On Jewish identity in our time and in general

With God’s help

Advances – 2014

"Suddenly a man wakes up in the morning and feels that he is a people, and begins to walk"

Michael Abraham

If there are kibbutzim who don't know what Yom Kippur is, don't know what Shabbat is, and don't know what a mikveh is. They raise rabbits and pigs. Do they have a connection with their father?… An assembly? Is an assembly a holy thing? They have cut themselves off from all of our past and are seeking a new Torah. If there is no Shabbat and no Yom Kippur, then in what way is he Jewish?

            ("Rabbi Schach's "Rabbi Speech", Yad Eliyahu, 1990)

This article was written right in the days when another negotiation between us and the Palestinians is exploding, except that this time the identity questions that led to it are much closer to the surface. The main reason for the explosion from Israel's perspective was the demand to recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state. This demand is met, among other things, by arguments from Palestinian and other parties, who demand that we first define what and who a Jew is in our eyes before we demand it from others. In this context, some present us as descendants of the Khazars, thereby undermining the historical authenticity of the Jewish narrative, that is, that we are indeed the natural continuation of the ancient Jews who lived here in the Land of Israel. On the other hand, the Palestinians also present a historical national identity (somewhat illusory) as the basis for their arguments. I found a particularly amusing example in Eldad Beck's article, which describes a conversation between Minister Tzipi Livni, who is in charge of negotiations with the Palestinians on behalf of the Israeli government, and Saeb Erekat, who is in charge of negotiations on the Palestinian side:[1]

Members of the large Israeli delegation to the Munich Security Conference were stunned last night when Saeb Erekat, a member of the Palestinian team for negotiations with Israel, accused Bani of being Canaanite and living in Jericho 3,000 years (!?) before the Israelites arrived in the city under the leadership of Joshua Ben Nun. During a discussion on the Middle East peace process in which the two participated, Erekat began talking about the different historical narratives of the two sides, the Israeli and the Palestinian, and claimed that the Palestinians and he as their representative are in fact descendants of the Canaanites and therefore have more rights to the lands of Palestine than the Jews. Bani replied that Israel and the Palestinians should not ask which narrative is more just, but how to build a future. "I do not look at a peace settlement in a romantic way. Cynicism is no less dangerous than naivety. Israel wants peace because it is in its interest."

Beyond the practical argument, there is a sense that Livni is trying to avoid this embarrassing discussion because she thinks that national identity is essentially a kind of narrative, and therefore a discussion about it is irrelevant. There is no right or wrong here, since as is commonly thought today, each people establishes its own identity and no one else is allowed to do so for it. Many would say that even in Jewish identity there are holes that are filled by various narratives (although the dosage is very different from the Palestinian example). The claims of Golda, Ben-Zion Netanyahu and many others, according to which there is no such thing as a Palestinian people, sound very outdated and archaic today. Not because of any historical findings, but because people and nation are concepts that are only defined de facto.

Questions of identity, historically and culturally, refuse to let go of us. They rear up and attack us again and again. It seems that almost nowhere in the world do questions of national identity occupy people in such an existential way as among the Jews, and of course in Israel as well. One can perhaps find arguments about whether one is authentically Belgian or not, but mainly as a weapon of attack by opponents, or as part of the romanticism of a nationalist movement. It is difficult to even imagine a group or an individual struggling existentially with the question of being Belgian, or Libyan, real and authentic.

If we take our personal identity as an example, none of us hesitates over the question of whether I am the real Michael Abraham, and what exactly am I Michael Abraham? What is the definition of Michael Abraham, and do I meet it? Personal identity is self-evident and does not need definitions. The same is true with regard to family identity. Every person who belongs to the Abraham family is simply that, and that is it. Questions about criteria and definitions in these contexts seem delusional. I get the impression that in most peoples it is the same with regard to national identity. It is simply there, and that is it. So what is it about it, in Jewish identity, that keeps troubling us in such an existential way? Is it even possible to have a constructive and intelligent discussion on this subject?

In this article, I will attempt to describe the methodological problematics involved in the discussion of Jewish identity, and to present a common-sense, on the one hand, and an analytical-a priori, analysis of the issue and its meanings. Therefore, I will not go into details and nuances so as not to lose sight of the big picture, and I will allow myself to use generalizations that seem reasonable to me without resorting to specific sources, Torah, or general thought. My recourse to current events, and in particular to the politics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is not made here for polemical purposes, but rather to illustrate claims that will be raised in my remarks. I am not expressing a position here regarding the conflict itself or the methods of its resolution.

The cultural-philosophical debate and the halakhic-Torah debate

The main concept in the title of the discussion, Jewish identity, is vague. The discussion about it can be taken in at least two directions: A. Jewish national identity in the philosophical-ethnic-cultural sense. B. Jewish identity in the Torah-Halakhic sense (many will not even accept the assumption that these are two different discussions). This of course is related to the question (the barren one in my opinion) of whether Judaism is a religion or a nation, which I will not touch on here either. I believe these are not just two different discussions, but they express two different methods of discussion: whether to conduct the discussion in the more general conceptual system or in the Torah-Halakhic system.

In general, religious identities are easier to define than national identities. This is because religious identities are based on shared values and norms, and in particular on committed actions and beliefs (albeit with different shades of interpretation. Nothing in life is ever really simple).[2] In contrast, national identity is a more amorphous concept, and is based on history, territory, culture, religion, language, certain character traits, and more, or some combination of all of these. National identity is generally not associated with shared intellectual or practical principles, and certainly not with principles unique to a specific people. But culture, language, psychological characteristics of one kind or another, are variable and ambiguous, and in most cases they can also be shared with other nations. Furthermore, some of these characteristics change, and a person or society can adopt or abandon some of them. So which of these is a necessary criterion for national identity?

This is also the case in the Jewish context. It is quite easy to define Jewish religious identity. Anyone who is obligated to observe the commandments has a Jewish identity. How many commandments must one observe? This is a more complicated question, and it is becoming more complicated in our complex generation, but it is a second-order question. A principled commitment to the commandments is a sufficient definition for our needs.[3] Furthermore, in the halakhic context the question of identity, even religious identity, is of no importance. There is a fairly clear halakhic definition of all types of religious obligations, to whom they are addressed and who is obligated by them. Questions of religious identity do not arise directly in the world of Torah-halakhic concepts.

If the question has no halakhic significance with regard to religious identity, then it is even less so with regard to the question of national identity. What is the halakhic implication of the determination that any group has a Jewish national identity? In halakhic law, the question of who observes or does not observe commandments has significance, and even more so the question of who must or must not observe them. The question of identity has no clear halakhic answer, and it does not in itself have direct halakhic implications.

From a halachic perspective, a Jew is someone who was born to a Jewish mother or who converted according to Jewish law.[4] This is his identity in the halakhic sense, and it doesn't matter what he does, and in particular whether or not he keeps the commandments. From a halakhic perspective, he is of course obliged to keep them, and one can discuss whether someone who doesn't do so is a criminal and what should be done to him. But the question of his identity is of no importance. Expressions like "he left all Israel" are mainly metaphorical, and have no real practical implications in halakhic terms. And even if they have any meaning, halakhic terms define them according to its technical criteria.

National Identity: The Distinction Between Conventionality and Essentialism

So far we have dealt with questions of identity from the halakhic-religious perspective. From a general philosophical perspective, the main concern is with national identity, not religious identity. I have already mentioned that national identity in general is a vague and difficult concept to define. Here I will mainly focus on two extreme poles in relation to the definition of national identity: the conventionalist approach and the essentialist approach.

The question of nationality and national identity is a new and modern question in its essence. In the distant past, for various reasons, people hardly asked themselves what their national identity was and how to define it. The world was more static, people did not make many changes in their lives, and they hardly had to confront their identity with competing identities. It is doubtful whether there was a distinct concept of national identity in their minds, and even if there were changes in this identity, they came naturally and naturally and unconsciously. National identity was natural, in a similar way to the personal and family identity mentioned above. Religious background also contributed to the matter, as most people had a religious identity. In the more ancient world, the perception prevailed that kingship was a gift from God to those born to kingship, and so was national and religious identity and our affiliation with it. All of these were created with the world in the six days of Genesis, and were perceived as natural and self-evident.

In the modern era, with the awakening of nationalism in Europe and the world in general, the question began to emerge in full force. The difficulty of defining national identity has yielded answers, most of which lie between two poles: the first is the conventionalist pole, which sees national identity as something founded on an almost arbitrary agreement. The moment a group sees itself as a people, at least if this lasts for a certain period of time, then it is a people. The poet Amir Gilboa, in 1953, following the establishment of the state, described it this way: "Suddenly a person gets up in the morning and feels that he is a people, and begins to walk." The second pole is essentialist perceptions that see national identity as something natural and structured, just like personal identity. When wondering more about the nature of that elusive "natural" element, the nation, the romantics sometimes reach metaphysics. According to these approaches, the nation has a metaphysical existence in some sense, something like a Platonic idea, and the individuals that make up the nation are included in this entity because of their metaphysical connection to it. Every horse belongs to the group of horses without having to explicitly define what horseness is. It is simply a horse, and that is it. Likewise, every Belgian belongs to the group of Belgians without having to commit to any definitions. Not only because it is difficult to offer definitions, but because there is no need for it. National identity is a natural concept just like personal and family identity.

It is important to understand that Amir Gilboa's words describing the national awakening could also have been written within the framework of the essentialist-metaphysical concept, except that here it would be an experiential awakening, in which the metaphysical reality that had previously been dormant suddenly penetrates people's consciousness. It awakens in them and they want to realize it in practice, in concrete institutional, political, and social ways. Suddenly a person stands up and feels the metaphysical fact (which has always been true) that he is a people, and begins to walk. In the romanticism of the national awakening, a person stands up in the sense of awakening from slumber, in contrast to the conventional concept in which rising is interpreted as rising from the ground in order to begin the march. The debate is over whether rising is awakening or formation.

National Identity: The Consensus Approach and Its Expression

On the consensual side of the map stand thinkers like Benedict Anderson, in his influential book Imagined communities (1983), and many others following him. These deny the existence of an essential content of concepts such as nation and national identity. Those who adopt this approach see nation as a kind of arbitrary fiction that is created and crystallized in the consciousness of certain groups during their (usually shared) history. It is important to understand that this does not mean that this awakening is not valid, or that its demands and claims can be disregarded. Absolutely not. National identity exists as a psychological fact and is important to people, and as such many believe that it is entitled to respectful treatment. But from an essential point of view, it is something arbitrary. In order to clarify the meaning of this approach, the reader will forgive me if I devote a few paragraphs here to its current state.

A blatant example of an approach that belongs to the Hashemite school is the view of Prof. Shlomo Zand. Zand is a historian from Tel Aviv University, who was formerly a member of the Mitzpeh circles and belongs to the radical left circles in Israel. In his controversial book When and how was the Jewish people invented? (Resling, 2008), Sand chose to analyze an example that particularly challenges Benedict Anderson's thesis. There he attempts to prove that the Jewish people are an imagined community. This task is particularly ambitious, since whatever one may think of Anderson's position, if there is an example in the (Western) world that strongly contradicts his thesis, it is the Jewish people. Indeed, in my opinion (and in the opinion of many others) Sand's book gives historical research a bad name, and in particular it undermines the fundamental and all-important distinction between ideology and academic research.[5] But what allows him to accomplish all of this is the inherent ambiguity of the concept of national identity.

Continuing with current events, a particularly clear example from the other pole, one that strongly supports Anderson's view, is the Palestinian people. The Palestinians are a people clearly based on an imagined identity (which sometimes includes downright fictional delusions, such as affiliation with the Philistines or the biblical Canaanites, or even with earlier eras).[6], created almost out of thin air in historical terms.

It is worth pointing out here a typical implication of the conventional view. At the beginning of his book, Zand dedicates the book: "To the memory of the residents of Al-Sheikh Muanis who were displaced in the distant past from the place where I live and work in the near present." The tone is descriptive and peaceful, and on the surface it seems that he should not see this as a problem. If national identities are by their very nature imagined, then one imagined identity pushes the legs of the other. One comes and the other disappears. Such is the way of the world. According to him, these are psychological facts, not values or metaphysical truths, or even historical truths. This is the other side of the conventionalist coin that sees national identities as imagined.

The conclusion is that if national identity is essentially an arbitrary, subjective agreement, then it is possible (though not necessarily) to draw two opposite conclusions from this: 1. Such entities have no real rights. Nations are spineless creatures that have no existence outside of people's imaginations. 2. National identity is an integral part of the identity of many people and in fact there is no other (substantially real) national identity, and therefore the fact that it is an imagined identity does not mean that it is permissible to disregard the claims and allegations of such entities.

Miraculously, quite a few of those who hold this approach allow themselves to use it to criticize the one identity (in Sand's case, the Israeli-Jewish) and accuse it of mystifying an arbitrary and imagined social convention, invented by ourselves, while at the same time, from the same perspective, they raise arguments in defense of the right of another imagined identity (the Palestinian, in Sand's example). The absurdity is even more acute if we recall that the Jewish people are the least successful example and the Palestinian people are the clearest example of imagined nationalism. I will reiterate and emphasize that I do not intend here to discuss the appropriate attitude towards such a community's claim to political recognition, since this is a normative-value-political question. Here I am only concerned with a historical-cultural description and a critique of the lack of coherence in the discussion.

National Identity: The Essentialist Approach

So far I have discussed conventionalism and the problems it entails. Perhaps precisely because of these difficulties, some take the concept of national identity to the realms of metaphysics. The awakening of nationalism in Europe, as well as the Jewish national awakening that was expressed in the Zionist movement and was greatly influenced by European national romanticism. These movements often express a position according to which nationalism is based on some metaphysical entity (the people, the nation). Extreme expressions of this view appear in fascist dialectics (in the Germany of Hitler, Bismarck, and many before them, as well as in the Italy of Garibaldi and others). These approaches found expression in the Torah thought of Rabbi Kook and his disciples. They adopted this metaphysical idea and made it a core Jewish belief. The Jewish spark, dim, hidden, denied, and repressed, however it may be, is what defines a person's Judaism. The Jewish character and the innate and genetic uniqueness of every Jew became almost the exclusive criterion for Judaism, especially when all traditional characteristics (observance of the commandments) disappeared, or at least ceased to be an agreed-upon common denominator. "Knesset of Israel" became a metaphor for the ontological expression of the Jewish metaphysical idea.

I present the essentialist approach here as a reaction to the conventionalist one, but on the historical axis it is clear that the essentialist (even if not always metaphysical) view preceded conventionalism. Historically, it is the conventionalist approaches that emerged as a reaction to the essentialist approaches. If the essentialist approach is closely identified with modernism and the national awakening, then conventionalism is part of the post-national "new criticism", which is identified with the position known as postmodernism.

The basic paradox

So far I have described the two concepts against each other. Where do they conflict? What are the differences between them? I think that on this level we are in for a surprise. A priori, those who hold the second approach, the essentialists, are exempt from searching for definitions of national identity. After all, according to them, anyone who has an affinity for the metaphysical idea (the Knesset of Israel) is a Jew. Even in the conversion controversy, we hear again and again about the argument of "the seed of Israel" as the basis for the demand for easing the conversion process, and not surprisingly, this comes mainly from circles close to Rabbi Kook. Metaphysics is what defines us as Jews, and therefore we are exempt from the need for programmatic definitions. From the perspective of metaphysical romantics, Jewish identity is an empirical fact that is not subject to content, values, or any other criteria. Of course, those who hold such an approach can believe that every Jew must uphold the values and commandments of the Torah, but this has nothing to do with defining him as a Jew and his identity.

Of course, according to the essentialist-metaphysical conceptions, it is also possible to propose various characteristics of Jewish national identity, but according to them, these characteristics are contingent, that is, not important for the purpose of defining the nation. Even someone who does not fulfill them is a Jew by virtue of his affiliation with the Jewish metaphysical idea. As unexpected as it may be, the question of identity is foreign to traditional thinking.

On the other hand, those who have a conventionalist approach, those who do not believe in metaphysical romanticism, are much more in need of definitions, criteria, and characteristics by which they can judge who belongs to this national identity and who does not. That is why they ask themselves what we are Jews for. If not metaphysics, then what is? But conventionalists cannot find such a reasonable definition, and thus arrive at perceptions of an imagined identity. Many of them adopt a definition that does not seem to be a natural continuation of Jewish identity as it was perceived in the thousands of years before us. Reading the books of Amos Oz, speaking Hebrew, serving in the army and paying decent taxes to the state, being persecuted during the Holocaust, and perhaps also receiving inspiration from Torah sources, are the characteristics of Jewish identity today. To this must be added the shared history and genealogy. After all, factually, this and only this is what truly characterizes Jews in our time (although certainly not all of them). So, according to their method, national identity is also a type of fact, just like in the metaphysical method, except that here it is a psychological-historical fact and not a metaphysical fact.

Two questions arise regarding the conventionalist approach:

• In what sense is this national identity a continuation of its previous manifestations? If only the imaginary identity is the basis for continuity, then it is not enough. We must first define the group and only then can we ask what its characteristics are. But as long as the characteristics do not exist, how do we define the group? This is a question that remains without a satisfactory solution, and no satisfactory solution for it is possible in the conventional picture. As mentioned, even those who hold the essentialist position have no solution to this question, but they are not at all bothered by it.
• Do these definitions really "do the job"? After all, these definitions do not really stand up to any critical test. Think about the definitions proposed above. Speaking Hebrew certainly does not specifically distinguish Jews, and on the other hand, there are many Jews who do not speak Hebrew. Even the connection to the Bible is not like that (Christianity is much more deeply connected to it, and many Jews are not connected to it at all). Paying taxes and serving in the army certainly do not specifically characterize Jews (Druze, Arabs, migrant workers and other non-Jewish citizens do this no less well). And conversely, there are quite a few good Jews who do not do this, and no one doubts their Jewishness. Amos Oz and the Bible are read all over the world, even if not in the original language. And on the other hand, is literature written in Poland in connection with the Bible also Jewish? So what is left?

It is important to note here that there are certainly Jewish character traits, just as one can speak of the collective character of many other peoples. But character traits are not national identity. Furthermore, in order to speak of a character trait, one must first define the group that possesses it. After all, there are many people in the world who are endowed with a character that could fall under the definition of Jewish character, and yet no one would say that they are Jews. Only after we know who a Jew is, can we look at the group of Jews and ask whether there are character traits that characterize them. There is also a Jewish history and a common origin, but these are simply facts. It is difficult to see value in all of this, and it is not clear why all of this is perceived as an existential problem and as something that needs to be defined. It is factually true that most Jews have a common origin and history in some sense. So what? Is there room for claiming that someone is Jewish, in the sense of genealogy and history? If he is like that, then he is like that, and if not, then he is not.

So, even if we are very open and flexible, it is still difficult to put our finger on a clear criterion for who is a national Jew in a value sense in the consensual approach. Should we adopt the method accepted in psychological (and sometimes also medical) diagnostics, according to which the existence of a certain number of characteristics from a given list will constitute a satisfactory definition of Jewish identity? As I showed above, it is difficult to see this as a sufficient criterion either. Can any of us give such a list? Can any of us explain why six of this list of characteristics are required, and not seven or five? And above all, will this criterion really be able to reliably distinguish between Jews and non-Jews? Quite clearly not (see examples above).

Because of this problematic nature, many conventionalists return here to the realm of halakhic genetics, meaning they too seek Jewish identity in the mother. Others will attribute this to the person's personal consciousness: a Jew is someone who feels and declares himself to be Jewish.[7] The circularity and inherent emptiness of this definition do not really bother conventionalists. Conventionality is willing to accept any convention, however circular or meaningless it may be. Its validity is due to the fact that it has been agreed upon. But it is to be expected that an imagined community would be willing to base its identity on imagined criteria. Beyond all these arguments, these are still either facts or empty claims, which certainly does not explain the existential tension surrounding this issue.

In his speech quoted above, Rabbi Schach attacks the definition of Jewish identity, and does so in halakhic terms. In essence, he presents a kind of essentialist position, but not necessarily metaphysical (national identity in terms of commitment to certain values). Wikipedia, on the subject of 'The Rabbit and Pig Speech', describes the Lubavitcher Rebbe's response to Rabbi Schach's rabbit speech as follows:

The Lubavitcher Rebbe', Bar Plogta Rabbi Schach for many years, responded to the speech with his own speech, which he delivered inSabbath which was followed by his beit midrashim. The Rebbe said that no one has any right to speak against the Jewish people. The Jewish view is that "Israel, even though Israel is a sinner," the children of Israel are the "only begotten son" of God. God And whoever speaks against them is speaking against God. Every Jew must be helped to fulfill all Commandments religion, but in no way to attack it. The Rebbe defined his generation as "Odim sheltered from fire," and as "Babies who were captured"That they are not to blame for their knowledge and their relationship to Judaism."

This is an example of a metaphysical type of response. In contrast, the then-President Chaim Herzog expressed the conventionalist response to Rabbi Schach's words, when he wondered how it was possible to doubt the Jewishness of the kibbutzniks from the Jubilee and the Handi-Guides who founded the state and served in the army with great devotion. So what is Rabbi Schach aiming for? He does not accept metaphysics, nor is he willing to be a conventionalist. Is there a third option?

Do undefined concepts not exist?

The obvious conclusion is that the concept of Jewish national identity is not definable. Of course, one can propose different definitions, each according to their degree of creativity, but it is certainly impossible to agree on a definition, and at least for most groups it does not seem that they will exclude anyone who does not meet their definition from the Jewish people (as long as their mother is Jewish). Does this mean that such an identity is necessarily imaginary, that is, that a Jewish identity does not really exist? Is the only option for metaphysics or halakhic formalism narrativization? I am not sure.

This question takes us into philosophical realms that are beyond the scope of this article, so I will only attempt to touch on them briefly. We use many vague concepts, such as art, rationality, science, democracy, and more. However, as soon as we approach defining such a concept, we encounter problems similar to those described here. Many conclude from this that these concepts are imaginary, and even build a magnificent postmodern palace around it (the conceptual connection to Rabbi Shagar is not accidental). A clear example of this is Gideon Ofrat's book, Definition of art, who offers dozens of different definitions of the concept of art and rejects them, until in the end he comes to the conclusion that art is what is displayed in a museum (!). On the other hand, Robert M. Pirsig, in his book Worship Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance, describes a metaphorical journey of a rhetoric professor named Phaedrus, who is in pursuit of a definition of the concept of quality. At some point he experiences an epiphany, and concludes that Greek philosophy has deluded us as if every concept must have a definition, and a concept without a definition simply does not exist (it is imagined). But a concept like quality is apparently indefinable, and yet he refuses to accept the conclusion that it is a concept that has no real content. A mere convention. After all, it is blatantly clear that there are quality compositions and there are those that are not. To the same extent, there are works of art and there are works of poor artistic value. The conclusion is that concepts like quality, or art, although difficult or perhaps impossible to define, nevertheless exist. They are not necessarily imagined.

It seems that a similar claim can also be made in the context of national identity. The essential thesis that there is a national identity can be accepted without resorting to metaphysics. National identity has various characteristics and it is difficult to propose a definition for it, and yet it is not necessarily a question of imaginations or conventions, nor is it necessarily metaphysics. It can be an amorphous, real concept that is difficult or impossible to define. It seems to me that a similar essential definition underlies Rabbi Schach's view (although he offers a halakhic definition, and does not accept the possibility of an alternative national definition). He claims that there is an essential definition of Jewish identity, and even demands claims from people on its basis. On the other hand, he does not see metaphysics as a sufficient alternative. Personally, I am not inclined to think so. Without metaphysics, I do not see how it is possible to speak of a national entity in the ontological sense. But it is clear to me that many disagree with me on this.

Conclusions

So much for philosophy. But now comes the next question: Why does all this matter at all? Why should we define, or even try to understand, Jewish identity? My answer is that it doesn't matter at all. There are no implications to this question, and it is at most a matter for intellectual analysis (usually fruitless, and perhaps even empty of content). If I may sin more by armchair psychology, the search for Jewish identity is an expression of a sense of commitment to religion and Jewish history without a willingness to actually realize them. People are looking for alternatives to the identity that was once religious, so that they can feel Jewish after the religious identity and commitment have been discarded. To this end, new questions and new concepts are invented, and considerable and futile effort is invested in deciphering them.

In my opinion, there is no possibility of having an intelligent discussion about Jewish identity, and certainly not of reaching decisions about it, and that is not really important either. If this is a convention, then why argue about agreements? Everyone will sign the agreements that seem right to them. If this is metaphysics, I do not see how it is accessible to discussion and debate. And even if we accept an essential conception of a Jewish national (as opposed to a halakhic) identity, it is again inaccessible to definitions, debate, and certainly not to an agreed decision. These are semantic proposals, a significant part of which are unfounded, and others are completely devoid of content, or do not stand up to any test of reasonableness. Furthermore, as I mentioned, none of this has any practical significance whatsoever. These are psychological struggles of people with themselves, and nothing more.

This unnecessary and unimportant debate is now used mainly to bash the opponent. Those who are interested in promoting socialist ideas explain to all of us that Judaism has always been socialist, and those who are not are not Jewish. Others who are interested in militaristic ideas also flaunt Judaism and Jewish identity. The same applies to democracy, equality, capitalism, freedom, openness, coercion, charity and kindness, social justice, and all other noble values. In short, Judaism is a light to the nations, but the nature of that light is fundamentally controversial and cannot be decided. Unlike other disputes, which can have ways of resolving them and can also have some value in it, the dispute about Jewish identity is fundamentally undecidable and unimportant in any sense.

One thing is quite clear from a logical perspective: none of this list of values (socialism, militarism, social justice, equality, freedom, etc.), or any other value, can constitute an essential, necessary, or sufficient element in the definition of Jewish identity. Anyone who believes in any of these values or any combination of them can be a gentile who is distinguished by all opinions and without dissent. There is no reason why a gentile can be a socialist, an advocate of equality or freedom, a militarist, or otherwise. Therefore, none of these are relevant criteria for Jewish identity, even if the unbelievable were to happen (and don't worry, it probably won't happen) and someone were to succeed in proving from Jewish tradition and sources that any of these are indeed part of the content of this identity.

Jewish identity in our time

The conclusion is that the discussion about national identity is futile and worthless. As I have already mentioned, the same is true with regard to religious identity. Anyone born to a Jewish mother or who has converted properly must observe the commandments of the Torah and the words of the sages and not commit transgressions. That is all. The definitions of a person, their identity, and other things, are a subjective matter, be they psychological, metaphysical, conventionalist, or perhaps even amorphous essentialism (which cannot be defined). All of the possibilities can be correct, and therefore there is no point in discussing them.

Let us consider what the implications of such a discussion could be? Will someone feel satisfied that they are a good Jew? Feeling good is a matter for psychologists. Discussions about identity in the value sense are sterile and empty semantics, and therefore unnecessary. If a concrete implication is given for which we are interested in defining identity, then it will be possible (perhaps) to discuss the relevant questions regarding it. But as long as this is a general discussion, everyone will define their Judaism as they wish. Even if one is right and the others are wrong, this question should not interest anyone, except for a few academic researchers who make a living from such semantic analyses. On the other hand, who am I to interfere with this heroic and futile effort? Sisyphus is also part of our cultural identity…[8]

[1] Eldad Beck from Germany, YNET, 1.2.2014.

[2] The process of secularization raises problems of secularized religious identity (does Protestant, Muslim, or Catholic have a secular meaning?).

[3] If we are talking about definitions, then the nature of the commandments in question and the motivation for their observance are very important. Even if the law requires moral behavior, it is not reasonable to define Judaism on this basis, since it is common to all people in the world. Even commandments such as the settlement of the Land of Israel, which are not of a moral nature, cannot define Jewish religious identity, since it exists even among those who do not define themselves as part of the Jewish religion, and this is because in many cases the motivation for their observance comes from the same place as in national awakenings among other peoples.

[4] Although conversion is also a process that is itself subject to certain controversies, like many other halachic issues, this is sufficient for our purposes.

[5] This did not prevent the book from being translated into twenty languages and winning awards around the world.

[6] See, in the quote from Eldad Beck's letter cited above.

[7] To the best of my recollection, the then President, Chaim Herzog, in his response to the Rabbits' speech, as well as many others to this day, mentioned this "criterion." Anyone with even a little logical sensitivity stands in astonishment before this fascinating phenomenon. We want to define the concept of Jew, and we do so in the following way: Any a that can be placed in place of X in the following pattern: "X who felt himself X" and the description comes out true, is a Jew. According to this definition, any self-aware being who does not lie to himself is a Jew (check the placement group).

[8] Perhaps this is how we should understand Gideon Ofrat's above conclusion. Perhaps he is not saying that there is no such thing as art, but merely concluding that discussion about it is unnecessary and fruitless.