Anselm’s vision
Peace to the rabbi
I have a few questions about what you wrote in the notebook of the ontological view.
A. In Chapter 5, “Defining the Concept of God” –
You mentioned there that all the basic definitions come from the eyes of reason, and the believer derives the concept of God from “the eyes of his mind,” (and so you mentioned truthfully and unsettledly), it follows that it is possible to argue about the definitions (ibid., p. 89). It is possible to argue that the definition that Anselm gave is inappropriate for the concept of God, etc., as long as you do not deny your understandings.
That is, if I do not accept Anselm’s definition of the concept of God, I can also not accept his conclusion on the grounds that he assumed what was wanted. In other words, definitions and axioms are not at all an arbitrary procedure; if they fit our intuitive perceptions, then they are correct, and if not, they are not.
On the other hand, you mentioned later that there are concepts that have a clear and good definition but do not exist in reality itself (such as a unicorn or a fairy with three wings, etc.), meaning that concepts can be defined even without understanding and seeing with the ‘mind’s eye’, and yet they seem to have validity towards others around them.
So even if Anselm assumes what he wants, it still follows from your words that they have validity… otherwise it is not clear how one can define concepts that do not exist in reality. After all, we do not have an intuitive understanding of these things!?!
B. In Chapter 7, “The Body of the Argument” (The Villain Understands What He Hears)-
Moreover, you mentioned Anselm’s address to the devil, and wrote that Anselm’s claim (“something greater than this cannot be given,” etc.) –
Addresses two types of people (1. Toward the villain who denies the believer.)
2. To those who deny Anselm’s definition – I will quote from your words there: “2. This definition is self-evident. It consists of simple terms and concepts, and the claim that there is something incomprehensible here is dishonest. It is not reasonable to claim this…. (Therefore) it is possible that this evidence may also convince agnostics or opponents of the non-positive type. It appeals to anyone who understands the definition proposed above.”
Here, in fact, you explicitly mentioned that the mere fact that Anselm’s definition is coherent is enough for even someone who does not accept his definition of the concept of God, or is otherwise doubtful about it, to still accept it.
So your words here really need clarification!! Either the evidence can convince even those who don’t accept the definition or not. Or it can be defined without intuition or not.
third. In the chapter of Gaonillo’s appeal on the existing lost island, chapter 18,
You mentioned Gaonillo’s question, but nowhere did you accuse him of assuming what he was asking for and inventing an unrelated definition. You only tried to find a contradiction in his definition (conditioned entity, etc.).
Once again, we see in your words that you see the ontological view as appealing even to someone to whom the proposed concept is foreign. (The largest island, etc.). After all, even Gaonillo does not see the largest island ‘in his mind’s eye’. It is a fact that he brings this up as an objection! Not as proof!..
D. In one of the explanations of The Greatest Island (p. 67) you mentioned that if we assume that it is indeed possible for such an island to exist, then God is ultimately greater than it and therefore it cannot exist (unless He Himself is God),
Therefore, I came to propose a new interpretation of Anselm following the initial understanding that it is sufficient to show a definition that is coherent,
Let’s assume X – the most evil and perfect entity imaginable. Since something that exists is necessarily greater than something that does not exist, etc., then it is proven that it necessarily exists. (Here is all your objections that you mentioned towards the island not being a period – the infinity of the island in relation to God does not exist, since X is no longer from the group of islands but rather from the group of “gods”, and there is also no reason to assume that he is a conditional entity – he is not a physical body, and so on. All the objections mentioned there are not valid towards X)
And anyway, as soon as X necessarily exists, then God is no longer the most complete being, for one very basic perfection is for God to be omnipotent, but as soon as another entity exists that is omnipotent, God is no longer omnipotent. (In the sense that there are no two kings in one crown),
Also, God would have to be limited with X in some dimension and manner (I am a bit skeptical about this appeal), so in any case, God is no longer perfect.
From this it is proven that there cannot be a perfect God. And in any case, if God is not perfect, then there is a contradiction in his definition. Therefore, Anselm’s entire view is not valid towards God or any other god (after all, something else perfect will always ‘overrun’ him) and has fallen into disrepair.
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B. See previous section.
C. Indeed. See section a.
D. See a similar discussion that was here not long ago with her friends (and I’m already tired of it. Maybe it’s you?).
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D. Indeed. You wrote there in the N”D, so I said that we should not (without) breaking vows and oaths because no good would come of it.
A, B, C Okay, thank you! If so, then I completely misunderstood the evidence. Because in chapter 6, truly and unshakably means completely not so. And analogy, etc., are the eyes of reason according to your system.
E. In Descartes's view (which you didn't mention so much) – that he claims that God is the most complete being. How do you measure perfection according to his system? Between an idea of an entity and an idea of an existing entity? Like Anselm.
Or between an idea of an entity and an existing entity in reality.
F. It seems for some reason that you claim that the assumption that existence is necessarily part of perfection seems tenuous to you. If I may ask why?
A. I meant because truly and unstable On page 89 you explicitly wrote that it was not so:
“Definitions and axioms are not arbitrary and can certainly be spoken of in terms of right and wrong, or truth and falsehood. If they fit our intuitive perceptions, they are correct, and if not – then not.” The definition you gave there as a dog’ is convexity and so on’.
On the other hand, yes, you completely contradict yourself and claim that the definition cannot be judged in terms of right and wrong. Only claims can be judged as such.
I have already explained that there is no contradiction. I will come back to that again.
When you propose a definition for a concept, it can certainly be judged in terms of right and wrong. The question is whether it fits the intuitive concept that it defines or not. I have expanded on this in the series on poetry here, and I think it is very worthwhile to read there.
But in Anselm's argument, he does not propose a definition for discussion, but rather as a starting point for an argument. Let's say there is a concept X that is defined in this way and that way. Now he asks you: Do you understand the definition? (And, to be precise, I do not agree, but I understand.) If so, let's analyze it and see if we can deduce from it that the concept that it defines is realized in reality. That is all. In such a case, there is no point in discussing whether the definition fits the intuitive concept of God or not. Even if it does not - I have proven to you here the existence of another concept. For my part, you will call it an open universe and not God.
Okay, thanks. So according to your words, it turns out that the definitions here cannot be disputed. And there you tried to say that the definition aims only to conform to the basic understanding.
So, once again the question returns, you wrote in the notebook on p. 60, ‘ Necessary existence is a better candidate to be used as a predicate. Even if existence itself is not a predicate of the object, necessary existence seems to be a predicate. After all, existence stems from the definition of the object, and therefore it is truly its predicate (one of its properties). ”
So we *define* the universe of Furkan as the most evil entity that can be thought of and that necessarily exists.
We ask whether this definition is clear and understandable? Yes.
From this it is proven that it necessarily exists. After all, this is a definitional property. And not an assertion about the world.
Although the Rabbi wrote in one of the answers that this is an assertion and not a definition as if it were perfect. But it turns out here that it is indeed a definitional property.
I mean, you wrote that a definition includes only characteristics and not claims. And yes, it is enough for a definition to have the power to distinguish the defined object from other things.
So then, ‘necessary existence’ (as opposed to ‘existence’ just like that) is among the greatest characteristics that can exist. There is a huge difference between an entity that exists necessarily without… and existence necessarily is a subject as you mentioned, (as opposed to ordinary existence that can be doubted) so in any case there is no problem assuming that such a definition can exist.
And in any case, if so, we can conclude from the definition of that which characterizes the ‘unleashed universe’ – an especially wicked entity, powerful and all-powerful and all-knowing, etc., etc. and the necessity of reality. That it does indeed exist in reality, etc.
But it seems from your words that this is not the case. I would like to know why. Why is existence by necessity not a definition but an assertion?
PS It seems from Steinz's words in a scientific logical rocket that existence by necessity is indeed a definition. (Only in contingent identities is there a problem with assuming yes and yes)
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