Actualism and Informativism – Aristotelianism and Platonism?
Have a blessed week, Rabbi Michi,
I would like to ask three questions regarding Aristotelianism and Platonism in the context of the theory of ideas:
A) In your book “God Plays Dice,” Appendix B, you deal with the evidence in favor of the informativists in a debate with the actualists.
I wanted to ask (following the fact that you did not address this point in the book):
Do you think there is a clear connection between the actualist position and the Aristotelian position, and between the informativist position and the Platonic position?
That is, Aristotelianism assumes that things cannot be generalized together, and that any generalization in the world is at the discretion, imagination, and benefit of the generalizer.
And Platonism believes that: 1) it is possible to generalize, and 2) from the generalization, a conclusion can be drawn regarding the existence of something spiritual (a natural law) that underlies the details (this is separate from the main question you present there – that generalization seeks to order the world according to our patterns of thought. However, it seems to me that the first floor of the Informativists must insist on the possibility of Platonic generalization)
b) Another question:
Is the controversy between Aristotelianism and Platonism related to the debate over the existence of God, in the context of the proof from complexity?
That is, the proof of complexity requires proving the existence of a spiritual being from a generalization of reality in the world, which according to Aristotelianism is perhaps irrelevant.
c) What is your understanding of the relationship between the Platonic Idea and its representation in the world?
That is, assuming that the idea of horse breeding is abolished, what will happen to the horse I have on the farm? Will it disappear?
With greetings and great appreciation
A) A tenuous connection in my opinion. Aristotle is willing to accept generalizations, he just doesn’t see them as entities. And those who make generalizations don’t necessarily perceive them as entities. \
b) No. God is not the idea of complexity. Complexity proves his existence. It is not the same thing.
C) I don’t know. I guess not.
Regarding 1 –
From the example you bring from Borges' story about that planet, (as I understood it until now) to understand the Aristotelian method, I understood that the Aristotelian method has no real meaning for generalization in the world, and that it is a function of the generalizer only.
After all, if the generalization of horses and the generalization of all animals over seventy meters tall – are equally equal in the Aristotelian method (according to your explanation in the lessons), then the generalization in general is at the head of the generalizer, and not something real in the world.
If so, apparently this should also apply to the generalization of natural laws.
What did I miss?
No, that's not true. Aristotle accepts generalizations and makes a lot of use of them. He only claims that the generalization describes the law that governs the behavior of things in our world and does not reflect an idea that exists somewhere. Horseness is a generalization that we make about horses and it is true in the sense that it describes what all horses have in common. But there is no idea of horseness. The law of gravity is also true according to Aristotle, except that there is no idea of gravity in another world.
I think what confuses you is my claim that if the generalizations are indeed true, then it is likely that they also have an ontic (=Platonic) root. But Aristotle does not think so, and according to him the generalizations are true and do not have such a root.
Thank you very much.
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