A poem about a woman and a work that does not need a body
Hello Rabbi Michael,
In the Mishnah Torah, the Rambam writes:
- All those who cause damage are exempt. How: If he harms his friend or an animal through damage, and if he tears clothes or burns or breaks utensils through damage – this is exempt; if he digs a hole and only needs it for the ore, then this is a damage and exempt. Even though he did a job, since his intention was to cause damage, he is exempt.
Regarding the above Halacha, the following questions arise:
- Why does Maimonides compare digging a hole to damaging a friend or an animal through destruction? In digging a hole, it doesn’t seem to me that there is any resemblance to spoilage or destruction.
- Even if we follow the Rambam’s method that there is an aspect of spoilage in digging the hole, and it only requires gravel, why doesn’t this seem like a likely case of a Risha ruling, an act that, by the way, is certainly performed in another way, which according to the Rambam requires a keret, and not just forbidden by the rabbis as the Rambam notes in the introduction (the intention of being forbidden by the rabbis is exempt).
Best regards,
1. First, digging the hole involves spoiling the soil. If you need the hole, then of course it is a repair, but if it is done for the dirt, then there is spoiling the soil.
But I think that without the words of Maimonides, in principle, there is no need for this. Both a work that does not require a body (digging a hole for dirt) and a spoiling are works that are done for a purpose other than the usual, and this is their exemption. According to the Shatzlag, the intended result does not have to be spoiling, and there is a rabbinical prohibition on this (and in one opinion even from the Torah without punishment). There is an exemption for a spoiling not only because the purpose is different from the usual, but because the purpose is spoiling. I will only point out that it is clear that a spoiling is exempt even if there is no other ordinary purpose for which this action is done. The exemption is because of the spoiling. If this is also not the usual purpose, then there is another exemption from the Shatzlag.
But all of this is only according to the majority of the Rishonim (and so is the Halacha), who is exempt from it (Karach). But Maimonides is the only one who rules like Rabbi Yehuda who is obligated, and therefore he is exempt from digging a hole only when there is a spoilage in it, and the exemption is from the spoilage rule, not from the Shatzlag rule (whose opinion is that it is not exempt at all).
2. Pesik Risha is only said about a situation in which two actions are performed, and the one I intend to do necessarily entails the other that I do not intend to do. For example, dragging a bench and creating a groove in the ground. I intend to move a bench, but a groove will inevitably be created. On the other hand, in cases such as digging a hole in the dirt, the halakhic definition is as a shatzlag and not as an unintended one. In a shatzlag, the question of pesik Risha is irrelevant, because it is always a pesik Risha. The difference between not intending to do something and not intending to do something is very, very subtle, and difficult to define. But the Maga, following Rabbi ben Maimonides, explains that not intending to do something is doing two things (when I intend to do something permissible and do something forbidden with it) and that from the Maga to do something is doing one thing with two results (when I intend to do something unusual). Digging a hole is one action that has two results (a pit and dirt). Dragging a bench and making a groove are two different actions. This is one of the most difficult issues in the laws of Shabbat, and one of the most subtle and vague definitions.
Happy New Year and happy writing and signing,
Michi
I thought I would offer an explanation for the difference between a משצלג and a פסיק רישיה using the example of opening a refrigerator door on Shabbat. The act of opening the door is an action that does not have a “craft” character, but it results in a פסיק, and therefore it is a פסיק רישיה. But when an action is done that has a “craft” character (meaning that there is a change in state in this action) but I do it for a purpose other than changing the state, it is a פסיק that does not need a body.
For example, the Rambam writes (the first words in each section are the most important, helping to make my distinction):
And ***does a deed***, and because of it a work is done that will certainly be done for that deed, even though it was not intended, it is obligatory: because the matter is known, that it is impossible not to do that work. How: So if a child needs the head of a bird to play with, and cuts off its head on the Sabbath, even though his intention is not to kill the bird alone, it is obligatory: because the matter is known, that it is impossible to cut off the head of a living being except that death comes for it. And so on.
7 ***Anyone who does work on the Sabbath***, even though he does not need the body of the work, is obligatory for it. How: If one extinguishes a candle because it needs oil so that it does not get lost, or so that the clay of a candle does not burn, then one is obligated: because extinguishing is a work, and one intends to extinguish it, even though the body of the extinguisher does not need it, and he did not extinguish it except because of the oil or the clay or the wick, then one is obligated. Similarly, one who moves the thorn four cubits in public, or who extinguishes the embers so that many will not be harmed by them, then one is obligated: even though the body of the extinguisher, or the body of the transfer, does not need it except to remove the harm, then one is obligated. And so on.
The difference between "does not intend to provide" and "does not intend to provide" is also understood according to this division. "does not intend to provide" refers to actions of a "craftsmanship" nature, and "does not intend to provide" refers to actions that do not have such a nature. Therefore, it is also understandable why R”S and R”Y disagreed about "does not intend to provide" and "does not intend to provide" since both refer to actions of a "craftsmanship" nature, while in contrast, they did not disagree about "does not intend to provide" (where there is no craftmanship).
I think you are right that when you do not really intend, it is always a situation where the action you intend to do is not a craft. But this is not a matter of defining what you do not intend, but rather a result of the very nature of the exemption. If there was a craft here and you intended it, why would it be exempt? Therefore, by the very nature of the exemption, it must be a drawing that the action you are referring to is not a craft, but that at the same time another action is performed that you did not intend and that is indeed a craft, and the innovation of the R”sh is that you are exempt for this craft because you did not intend. On the other hand, in a craft that does not need a body, only one action is performed and not two, and therefore by definition this is an action that is a craft (otherwise there is nothing to be held liable for). However, it is done for a purpose other than the usual one, such as digging a hole and only needs ore. Therefore, according to the R”sh, it is exempt.
Therefore, the division is not between an action and a craft for two crafts, but between one action and two actions (one of which is a craft). As far as I can remember, Rambam (who was also quoted in the Maga or the Kassam, I don't remember) wrote this division.
I wanted to propose a different division from the familiar division you mentioned, which is based on the nature of the action being performed. There are actions that lack a “craft” character, such as stepping in front of a camera or an electronic viewfinder these days, which I argue is the classic example that defines the Risha comma (even more appropriate than a chicken head cutlet). From and does not mean do not belong with regard to actions that lack a craft character, such as opening a refrigerator door and stepping in front of an electronic eye that I mentioned above. The invention of electricity makes it possible to establish the nature of this division more clearly.
I understood and also agreed with the description. Indeed, in "not intending" we are talking about an action that is not a work, and in "not intending" we are talking about a work. However, I argue that this distinction is not the scholastic essence of the difference between "not intending" and "not intending". As I explained, this difference arises for a technical reason (because it is not possible for a "not intending" situation to exist between two works). But the exemption in "not intending" is not because it is an action and not a work, but because he does not intend the second action, which is indeed a work.
Here is the problem between us: If it were to be drawn that there would be a situation where "not intending" occurs in two works, one of which he intends and the other not. In my opinion, in such a case too, he would be exempt from the law of "not intending" for the second (although he would be obligated for the first). On the other hand, if I understood you correctly, you argue that such a case would be "not intending" and not "not intending" (and therefore, for example, according to Maimonides, he would be obligated). I do not agree with this.
I thought that perhaps there was a place to link this to the dispute between the first, since Tus’ identifies the clause Risha dela nicha liya with mashtzal”g. In his view, these two are the same thing. But simply put, it is not the same at all because of what I wrote (that which does not mean is two actions and that which does not mean is one). But it seems to me that according to you, Tus’s words are also not understood, because if the clause Risha dela nicha liya is part of the subject of that which does not mean, this means that it is an action and a work, whereas in mashtzal”g it is an actual work, so how can one identify these two?!
I think you didn't fully understand what I meant. According to my suggestion, "does not mean" is an action of a craft nature, only there is doubt about the by-product of the action (like a notch in the ground), whereas in "shetzl" it is the same as "does not mean" except that the doubt becomes certain. In other words, "shetzl" and "does not mean" are both quite similar things (actions of a craft nature), and the only difference between them is in the level of certainty of the occurrence of the problematic by-product (a notch in the ground). On the other hand, there is the pesik risa (and the pesik risa doubt) which is defined by an action lacking in a craft nature (like opening a refrigerator door). In this case, Rabbi Shimon also admits that it is forbidden. I think this approach is also simpler and more intuitive to understand.
So I really missed it. I thought you were dividing between "does not mean" and "does not mean". So it seems to me that you need to first define "does not mean" and only then explain the Risha comma, because the Risha comma is a clause within "does not mean".
The definition does not mean an action that is in the nature of a craft. But dragging a bench is not really a craft. The groove is the craft.
Dragging a bench is the act of dragging an object on the ground that creates a groove in the ground – this is exactly the work of plowing. Only I do it for a different purpose than plowing, but for the purpose of moving the bench – that is, I am not interested in the usual purpose of creating a groove (the body of the work) but my goal is only to move the bench.
According to my proposal, does not mean is a clause within the Shatzel”G, and this also fits with the disagreement between R”Y and R”S that were divided in the Shatzel”G and in the Inu does not mean and were not divided in the Risha clause.
It is still not clear to me why dragging a bench when there is no certainty of creating a groove does not mean that, after all, it is an action of a manual nature (harisha). Why does the comma Risha make this an action that is not manual?
“Does not intend” according to my proposal is defined by actions of a manual nature only when there is doubt about their by-product.
I did not understand the second question. What is meant by the comma Risha making this a non-manual action?
A comma Risha according to my proposal is defined as an action of a non-manual nature (an act of ignorance like opening a refrigerator door).
Exactly. That's why I ask: A person drags a bench and creates a groove. If there is certainty that a groove will be created, it is a psiri”r, and if there is no certainty, it does not mean ordinary. But whether there is certainty or not, the action is making a groove, that is, a manual action.
If there is certainty that a crack will be created, it is not a psi”r but a schatz”g (according to my suggestion).
The Gemara makes it clear that a Risha clause is a clause of the law of non-intention (Shar”s who permits non-intention in Ps”r). See Ketubot 6:1 and Kirot 25:1, as well as in Shabbat 6:17 and in the Gemara Shabbat 7:1 according to the commentary of Tod”e ‘metzeb‘l there. And see also at the beginning of Tod”e ‘tefi‘ on Shabbat there, and many more.
Hence, in the same case, if there is no certainty, it is non-intention and if there is certainty, it is a Risha clause. Therefore, it is clear that in dragging a bench, if there is no certainty, it does not intend (Shabbat 29:2) and hence, if there is certainty, it is a Risha (and not a Mashtzal). And so it is in all cases of a psikh (that is why Tussal commented on the discrepancy regarding the one who is engaged in the business).
Also, in cutting off the head of the rooster, if there was no certainty that it would die, it would not intend, and only because there is certainty, it is a Risha. And after all, there it does deal with the work (killing the rooster) and not just an action.
Therefore, it seems to me that you cannot be right. In your opinion, there is a difference, and he does not intend a psikh that is not at all on the level of certainty, but on the level of the nature of the action (work or not). In fact, according to your opinion, it turns out that he does not intend and that he does not intend are the same clause (whether or not there is certainty), and the pesik risha is something different from both of them (when it comes to an action that is not a work). Absolutely not like the Gemara and Rishonim.
Although the Gemara Shabbat 29:2 seems difficult to me, since there they want to divide between large and small benches, and the division is that small benches can be lifted without dragging. And apparently if I am right, it would be reasonable to divide the opposite way: in large benches it is permitted because there is certainty that there will be a notch and this pesik r and in small benches it is permitted because there is no certainty that there will be a notch. However, in the data that they are trying to settle, it is explicitly stated that in large benches it is permitted and in small benches it is forbidden, and therefore the Gemara is forced to divide according to the axis of possible or not possible.
In any case, whatever you say in the Gemara there, from all the Shas and the Rishonim it is clear that the distinction between does not mean and does not mean is based on the question of certainty.
Incidentally, I remember from many years ago an interesting recitation that makes it difficult for the Gemara Shabbat Kiz 17:1 that the Gemara there expresses itself as if it were a פסיר, even though the case is a מצאזל ג and does not mean. And Rabbi Aharon Kotler (in his collection of riddles, 12) settled his question when he distinguished between a פסיק רישה in a מצאזל ג and a פסיר in does not mean. But I saw it decades ago and I don't remember. I think you should take a look there. I will email you a file with this sign. It is very worthwhile reading for anyone who deals with this.
I sent
Thank you very much!
Here is a link to the file for anyone interested:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1DFMkIi1sSF3MlMBSbdGoxWJm9WUEDNWn
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