On Secularism, Morality, and Quantum Logic (Academics – 2002)
Dr. Meir, in his article 'Religion and Morals – Towards a Synthesis' (Akademot 12), uses an almost axiomatic structure to justify the following conclusions:
1. "Secularism is a meaningful phenomenon...and therefore is not dependent on time and in any case will not be abolished at some future point in time."
2. We must learn from it, and even include secularism and the secular in the systems of shaping Halacha. The main contribution of secularism, as described in the article, is the sense of responsibility and the inability to rely on G-d, or any other entity.
3. Secularists must make room for religiosity as a partner in establishing the world of values and morality. The contribution of religiosity, as described there, is primarily in the consciousness of God as an entity that cannot be evaded even in secret, that is: moral precision and rigor.
Many passages can be found in the article, and certainly in its axiomatic pretensions, but I will try to be brief and concentrate on a few of the main points.
First, the fact that secularism will never disappear is a rather presumptuous prophecy (which has been made by several writers recently). Against it I would argue, "What is the problem with motherhood?" and "What is the problem with motherhood?" I will explain (this is of course a fallacy, not a counter-proof): There was room to say the same about biblical idolatry. It lasted much longer than contemporary secularism, and it seemed much more dominant throughout the ancient world, and yet it died out.
And from the "Kara" (and this is already proof): Belief in the coming of the Messiah says that in the future the entire world will be corrected by the Kingdom of God. Is Dr. Meir trying to say that this is not the essence of Judaism? Or maybe it is not true at all? Or maybe his claim is that after the coming of the Messiah the entire world will be secular? From his words it seems as if the Messiah is coming to sort out the religious-secular relations in our world. I wonder.
If we continue this analogy, we will see the fallacy of the rest of Dr. Meir's argument. Now it is said that there is much to be learned from those who worked in idolatry. Many of them were very polite, full of joy, and perhaps also filled with a sense of freedom (although, of course, this can be disputed, at least with regard to some of the idolatry), and certainly many other beautiful qualities and values.
By the way, to distinguish a thousand and thousands of differences, in a more extreme way it can be said that even from the Nazis one could learn a lot (truly!): discipline, love of homeland, loyalty to principles, etc.
Secularism disbelieves in God. It advocates the right to desecrate the Sabbath, an offense that is religiously punishable by stoning, and many other offenses, even more serious. Dr. Meir claims in his article that this is a positive position and therefore it will remain forever. I wonder.
The basic problem with these erroneous claims is that in both cases (despite the thousands of differences between them), these beautiful values serve a false idea. Therefore, I do not wish to preach to the public to learn anything from those who have such ideas, or to incorporate them into my theology. There are certainly aspects of them that can be learned from, and perhaps secretly I will even do so. However, to give them legitimacy, and even to grant them eternal life with the wave of a pen, seems to me to contradict the entire foundation of religious thinking.
I learn nothing from secularism, but from the secularists (at least some of them). I do not need secularism to recognize my commitment to morality, or to natural law. Neither did Rabbi Shimon Shekap, who is quoted in Dr. Meir's article, learn this from them. He proves his claims from the Talmudic issues themselves (it is worth examining his words carefully, because many use them improperly). There is a general human layer in the service of God, but there is no need to learn it from secularism. The human mind and will are common to secularists and religious people, and they do not have a secular monopoly, as can be seen from Dr. Meir's words. Secularism can help and draw attention to these commitments, but I learn nothing from it in itself and its ideas.
As mentioned, the structure of the argument, despite its outward appearance, is not at all axiomatic. It even assumes what is sought at several points.
The reading of Rabbi Shimon Shekap's words, which I am convinced would make him turn over in his grave if he saw how his words are read, is (as explicitly stated in the article) a radical reading, even more so than the other two readings cited in the article (Sagi and Ailon). There is no proof here from Rabbi Shimon, only illustration, and perhaps even empty rhetoric. There is also no reason why this is the correct reading. There is no doubt that this is simply the reading desired by the author, and the truth, or the intention of Rabbi Shimon himself, is not of concern here.
RSG, who opens the discussion, does not identify secularism with religion, but rather a religious view without the giving of the Torah with the view after the giving of the Torah. Both views discussed by him are religious. He makes the giving of the Torah redundant, if at all, and not belief in G-d (which is the foundation of secularism).
The claim that there is a common object for both systems, which is morality, is also both banal and absurd. Dr. Meir ignores much broader objects that both systems have: all the commandments all belong to the common object (as he defines it). Secularism claims that one must be moral, perhaps! However, it certainly claims that there is no obligation to keep the Sabbath, or in general to observe the commandments, or to believe in God. And that is certain! Isn't this a common object? Should I learn from this too? And perhaps give it halakhic status! We should go into this further, but I will not.
In conclusion, I say this. Usually an axiomatic structure is intended for one of two options: 1. To dispel fog from a complex field. 2. To draw unexpected conclusions from a field that seems understandable and clear. Therefore, my argument against the article is twofold: 1. The situation here seems simple, and therefore there is no point in obscuring it with axiomatic formulations. 2. The conclusions that emerge from the article are either wrong or banal. Legitimization is wrong and impossible. The respectful attitude and sharing of points that it is given already more or less exists, and therefore this is a banal conclusion.
I argued above that the situation in my opinion is simple, and this is its description:
1. I believe in the Torah from heaven, and in what it requires (which, of course, has different interpretations). Therefore, anyone who believes the opposite is mistaken. This could be called arrogance, but I believe it is not to that extent. There are good reasons for this mistake, and I assume that if I had grown up in a background similar to that of our secular brothers, I too would have adopted a worldview similar to theirs. The problem is not stupidity but a lack of knowledge, religious awareness, and religious education (see my response to Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun in Akademut 11 at the end).
2. Any formulation that claims that the secular is not wrong gives it legitimacy. To say that it is legitimate not to believe in God means to renounce the halakha that requires one to act vigorously (to put it mildly) against such beliefs. There is a logical flaw here of accepting two opposites, and so on (see below).
3. If the secular person does make a mistake, he is liable to the law, unless he is raped, or a baby was taken captive, or our hands are simply not strong enough to take care of him.
4. I also believe that the Messiah will come, and then He will bring the people of Israel back to repentance (as it is written in the Torah itself: And the Sabbath to the Lord your God, which is different in the prophets and threefold in the scriptures, and among the Torah scholars who have spoken orally throughout their generations, except for Rabbi Hillel, known in the Sanhedrin, about whom the Gemara says there: May Mary be with Rabbi Hillel). Therefore, secularism, like idolatry, and like every other evil, will be eradicated from the world. Of course, we are talking about sins and not about (all) sinners. I pray that all of us, religious and secular, will be worthy of recognizing the truth (with all its complexities, but there is such a thing as 'truth'), and abandoning falsehood.
5. We can learn from anyone, even the worst (see above), but if there is no legitimization here, this is a trivial statement. And if there is legitimization here, this is a serious statement.
This simple image leads me to Aryeh Baratz's article, which proposed adopting a theology of completion (following the principle of completion in quantum theory).
My criticism here is divided into two parts: First, as a physicist, my claim is that there is a misinterpretation of the quantum complementarity principle here. Second, as a religious Jew, my claim is that there is no connection, except for a purely illustrative connection, between the complementarity principle and any theology, and certainly not between it and reasonable Jewish theology.
Above I wrote that if I believe that there is a God and that every Jew must keep His commandments, then anyone who does not believe this is mistaken, perhaps accidentally or perhaps even intentionally.
No quantum principle of completion, nor any philosophical, religious, or other chatter that occasionally appears in our circles, can change this situation. Despite all this, I can relate with respect, but not with understanding and legitimacy, to a secular position. This is the essence of the religious layer of the criticism, which I have already discussed in more detail above.
Now I will move on to the scientific level. The principle of complementarity does not state that a contradiction is a valid logical claim. If this is indeed what we learn from the principle of complementarity, then simultaneous acceptance of Baratz's claim along with its opposite is an equally valid logical principle. Not to mention logic itself and its opposite.
The principle of completion cannot change any basic logical principle (contrary to the eccentric position of some proponents of the so-called 'quantum logic' approach). The logical principles underlie the mathematics that was used to build the devices that measured the results on which quantum theory is based (Chad Gadya). Mathematics serves both quantum theory and the language in which quantum theory is spoken. No principle of quantum theory is valid together with its opposite (and therefore, neither is any religious or other principle). Therefore, it is absurd to claim that the results cut down the branch on which they sit. In other words: logic cannot be measured in the laboratory. Logic is an assumption that underlies empirical activity, not a result of it.
The principle of completion, which many people (including professional physicists and philosophers) believe to be wrong, establishes a principle that applies only to the material world, and even then only in its relevant field of application.
In my humble opinion, this is an ontological principle, not a logical principle. The complementarity principle does not state that a particle is a wave and a wave is a particle, even though these concepts are contradictory. Nor does it define a logic different from the accepted one. This is absurd, as I have already shown.
This principle states that in reality itself there are neither particles nor waves. There is an entity that cannot be measured, called the 'wave function'. It appears to us in two forms, which are what we call 'particle' and 'wave'. These two are different appearances of this basic entity, but they are not entities themselves. The direct properties of the wave function cannot be measured, but only its appearances (similar to the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomenon), and therefore there is an illusion as if it does not exist. However, as stated above, no other interpretation is logically valid.[1]
If we now try to apply the principle of completion, in its correct, ontological and not logical formulation, to the theological context, we will accept that God is not an existing entity. There is a divine wave function, which sometimes appears as existing and sometimes appears as non-existent.
Here we come directly to Schrödinger's cat. I do not believe in half-dead cats but in a living God (completely). If God exists, then He exists. And anyone who thinks He does not exist is making a dangerous and serious mistake (sometimes through no fault of their own). I do not intend to tolerate, and certainly not to legitimize, such mistakes, and I do not see how anyone who truly believes what I believe could suggest this.
In addition, even if the formulation of the principle of completion were correct, it is only a metaphor. I do not see how theological conclusions can be drawn from it. It is an illustration of the writer's heart's desires, and the only justification for a change in accepted theology that I found in his article was that he very much wants it. I want it too. But desire is one thing, and logic is another!
Here too, I should elaborate, but due to the brevity of the platform, I will summarize: Metaphors should also be used with caution, and their correctness should be checked. Of course, one should not draw a conclusion from a metaphor that does not arise from the essential matter itself. One must be careful not to take metaphors, even if they are indeed accurate, too far, beyond their scope of relevance.
[1] This entity, by the way, behaves in a completely deterministic manner, unlike the particle and wave in quantum theory.