A question about the cosmological view

I may not have made myself clear enough, the cosmological argument is a broad family and type of argument.
Part of the argument is the argument from dependence (the argument from a contingent entity) that every contingent entity has a cause, so there must be an entity that is the necessity of reality (the entity itself is contingent).
This is where my question is focused.

In this argument, the conclusion is indeed that there is a necessary entity. What's the problem with that? And in my opinion, the question of whether necessity is a property or not (in my opinion, it is) makes no difference.

The problem is, what is your mind?
If an entity that “necessarily exists” is a property, then this is ruled out in principle, as we assume that existence is not a property.
And if “necessarily existence” is not a property, then there is only one way to understand this, so that you claim that the concept of “necessarily existence” emerges from the collection of properties of the entity. If so, there is no necessity for existence to emerge in this way and not another.
The claim that the entity simply exists and cannot cease to exist (or exist in a different way) is distilled in some way from some characterization and context from the concept of object. And as stated, it does not exist.

2. The rabbi here surprised me by writing that the rabbi thinks that necessity is a property, so why do you rule out the ontological view? And why don’t you assume that “necessarily existence” And a ”demon that necessarily exists”

Disagree. Existence is not a property, but I think necessity can be a property (of my existence and therefore mine).
I didn't understand the other side (if existence is necessarily not a property).

I don't categorically reject it, but I think it is based on assumptions that can be rejected. I argue that this is not just a conceptual analysis (as Anselm thought) but an argument based on assumptions.
In the updated formulation that will appear in the book, I do reject Anselm's argument, because one of the assumptions is unreasonable. But that requires a detailed analysis, and so on.

Do you reject Anselm Deike? Or the entire ontological view.

My argument is that if necessity is not a property, then how can the conclusion about an entity that necessarily exists be expressed? Than an entity that exists? If it is not something in the property of the thing, then what distinguishes this entity? It is proven that there is no such entity.

I don't know what the difference is. The vision of Anselm.

I still don't understand the last bit,

The questioner, perhaps you didn't see, but in the previous response, the Rabbi wrote that in his opinion necessity is indeed a quality, and the gibberish fell flat.

D, I understand that the Rabbi also says the method of those who believe that necessity is not an attribute.

Rabbi, (regarding the cosmological view)
My argument is that if necessity is not an attribute, then how can there be a thing that necessarily exists? After all, it must be expressed in some way in its essence. If there is no ability for this essence to be expressed in essence, then there is no reason to assume that there can be evidence that proves the necessary existence of the thing. Because there can be no necessary existence for a thing, but only a contingent existence.

You are actually making the very term “necessarily existing” difficult, without any connection to the cosmological or ontological view.
I don't see the difficulty. An entity that exists has a property that its existence is necessarily. And if this is not a property then it is like another type of existence. So what? Still, just as it is possible to say that an entity exists, it is possible to say that it exists necessarily.
As mentioned, I am inclined to believe that necessity is indeed a property.

First of all, I am not looking for the answer by assuming that necessity is indeed an attribute. Let's put that aside.
(Those who believe so, then of course the question is basically nonsense). My question is only for the opinion of those who do not believe so.

Now, I see two lines of thought here with the Rabbi, only I did not understand both of them.
A. The Rabbi mentioned that “an entity that exists has an attribute whose existence is a necessity”, I understand that you are claiming that to the extent that the entity exists, then some of its attributes cause its existence to be necessary.
In fact, the essence of necessity emerges (emergently) from the collection of attributes of the entity. But how does this happen? If every attribute in it has no connection to existence (because as stated, existence is the realization of the entity and is not an attribute).
B. It is possible to understand your words, that to the extent that an entity exists, there is another attribute called “necessity” And it acts on the entity that will always remain in existence. But it cannot force the entity to exist (as the ontological view says, but to the extent that it exists then it necessarily exists), but not so much how this happens, for if you admit that there is no connection between existence and the properties of the entity, then how can a property affect the existence of the entity.
C. Later the Rabbi wrote, “And if it is not a property then it is like another type of existence.” I did not quite understand how this could be, for there is *something* that causes a difference between existence and existence by necessity (neither a property nor an essence in reality).

A. I don't know what emerges from what and why. There is a necessary existence as distinct from existence (assuming necessity is not a property). That's all. Why does something have to emerge from something else?
B. What does it mean that it cannot force the object to exist? I don't understand these word games.
C. It is a different real essence. What causes two identical raindrops to be two different objects? That they are two different things. That's all.
I see no point in this discussion.

A. So how does this difference (between necessary existence and ordinary existence) happen if it is not expressed in any parameter?!?
B. If they agree that properties do not affect existence (and not like the ontological view) how does the property of necessity (for those who believe that there is such a property) affect.
C. But how does it manifest itself if there is no difference between the two drops of water? Perhaps the preliminary assumption is what is existence for those who believe that it is not a property.

There is a great deal of point in this discussion, regarding the cosmological view.

A-C. I have already asked you what distinguishes two identical raindrops (which are also in the same place). In what sense are they two? There are distinctions that do not arise from difference but from lack of identity. See my remarks in Two Carts, Chapter Two, regarding the principle of the identity of the indistinguishable. You did not answer me on that.
B. I do not understand a word. There is no point in continuing, in my opinion.

That these are two different entities. Each entity contains the characteristics. Therefore, even when the characteristics are the same, there is not always an identical entity.
But I still haven't understood what distinguishes an entity that necessarily exists from an entity that exists? If it is not expressed in any characteristic or essence.
C. Naturally, then it can be unified with what I just wrote above.

I'm not sure I understood what you wrote. You're saying that despite the identity in characteristics, these may be two different objects. If that's what you meant, then we're done. That's exactly what I'm arguing, and therefore here too we're talking about two different types of existence that don't differ from each other in their characteristics but in their essence.

How can there be a different existence in the bones? (This is question C)
Either something exists or it does not exist. It cannot necessarily exist.

You assume what you are asking for. This is exactly what the Rabbi claims: that there can be non-existence, existence, and existence by necessity.

I agree that it sounds like that from what I wrote, but it is not so, because the concept of existence is not a “property” (in the broad sense of the word), but rather the realization of the object in reality. So either there is realization or there is not. There is no concept of necessarily realization.