A moral question about Amoraim

Thank you very much.

Is it morally permissible to behave immorally towards a Gentile who usually behaves immorally?

That is, does his immorality also allow me to act this way toward him?

Absolutely. Whoever does not return my loss and robs me has no reason for me to return his loss. In the sharp language of the Maimonides, one who behaves like an animal is not entitled to be treated like a human being.

Following on from your words, can you elaborate on what immoral behavior justifies similar behavior again?

Here's an extreme example - would you justify it?

https://www.kikar.co.il/275814.html

I don't think we should behave differently towards a Gentile or a resident in returning a lost item. Because if we don't return a lost item to someone who lost it - it's a type of theft that brings pain to the person we lost it to. And if we assume the person we lost it to was an immoral Gentile - it doesn't mean we are allowed to behave towards him to the same extent. Justice will be pursued. And you shall not bring abomination into your house – which includes things you did not earn honestly. And it is forbidden to take revenge or to be jealous of any creature.

You cannot justify something illegal. But these thieves have a choice - to open a case against them with the police. Every thief is supposed to prepare himself for such a case, no matter what he steals. I am happy that this is so. I hate thieves - they damage networks and it is difficult to prevent them from stealing. So if they are caught - let them pay.

Aharon, it is difficult for me to give a general criterion. In general, one must distinguish between a moral act and a moral deed. A moral act (such as returning a lost item) is not binding on an immoral person. But harming him (an immoral act) is not permitted. The distinction between moral acts and immoral acts is not simple, and in a certain sense this is a somewhat circular definition. In my article on the sixth root, I defined these concepts on a halakhic level, and we took it from there.
Regarding the case you cited, I think it is wrong. If there is an obligation to complain to the authorities, they should have complained and not given up. But taking money from them as compensation seems immoral to me (although I do not think it is halakhically forbidden. Does it depend on what you want?). By the way, I assume that legally and legally it is prohibited. In the definitions above, taking money from someone is immoral and not an immoral act towards them.
If the complaint to the police is to fine the thief, there may be a place to take money from him and not complain. I'm reporting him instead of the police (and that's also a point to make, since the fine is supposed to go to the state). But if the complaint is to prevent him from committing future crimes against others, what good would it do me to drop the complaint? Maybe if you could get the impression that he had repented and would never commit that sin again, there would be a reason to drop the complaint, but that's very hard to know.

Moshe, not returning a lost thing to a Gentile is not revenge or punishment. His loss is a stranger's and I am certainly not obligated to bother and return it to him. Therefore, in my opinion, the commandment of return here is primarily a misdemeanor (what I defined as a moral act, not a non-action), and therefore it depends on his moral standing.

I haven't read the rabbi's article on the sixth root, but it seems to me that there is no such thing as a moral do. All morality is a don't. When I hear the word "morality" I always have an image of someone's angry face saying, "You're wrong." It also seems to me that this is the general feeling among people. Anything that a rabbi defines as a moral act would actually be correct to say that the moral act is not to cancel it. And the meaning of the word "muser" comes from the word "torment and punishment," which mainly pertains to a transgression against a law and not to cancel a deed (although there is a punishment for this too, but as I said, it will not be for not carrying out the deed but for canceling it. Something active).

What is true is that perhaps for a wise (or right) or not, there is an option to do and not only to do. Although here too, perhaps someone will argue that not doing the right deed is doing the wrong deed. Because there is no vacuum. But we can talk about the usefulness of an act (that it is worth doing it, but if it is not done, no harm will be caused, but profit will be prevented. Unlike not brushing your teeth, for example)

Ayalon, it will be difficult to decide on this matter, because it is actually a matter of definitions. But restoring a lost thing seems to me to be a clear do and not a no. If I didn't restore a lost thing, I didn't do anything wrong. I don't have to make an effort for someone else. But if I did it, I did something good.

This is also complicated. The question is whether there is responsibility towards that person (indeed, if he is immoral, then there is none. Because it seems that such responsibility is a mutual matter). Because if so, then we need to ask whether you would want your loss to be abandoned and damaged by natural disasters (assuming that you took something that is not yours for your use, which is wrong, and then no one will take the loss. Active return is indeed not morally obligated unless the owner of the loss demands it from you), while someone who saw it can easily collect it to his home. Indeed, regarding its care, this also seems excessive to me. But indeed, if there is no responsibility towards an immoral Gentile, I am not sure that returning a lost thing to him is a good deed. Immorality turns a person into an animal (and a little worse. And even an animal may not be harmed for no reason - in accordance with the Rabbi's words that there is no morality towards an immoral person) and then it is the destruction of property that was useful for good and will now go to evil.

This is, of course, a general claim that doing good to a bad person is a bad deed. And in the case of a moral person, we have already said that this (the moral act) is included in the moral law. In any case, it cannot be a moral act.

To Ayalon, Greetings,

I don't think it is necessary to enter into divisions between "moral acts" and "thou shalt nots." For the reader, the division is between what is a "categorical commandment" that binds all who come into the world (= the seven commandments of the sons of Noah) and unique obligations that the Torah only obligated on the "kingdom of priests and holy nation" (= the thirteen commandments).

Therefore, it is forbidden to rob a Gentile, because the Torah forbade robbery among the Noahide people, but there is no obligation to return a loss to a Gentile, since the commandment to restore a loss is not part of the ’Seven Commandments of the Noahide People’, and is not a ‘categorical commandment’ that binds a person as a person, but rather is a unique obligation towards ‘your brother’.

Indeed, since the Seven Commandments of the Noahide People include the commandment of ‘laws’ that authorizes the monarchy to enact laws and regulations for the benefit of society, beyond the basic requirement of the ‘Seven Commandments of the Noahide People’, then a norm accepted by society as a ’categorical commandment’binding, will be considered ’dina demalchuta’ Which also binds the Israelites in that country (and Samuel is the author of the Mimra ‘Dina de Malchuta ” Dina”).

The commandments of ‘Dinaim’ and the subsequent rule of ‘Dina de Malchuta – Dina– open the door to raising the demands between a person and his fellow man beyond what the Torah required, and thus the world progresses to a situation where norms that the Torah could only demand as Hasidism become ’equal to every soul’..

With blessings, Shࢭz Levinger

To the point

I am mixing two levels of discussion. The discussion here is not about Halacha (Torah) but about morality. Morality belongs to the way of life that preceded the Torah and the Seven Commandments of the Noahide are the ”Torah” Of the Gentiles. Chassidut is something that the Torah preceded (another level above it, but there is a connection between it and the level of the path, the earth, just as a man was a forefather, his head was visible above the four worlds of the Father (which clothe him from his neck to the soles of his feet, and the soles of his feet in this world are below all these worlds. In general, the Father is the Torah). Morality is universal.

The categorical imperative belongs to morality. And if it enters the commandments of the law, then there is a duality here, like a two-story building. It is forbidden to rob a Gentile because it is forbidden to rob. Period. Besides, there is a commandment from God (to a Gentile, and probably also to Israel) not to rob a Gentile. Just as you shall not murder in relation to Israel. Which belongs to morality and also to the commandment of God.

Rabbi Michi
There is a permit to make amends to a Gentile and his morality does not matter to us at all, and if the morality of the Gentile does not matter here, then why does his morality matter to us when restoring a loss to a Gentile?

Why should we spoil our morality? By the way, civil law requires that every person be restored to a loss. Even to a Gentile - and if not restored - then from the perspective of the law it is as if you actually stole.

Eilon rightly argues: Is it permissible to murder a Gentile? Of course not - so why is it permissible to steal from him indirectly (=permitted)?

Moshe, it's a bit difficult to address the collection of unfounded statements you've made here. If you want to assume something, assume it. But what do you want from me? I think otherwise.
1. There is no permission to belittle a Gentile who is bound by the manners of the nations. And so it is with all the commandments between a person and his fellow man. This is the method of the Meiri, and I, the little one, am also with him in trouble.
2. According to the law, failure to return a loss is not theft.
3. I gave above (in response to Aaron) a criterion for which moral rules depend on the morality of the other and which do not.