A cosmological view in the shadow of the timeless bang

Time is change.

So I don't understand.

First, one thing is clear: the equation in your words, time = change, is nonsense. There is no identity between these two. Time is some abstract axis, change is a process that things go through.
But what? As I explained, time is the axis on the basis of which we describe changes (and not that time is the change, as you wrote). Hence, in a world where there is no time, there is no reason to assume that there will be no changes in it. What is more, the inhabitants of such a world will simply describe the changes in a different way (they will not use time terms). It is like someone who does not use space terms does not deny the existence of a world. However, the system of concepts that he uses to describe the world is not spatial but in a different way. This certainly follows from Kant's assumption that space and time are only forms of our observation and not things that exist in the objective world per se. By way of analogy, someone who does not wear glasses cannot see, but that does not mean that there is nothing to see.

He probably relies on the Aristotelian definition of time (which appears in many medieval Jewish books). In his opinion, time (like space) is not a medium with an independent existence, but only our abstraction of changes - we place the states of the world (in particular the external wheel that rotates constantly and causes all other movement in the world) on an axis and this axis we call time. In a world without change, according to Aristotle, there is no time at all.

I don't understand,
After all, change cannot be described without time, not because we have a disadvantage in description.
But because only through time can there be change.

Because without the concept of time, the world would be stuck in its ”initial” state, and therefore it is not appropriate to claim that the world was created by a Creator, because if there was a Creator who created the world, time would begin at the moment before creation to allow for the change in the state of the world.

From this, not only is there evidence that a Creator is not needed, but that there cannot be a Creator. The lack of time prevents it from changing…

We extracted.

Yishai yes, to be honest, I mean Zeb.
It's lucky there's someone who understands me. 🙂

In short, maybe the Rabbi could explain why what Yishai says is not true?
Instead of saying from our point of view.

I think Yishai didn't understand you either, he just explained what you meant. I understood it too, and as I explained it, it's simply a mistake.
I'll try one last time. In a world where there is no time, a different set of concepts prevails than ours (which I can't really understand). Everything that happens there can be similar to what happens here, except that in that set of concepts it will be explained in different concepts. If there is no time, change will be described in a different set of concepts, but that doesn't mean there won't be change. You perceive the absence of time as freezing in place (there is only one static point in time). And it isn't. The timeline is simply irrelevant. Think about a creature that doesn't have a perception of time or space. From its perspective, wouldn't the world exist? It would exist, but it would be described in a different set of concepts.
That's it. I don't know how to explain it any better. All the best.

The very fact that scientists are looking for an answer to the question "What was before the Big Bang? And what caused it?" indicates that everyone assumes a causal chain even before the timeline.

The Rabbi turns the concept of time into a personal concept.
Because we feel time, not that it is an axis that really exists.

Therefore, you give the dogma of a creature without a sense of time.
I agree that he can live in our world, but due to his lack of stupidity he does not understand why.

But really in the world of the creature there will be time...

I fail to understand how change prevails without time.
Of course it is stagnation in place. There may be other concepts in stagnation such as width and length, etc.
But it is stagnation without the ability to change.

A creature without a sense of time is an example for ourselves in a world where there is no time. A creature without a sense of time is not necessarily stupid, but a creature that arranges phenomena in terms of a system of concepts different from ours. If a person is not endowed with eyes but perceives the world around him with another sense, unfamiliar to us, he is not stupider, but simply different. This was an example of how in a world without time there can certainly be changes, and we will perceive them in the same way that a creature without a sense of time would perceive events in our world.

I still don't understand why it's not stagnation.

But I think what I'm saying doesn't make much sense.
Because otherwise, if timelessness is stagnation, then it can't be that the universe made a change between a state without time in which there was nothing and a state in which there is a universe.
After all, the change in state (between before the bang and after) is a change. And it happened and began even before time.
A sign that it is possible to make a change without time.

What does the Rabbi say about this? Maybe he has another explanation?

Hello Kobi. If time was created with the creation of the universe, then your question is not entirely defined. At the moment of creation, time was also created. This is the mechanism of “in nothingness” in the Gemara. But all this discussion is unnecessary, as I have already explained, because the concept of change does not depend on time. Therefore, I do not know what other explanation you are looking for. Read about this mechanism from a similar perspective in my article here (Mida Tovah, Parashat Balak 567): What is a ‘moment’? A Look at the Nature of the Timeline Introduction In our article this week, we will deal with a topic that is not clearly halakhic: the nature of the timeline as a continuum. Although we will mention halakhic implications on the issue of ‘it is impossible to reduce’, this will not be our main concern. Nevertheless, clarifying the concepts and ambiguities that concern the perception of the timeline can be useful in studying several halakhic issues, as well as others. A. Probability, Dimensions, and the Essence of Time Introduction: Two Interpretations Regarding the ’Moment’ The Gemara in Tractate Berakhot 7:1 says that there is a moment every day when God is angry. It adds and requires the verses in our parasha, and says that only Balaam knew how to determine this moment: Datanya: +Psalms 7:1; + And God is angry every day. And how much was he angry? – A moment. And how much was a moment? – One of five hundred and eight thousand and eight hundred and eighty-eight hours, and this is a moment, and no creature can determine that hour, except for the wicked Balaam, as it is written in it: +In Numbers 24+ and he knows the knowledge of the Almighty. The knowledge of his beast did not He know – The knowledge of the Almighty did He know? Rather: It teaches that He would have known how to determine the time when the Holy One, blessed be He, was angry, and we would have said to him, “My people, remember what Balak, king of Moab, and so on.” The moment in question here is a very short period of time. This is not a single point in time, nor a short period. Immediately afterward, a parallel sermon is presented that is based on a verse in Micah in which the Holy One, blessed be He, tells us about the kindness He did to us by not being angry in those days when Balaam came to curse Israel: “What is this?” “What is this?” “For the sake of the knowledge of the righteousness of the Lord?” Rabbi Elazar said: The Holy One, blessed be He, said to them, to Israel: “Know how many righteous acts I performed among you, that I was not angry in the days of the wicked Balaam, for if I had not been angry, there would not have been a remnant and a fugitive left of the enemies of Israel.” And we were told that Balaam said to Balak: +In Numbers 23+ What did he not do to God, and what did he not do to God, the Lord was not angry, teaching that all those days he was not angry. In the Tod, on the Atar, they apparently understood that at this stage in the Gemara they still adopt the view that this moment is a segment of finite length (albeit short): If I had not been angry, we would not have remained, etc. – And if you ask what he could have said at a moment. We must say all of them. No, since he would have begun his curse at that moment, it would have been harmful even after that. Although in the second excuse, it is possible that Thos’ has already adopted the position that the moment is a point in time (and not a short segment). Indeed, at the end of the Gemara such an approach is presented: How much did he rage? – A moment. And how much did he rage? – Rabbi Avin and Itima Rabbi Avin said: A moment is like a moment of boiling. And from where does it boil? – As it is said: +Psalms 37;+ For a moment is in the nostrils of life at His will. And what is the problem of a mother, from here: +Isaiah 26+ It is almost a moment until the wrath passes. That is, Rabbi Avin/na says that a moment is a discrete point in time. According to the first interpretation, the inability to pinpoint the moment stems from mere ignorance. According to the second interpretation, the lack of knowledge is the result of the inability to pinpoint the moment, which is a discrete point in time. Midnight We also find a similar dilemma in relation to midnight. In the Book of Exodus (11:4), God informs us: And Moses said, Thus saith the Lord, At midnight I will go out into the midst of Egypt: The expression "at midnight" means "I will go forth." And indeed, the Sages noticed that there is a parallel verse (Exodus 12:29) that says: And it came to pass at midnight, that he smote all the firstborn in the land of Egypt, from the firstborn of Pharaoh that sat on his throne unto the firstborn of the captive that was in the well, and all the firstborn of beasts: here the expression is “in the middle of the night,” which is a more precise expression. The Mekhilta demands concerning this (Deuteronomy 13:4): And it came to pass at midnight, why is it said, “And Moses said, Thus saith the Lord”? At midnight I will go out and finish (Exodus 11:4) that it is impossible for flesh and blood to stand on the half of the night, but here the Creator has his part. Rabbi Yehuda ben Batira says that the one who knows its hours and seasons is his part. That is, the Holy One Himself can stand on the exact moment of midnight, and therefore the verse that brings the word of the Lord Himself speaks in the language of ‘at midnight’, but Moses cannot stand on this moment, and therefore it is written in his book ‘at midnight’. And so it is in Mekhilta Darshav”i (Pe”2, 29, 4”v&#8216 (Ex. 11:4) Or [if the word is] equal to the night, [whether it is like a hair's breadth and above, or [like a hair's breadth and below], sitting on a [waxstone] and setting the hour like a hair's breadth, that [kingdom] does not touch [its company] even when it is full, but [its time has come], that [kingdom] falls by day [falls by day at night], falls by night, and so it is [in the night], and In them, woe to us, for the day is past (Yerem: 6:4). In the Midrash, this means that God sets the hours precisely to the hair's breadth, although here it is applied to the fall of various kingdoms. The Gemara in Berakhot 3:2 deals with David's rising at midnight to play and engage in Torah, and it continues the line we have seen, and brings a parallel topic that compares King David to Moses our Lord: And David, who knew that Delilah was a scourge? Did Moses our Lord not know, as it is written in +Exodus 11:1+ At midnight I will go out into the midst of Egypt, whence at midnight? Or did He not say to Him, "Holy is the blessing of the Lord, at midnight; who is there who will rise up from the heavens?" But he said to him (tomorrow) at midnight (because he was asleep), and he said to him: At midnight, does he not satisfy him – and David knew? – David had a sign for him, as Rav Acha bar Bizna said, Rabbi Shimon Chasida said: A zither was hanging above David's bed, and since midnight came, a north wind came and blew on it and played of its own accord, he would immediately stand and engage in Torah until the dawn rose. The conclusion is that Moses did not know, and David knew by virtue of a special sign that he received from above. Indeed, later in the Gemara there (4:1) the opinion is presented that Moses also knew (and this opinion is presented by Rashi on the Pentateuch. And see there also in the Torah Shlomo 67): Rabbi Zira said: Moses always knew, and David never knew. And since David knew, why did he have a zither? – To the end of my years. And since Moses knew, why did he say it was midnight? – Moses explained: Lest Pharaoh's representatives should deceive me and say, "Moses, it is a day." The wise man said: Teach your tongue to say, "I do not know," lest you be deceived and take hold. The words of the ’Ohel Yehoshua’ Rabbi Shimon Moshe Diskin, author of Ohel Yehoshua, in his commentary on the second verse we cited (Exodus 12:29), complicates the following question: It should be noted that this time of midnight should not be forgotten, for when the night is divided into two halves, it is found that the first half is before midnight and the second half is after midnight, but midnight itself does not occupy any time, and is not a state at all, since it is only a name for the division of the night. Every time in the middle is also divided into two, half here and half there, and if so, how can you forget midnight? In other words, he has difficulty in speaking about the time of midnight, since there is no such time at all. It is the night that cuts the night in two, but it itself has no existence in itself. Up to it, it is the first half of the night, and after it and onwards, it is the second half. It itself has no existence at all, like a point that crosses between two parts of a line, which in itself has no length and no existence in terms of the time axis. For this he offers the following elaborate excuse: And it seems simple, since it is also a matter of time, since before it was alive and now it is dead. After all, there is no hour of death at all, any time that has not yet died is alive and when it has ceased to live, it is dead. There is no time of death at all. And if this is indeed true, and therefore the problem of Kamaita is settled, then it was the same in the plague of the firstborn, that those who were alive at midnight of the first and at midnight of the second had already ceased to live and were dead. And it is not that midnight was a time, nor was the hour of death a matter of time, but rather that the transition from death to life was equal to the transition from midnight of the first to midnight of the second. And this is an explanation of ‘and it was at midnight’, that the meaning is not the time of midnight, but that midnight, just as the night crossed over, crossed over between the death and life of the firstborn of Egypt. He prefaces that death also does not occur at any time. Death (=the departure of the soul) is nothing but the transition between life and death, and therefore it in itself does not occur on the axis of time. It crosses it into two parts, each of which has a meaning of time. These two descriptions complement each other: indeed, there is no moment called ‘midnight’, and there is no moment in which death occurs. The moment of midnight is the point at which the first part (where the firstborn were alive) changes and becomes the second part (where the firstborn die). Death itself is not a state at all, and it does not last for a time. Two types of probability 0 It is usually understood that when there is a probability of 0 for some event, then it is an impossible event. But this is not true. The chance that any integer out of all integers will come up in a lottery is 0, but in the end one integer will come up anyway. That is, in such a situation, an event with a probability of 0 is certain to occur. Sometimes there are impossible events, such as the instantaneous disappearance of an object into nothingness, and from this we conclude that the probability of their occurrence is 0. In these situations, the determination is not probabilistic but rather different. After we have reached the conclusion that the event is impossible, we attach a probability of 0 to it. In the first case, the probabilistic calculation is what underlies the matter. Since there are infinite whole numbers, the chance that a certain number will come out in a random experiment is 0, but the event is not impossible. In the second case, impossibility is the basic assertion, and setting the probability to 0 is a consequence of it. The conclusion is that the assertion that some event is impossible is not a probabilistic assertion. The assertion that the probability of the occurrence of some event is 0 does not mean that it is impossible for it to happen. We will now present an example that will clarify this claim. Demonstration: The creation of the world as spontaneous formation Many tend to prove that the claim that the world was created by itself without a creator is impossible. A significant part of the proofs for this claim are based on various calculations of the probability that any object or reality will be created by chance. For example, calculating the chance that a single organic molecule will be created by a random process. But this argument is flawed and invalid. These calculations cannot refer to the quantity that is ‘the chance that something will be created by chance’. At most, the rate of formation (or the probability per unit of time) can be calculated in this way. It is clear that the chance that one organic molecule will be formed by a random process depends on the time given to this process. Over a billion years, the chance of this is greater than over a single year. Therefore, such calculations can yield the chance that an organic molecule will be formed by chance per unit of time. For example, if such a calculation gives a result of (1/1000), the units of this result are molecules per year (i.e., on average, 0.001 molecules will be formed each year – the average rate of formation. Although the chance that a molecule will be formed in this way in one year is small, if we wait a time of a thousand years, i.e., (the average rate)/1, then the average number of molecules that will be formed randomly will be 1. If so, ironically, any calculation of this kind actually proves (or assumes) that a process of spontaneous generation is certainly possible, but that it must be given enough time. So how can one prove that such a process is not possible at all? It certainly cannot be done with probabilistic tools. The determination that such a process is impossible is not the result of a calculation that shows that its probability is 0, but rather the opposite: a philosophical-intuitive argument would show that it is not possible, and now we say that the probability of this is 0. In fact, there is no probabilistic calculation of this kind whose result is 0. There is no way to probabilistically arrive at the result that any process has a probability of 0. The result of a probabilistic calculation of the chances of any process is always finite (between 0 and 1), since it consists of products of the chances of the intermediate stages, and sums of possibilities for various processes. Therefore, whenever we talk about a probability of 0, this determination is necessarily not based on a probabilistic consideration. Only a statement that the probability is very small can be the result of a probabilistic calculation. A probabilistic statement that some event has a probability of 0 can be made only by pointing out that there are an infinite number of equally weighted possibilities for the outcome of the process, and therefore there is a 0 chance that a particular one of them will occur. But this is not really a mathematical calculation of the probability of a process (it is nothing more than the product of intermediate probabilities, and so on), but a formal mathematical formulation of a simple intuition. Everyone understands that in a fair lottery the chance of getting one particular outcome out of infinity is 0. This claim does not require calculations or a probabilistic understanding. Furthermore, if such a claim arises from a probabilistic calculation, it is a sign that it is a statement that the probability is 0, and not that the process is impossible. The determination that some process is categorically and absolutely impossible (the essential type of avoidance defined above) is never the result of a probabilistic calculation of any kind. Returning to Balaam's ability, the impossibility of pinpointing the moment when God is angry can also be interpreted in two ways: 1. This is the result of ignorance. It is difficult to pinpoint one small moment out of countless moments that exist every night. The chance of this is 0. This is a perception that sees the timeline as composed of discrete moments, but each such moment is infinitely small, and therefore it is difficult to pinpoint it (the probability of this is 0). 2. From the description of the tent of Joshua, it seems that pinpointing this moment is impossible. The reason for this is that in reality there is no specific moment called "midnight", like any other discrete moment. Midnight is not a specific time, but a transition between two segments of time. Of course, midnight is not special in this, and in exactly the same way, we can conclude that every moment of time is nothing more than a transition between sections. If so, it seems that projecting to the moment when God is angry is impossible (and not just has a 0 chance). God can be angry in a moment (whatever the meaning of this may be), but the term "moment" does not reflect any reality, and therefore it is impossible to project to it. Here we are not talking about a huge difficulty that has a probabilistic expression, but about an event that is unavoidable. The distinction between these two proposals stems from two different perceptions of the timeline: the first perception sees the timeline as composed of discrete moments that stand densely next to each other. According to the second proposal, the timeline is not composed of moments. It is possible to mark discrete moments on the timeline, but they are not a real part of it. Comparison with the words of the "Ohel Yehoshua" From the words of the author of Ha'el Yehoshua it follows that death is a process and not a state. It is a transition between a state of life and a state of death. The two states last for continuous periods of time, but the transition between them lacks ontological (=existential) status. If so, his description does explain how death can occur in one discrete moment of time. A moment does not exist, but it reflects a transition between segments of time. Therefore, events that express processes and not states can occur in a discrete moment of time. But the wrath of God is a state and not a process. God is angry for only one discrete moment, and nothing more, and therefore cannot be stopped. But how can a state exist in one discrete moment of time? Here, Ha'el Yehoshua's description can no longer be applied. Ostensibly, the conclusion is that with respect to God's wrath, it is a matter of probability 0 and not of actual avoidance. But above we saw opinions that these are indeed avoided, namely that this moment has no duration, and therefore it is not possible to reach it at all. Dimensions and measure In modern mathematics, a continuous line is treated as something that does not consist only of discrete points. It is true that such points can be marked on it, but the elementary particles that make up the sequence are infinitesimals. An infinitesimal is a segment as small as we want, whose length is 0 (in the language of mathematics, it “aims” to 0). What is the fundamental difference between a point and an infinitesimal, since they both have length 0? The simplest formulation of this distinction indicates a difference in dimension. Although the measure of both is the same (the length of both is 0), their dimension is different: the dimension of a point is 0, and the dimension of an infinitesimal is 1 (since it is a one-dimensional segment, not a point). If so, it is more correct to say that the point has no length (and not that its length is 0. After all, length characterizes only segments whose dimension is 1), and the infinitesimal has length (since its dimension is 1), but that this length is 0. The conclusion that emerges from this picture is that the status of the moment is complex. On the one hand, it has no length, and therefore it is not a duration of time. On the other hand, it has some existence, and it is not just a transition between segments of time. If time is an ‘object’ that has dimension 1, the moment is an ‘object’ that has dimension 0. The conclusion is that the moment definitely has existence. It is not just a process, or a marking of a transition between ‘objects’. It is an object in a lower dimension. Application to the wrath of God Now we can try to apply the description of the tent of Joshua to momentary situations (such as the momentary wrath of God) and not only to processes (such as death). Indeed, there is no time when God is angry, since a situation is characterized by a segment of time and not by a point. On the other hand, it is not correct to say that a moment has no existence at all. A discrete point on the timeline is also a type of time, but it has no duration. For this reason, it is impossible to pinpoint it, since every human action occurs over a segment of time, and therefore a person cannot pinpoint exactly a momentary situation. There is room to debate whether this impossibility is inevitable or whether its chance is only 0. Ostensibly, only the chance is 0, since there is a moment on the timeline when God is angry. But we have just described this as an avoidance, since a person's actions always last for a period of time, no matter how short, and therefore they cannot be precisely combined with a discrete moment. Are a process and a momentary state two different things? Looking further, we can say more than that. Our words show that death is also a state, and not just a transition or process. It is a state that lasts only one moment of time. The author of Ha'el Yehoshua does not refer to a discrete moment as a reality of time, since he had a dimension of 0, but as we described above, even a moment has a reality in some sense, and therefore we can speak of it in terms of a momentary state and not only in terms of a process. It is true that a person cannot create a state on his own that lasts only one discrete moment. Our conclusion is that the second explanation (which sees the moment as a reality on a lower dimension) can be correct for both cases. B. Implications for the question of whether it is possible to reduce an introduction Some of the divisions we have made here are relevant to understanding the halachic principle that states that ’it is impossible to reduce’ (See Mishnah Bekorot 17:1, in the Gemara there and in parallel). This principle states that two things that come as one cannot fall at the exact same time. Likewise, two things that are equal to each other in their measure cannot be completely identical. The very fact that this same principle is expressed in two different contexts (time and measure) indicates that it is probably at its root the problematic nature of continuity that we discussed in the previous chapter. This problematic nature appears both when we ask whether two events can appear at the same discrete moment, and when we ask whether two things can have the same measure (measures also usually take on continuous values). In this chapter, we will briefly discuss this principle and the application of what we have said so far regarding it. It is impossible to reduce The Torah states that the firstborn of a pure animal goes to the priesthood as one of the gifts of the priesthood. What happens when there are two firstborns who are born at once? In this regard, the Tannaim in the Mishnah differed on the issue of the firstborn: Rachel, who was not the firstborn, gave birth to two males, and their two heads came out as one, Rabbi Yossi of Galilee says: Both of them went to the priest, as it is said in +Exodus 13:13+ the males to the priest, and Proverbs 1: It is impossible to reduce, but one for him and one for the priest. According to R. Yossi, both went to the priest. According to the Sages, it is impossible for both of them to come out as one, and therefore only one of them is the firstborn, and only one of them must be given to the priest (further on the Mishnah, more Tannaim are divided on how to do this). The Mishnah itself states that the dispute is over the question of whether it is possible to reduce or not. And here is Rashi on an explanatory website: A. To reduce – if both of their heads came out as one, but one came out first and they did not know it was him. His language explicitly means that the possibility that both of them came out as one is impossible. There must be one of them who came out first, and therefore he is the firstborn. Clearly, there is no physical limitation in mind (that two newborns cannot come out of the womb at the same time), since we are talking about both of them coming out at the same time. Furthermore, if this were indeed a principle that is specific to the law of the firstborn, there would be no room for it to be formulated as a sweeping principle that applies to all of the law. If so, Rashi explains that the problem here is the problem of continuity: it is impossible for two events to occur at the same, discrete moment. It is quite clear that this is not a matter of principled avoidance (since there is no reason to assume that this is not possible on a principled level), since the determination of principled avoidance is not found in the realm of probability but in the realm of physics (or physiology). And since we showed above that this is not an argument from the field of physiology, we must assume that the intention of this mishnah is to say that this is an event whose probability is 0. That is, the probability that both events will occur at exactly the same, discrete moment in time is 0. This is also implied by the language of the Maimonides, who rules according to the opinion of the Sages, and writes (Halak Bekorot, p. 55. See also Shulchan Yom Kippur, s. 11, who rules thus): Rachel, who was not the firstborn and gave birth to two males, even if both of their heads came out as one, it is impossible that one did not come first, since it is not known which of them came out first, the priest takes the firstborn and the second, and there is doubt about the firstborn. If one of them dies, the priest has nothing to do with it. The one who lives is doubtful, and he takes the evidence from his companion. Likewise, if she gave birth to a male and a female, then the male is doubtful, perhaps the female came out first. Therefore, the priest has nothing to do with it. The one who brings out the evidence from his companion is the one who sees it. If so, the Maimonides also sees a problem here that concerns the sequence: the chance that two events will occur at the same discrete moment in time is 0. The Thos method The owners of the Thos on Atar (ibid., 4:5) disagree and believe that this is possible, but we cannot ascertain whether they came out equal or whether one of them preceded his companion (and which one of them), and therefore only one is given to the priest (because the one who brings out the evidence from his companion is the one who sees it). In other words, the owners of the Thos believe that this is indeed possible, but we will never be able to know this. Ostensibly, there is a fundamental argument here, since according to Thos this is a possible event and the doubt is only from our perspective, whereas according to Rashi and the Maimonides this event is impossible. But in light of what we have stated above, it seems that there is no fundamental debate here: everyone agrees that this is an event whose probability of occurrence is 0, but it is clear that in principle it can occur (it is not absolutely avoidable). In fact, in this matter the outcome will necessarily be one with a probability of 0 (since every moment in which the firstborn came out has a probability of 0, since there are an infinite number of moments in which he could have come out). If so, it seems that Rashi and the Rambam do not fundamentally disagree on Thos, and everyone knows that this is an event that can occur (with a probability of 0), but we cannot know this. And yet there seems to be a halakhic (not probabilistic) argument here: According to Rashi and the Rambam, two events that occur at the same discrete moment in time are considered halakhically unavoidable. An event whose probability is 0 should not even be considered as creating doubt. In contrast, according to Thos, the possibility that the two events did indeed occur simultaneously is a possibility that must be considered and creates doubt. Reduction by Heaven and by Man The Gemara there in 2: Rabbi Yanai said: Rabbi Yossi of Galilee, who said that it is possible to reduce by Heaven – and so on by man, and our Rabbis by Heaven it is impossible to reduce, by man what? And the Rabbis there explain: It is possible to reduce by Heaven – such as Hech Lida and others, who do not insist on this. And even more so by man – who plans to reduce any measure or anything, it is certainly possible to reduce. By man – who plans and measures in order to reduce what cannot be reduced or not. The Gemara assumes that reduction by Heaven is more difficult than by man. The reason for this is that reduction by God is a random event, and therefore the chance of reduction is 0. But reduction by man is a deliberate event, the man is trying to achieve simultaneity, and therefore there is more room for the claim that it can be reduced. One of the examples given in the Gemara for reduction by man is the sikra thread that was supposed to be in the middle of the altar (to distinguish between blood given above and below). When the thread is tied to the altar, there is a deliberate attempt to reach exactly the middle, and therefore there is a greater likelihood of braiding exactly the middle. Since the event is not random, there is perhaps room to say that the calculation to braid exactly the middle does not yield a chance of 0. Reduction by Man: A Problem with the Thos’ Method Ostensibly, the distinction between reduction by God and reduction by man can only be made to the method that here concerns the impossibility of reality itself. Here it can be said that if one intends to reach reduction, the chance of this increases. But according to the Thos’ method This is only an ambiguity in man and not an impossibility in reality itself. What is the point of distinguishing between a reduction by heaven and a reduction by man? If man cannot discern something that is reduced, then it is impossible to reduce, neither by heaven nor by man. And indeed, in the Tod”ha, “It is possible to reduce” there, after citing Rashi’s words, they explained in several ways regarding several types of cases: For example, in a reduction by heaven, a person does not have time to try and adjust, and therefore he does not succeed. But if the reduction is by man, then the person is prepared to reduce, and in such a situation it is possible that he can succeed, and more. The ruling and its meaning from our words indicate that according to Thos’ there is really no question of an essential impossibility here. It seems that they do not see the problem of reduction as an aspect of the problem of continuity, but only as a technical problem that is difficult to overcome. However, according to Rashi and the Rambam, it seems that this is an expression of the problem of continuity, and therefore the reduction is impossible (i.e., the chance of it is 0). And here, according to the halakhah, it is ruled that by the hand of God it is impossible to reduce (see the Rambam and the above-mentioned Responsorial Psalm). And regarding reduction by man, the Rishonim were divided: according to the above-mentioned Toss (and in parallel in Eruvin 5) it is ruled that it is possible to reduce. However, the Rambam (see the Rambam Murderer 5:8) rules that it is impossible to reduce by man. It is certainly plausible that they are following their own methods here: the Rambam sees this as a fundamental problem of impossibility in reality (an expression of the problem of continuity), so it is clear that by the hand of God it is also impossible to reduce. While theists, who see this as a technical difficulty on the part of man, rule that it can be reduced by man. C. Zeno's Paradox Introduction We will conclude the article with a brief discussion of one of the paradoxes that Zeno of Elea presented, in order to challenge the concept of motion. We will propose a solution for it, and then we will briefly discuss several aspects that have implications for this solution. The Paradox of the Flying Arrow The Greek philosopher, Zeno of Elea, raised the following question: Let us observe an arrow that is flying. At every moment, if we observe it, it appears to be standing still. That is, at every moment of time it stands still, each time in a different position. So when (=at what moment) does it change its position? It is customary to see the solution to the paradox in the infinitesimal picture. That is, the assumption that the time axis is composed of discrete moments is considered a minefield that leads to the paradox. If we adopt the infinitesimal picture, that is, that the time axis is composed of a collection of infinitesimals, then the question disappears. We cannot talk about the state of the arrow at a single moment in time because there are no discrete moments of time. The feeling that arises when we see this solution is that we have circumvented the obstacle, but we have not really removed it. Clearly, there are discrete moments on the time axis. Such points can be marked on any continuous axis. Therefore, even if we cannot actually refer to a discrete moment, we can still ask the theoretical question about the state of the arrow at some discrete moment. The fact that the infinitesimal language prohibits raising the question does not constitute a solution to it. If the question were about our inability to discern any state, then there would be a fundamental possibility for a solution here, since human reference always concerns a segment of time and never a discrete moment. This is one of the possibilities we raised regarding the impossibility of reduction. But here the question is theoretical, and therefore this answer does not solve it. The solution to the paradox The correct solution to this paradox lies in the distinction between ‘being in a place’ and ‘stand still’. While it is true that at every moment in time the arrow ‘is’in a different place, it is certainly not true that it ‘stands’in those places. It is somewhere, but at the same time it is also moving. Therefore, the answer to the question of when the arrow changes its position (=moves) is: at the very moment when we observe it. It is both somewhere and moving to another place. The root of the confusion What underlies Zeno's confusion is the intuition that it is not possible to speak of speed at a point in time. The feeling is that speed exists and is defined only along a segment of time (and also a segment of space), but not at a discrete point in time (and space). Speed means a change of place, and it is not possible for a change of place to occur over a single point, of time or of space. This implies that at a discrete point in time the body cannot be at speed, and it must stand still (=rest, i.e. be at speed 0). But this assumption is completely wrong. Velocity is not a change in location. A change in location is a result of the fact that a body has velocity. Bodies with velocity (which is not 0) change their location, but the concept of ‘velocity’ should not be identified with a change in location. Velocity is a potential for a change in location, and therefore, although a change in location does not occur at one discrete moment, the potential for change can also be defined at a discrete moment in time. Physics defines velocity at a point in time (i.e., there is velocity at every discrete moment in time), but the way to calculate this quantity is to divide a spatial segment by a temporal segment (=how long it takes to traverse the spatial segment). This is the form of calculation, i.e., an operative definition, but not a fundamental definition. Essentially, a body has velocity at every discrete point in time. As mentioned, the calculation of that velocity requires expansion to a small segment around the point in question, but this is only a computational constraint, not a fundamental one. Returning to reduction, we can see in this distinction another aspect of the distinction we presented above. Speed is a quantity that exists at a single discrete point in time, but we as humans cannot refer to a discrete point in time, but only to a segment of time. This is what causes us to mix up the operative definition of speed (which refers to segments of time and space) with the essential definition (which refers to discrete points). In this formulation, we can say that Zeno's paradox was created due to the fact that it is impossible to reduce. Hael Yehoshua's reference to death as an event that cannot be captured (i.e., an event that does not exist on the timeline), i.e., a process and not a state, stems from the fact that we cannot refer to a discrete point in time. But as we suggested above, this event does exist on the timeline, but it is a momentary event. The same is true of the momentary wrath of God. Conclusion In the concluding section, we will raise a few reflections, most of which will end with a question mark, and will not lead to a clear conclusion. There is room for debate about the meaning of the study we did this week. Is this Torah study? Or is it the use of Torah sources to study physics (understanding the meaning of the timeline generally belongs to the field of physics). Is this the study of a legend, or is it actual halakhic study (since this topic has several implications in the fields of halakhic law as well). The question can be expanded and examined to see what the boundaries of the concept of ‘Torah’ are. Is the study of the Teacher of the Perplexed, with its philosophical parts (and even from foreign sources) considered ‘Torah’? If so, then how do modern mathematics and physics differ from Aristotelian physics? Why did Aristotelian physics, which was included in the Rambam's Fundamentals of Torah, receive the same status as Torah study, while the study of concepts and insights from modern science does not? The same can be asked about modern philosophy. There are quite a few situations in which mathematics, or some science, is required to understand a halakhic issue, or to decide a halakhic question. In these cases, it seems that the engagement in mathematics or science is a mitzvah instrument (the kosher mitzvah for the mitzvah of studying Torah). But here the situation is the opposite: the goal was not to understand a specific halakhic or Torah subject, but to use Torah and halakhic sources to understand the essence of the timeline. Is this Torah study? If so, the conclusion is that it is on a higher level, since it is actually Torah (and not just a mitzvah instrument for studying Torah). Are abstract legal reasoning that explains the laws of neighbors, or the laws of evidence, Torah, while insights into the essence of the timeline, space, human nature, etc., not Torah? Is it a question of sources (from where we draw our conclusions), or of content? The Rambam himself (in his law, see Yesodei HaTorah, p. 4, 10-11) states that the act of Genesis and the act of the Merkava (which the Gemara refers to as a "great thing," as opposed to the entities Abaye and Rava, which are "small things") are physics and metaphysics, and therefore he devotes several chapters in his Law of Yesodei HaTorah to dealing with these subjects. If we learn from him, it seems that the conclusion is obvious that this too is included within the scope of Torah. Now, of course, we can ask the question: What is not called Torah? Is any engagement with wisdom of any kind within the scope of Torah? So what is the difference between wisdom and Torah?

To Kubah (Koby?)
It seems to me that one can see the ”difference” as a change without time.