A reasonable reality in the face of dry, varnished fences
Hello Rabbi
What is the relationship of reasonable reality to the dry halachic limits? That is, when Rabbi Ovadia permits placing chicken with sauce (as long as the sauce is a minority with respect to the chicken, even if there is a lot of sauce) on the platter on Shabbat, even though in his opinion it is forbidden to place food on the platter, it is only here because the minority is nullified by the majority that it is permitted.
I tend to say that we should not close our eyes even if, from a formal point of view, a dry minority is nullified by a majority. After all, there is a moist cooking here on Shabbat, and it is likely that in such a case there is no majority and minority!
In other words, I think that the majority of annulment laws speak of realistic, reasonable annulment, and not just according to halakhic definitions…
Or regarding the question of whether a second vessel can be used to brew tea on Shabbat, which the Gemara says is not the case. Therefore, Rabbi Ovadia permits making tea in a second vessel, while most poskim are strict about this because there is not that much difference between a first vessel and a second vessel in tea… and the temperature needs to drop, etc.
What does the rabbi say?
You may think so, but you are wrong. Halacha, like any normative system, speaks of formal boundaries. There are situations in which there is reason to fear the spirit of the Halacha, etc., but the Halacha itself is determined by its boundaries. You may wonder about the very fact of overturning by majority: Why deliberately eat a clearly forbidden food? What is the meaning of the permission to rely on the majority? What do I care if it is a reasonable majority or not? What is a reasonable majority anyway?
Regarding the question of whether a second vessel is boiling, that is a different question, because the determination in advance depends on the facts. Here there is room to discuss whether the facts are correct or not (and what the Sages actually meant). But that is a different question.
When I write a reasonable majority, I mean that it is not reasonable in my opinion that where there is clear cooking (as in the example with the sauce) we would follow the solid majority. Because following the majority in such a situation is not reasonable in my opinion… the wording is really not good. But I explained my intention
Dvir, I vaguely and vaguely remember that Rabbi (Shalom) Mashash disputed Rabbi Ovadia, and from what I remember, the main point of his argument and his surprise was as you said, that it is not reasonable to cook the sauce until it is completely cooked just because there is a lot of chicken in the pot next to it. And Rabbi Ovadia (according to the aforementioned vague memory) dismissed it as "this is what it is".
[By the way, there is a gemara that abrogation by majority is irrelevant in the impurity of a load (in the matter of kosher ashes mixed with ashes of a stick, which even if the majority is ashes of a stick, if it carries all of it, it becomes impure due to the impurity of a load) because it carries all of it together, unlike a contact that touches one. And there is a great complication in the interpretations. At first glance, cooking is similar to a load and not to a contact. One should study Rabbi Ovadia's answer and see what happens].
You are just repeating the same question again and I have already answered it. You could have said the same thing about any cancellation by majority. If you ate a dish in which there is a minority of prey, then you must have eaten prey, so what does it matter to me that there is a kosher majority there?
I am not familiar with Rabbi Ovadia's words, but in my opinion this is not a cancellation by majority but rather a law of the majority as a whole (although some have understood that these are laws from the same root). Simply put, it means that the essence of the matter is determined by the majority. For example, if the majority of Israel are impure and some are pure, then they do not postpone the second Passover but bring the first Passover in impurity. Note that here there is no cancellation by majority (there is no mixture at all and it is known about each one whether he is impure or pure), but rather this is the law of the majority as a whole. The essence of the group is determined by the nature of the majority. You have to decide whether the people of Israel (the public) are impure or pure. Since there are some and there are some, the status of the public is determined by the status of the majority. [As mentioned, some have also explained the cancellation by a majority in this way.]
And in our case, if there is a majority of stew and a minority of sauce, then when I ask you what you put on the plate, you will say I put stew. If there is a majority of sauce, it is impossible to say that you put stew and therefore it is forbidden. Very simple.
If you squeeze a lemon on Shabbat into a salad or sugar, then you did not squeeze. Why not? Because the lemon mixes with the food and now we have no liquid but a solid. Squeezing is removing liquid from a solid. Does that sound more logical to you? And this is from the Gemara.
What's more, the sauce has actually already cooked. This is just a gimmick that seems to be cooking after cooking with moisture [with sauce, this is even stranger]
And on Shabbat, the scientific facts don't matter whether you cooked or not [and factually, the sauce has already been cooked and now it's just heating], but what is the definition among people for what you did, only the work of thought forbidden by the Torah. And if in the opinion of people, you heated chicken [and in a dry dish there is no cooking after cooking] with sauce [certainly when he is the minority], then it is chicken with sauce. The story here is the chicken and you just heated it and you didn't cook it and you just heated the chicken and it wasn't liquid, but chicken with the handle attached to it.
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