About God, and reward and punishment
Hello Rabbi, two questions:
- I watched your series “Faith” on YouTube (I admit not all 50 hours, but I watched it) and in the fifth and final step you say that if we saw that there is a God who created the world and designed it and expects moral behavior, etc., then apparently He is also supposed to be revealed (sort of, I assume you have some misunderstandings about my wording). But I didn’t understand one thing – in the previous parts you showed each of the arguments and you showed one of them proving or at least giving a very reasonable indication of the existence of God, when each argument defines Him differently (the cosmological as “first cause – creator” and the moral as “validating morality,” for example). But how do you reconcile them? How do you know that the Creator is the same entity that expects moral behavior? Etc. It is possible that you answered this and I didn’t notice.
- I saw an interesting argument for proving rewards and punishment and I wanted to know what you think about it:
First premise: Destroying the world is immoral (thought experiment – if you were given a button that, when pressed, would destroy all of reality, would you press it? Of course not)
Second premise: A world without justice (i.e. reward and punishment) is worthy of destruction. A world where everything goes to one place and the righteous perish with the wicked (without continuation) is worthy of destruction.
Assuming and agreeing with these two assumptions (and at least I completely agree with them), it follows that in this world there is justice, there is reward and punishment. And since we see that it does not exist, or at least not all of it, in this world, then there will be it in the next world (or in the future).
And don’t say that the only reason I won’t destroy the world is because I rely on the chance that there is reward and punishment (right now I don’t know), a. Because it’s equivalent to saying that there is justice for sure but not perfect, and b. Because the “emptiness” is indeed just and therefore is preferable to a world that might be just.
1. I did answer and you probably didn’t notice. Occam’s razor.
2. I didn’t understand what the pepper adds. This. You can simply say that it is unfair to treat the righteous and the wicked in the same way, so it is clear that there is reward and punishment.
Rabbi, it's hard for me to understand how you can base something so big and significant on Occam's razor. A big claim requires big proof.
Right. The whole argument is proof that the world is indeed fair.
All science is based on Occam's razor. Big enough for you? Or does that mean you get it too?
And besides, there are several gods. So what?
A. Science proves reality while you try to prove the transition. And besides, there are rare times when science has not discovered in the end that it was wrong and changed its explanation. A scientist does not need to know that he is facing the law of gravity while you and I need to know who we are facing (during prayer and in general).
B. It is a lie that this is complete heresy, everything is fine.
C. For clarification - does the rabbi actually agree that the argument proves that the world is fair?
What does it matter? Either you accept the razor principle or you don't. And by the way, God exists in reality.
The argument doesn't even pretend to prove that the world is fair. It assumes that
Well, I propose to end. The discussion seems pointless to me.
Rabbi, I would just like one last clarification: Where did the argument assume that the world is fair? Is there some hidden assumption that I am not paying attention to? In the second assumption, I was talking about a hypothetical world that is unfair?
A second assumption is that a world without justice deserves to be destroyed (an assumption that itself is not entirely clear to me). In other words, you assume that the business is being conducted morally.
Beyond that, the conclusion really does not follow from the assumptions. How is there justice in the world? Because it is not being destroyed? So we are back to the assumption that the matter is being conducted fairly.
But that. Please don't pull my tongue again. This is really a completely unnecessary discussion.
The Rabbi says just one last thing, then you decide whether to answer or not
I'm not assuming anything, I'm saying:
Would I destroy the world? Of course not. How is it clear that it wouldn't? From morality, just as it is clear that it is not to murder
Would I destroy an unfair world? Of course yes
Therefore I know that the world is fair, not because it is not destroyed – but because I would not destroy it
I saw that the Rabbi wrote here on the site that he doesn't know if there is reward and punishment. I wanted to ask what the Rabbi says about dividing offenses between a person and a person for which there is a punishment [He will send me down to the world again if there is trouble] because it is understandable that I have hurt someone, but for offenses between a person and a place there is no punishment because he is not a person and I cannot hurt him, and therefore there is no reason to assume that he will punish us for this. And regarding reward, there is no reason to assume that it is possible, as the Rabbi explains, that he created us as slaves to serve him for a spiritual purpose by us fulfilling a mitzvot and nothing more. I ask the Rabbi because it bothers me many times what is the point of giving a punishment if I did not harm her. At most, it seems to me that if I did not do my duties, he will send me down to the world again so that I may complete the purpose for which I was intended.
I have no idea.
I saw that the source of the reward in the next world is the גמ in Kiddushin, which the גמ asks, "It is written, 'For the sake of prolonging your days,' regarding honoring your parents, and the גמ brings a story from one who honored and died, and therefore it comes to the conclusion that it is a reward in the next world, according to the rabbi, who claims that it is doubtful whether there is a reward in the next world. How do you explain the promise of the verses? [There is apparently evidence here that the rabbi claims that even our rabbis did not speak facts from the Holy Spirit, but rather by virtue of evidence from verses and their context.]
It is necessary to extend this to Toba. Indeed, it seems that the Gemara learns this from observing the world and explaining it. But it does not have to reach the point of honoring parents. Such a consideration exists in relation to every injustice in the world (righteous and evil). It is more likely that this is just another reference or confirmation of an existing tradition or an existing understanding.
The promise of the verses can be explained in several ways, and building a new conclusion on verses is really not the most reliable matter. It is also written "eye for eye" and "until I come to the Lord of hair" and more. Here are some suggestions:
1. They will prolong the right hand qualitatively. You will have good days.
2. They will prolong your days as a public. A public that honors parents has a longer life expectancy (not necessarily for those who honor themselves). Due to evolutionary altruism.
3. Your life will generally be prolonged, unless there is another reason that contradicts this (such as the well-known explanation of the Rabbis about the caution in the Havdalah about the cup that gave him male children). In other words, honoring parents leads to longevity, but if there is another reason to shorten one's life (for example, that his father was not careful with his vows) then they can be shortened.
And so on and so forth.
All of this, of course, calls into question the very evidence that the Gemara presents, and indeed it is very weak evidence. Wart. It seems that someone today draws such a renewed theological conclusion from observing a single case. It is written in the Torah that the king shall not multiply wives for himself and his heart shall not turn away. There is a king who has many wives and his heart has turned away. Therefore, the prohibition is invalid or the explanation is incorrect, etc. Just look at how my conclusions regarding providence that are obtained from observing the conduct of the world and science in general (and not just a single case), and you will understand how hasty and not serious this conclusion of the Gemara is. Aggadatha.
Therefore, in general, when there is no evidence from verses and no clear tradition from Sinai, then even if there is a logical consideration in favor of the Awwa, it is at most a logical consideration with a speculative conclusion. Is this conclusion correct or not? I have no idea. Maybe so, but I would not base on it the tenets of faith and the concepts of heresy and firm certainty as is usually heard in relation to these perceptions. I have written more than once that in my opinion it is logical that there is some continuation, but such a consideration can create at most possible speculation and certainly not absolute truth or a binding tenet of faith.
In fact, your method is very similar to the Sadducean method as explained in Josephus, who describes the Sadducees thus: “But according to the teaching of the Sadducees, the soul disappears along with the body, and their main aspiration for the world is nothing but the observance of the laws; for to disagree with the teachers of wisdom, to whom they are bound, is considered good learning in their eyes. This Torah has reached (only) a few people, although to the foremost, but they do nothing (according to it), if it is possible to say (so). For when they come to power, they act unconsciously and even forcibly according to what the Pharisee would say, otherwise the masses would not tolerate them.” What does the Rabbi think of them? Were they just a party or an organized system?
I didn't write any position here so I don't understand how you compare my position to anything.
I have no opinion on them. I don't know them.
In general, the description I gave of the Sadducees very much describes the Rabbi's thinking, such as keeping the laws and also disagreeing with the teachers of wisdom, and in our case, they denied the permanence of the soul, etc. They thought with reason, as the Rabbi does regarding everything, including the Messiah, and yet the Sages denounced them and wrote about them that they had deviated from the Torah. Why does it not matter to the Rabbi to reconcile this with the Rabbi's worldview? The Sages had a stronger intuition [as explained in your book, Movements Among the Standing].
I don't understand the question. If they say like me, then I think they are right. Surprising? The question of whether they really say like me or not is a question that should be discussed in its entirety in each aspect separately, but it doesn't really interest me. Especially regarding issues on which I have not expressed an opinion (such as reward and punishment or avul”b).
You ask why I am not excited that the sages opposed my views (identity with the Sadducees?)? Again, I don't understand this strange question. I have my own position based on various arguments, and I do not reject it because of ad hominem (reference to an authority or some person) but rather based on arguments. Furthermore, in order to say that the sages opposed my views, you need to be specific about which view exactly you are talking about, and not a general statement that it is like the Sadducees and the sages opposed the Sadducees. This is not a serious discussion, and as far as I am concerned, it is completely exhausted.
Now I found Yerushalmi 18:22, whose words apparently can be proven as the words of the rabbi regarding reward in the world to come, and so Rabbi Abbahu, who is your blood, Evron, Kumi 13:13, Naharin, Dafersmon, said, "Lun, all Ilin, to whom?" They said to him, "Your father said, "Lun, all Ilin, Daber," and I said to Rick, "I am tired." Apparently, from the simplicity of the words, it seems that Rabbi Abbahu did not think that there is a reward, but that is how God said it and that is how it should be done.
It's good to pepper it, and that's it.
Does the rabbi perhaps know of books by scholars or rabbis on the subject? Is there such a thing as Jewish philosophy [or is it all taken from their environment]?
not
Why does the Rabbi write about reward and punishment that he does not know, and about other things that follow common sense, such as in your first book, you wrote that common sense is that there is a cause and effect, and there is no reason why we should not say this about the ’ even though it is an entity with which we have no experience, the Rabbi has an opinion on the matter and also about the meaning of the commandments. The Rabbi explains that it is for spiritual matters, even though the Rabbi has no knowledge of what happens above, from the island to the island?
I didn't understand the question. When there is a logical consideration, I definitely take it into account. It doesn't make the conclusion knowledge, but rather something that is proven.
Why doesn't the Rabbi make some kind of analogy from reward and punishment from our world [the court] regarding the ’
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