a separation. In a public place, books that are 'Torah' for all the students in that place should be placed on the Torah shelf (=the Jewish bookcase). In a private library, the Torah can be defined subjectively, but in a public library it appears in its objective meaning. Only 'Torah in the haftza' should be placed there.

I will say again that the Anad also Holy Lights also Teacher of the Confused (at least significant parts of it), has no place there (and this is indeed the practice in the more 'old' yeshivot). Just like Critique of Pure Reason And the like.

And what about bringing such books into the filthy entrances (=toilets and the bathhouse)? One should not bring 'Torah' there, and one should not study Torah there. This is certainly true with regard toThe ends of the breastplate And the Rashba's innovations. Is there room for a distinction between a book of Jewish thought and a book of philosophy in this regard? My personal feeling is that yes, but there is no reason.

"What cannot be spoken about must be kept silent"… (end ofTractatus of Wittgenstein).

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[1] And see also there, Ch. 1, P. 7, Ch. 2, P. 29-3, and the introduction to Ch. 3, as well as Ch. 3, P. 29. And also in the introduction to the Mishnah, D. 5, 'Vahrebii, Sermons', and more.

[2] Of course, there are different levels, and the picture is not binary (yes or no). I describe two poles to sharpen the argument. Then we can try to place each creation on the axis between the Torah given to us at Sinai and the completely original human creation.