A piece that meant crossing from the fixed place – a halakhic conflict

A. I did not ask about the explanation of how it is possible to divide the two halves, and say that each has a different ruling.

I asked about the secret rulings between the two rulings specifically. Is it logical to require someone to eat the second half after someone ate the first half that he did not interpret (and therefore did not issue a halachah), is it necessary to require him to eat the second half? And I did not find any reference to this in your words. What is the logic in requiring him to eat from the same piece again?

B. Regarding the Shev Shema'ata: I saw today in Shev Shema'ata with the issues of Rabbi Gnichovsky, a similar question, regarding an impure piece that was mixed with other pieces, and interpreted half a piece, and then the two halves touched each other. Is it said that the half that was interpreted became impure from the half that was not interpreted.

C. Regarding the question of whether a majority creates or reveals, does this question also apply to 'following the majority' or only to a single mixture?
To my knowledge, in a mixture of prohibition and permission, one must be satisfied with whether the majority law clarifies that the specific piece is permission, or whether the majority removes the prohibition. As is known, even in a mixture, a majority cannot create a new law, but at most remove laws. Therefore, a piece of permission does not become a prohibition in a mixture of permission (and is issued as an olive in order to eat a reward).
But in the case of “following the majority,” I have not heard of being satisfied with either of these two sides.
So do you believe that in one matzah that we are coming to discuss on the grounds of “following the majority,” most matzahs that are lishma can “create” lishma’s halals upon it?

Thank you very much!

A. I do not see two rulings here. In the first, it did not come out as a satisfactory yed. In the second, it certainly comes out as a yed. Therefore, it is more likely that the half outside that has a positive law on it drags after it the half in the mixture that has no law on it (it is in doubt).

B. Regarding impurity for a person, there is no question. If it is in a bara, then the doubt is certainly impure, and if in a bara, the doubt is certainly pure. And it seems to me that it is necessary to say that in the fixed case, I am and we apply the laws of spikkot even in impurity.

C. Regarding the question of whether a majority creates or reveals, you are right. But one must discuss the half that remains in the mixture (and not the one that has separated). The fact that there is a fixed state regarding it reveals that it is not lishma or that it makes it not lishma.
I will only note that according to the Rashba, the law of annulment is a law that follows the majority. Therefore, it seems that in his opinion there is no creation here, but rather exposure. But as we know, his words are controversial.

Thank you.

A. I really didn't understand. If the outside half drags the inside half, then he has already left the house when he ate the inside half, and if so, he will be exempt from eating the outside half. Isn't that right?
That was the question, should he be required to eat the outside piece after he has eaten the inside one (for the sake of the law and its like, it is not clear that one half drags its companion).

B. The book is not available now, and I will check it later.

C. I didn't understand why it should be said about the inside half that there is a revelation or exposure. After all, if it were not for the law of the majority, we would have a doubt. Now that there is a "majority" here, and in contrast there is a "fixed" here, the law of the fixed one overrides the law of the majority, and the Darinan to the extent that there is doubt here.

A. Perhaps there is such a side, but I doubt it. And the reason is that it is possible that the dragging is done only when the other half is eaten, otherwise there is no halachic ruling regarding it and in any case it will not drag the other half (in other words: the question is what half I ate and not what the nature of this half is in itself).
C. Because the majority ruling is on the outside half and there is no fixed ruling regarding it that will overturn its ruling. The fixed ruling overturns the majority ruling on that piece in the mixture and not on the outside piece that separated.

A. This means that only after someone eats the outer half, will he be able to say that he has already made a mistake in the inner half.
Very interesting.
According to this, if the whole piece is as big as an olive, when he eats the outer half as an olive, will he be able to make a mistake in combination with the inner half as an olive?

C. So the question of whether a majority is a revelation or an exposure is only meant for the outer half (and also for the inner half, after he eats the outer half, in your opinion)?

A. I was mainly talking about the second case (their combination with the word "kazeit"). But ah, if the half inside is enough, there is perhaps room for this explanation as well (although there is no need for this, since it comes out of the one outside). Furthermore, it is possible that only if the half outside is needed to come out of the outside, will it drag after it the one that remained in the mixture, since if it does not come out of the outside, no law has been determined for it (because the question did not arise regarding it).

C. On the contrary, the half outside is a fris, and in this, as you rightly wrote, it is clear that the majority reveals and does not create. Only the half in the mixture is there room to discuss the laws of annulment, and in this it is necessary to discuss whether it reveals or creates. It is true that there it is permanent and does not become null, but still if the laws of annulment by the majority reveal and do not create, then even a situation of doubt about the permanent is a doubt about its true state, and such a doubt can be decided by the majority of the outside that has been withdrawn. But if the laws of cancellation create a renewed state, then the constant of the half in the mixture is not doubt about its state but a renewed state of doubt. Then it seems that the outsider cannot discover anything about it, since its status is created from the mixture and therefore is different from that of the half that separated. In such a case, there is no connection between the two halves.

On the 24th of Shvat, the 1st of Shvat, the 1st of Shvat, the 2nd With blessings, Sh”ts Levinger

And perhaps there is a way to fix matzah that was not baked for its own sake, by cooking it and removing it from the Torah of bread, and baking it again for its own sake, so that turning it back into bread is done for its own sake, and in fact, and it is commanded [and may Israel save us from errors and fear His wondrous Torah] in the Bible. But one must be content with what the hachshara comes in the halachah, if we assume the taste of matzah, which is a matter of the halachah 🙂

In the last paragraph, lines 3-4:
… … one must be satisfied with the matzah that the hachshara came from a blasphemous pulp, if we consider…

But my suggestion that the matzah provided be the middle matzah and the afikoman should be discussed more from the perspective of a ‘parish’, which would supposedly have the problem of ‘abolishing a prohibition from the start’?

But it should be said that actually concealing the afikoman does not yet nullify the determination, and only when the child snatches the afikoman and hides it does the matzah become a ’parish’, and the child who hides it certainly does not intend to abolish a prohibition. It seems so on the surface, and in fact, clarification is needed.

Best regards, S.C. Levinger

To Rabbi Shtzel:
Any doubt that arises in the established place will not benefit again if it is withdrawn from there, and remains in its prohibition. Not because of the cancellation of a prohibition from the beginning, but because of a fixed law.
And I returned and examined your way of interweaving Hasidism in Halacha, because of some non-permissibility of the prohibitions in you, and I did not come up with it (see Responsa Hatt Och A, end of Si, 51).

One should be lenient in mixing Hasidism with Halacha because of the fading of gender in a non-gendered person. On the other hand, it is true that a prohibition is abolished by permission in the first place. And in the book of Hatz, it is said that it is better to distinguish between a sower of hybrids and a sower of a bull and a donkey together. And be careful.

I did not understand what the law is to mix sex with the opposite sex more than sex with the same sex. On the contrary, sex with the same sex is mostly different from the Torah, and sex with the opposite sex needs to be sixty.

Or perhaps our rabbi's opinion is like the opinion of Responsa Rametz (Mt. 1:1), who said that although the rabbi said that the abolition of a prohibition is initially forbidden by the Torah, the abolition of sex with the opposite sex is forbidden only by the rabbis (contrary to the opinion of the HaNuv and the Hatz), and therefore he favored the lenient mixing of Hasidism with Halacha.
Or perhaps the law should decide that it is better for them to be Shoggin and not to be Misdin. And indeed, Ka’il (Yo’d 49) said that one who annuls a prohibition intentionally does not annul it accidentally, but annuls it.

And I did not come to rule on the matter until our Rabbeinu Imady agrees, since it concerns the serious laws of hybrids.

To Aaron, – Hello Rabbi,

I did not see anything in my words that was relevant to Hasidism. You raised a difficult question concerning a person who is alone and only has matzahs that contain matzah that was not baked for his sake. Certainly, his dire situation requires a halakhic solution, and finding a solution to his plight is our duty from the state, not from the standard of Hasidism.

The solution is apparently simpler than what I suggested, and is: He should eat a handful of each of the matzahs and aim to fulfill his obligation with those that were baked for the sake of the mitzvah, since he ate all of the matzahs and certainly ate a handful of more than one matzah that was baked for his sake. And in this way, he would fulfill his obligation to eat matzah from the Torah. However, there would still be a problem if there were many matzahs, and he was not allowed to eat a handful of each in order to avoid doubt.

Therefore, I proposed two solutions:

Solution A:
He should leave a handful of matzah for the Afikoman, which, by removing it, would become a “parish” in which it is said to follow the majority.

For this, you have obtained from what is said in Ramat 14:3 that parish after doubt arises regarding the fixed one does not change the law of the fixed one.

However, to this it must be said that since unbaked matzah is permissible for its own sake, then doubt begins only when it reaches the stage of “taking out matzah who then wants to fulfill his obligation,” and at this stage the matzah of the Afikoman has already separated from its fixed place.

Solution B:
He should cook the matzah until he takes from them “Torah Danhema.” And they went out of the Torah of Bread, and baked them again for the sake of matzah mitzvah – so that its new existence as bread was made for its sake.

This solution sounds peppery (which is why I jokingly commented that perhaps one does not fulfill the obligation of matzah with peppered matzah :), but I think it is a real solution, since after cooking, the matzah went out of the Torah of Bread, and its second baking is already a new creation of bread, and it was made for its sake.

May it be the will of God our God that there will not be such a situation for a remote and lonely Jew on the night of the consecration of the holiday!

With blessings, Sh”ts Levinger

The question is not a practical one, of course. It is intended to discuss fixed and fixed interpretations. Therefore, we can imagine any possible situation. It is true that if all the matzot are before him, he can eat from all of them. And if not, he can also ask for a tabernacle.
For the sake of discussion, here we are talking about only having two halves before him, one interpreted by a Gentile or a small person who is not sharp, and one that has a fixed law, since it was interpreted from its fixed place by a Jew. And the fixed place is the bakery.

Your claim that snatching the matzot for the Afikoman is a fixed interpretation before the doubt is known is incorrect in my opinion for two reasons, first, the Seder table is not the fixed place in our example (and I don't know if it can be called a fixed place at all). B, because the doubt exists before the taking of the matzah (just as you would not say that someone who has no appetite or who waits half an hour after eating dairy products and then separates a piece of meat from the mixture in his hands is like someone who separated before the doubt was known). And this is completely clear.
Regarding your solution of cooking the matzah and returning to bake it. I am not familiar with the halakha of baking matzah. But it seems to me that since he cooked the matzah again, it cannot leaven. Therefore, when he returns and bakes it, it is not in the law of leavening, and anything that cannot leaven is not considered matzah. But as mentioned, I do not know the halakha on this, and I would be happy if you could correct me.

The second solution I suggested seems unlikely to help, given that the new baking is done for the sake of a mitzvah, but the caveat is that the preservation of leaven will be for the sake of the mitzvah of the mitzvah, and here after the first baking it can no longer leaven.

What is there for the lenient is according to the opinion of the Sefer HaNaj Yom (6217; 44) and the ears of Yehoshua (O” 6217; 1) that the mitzvah of eating matzah also applies to matzah that is not preserved (discussing their words in the vision of Ovadia 31, pp. 55ff., and cited in the Holy Bible (Lev. Harari) Laws of the Seder, Chapter 7, note 8). And yet in the mixture there is room for adding them to provide a spicah. And ch. 2.

Regarding the ‘Secret Districh in One Piece’, see also the discussion of Rabbi Rafael Bitran regarding someone who has taken the strict course of not eating matzah on Passover except for the Seder night kezitzit, whether it is permissible to apply this strict course also to the leftovers of matzah from which he has fulfilled his obligation, since there is a secret districh in that same piece.

Rabbi Rafael Bitran was one of the sages of Constantinople and a friend of Rabbi Shlomo Eliezer Alfandari. His discussion is found in his book ‘Medot Tov’ Al Mekhilta, ed. by Rabbi Nissim, Jerusalem 1981, pp. 59-60. Also cited by Rabbi Moshe Harari in Mikraei Kadesh – Hilchot Leil Seder’, Chapter 7, Note 37, p. 61. A commentary on the Mekhilta with good measures is, to the best of my knowledge, also found in the ’Otzar Hochma’).

Best regards, Sh”ts Levinger

Sh”el, again, you are moving to other realms. The question was to examine the idea of fixed and separated, and instead of solving it, you went and looked for a unique method that allows one to leave the matzah even with matzah that was baked for other than the sake of the Lord. How do you say? Well, that's it.
Secondly, the method of the pleasure of Yot does not solve my question. What did I ask? After eating the first half that was not separated, is there still an obligation to go back and eat the half that was separated. This question also applies to the pleasure of Yot!
For even the pleasure of Yot admits that there is an obligation to eat matzah that was baked for other than the sake of the Lord. It only claims that the law of the love of the Lord is a side law, that whoever ate matzah that was baked for other than the sake of the Lord is removed, but that it abrogated the commandment of preservation.
Therefore, according to his method, one must be satisfied with whether the person should be required to return and eat the half he has interpreted in order to fulfill the commandment of preservation.
Rabbi Rafael Bitterman's question does not seem related to me, but I did not see his sides and reasoning. I would be happy if you could quote or upload a photocopy of his words, from the edition of the esteemed institute that you are in charge of.

Rabbi Bitran extends this by about three pages (pp. 11-12), and in fact divides his discussion into a discussion regarding an animal that is partly fixed and partly interpreted, and as I mentioned, his book is included in the ’Otzar Hochma’ and the one who wants to learn from it should ask for it.

Regarding the animal that is partly fixed and partly interpreted, he summarizes the discussion in the poskim:

‘Ivara, we found in this way one thing that is half forbidden and half permitted, and as was the practice at the time of Rabbi Be”h [the author of the Tori], the late, in the case of animals that were slaughtered at home and half were spread out in the house, and then prey was born from one of them, so that in the house there must be prey and the other In the case of a meatloaf, it is certainly kosher, and regarding the animal, the division that separated one part of it into meatloaf, the teachers disagree on it, and here, one does not permit even half of it in the house, since the half that separated from it is permissible according to the law, even what is in the house is permissible, and here, the whole thing is permissible. And according to everyone, they did not say that one animal would be half permissible and half desecrated. But Rabbi Par”h in the last verse to the sign K”i disagreed on them and concluded that every piece is forbidden, its part in the house is forbidden and the half that was separated is permissible”

It seems that most of the poskim do not divide the same piece, either everything is forbidden or everything is permissible, and your discussion is only according to the opinion of the Par”h, and regarding matzah, there are perhaps three possibilities: (a) Perhaps this matzah was baked for its own sake. (b) Perhaps the law is as follows: the fixed rule is followed by what is interpreted. (c) Perhaps the law is as follows: the law of the Lord and the ears of Joshua, who go forth with unleavened matzah.

Whereas here, in the hour of great distress of a poor and lonely person who cannot seek help from neighbors, and here, in the midst of my three words, I would suggest that he eat matzah, for what is your soul permitted, but not to recite the blessing because of suffering. In fact, it is appropriate to ask the sage.

It is not right to inquire about the poor person being discussed whether he has the rest of the necessities of the feast, and it is also necessary for him to have no meat or wine, and we must settle the matter, how can we help him to celebrate the Feast of Unleavened Bread in peace! And maybe we will organize a fundraiser among the readers of the site 🙂

With greetings, Schach Levinger

By the way, Rabbi Raphael Bitran is sometimes also called ‘Aharon’. Prof. Benyahu assumes that his original name was ‘Aharon’ and was changed to ’Raphael’ due to illness. He notes that the sages of Constantinople continued to call him ‘Aharon’ even after his death.

Regarding the Farach's explanation of the division between the part he explained and the regular part

I am not familiar with the subject, but on the surface it seems that the explanation is that each piece is discussed separately. This is clearer to me when the discussion is about a question of prohibition, where each piece is discussed as to whether it is kosher or forbidden. However, with matzah, matzah is certainly permitted. The question is not about the piece but about the ’gebra’ whether I fulfilled the obligation of matzah or not, and in the discussion of the ’gebra’ there is no distinction between pieces.

This is what I think in my ’household’ opinion, and I leave it to the judgment of those who observe!

With blessings, the above-mentioned Shchel