After many to deviate in prohibition and permission
To the Rabbi Shalom
The judge in Holin Y. studies the law of “Zil Batar Ruba” in nine chastity and one tarifa from the verse “… after many to turn”
But the verse speaks of a ruling in a court of law, and the leap to the laws of prohibition and permission seems very puzzling to me.
After all, the essence of the law is to decide here and there, and therefore a verse is needed to instruct to rule according to the majority (and not according to another method such as wisdom or seniority, for example).
But in the laws of prohibition and permission, if it is a significant minority such as 9 against 1, there is seemingly no reason not to act according to the laws of sufficiency (to be lenient in the Durban, to be stricter in the Dauraita)
As with the laws of impurity, we should have been stricter in the case of the rabbi and more lenient in the case of the rabbi.
What is the mechanism that allowed Chazal to interpret this verse in this way?
I thought that perhaps the court understood that following the majority is a simple matter (contrary to what I wrote above), and therefore if it is not the court’s concern, it will be something else… but that seems narrow to me, and I really haven’t found a hint of that anywhere.
Thanks in advance.
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”Even in a court, one can not decide”
A court is expected to decide. To rule according to the laws of sufficiency means not to rule, because without a court, everyone must act according to the laws of sufficiency in the event of doubt
It seems to me that the explanation is simple in general when it comes to a significant minority such as a single person, or perhaps 51 kashrut shops and 49 terifots. It seems to me that there is a presumption for annulment by a large majority, not a narrow majority. It is true that a large majority that has the power to annul must be defined, but a single person certainly cannot be considered an annulment by a large majority
That is to say: there is a presumption for annulment by a majority but not for following the majority, unless one must take a position
Regarding impurity: In nine frogs and one creeper, one also follows the majority, as I understand it, and there I also ask why
Since there is no line, set it at 50%. I don't see any problem with that.
As I understand it, there are two different concepts (before the Halacha was abolished)
– Cancellation by majority
– Following the majority
Cancellation by majority is a very reasonable thing, since it is used in practice in many areas, not only in Halacha: if a small piece of waste falls into the food, it is not scrupulous. The condition, however, is that the majority be a very large majority: no one can eat a meal consisting of 49% waste and 51% food. Even today, everyone gets on a plane even though there is a one in a billion chance that it will crash. But no one will get on a plane (even once in a lifetime) if the chance of a crash is one in ten
Following the majority means that even though the majority is small, there are situations in which the minority is not taken into account. This becomes clear when one must take a stand. Otherwise, it is a major innovation and not intuitive. Therefore, Halacha requires a verse. And indeed, "after many to incline" with respect to a majority of judges, but as I said above, we expect a court to decide otherwise, the court has no meaning, which is not the case with a private decision on prohibition and permission, where we should have returned to annulment by a large majority only and not to following the majority.
Another note: If the commandments have meaning in reality (metaphysically, Platonist approach), then there is no reason to cancel a prohibition by a small majority, as I explained above (the parable of the airplane).
However, if there are no consequences for the commandments in reality, and the measure is only the level of obedience to the commandment of God, then it is possible that for every action it is necessary to define what its nature is (forbidden or permitted), and this definition can certainly be defined by the majority.
Even if there are consequences in reality, there was reason to argue that we would be worse off in any situation. Why take the risk of eating pork? Therefore, in any case, it is clear that the halacha allows taking risks in order to live a reasonable life. They crossed the line halfway. Beyond that, even if there is spiritual harm, if the halacha permits, perhaps it negates the spiritual harm.
Sorry if I wasn't clear, but I meant the opposite: If there are consequences in reality (metaphysical), it's hard to understand what the argument is for drawing a line in the middle. And the proof is in the parable of the airplane.
If there are no consequences in reality, then you can draw a line in the middle in order to live a normal life without violating the divine command
In other words: According to the Platonist approach, it's hard for me to understand the argument for making things so easy, because we make our lives easier at the expense of a defect in another ”place” that will happen with a probability of (for the sake of discussion) 49%
You were clear. I argued that even if there were realistic consequences, there was room to argue that no majority should be permitted unless there is certainty.
I'll try again…
We agree (I think) that it is impossible to demand following the majority in prohibition and permission, unless there is a priori assumption that following the majority (with the line in the middle) in prohibition and permission is at least reasonable.
Assuming that prohibition and permission have implications in metaphysical reality, how is it reasonable a priori to put the line in the middle and not somewhere in a large majority that has the power to cancel?
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