2 questions about the physico-theological argument
Hello, Michi. 2 questions that arose in my mind following your lectures on this argument:
- The principle of causality is a priori. It means that if complex things are supposed to have a component, it is supposed to have a component for all things, even those not in our experience. However, in your formulation, the third assumption in the argument says that “every complex thing in our experience is supposed to have a cause.” But if this principle is a priori, why assume this? It is clear to me that infinite regression should be avoided, but then it would not be more correct to formulate the assumption as follows: “Every complex thing is supposed to have a cause, whether in our experience or not, except for one (or several) objects that started (or started) a certain causal chain, since causal chains cannot be infinite.”
- It could be argued that the first link in the chain of complex things is something mechanical, for example that the singular point has always existed, and when it “exploded” the laws of nature were created. Your answer was that according to the principle of sufficient reason, one must ask about something, even if it has always existed, what is the reason for its existence. But this question assumes that an object with will (God) does not need a sufficient reason. Then again, opponents can say that the first object (e.g. the singular point) does not need a sufficient reason, just as you assume that an object with will does not need a sufficient reason. As I see it, the only way to deal with this is to simply say that in our world, for everything that does not have a will we look for a reason, and for a person’s choice we do not look for a reason (because he has a will, a choice). From this it can be deduced that even if something has always existed, as long as it does not have a will it will need a reason, while something with will (God) does not need a reason. What do you think of my analysis? Is there another way to answer this to an atheist?
And also, if we connect the matter of reason to the matter of the third assumption, it can be argued that the assumption in its most precise form should be the following: “Everything must have a sufficient reason (or cause or reason), whether it is in our experience or not, except for the object or objects that started a causal chain or those that provide a reason for the uniqueness of certain things (for example, a reason for the Big Bang or the laws of nature, if these had always existed).
thanks!
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
Discover more from הרב מיכאל אברהם
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
2. As I explained, it is unlikely that the first link is material or mechanical. I argued that this initial object may not have sufficient meaning (and not necessarily so), unlike other objects.
1. So in fact, according to what you say, every a priori principle is only about things in our experience? According to this, even angels, demons, and things in other possible worlds, do not have to have a reason.
2. I understand. But is there an argument that only something that is not material/mechanical does not require a sufficient reason, or is this intuition, a kind of assumption that does not require proof?
1. That's what you say. Not me.
2. Intuition. It may not have enough flavor (not that it necessarily doesn't).
But from what I understand from what you wrote, you contain a priori intuitions only about the things in our experience (since in them we “see” it), and from this it follows that things in other worlds or things not in our experience, such as angels or things in other worlds (if there are any), are not subject to those a priori intuitions.
Where do I not understand you correctly?
Mahil.
I didn't write this anywhere. I said there could be intuitions that only concern things in experience. I didn't say they were all like that.
Applies, of course. Thanks for the correction.
And okay, so the intuition about causality is an example of an intuition that applies only to experience?
What intuition applies to all things, even those not in our experience?
And what distinguishes them? That is, what distinguishes intuitions that apply to all possible things (even those not in our experience), and intuitions that do not apply to things not in our experience (like causality)?
The content of intuition. The idea that everything has a cause also applies to everything. But if one must exclude, it is more likely to exclude an object that is not in our experience. That simplicity is a criterion for correctness (Occam's razor) is a general intuition, for example. Intuitions about God are intuitions about what is not in our experience.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eNgWk2Zc0EUrOf6MnmLCcLjDzCFxyPcL/view?usp=sharing
I would appreciate a reference to the article linked in the previous response
Thank you.
I like to make people happy, but I don't work for you and I haven't really liked homework since first grade. If there's any argument you'd like to discuss, formulate it and present the problem you'd like to discuss.
God forbid, I appreciate your opinion and I thought the article presented things most accurately, but I will try to formulate it.
So the article deals with the origin of human cognition and presents that one day it showed that the principle of induction is not valid,
which leads to the fact that it is not possible to conclude from observation.
Then it presents Gödel's theorem, which proved that mathematical truth cannot be confined in any formalistic scheme. Then he presents Kant's a priori causality and this leads him to this
"In modern language, a very sophisticated computer (which can perform all logical operations) is unable to formulate laws of nature,
even when it has all possible experimental data at its disposal. Humans can see
truths that cannot be derived from experience algorithmically (see Gödel's theorem!). "
He then talks about Popper who said that we should see all laws and theories as hypothetical or conjectural and this makes them deductive but this is exactly what Gödel did.
In fact it shows that there is no rationality to reach any scientific knowledge, and it is all about hypotheses that can be replaced by placebos but endless observations will not bring us to proof and we cannot know how narrow the picture that our theory explains is like Newton and Einstein's revolution which showed that Newton's theory does not function well enough in high gravity like the mass of the sun for example.
Then he talks On the biblical approach in Judaism, which broadly says that man was created in the image and by virtue of the "divine intelligence that is embedded in him, who is in the image and likeness of God…" (Mora Nebuchim)
We have the possibility of scientific achievement and if I understand correctly, this reconciles our ability to learn from reality.
In fact, reason is the image of God and allows us to make scientific discoveries.
There are of course other arguments in the article, but this is the general picture as I understand it. Do you think this holds water?
Absolutely not. The individual today in the age of AI can see how many of the things we do can be mechanical. I have columns on AI versus humans and that will be explained there.
There are also errors here, mostly in scientific descriptions.
Hume did not show that induction is not true (valid is not a relevant term here), but only that it does not result from observation.
Gödel's theorem is limited to certain axiomatic systems and not all of them.
A computer can certainly formulate laws of nature and does so.
Popper, who claims that a theory is hypothetical, is simply wrong.
And if his (or your) unclear text claims that a person has the ability to reach conclusions, how does that reconcile with Hume and Popper? So are our theories really theoretical or hypothetical?
First, thank you for the response.
Hello, this is Prof. Benjamin Fine.
The argument is not that it should be reconciled with Hume and Popper, the argument is that through Hume Kant Popper and Cod it is difficult to show how a person arrives at scientific knowledge.
I am quite new to studying these topics, but again, the argument is that the principle of induction does not derive from observation (I agree, this is more accurate) so we have a problem in basing scientific knowledge on observation, right?
In my opinion, Popper means hypothetism in the sense that we are unable to prove that a certain theory describes reality as it is, like Newton and Einstein's dogma, and this seems correct to me because it really stands at the foundation of science.
Regarding computing, this is a quote, but I think the intention is that a person, unlike a computer, has an active role in shaping the laws of nature (this is derived from Kant).
The bottom line is that in a world without God we have difficulty developing scientific knowledge. We can only refute or deny, not prove or verify. In the biblical view, man was created in the image of the Creator and the world was created through the word "in ten statements the world was created."
The "word" itself becomes reality ("Let there be light, and there was light"), which indicates that reality can also be understood. The real is rational.
A person arrives at scientific knowledge not only on the basis of observations but also on the basis of a priori intuitions. What is the problem with that?
Obviously, there is no way to prove a scientific theory. So what? There is a way to confirm it.
From here on out, these are words I do not understand.
People have philosophical intuitions that, due to lack of skill, they present them incorrectly. In the fourth conversation in the first post, I explained the evidence that I called the evidence from epistemology, which is based on these things, but this is a different argument and requires additional precisions. See there.
I don't see a problem with learning a priori intuition about reality. On the contrary, the question is, I think, where does this learning ability come from, because out of all the theories that explain them and our theory, the chance of actually reaching ours is zero.
Creating a new basic theory is something that seems to emerge from nothing, so to speak, and in my opinion, this calls into question our ability to learn about reality, and I think this is the more likely option:
"I want to bring here a metaphor taken from physics: In fact, the physical world
is composed of matter and light. Now imagine that we know nothing about the existence of light,
and suddenly we notice that strange things are happening in the world of matter. Matter is not conserved. Here and there
matter is created out of nothing, and in various places matter disappears. However, the world stops looking strange
when light is taken into account. Light can create matter, and matter can become light.
What do I mean by this metaphor? Matter is our world, and that includes
the human mind and everything that exists in it. Light is God."
I think we can also look at it through the eyes of describing the complexity of the world, the likelihood of arriving at a scientific theory that we have been able to validate is so low/complex that it is more likely that the basic laws of nature led to the creation of a human with intelligence / "created in the image" behind which stands a Creator.
And we still have no ability to know that these are the basic laws of the universe, only that these laws explain certain phenomena.
I will read what you recommended, thank you.
That's exactly what I answered here. I don't see what's added in your last words. We have the ability to observe reality even without the senses. That's how we choose the correct theory from all possible theories. Why does that say anything about God or anything else?
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer