A “vessel whose work is forbidden” that belongs to a Gentile (and therefore most of its work is permissible) is assigned

The scissors in the hospital belong to the hospital, and therefore I think that we should not discuss them according to the majority of their use. Although in the hospital, this is intended for permissible use (because of the illness), and therefore it is necessary to discuss whether this is even within the scope of the mukta.

Although one must consider a tool whose function is forbidden, which is usually lighter than a regular mukta, in the case of a gentile tool there is reason to be stricter because the tool's function is forbidden for me and he is mukta.
Finally, I need to look into this further.

Well, what's up?

A. All the sources that the Rabbi cited regarding the fact that there is no law of a muktzeh due to a non-Jew, so was it generally ruled that there is no blanket prohibition on a muktzeh due to a non-Jew, or was it only permitted with leaven? (And another small question that bothers me that might give some counterpoint to those who slander the Rabbi's website against the Rabbi, did the Rabbi cite these sources from personal memory or was the Rabbi assisted?)
B. Apparently, from an explanation, I would say that Jewish ownership is a condition for the prohibition of a muktzeh. A stone of the unbeliever will come and prove that there is no Jewish ownership and that it is forbidden to shake it. What is the explanation that they did not rule on a muktzeh due to a non-Jew?

I haven't dealt with this yet. It seems to me to be a recent mishna (that in a tool whose function is to forbid one must be made stricter in such a situation, because its function is to forbid). Although this depends on the reasons for deriving tools, and whether it is part of the law of muktaza. Simply no (it was deduced separately in the baraita of Dvimi Nehemiah ben Haklia), and its reason for being simple is not the allocation from knowledge, and therefore the owner's knowledge is not important here.. But writing a systematic and final answer to this requires time.
A. I remembered the initial sources in general, but of course I searched and found them (of course, I didn't have any knowledge in my memory). I don't see what difference it makes with regard to the insulters. I don't think that remembering sources says anything about the person.
B. Ownership delays and does not suspend. There is a muktaza in the case of a deserter, but there is no muktaza when it is not muktaza to its owner. When there is no owner, the thing can be muktaza, but when there is an owner, it delays.

B. I still don't understand why this law is so convoluted and convoluted. Why did the Sages decide on such a definition that if it is not allotted to the owner, then it is not allotted to anyone. Moreover, it does not seem to me to be a correct law. Is a sick person who is in danger and needs to eat chametz on Passover, so his chametz is not allotted? Are there sources for this?
PS, knowledge of sources does not matter to a rabbi? Only analytical ability? Or also knowledge in general?

B. The twists are not necessarily the result of an initial decision. Sometimes it is a development of the law that was originally simple. Beyond that, I think that hanging on the owner is actually a fairly simple solution. It is unlikely that the same object will be assigned to one and not assigned to another (as it was assigned to the poor and the rich, in the dispute in B ”S and B ”H).
In the case of a patient, it should be discussed whether it is not assigned or whether it is assigned that is postponed.