A lawsuit in court for violation of rights
Shalom Rabbeinu. I make a living from painting and a famous work of mine has been printed in poor quality for some time by a printing house that also frames it and sells it to the public at a deplorable price (it is a sought-after portrait). Of course, he is violating copyright based on Israeli law. I do not know to what extent he is doing it intentionally and maliciously or through stupidity and inattention. This is a common swindle. Am I allowed to send him a letter of prohibition (to stop!) and a lawsuit to court to begin with, or should I first seek recourse through a rabbinical court? A rabbi told me that if I first sue him in court and they charge him a fine that is not according to Torah, it is robbery on my part. And indeed, it is clear that such a lawsuit would easily result in him being charged a legendary sum of 100,000 shekels or more. This is a price that could bring him and his entire family down financially, and to me it seems like a villain allowing the state to do so (I personally know a photographer whose main livelihood comes from legal suits against websites that have deliberately used his photographs. It’s really a trap… and there are those who specialize in all sorts of technological methods on the Internet to expose duplicate photographs and locate victims for huge claims for infringement of rights)… On the other hand, I feel that in court I will not receive adequate compensation at all, and I certainly will not receive the publication and prevention of future copycats without a lawsuit in court. In conclusion: Is it permissible to sue in court and why? And what about the enormous fine they will impose on him? (Even if I know how much he will reasonably give up on court expenses, he will pay for them and the authorities). What would you do?
I don’t understand what the concern is. Obviously, you should first send him a letter warning him to stop and maybe also compensate you for what he sold. If he doesn’t respond, then there’s nothing to fear from harming him. I’ll tie his soul.
Regarding the question of whether to go to the court or the Supreme Court, I don’t know how the court will discuss this (I assume it depends on which court). I also don’t know if he obeyed the law or if there is no point in going to the court with a guy with powers.
In general, I oppose requiring people to go to the courts, because the legal system there is problematic. They are not authorized to summon witnesses (any witness can refuse to come), and they cannot use investigative bodies and information from official institutions, etc. They are not a state institution. Therefore, they deliberate under very problematic constraints and certainly do not deliberate according to Torah law (but at most in a compromise close to law). Therefore, even if you go to them, you have not received Torah law (see Nadav Shnarb’s fascinating article in Akademo on this).
Beyond that, because we live within an existing country that has its own legal system, and because we do not have the privilege of not recognizing it (and even the ultra-Orthodox who apparently do this, when they have no choice, turn to it, and even when they have a choice, they pay a high social and personal price for this avoidance). Therefore, in my opinion, we can turn directly to it. In any case, this is the law of the kingdom and in my opinion there is no theft here.
Thank you very much
Regarding the concern, I will just clarify that the fine will be imposed on him for what he did in the past and not just in case he shackles his soul. In other words, there is no need for the artist to prove damage, the mere violation of rights will impose a fine on the violator of up to 100 thousand shekels. That is my concern. But I understand the picture better in light of your explanation regarding the powerlessness of the courts. Good luck and good news. One day I will draw you again. A white beard, a thick mustache, a pipe and a fur coat studying the edges of the raised breastplate on several volumes of Shalem Publishing
Peace and blessings
Regarding the court's authority to summon witnesses, if the parties apply to a rabbinical court for arbitration and sign an arbitration deed, then it is adjudicating under the Arbitration Law. The Arbitration Law (Section 13) [Rach”B] states that the arbitrator's authority to summon witnesses is identical to the court's authority.
(The punishment for a witness who does not respond to a summons is carried out in court and as stated there in Section 16)
Summon of witnesses
13. (a) The arbitrator has the same authority in arbitration to summon witnesses to give testimony or to produce documents as is granted to the court in a claim filed before it, and he may award them fees and expenses.
(b) A witness who testifies in arbitration shall have the same duties and privileges as a witness who testifies in court.
(c) For a witness summoned by an arbitrator, the court may, at the witness's request, cancel the summons if it deems that it was issued in an abuse of the arbitration proceedings.
After you gave him a warning, I see no reason to worry about the past either. The picture you described is very fascinating to me 🙂
Regarding the arbitration, even if it is true, the court judges by the power of the state and not by Torah law. So why turn to it? From my limited experience, in fact, witnesses do not get there. In the laws of the present and the future.
In your opinion, the fact that the court rules on behalf of the state is a reason that permits recourse to the courts?
After all, even when Rabbi Tarfon (Gittin 5:8) and later the Maimonides and the Rashba forbade recourse to the courts, even then the law of the Torah was not the law of the state, and yet it was obligatory to resort to it.
What do you mean?
As I wrote, the Bar does not really judge Torah law but makes a compromise, and its power comes from the power of the state's arbitration mechanism. I do not see why there is any interest in doing arbitration instead of going to court. What is required of us is Torah law and not arbitrations by people wearing frock coats.
As for the Rabbis and the Maimonides, I do not know if they also only made compromises and arbitrations. If so, I would say the same about them.
The main problem is not the fact that they come from the power of the state (after all, permission from the king was always required), but that they actually judge the law of the state.
A collection of halakhic material on the subject is in Rabbi Israel Rosen's article, Are the State's Courts Considered Courts of Law, on the ‘Tzomet Institute’ website,
With greetings, Sh”Z
It is worth noting that the compromise discussed in the courts is a ‘compromise close to law’, based on clarifying the halakhic law according to the Talmud and the poskim, and requires the element of ’compromise’ only to avoid taking an oath and the fear of error in clarifying the halakhic law. The rulings of the Torah courts are based on Torah law, in complete contrast to the secular court, which does not recognize the validity of Torah law at all.
From a practical perspective, too, hearings in a Torah court are faster and more efficient, unlike in the courts, where a case can drag on for many years and result in a waste of a fortune on lawyers. And in particular in this case, which concerns a picture of a rabbi, whose target audience is a public of Torah scholars - the greater the chance that the printer will not refuse to be heard in Torah law, and if the publisher does so, he risks a "refusal letter" that will damage his good name in the Torah community, and will also allow the plaintiff to go to court.
Rabbi Michi
You wrote:
“The main problem is not the fact that they come by force of the state (since permission from the king was always required), but that in practice they are discussing the law of the state”
But the Gemara in Gittin 5:8 says that even if the laws are the same, it is still obligatory to hold the hearing in the Jewish court. (“…Even though their laws are the laws of Israel”)
The court here is Jewish. It's like the courts in Syria. And since there are kosher judges who discuss the laws of the courts, I don't see why there is a prohibition against going to the courts of Jews.
Thank you for your words.
Courts in Syria are when there are no scholars who know the laws of the Torah (such as Ramat Ha-Khufu, paragraph 8). Where did you find that it is permissible to turn to courts in Syria and waive the laws of the Torah when there are scholars?
Where did you find that it is forbidden? After all, the Tahsih do not discuss Torah law. So both these and these are Jews who discuss according to foreign law. What is the difference? Do the latter have a fringe?
In the year 24, 1984,
The courts in Syria are God-fearing Jews, but because they did not study Torah, they are not familiar with Torah law and therefore judge according to their own judgment, and because there are no Torah scholars there, the public's need is to trust them out of lack of choice.
In contrast, appealing to a court that does not recognize the validity of Torah law is a "hands-on" in the Torah of Moses, and the fact that the judges are Jews with a basic legal education, who are willing to use precedents from all legal systems in the world, just not in Hebrew law, is a "court of courts."
The Jewish Law recognized the halachic validity of the ‘Dina de Malchuta’ as Shmuel said, ’Dina de Malchuta is dina’, but ‘Judicial legislation’ of courts that see the ’laws of the state as a mere recommendation that can be rejected through ‘Judicial legislation’ is not ‘Dina de Malchuta’ but a corrupt custom of judges, about whom it was said: ‘Let him wear black and wrap himself in black and do whatever his heart desires 🙂
And ’Dina de Malchuta’ also has halachic limitations. It is not possible in a Jewish state to comprehensively abolish the obligation to the laws of the Torah. In a Jewish state, Halacha should be the basis for law and justice, a basis upon which there is room for regulations in specific cases where there is a real need for public order.
Best regards, Sh”t
Rabbi Michi
Where have you seen that in Torah law they make a compromise and not judge according to Torah law?
Do you mean an arbitrary compromise? Or the application of the laws of the kingdom in areas where there was a change in reality (by virtue of their authority to compromise)?
In the meantime, I found Torah law rulings on the Din website, and I almost never saw a use of compromise there,
*Din Torah website
Usually, we do not discuss Torah law. Nor is the judicial system conducted according to Torah law. See Nadav Shnarb's article in Akademot.
I know the article and I think it is incorrect.
He claims, and you do too, that the judges rule based on compromise, but that is simply not the reality. I suggest you go to the Din Torah website and read the rulings. If you have a different impression than me, I would love to hear it. But in fact, the vast majority of the rulings strive to clarify the halakhah and are not based on compromise.
27, 2017
The compromise by which Torah courts deliberate is not a compromise of both parties in order to reach an arrangement, but rather a compromise that is close to the law, based on the clarification of the halakhah. A compromise is needed in order to avoid the need for an oath, to circumvent the limitations of the law, and to allow the debtor to also have obligations of "coming out of heaven", etc., and to alleviate the material concern about an error in the law.
A compromise that is close to the law It is based on Torah law, which instructs to judge a ‘law that is peaceful’, and is the ’beginning’of the court’s operation, and leads to streamlining the procedure and preventing torture of justice by dragging out procedural and formal arguments that often bring the discussion to a dead end.
With best wishes, Sh”t
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