Aliyah and Torah reading by women

I'll tell you my personal opinion (many poskim disagree, but in my opinion this is conservatism without any halachic basis). There is no halachic impediment to reading and making the Torah even within the framework of a minyan of men. There is no impediment to all the ol'ah being women. This is an explicit law in the mishnah (all ol'ahs are for a minyan of seven) and there is no need to go to extremes to permit this. Although there is talk of preventing their reading out of respect for the public, this is an argument that I believe is irrelevant today (no man is offended by the fact that a woman is more learned than him, as this is a very common issue today. And even if someone is offended – it is entirely their problem. In my opinion, if at all, then the public is offended by the exclusion of women from what there is no reason to exclude them). She recites the usual blessings because there is no difference between her and a man. Moreover, in any case, it is Ashkenazi custom for women to recite blessings even for mitzvot that they are not obligated to perform. In particular, they are obligated to recite the blessings of the Torah (see Shulchan Aruch 34). If you would like to delve deeper, I am attaching a very moderate article (I am more extreme than that) that discusses the matter in detail: You can find many more articles on Google (although you should know that not everything written in the article is true, of course). As for the number of women, this is discussed in Aryeh Primer's article, and here is a summary, including sources as you requested (taken from here ): Another question is whether women can hold a minyan themselves as if it were a minyan for men, that is, a prayer that includes reciting the ‘Barcho’, ‘Kaddish’, ‘Kedushah’, and other things that require a minyan. In the article ‘The Status of Women in Halacha – Women and Minyan’, Rabbi Aryeh Avraham Primer presents three methods regarding women joining a minyan: [21] According to the first method, women join the minyan only in matters that apply to them in exactly the same way as men, whether the obligation is from the Torah or from the rabbis, as long as the obligation on everyone is equal. According to this method, women join the minyan of men because their obligation is the same. The Meiri says: “All that she needs for ten” 11. Since the obligation of women is equal to that of men, they join the ten… and it will not be seen as such,” meaning that some believe this, although this is not the opinion of the Meiri.[22] In his words, the Meiri relies on Rabbi Chaim Eliezer ben Yitzhak, author of the Or Zarua, who said: [23]
And although regarding the issue of summons, they said [Berachot Ma A], “Women summon themselves… for the sake of breaking the law… but they join the scroll and it will not be seen as such. A simple custom from the words of the Ge’onim when they read the scroll, for they are reading it as a letter to announce the miracle and not as a Torah scroll.”[24]
[Since a scroll is opened as a letter to announce the miracle, unlike a reading from the Torah, no reading from a scroll is the same as a reading from the Torah, and therefore there are opinions that allow women to join in announcing the miracle and in the case of a scroll, women can therefore be active partners.] This means that the commandment to read the Megillah is clearly considered a commandment whose main purpose is to publish, and therefore not all the same laws that apply to reading the Torah apply to it. Although women are required to pray individually, they are exempt from praying in congregation, and therefore, according to this definition, which holds that their joining is dependent on publication, they do not join the minyan for the purpose of prayer. Therefore, their prayer as a group cannot include matters of holiness and will forever remain an individual prayer. Regarding Torah reading, according to most poskim, women are exempt, but Rabbi Yosef Teumim, author of Peri Maggid, believes that women do not join the minyan for Torah reading because they are exempt from reading, unlike for the reading of the Megillah, where they are required and therefore join. [25] The second method denies women the right to participate in anything related to the minyan. The source of this opinion is in the Gemara, in Tractate Berakhot, page 5, 2b: "And a hundred women are considered as two men." On this issue, the Gemara deals with the obligation to invite, and further writes that women invite themselves, and slaves invite themselves, as soon as there are at least three people, since there are three opinions, and three opinions are more important than two men. But the Tosafot interpret that any number of women will never be useful for matters that require a minyan, and even a hundred women will always be considered only two. There are additional sources that support this view, such as the Or of the Gra.[26] The argument is that since women are not worthy of completing a minyan, they cannot join in the reading of the Torah even in cases where they are obligated to do so, such as in the parsha of Zakhor. According to this method, the determination is not made according to the degree of obligation of the women, but according to the determination that they cannot join in the minyan for the purpose of sanctifying God. According to Rabbi Yosef Engil: "The issue of a congregation depends on the inheritance of the land and its hold, for only through this do people connect and gather together, but women have no hold, for they did not take part in the land and therefore did not gather a congregation."[27] Another view of the system is that of Rabbi Gedaliah Felder, who believes that in order for a person to be considered part of the congregation, he must be completely devoted to the congregation at that time, and since women are always in the possession of their husbands, they cannot devote themselves to the congregation and therefore do not join the minyan. [28] In order not to divide among the women, the same applies to single women. According to this system, women cannot hold any ceremony that requires a minyan because they are not allowed to read from the Torah in the first place. Therefore, even in cases where women are required to hear the Torah read, they cannot join the minyan because they are not worthy to complete a holy congregation. Here, joining is not dependent on obligation, but on their established status as women. The third method distinguishes between a minyan for "existence" and a minyan for "publicity." In a regular minyan, a minimum of ten men is required to observe certain mitzvot, but there are cases where the purpose of the mitzvot is only for publicity, and in such cases women join the minyan of men even if their degree of obligation is not the same as that of men (unlike the first method). It seems that the distinction between these two types of minyanim was first made in the matter of reading the Megillah, and this is the opinion of the Rabbi:[29] And the late Ramban wrote… All of them are considered to be a public duty [in Mishnah Berakhot, page 23, 2], and those who perform them are not obligated in any way, such as not hearing Kaddish and reciting the blessing. But the Megillah is not in their view, but rather because of the publication of the Nissa… [Unlike other texts that require a minyan for their existence, the Megillah requires a minyan for the purpose of publication, and therefore women certainly also participate in the publication of the Nissa.] The Ritva also believes that women join the minyan for the purpose of reading the Megillah: "Therefore, here [to join] them, they are nothing but for the publications of Nissa Balama… they join."[30] According to the law, the great Aharonim have ruled that women join the minyan for the purpose of publicizing, such as reading the Megillah. There is a dispute regarding women joining in the matter of sanctification, since this is a classic example of something that is essentially the sanctification of the name of God in public, that is, publicity. If so, do women join in matters of sanctification of God or not? Some associate them with this method, such as Rabbi Mizelman, but in the opinion of Rabbi Primer, women joining in matters of sanctification of God is only possible according to the first method.[31] Notes: [19] A.A. Primer, 'The Status of Women in Halacha – Women and Menin', Or Hamizrah, volume 34 [Booklets A-B (22-22)], New York, 1986. [20]Relying on O.H., section 55, Halacha a. [21] Above, note 19. [22] Relying on O.H., section 55, Halacha a. [23] Cited in Rama at the end of the 1970s. [24] Rav Hai Gaon, cited there. [25] Rosh Yosef, Megillah 23a, 45, "Lima Ra", Lviv, 18th century, cited in Primer (above, note 19). [26] The Gra's commentary on Orach Chaim 107, section 10, halakha 6, and see additional sources in note 73 in Primer's article, ibid. [27] In the Shas editions, for blessings of Ha-Ha, it is cited in Primer, ibid. [28] Peri Yeshurun, On the Great Tanya, Part 1, on the subject of reciting the Shema and its blessings, letter 15, page 368, cited in Primer, ibid. [29] The Wars of the Lord, Book 5, 1. [30] The Ritva's novellas to Megillah 4, 1, Sudha Shaaf. M. Meiselman, Tradition 52 (3), Fall 1975 [31] cited in Primer (above, note 19), note 20. [32] See Primer (supra, note 19), note 71. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Greetings to Rabbi Michi, Following on from my questions about women reading Torah, I read Rabbi Primer's article (and I also saw that you included my question and your answer on your website). It seems to me that Rabbi Primer feels more comfortable with women's aliyah specifically within the framework of a minyan of men, and not even when all the aliyah are women. I want to refine our questions because our minyan is going to determine how we conduct ourselves. We are mainly talking about Simchat Torah, when the Torah reading (in most synagogues I know) is split into several locations according to the number of Torah scrolls to allow as many people (including children) as possible to approach the Torah. During the prayer service we held over the past two years, we split up so that there was one Torah scroll with the men and two with the women (several hundred Orthodox women came to pray the Torah). With the men, only men read and prayed, and with the women, only women read and prayed. The questions that are important for us to receive a clear ruling are: 1) When there are only women in the space (meaning there is no minyan of men or no men at all), are women permitted to read and ascend to the Torah, including saying "Blessing"? Is saying "Blessing" one of the things in holiness that requires a minyan of ten men? Or can ten women also constitute a minyan? 2) For those who believe that a quorum of ten men is required, does the mere fact that there are men with the help of men constitute a "sufficient" quorum for women to be able to say "Barchu" upon their ascension, or should we ensure that there are ten men who specifically intend to respond to the recitation of "Barchu" in each of the kodim? Best regards and many thanks, —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I answered you according to my opinion. I also added that, as you know, there are other opinions. I think there is a misunderstanding in your words regarding the question of what a halachic ruling is. If you expect a description of the opinions, I have already said that there are opinions here and there. In this context, my opinion is just another opinion, just like Primer's opinion. If for some reason you are interested in my opinion (even though I am not the rabbi of your community and of course you are under no obligation to accept it), then I wrote it down. Now you must decide what to do. What does it mean to give a clear halachic ruling? Do you expect me to decide for you whether to follow my opinion or other opinions? After all, even in this decision itself, you can accept or not accept my opinion, and we will return to the same point. I will repeat: In my opinion, a minyan of women is a minyan for everything, and it is possible to read and recite the oleh and bless in such a minyan. Furthermore, in my opinion, it is much better than a situation where ten male potted plants are present with the help of men and are not related to the matter and thanks to them, because many of you will ascend to the Torah with the help of women in another place. In such a situation, the Blessed One will dwell with the help of men and you will read and bless Him with the help of women?! The minyan is supposed to be ten such people who participate in the act of reading and respond to the blessings of the oleh, and not clever patents of this kind. Good luck, Michi —————————————————————————————— A': In honor of Rabbi Michael Avraham
Further to what you wrote regarding Aliyah for women, please refer to the accompanying article:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwJAdMjYRm7IQmM1N2JSYkRlejg —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Thank you for the article (which I was at least partly familiar with, and I even commented on it quite a bit).
I have now quickly gone through his writings again, and I see that it is good. Although there is of course a great deal to discuss in the manner of Torah, I will make only a few comments here (and again, I hope that you will forgive me if I am wrong because I went through them very quickly):
1. As I believe, in some cases the poskim who believe that women are exempt from reading the Torah do not say this before the consideration of public honor, but rather from this consideration itself. If this is so – then according to them the conclusion can be different (after all, if the consideration of public honor is null, and this too of course must be discussed, then the obligation itself returns). This is how I wondered about the words of the Ma'b, which cites the words of the Maga and does not bring dissenters, but nevertheless comments that indeed many did not act like him and even women used to go out. This means that there is no disagreement in principle here, but only a lack of strictness in fulfilling their obligation for some secondary reason (public honor??). Indeed, the Katzlaa says why go out if they are not obligated? And is there a prohibition on this?! I did not check now.
One way or another, regarding Aliyah and even a blessing, there is a lot of room for permission even if they themselves do not require recitation as stated in the article.
2. The words of the Rashba that you cited, that in a public setting anyone can read, even those who are not obligated, should be expanded further. As soon as the mitzvot imposed on the public are obligatory, women are also obligated in the general public, even if they are mitzvot that they should have been exempted from (such as because of the time, as in the congregation. As in education, etc.). Therefore, perhaps also in reading the Torah, and even if they understand that it is part of the law of Talmud Torah (which in itself is highly questionable to the Jewish people for several reasons), since it is a public law, women are also obligated in the general matter, and then it follows that even from the principle of the law they are actually obligated in this, and not just that they can ascend and recite the blessing.
3. I will also note that regarding public honor, if I understood correctly (I read very quickly), the article mainly discusses two arguments: 1. Is forgiveness possible? 2. Does human dignity reject it (Sperber's words). But a third argument could also arise: 3. In our current situation, there is no problem with public honor at all, because there is no harm to public honor when women read or perform ol'ah. And perhaps the opposite, when they do not perform ol'ah, it is harm to public honor. This of course depends on the question of what public honor means, and so on.
4. I would also add that even if the Rishonim and the poskim explain the term public honor in a certain way, the bottom line still depends on whether or not public honor is actually harmed. For example, even if someone explains that public honor is harmed if someone who is not obligated comes, and even if we assume that women are truly not obligated in a matter, we still have to discuss what the law is if in fact public honor is not harmed by this (or at least that is how it is perceived today). Is this exactly like a public that forgives its honor, and Talia cannot forgive or not (as discussed in the article). Or perhaps what cannot be forgiven is only said when in most cases the public does see it as an injury to its honor, and then there are opinions that if there is a specific public that wants to forgive, it cannot forgive. But here the reality has changed and all publics (at least modern ones) do not see it as an injury, so by all accounts there is no problem with public honor and Talia cannot forgive or not. In other words: the question of whether the poskim's determination that it is not public honor is factual or normative.

There is a related question here as well.