Anyone who vows with the consent of her husband vows

The Rishonim clarified that the vow, etc., is not a condition of a vow, but rather a reason why the Torah gave the wife the right to break vows, and the Rashba wrote that this right of breaking exists even if the wife explicitly said that she was making the vow against his will, because most women want it. If so, it turns out that the law would not be different today, because in vows between her and her husband, most women apparently want to have a break (men would want it too, but the Torah did not grant permission), and even if occasionally, in a serious quarrel, they do not want it, the Torah grants the husband the right to break it according to the majority opinion.

That is why I brought the words of the Toss, which imply that Rav Pinchas's opinion is correct.

Does the Toss agree with the words of the Rashba?

Aaron,
There are various restrictions on breaking vows, such as having to say it in a specific language, or being able to hear the vow (excluding a deaf woman), etc. These restrictions indicate that this is a law that the Torah has renewed, and not a condition that women have, because if it were a matter of language and hearing, they would not be relevant (see Rabbi Nedarim, 3b).
What is the relationship between the law of breaking vows and the rule that every woman makes a vow, etc.?
The Torah renewed that since women make vows with the consent of their husbands, they will have the husband's permission to break them. This is evident from the Rabbis and the Rabbis mentioned above. This is also evident from the words of the Rabbi in the answer to the rule of the Rabbis, who called every woman a "main reason" And he explained there that the main reason does not depend on the method of R’ Shimon, who taught the doctrine of the reading of the text, and therefore laws can be deduced from it. There is no reason to think that the Tosafot would disagree on this principle.
(If it were not for the words of the above-mentioned Rishonim, it might have been possible to say that “everything that is vowed” is not a rule in the opinion of the woman and is not the reason for the law, but rather it is a law that the Torah renewed that for women’s vows, the condition of the vow will be in the opinion of the husband, not because they vow in the opinion of the husband, but because the Torah binds their vows in it).

As Aharon wrote, the Torah does not seem to be so (but rather that it is a real condition).
Incidentally, as you explained, I once wrote about all the temple vows and the ephemeral vows, which are usually understood as a condition of the husband (the law of Moses and Israel), while the simple explanation is that it is a condition that the Torah gives (like a heart in a dream).
The Rashba also attached this to the opinion of most women, and therefore it is not clear that it is not a condition. It is an implicit condition of society as a whole, and therefore anyone who vows is presumed to vow this way. But if it were to be shown that a situation arose where most women do not vow this way, it seems that the Rashba would also agree. According to Aharon, this is the situation today. Although his words are generally correct.
Although, as I wrote, with vows of torture and between us, it is certainly likely that this is also the case today, but perhaps it is mutual. And by the way, even the novelty of breaking vows, if there is a condition, it certainly applies, and therefore, even if there is an estimate that the woman vowed in this way, it applies to all opinions. We did not find any innovation that a woman cannot vow with a condition. And in the law of conditions, it is explained that in matters that are in the heart and mind of every person, they are not in accordance with all the laws of the condition.
And another note, the head who wrote that it is a main reason that does not depend on the dispute regarding the reason for reading, apparently follows his method as I explained above (he also writes this about the cancellation of regulations when their reason is canceled).

1. I don't know if Tosafot doesn't mean yes, I haven't checked, but I wouldn't be surprised if even the Rabbi who wrote quite clearly that it is not a condition, would explain it here like Tosafot.
2. That's really how I understood it in ”kol d'mekdesh ada'ta darbanan mikdesh” (but I haven't seen anyone in the Rishonim who understood it this way). In vows, this is an even clearer view because here the Torah explicitly granted the right to violate the husband.
3. Regarding the Rashba, you wrote: “This is an implicit condition of society as a whole, and therefore one who vows is presumably vowing thus” but the Rashba wrote the same thing even if she says that she is not vowing with her husband's consent (I understand: that she says so even at the time of the vow (*))
4. Indeed, according to the Rashba, apparently if most women don't want to, it is possible for the law to change. But for the ענדה, this does not really depend on an actual and conscious will at the time of the vow - it is clear that even in the time of the Gemara, a person who excluded her husband from using the bed during a quarrel did so intentionally in order to punish him and not so that he would make amends to her. So what is the intention that she vowed on his mind? Apparently, somewhere in the subconscious there is some kind of assumption that there is a way out and an escape if she reconciles him (such an assumption is impossible to empirically examine, and therefore it is not clear that it changes over time. On the one hand, this is a problematic assumption because it is not empirical but intuitive, and on the other hand, how can one explain the ability to break the vow even during a quarrel?).
5. It is clear that a woman can make a condition, but the halachic restrictions on the language of the vow and on the ability to hear (except for a deaf woman) prove that this is not a condition (perhaps this is related to what I wrote in the previous section, that there is no actual will here, but rather a relaxation of the mind, not necessarily conscious of the ability to break the vow).

(*) This is the language of the Rashba (d. s. i): … And in this place, the congregation's prohibition is severe, from the oath of a married woman who swears under her husband. Even though it explicitly said: that she does not swear by her husband; even though her husband violates her. The Torah gave it with the permission of the husband, for every vow and every oath of prohibition that involves torture of the soul, or that is between her and her husband. And also with the permission of the father, for every girl and with the permission of a father who is not married. Because the majority, so they think, and most of them with the knowledge of so they swear. But the congregation, that they act thus of their own accord, it is enough for us to rely on their hidden actions on the conditions of this thought. But as long as they are explicit, or in a way that their thoughts are evident from their actions, or from their language, the matter is subject to his judgment, and he has no permission.

As I wrote, the Rashba's words are very puzzling. If the Torah determined this, then what does it matter to most women? Beyond that, it is clear that there is a condition in vows, and therefore regardless of the language of the breach and other halachic requirements, and even if we perceive that the breach is not a condition, if it turns out that there is such a condition in the woman's vow, it is still possible to break it in any language we want.
In explaining the Rashba's method, we see in a possible way that most women only determine the marriage contract (what the couple agreed to there). When a woman consents to the Kiddushin, she hands over to her husband some authority over her, including the breach. The question is what she gave up, and this is indicated by what most women intend. And when the majority changes, it seems that the consent during the Kiddushin changes. Therefore, even if a woman told the bridegroom at the time of the vow that the husband would not break it, it is of no use because she already made the consent to it at the time of the Kiddushin.
The point is that if a woman says during the Kiddushin that her vows are not at the husband's discretion, it will be beneficial even if most women do not agree to it. And in fact, this is like any condition in Kiddushin.
Although I have always wondered why we never put a condition on the woman's gift in Kiddushin (even "in order for the father to please" is a condition on the part of the husband). Although the husband does the deed, the wife's consent is required, and she can certainly consent to the condition. And so be it.

These are somewhat difficult things in my opinion, since a husband breaks his wife's vows even when she was consecrated by her father, and even when she was consecrated by the rabbis by her mother and brother.
And how can her mother and brother transfer the rights of breaking the vow to the husband if they are not in their hands at all (since they cannot break her vows when she reaches the age when her vows are examined)? Furthermore, how can a wife break her vows? It is impossible to say that by breaking her vows she transfers the rights, since breaking her vows applies even when she did not excuse herself from breaking them at all (unless it is said that by betrothal to her dead husband she already transferred the right of breaking their vows)?
And the Rashba himself, in his novellas on vows, wrote: “But Dr’ Eliezer believed that since she was bought for him either by engagement or by marriage and her time came, she gave her mind and made a vow to him, and we have no reason to read that it is said that her father and her husband break her vows; this can apparently be said only if it is a suspension of a vow, not if it is a kind of agreement, since when she is still a minor, she apparently does not have the power to claim the right to break it.
Of course, according to the Rashba, this is not a condition, but a general concession of most women, because of which the Torah granted the husband the ability to break his vows, not by virtue of a condition.

52
The Tosafot in Nida Mo wrote (and the Rashba in Nida quoted their words and did not share): “And it is written in Parasha Nedarim that a husband breaks his wife's vows even if’ Is not his wife like this: the husband breaks his vows against his will and Deitztrich says that if he said, "It is lawful for me" that he cannot break his vows, because he said, "May God have mercy on him, if the husband breaks his vows against his will, she makes a vow, and yet, this is nothing but a rabbinical marriage, and the Torah did not say that he broke his vows against his will."
This means that it is a complete condition. And both excuses need to be examined:
1. The first excuse is a bit difficult, and what about the one who said, "It is lawful for me"? In the end, the condition will not be fulfilled. Moreover, if so, in a rabbinical marriage, the husband's presence will not be of any use, and why did we find this difference?
2. The second excuse in the Tosafot seems to be understood as a woman vowing on the advice of her husband because the Torah has given him the right to break it, that is, the reversal of cause and effect - it is not the opinion of women that leads to the right to break it, but the right to break it leads to the opinion of women. But if that is so, the Gemara is difficult in another place, which says that we have not found this prohibiting and this permitting and making a woman's vows difficult, and it excuses that anyone who vows on the advice of her husband is a vower, but apparently this is not consistent with the Tosafot's excuse here that the law of breaking vows precedes the opinion of the woman.
And the Tz'a and the Ha'a shed light on our eyes.

Indeed, all of this is a matter of law. But the precedence of the law in her opinion is puzzling. If either way the law is this, why is her opinion required? The words were only said in the rabbinic kiddushin, where from the main point of the law he does not have the right to break, but from a point of view that she believes he has it, as in the rabbinic kiddushin, therefore she hands it over to him.
But it seems more likely that the intention is not that the law precedes the condition, but rather that the verse that hands over the husband the right to break reveals to us that a woman vows on his will. This is a matter of interpretation. Although the language of the rabbinic does not mean that this is what they mean, otherwise they would not have to say regarding rabbinic marriages that she believes he can break, but simply that she hands over the right to break to him, as in the rabbinic Torah. It is understood that the rabbinic law is not a matter of law. Therefore, their language truly means that the right precedes the condition, and a matter of law.

And regarding a younger woman, it must be said that the condition comes from the husband: he sanctifies her on the condition that he be given the right to break her vows. And I have already noted that we have not found conditions that the woman imposes in the sanctification. Even when there are conditions in her favor, it is the husband who imposes them. And certainly when the condition is in his favor, as here (who can break her vows). She (or her father and mother) only consents to it.

The problem with her father and mother and brother is not difficult. If they are able to give consent, they are also able to give consent with conditions.

How is it appropriate to discuss a husband who is gay, a cliché, if it is merely a condition that the wife submits to her husband's will?

We have already stated above that it is unlikely that this is an ordinary condition but rather a Torah law. Beyond that, why is it necessary specifically on the day of hearing and in a specific language, etc.?
Migs Gays' question does not seem difficult to me regarding the concept of the condition. It is a condition in the opinion of both (the fiancé and the father), and therefore the question of how to precisely determine its opinion is divided between the two. What is the problem with this?

This is exactly what I came to prove, even though the words of the rabbi in Gittin Peg are outdated: It seems that the husband does not permit and does nothing in breaking his wife's vow. I am referring to the issue in Nazir, page 22: which discusses a woman who vowed to be a nun and became defiled and then her husband broke her vow, whether by breaking it he revokes her vow retroactively or only from now on and she needs a sacrifice, and it is simply that it is not possible to stipulate that a vow will be imposed and then revoked from now on by someone's will or subject to some condition; conditions can only apply retroactively or not apply at all.

I didn't understand. I wrote that I don't see proof of the Migs Gays issue even though I agree with the conclusion you wanted to prove (as described above in the thread).
As for the conditions from here to here, it's not accurate. There is from here to here and a retroactive one, and the main evidence is precisely a vow that is considered something that has a permissibility even though its permissibility was revoked retroactively. See the lessons of Rabbi Shmuel Makot Si’ Takht.