Attack Cohen
Greetings to Rabbi Michael.
Our rabbis taught us that in the sense of justice, all obligations of one person arise from the rights of another, while an obligation in a judgment does not arise from the rights of another. An example of this is the commandment of charity and usury.
The redemption of a son is a mitzvah in Yore Dea. The father’s obligation to redeem his son. Ostensibly, the father’s obligation creates a right for the priest to receive stones from the father of the son in order to redeem his son. This right of the priest is not a right that stems from the property that the priest has in the child. And the father of the son can choose another priest as he wishes. The situation is quite similar in charity, the poor have no right to the charity money, the giver has an obligation to give.
The same is true of the issue of Cohen’s attack.
Why is there even a dispute over whether to remove from the priest the firstborn concerning whom there is doubt?
After all, the priest has no proprietary right to the firstborn he has seized. The obligation lies with the owner, and he can choose another priest.
They should take it out of the priest’s hand, give it to the owner, and he should decide which priest to give it to. Why is the fact that there is doubt about the authenticity relevant to whether to take it out of the priest’s hand?
Thanks in advance for the answer.
Simply put, even if the benefit is money, the object itself does not belong to the owner, but only the benefit in it. Therefore, when a priest seizes the firstborn, he seizes his (the tribe of priests’) property, but he deprives the owner of the benefit of the property. Therefore, at most, he can be required to pay the benefit of the property but not return the object (see Ramban and Rashba Kiddushin Noah, 2b, regarding the theft of his friend’s baptismal font. The Ritva disagrees there, and simply the dispute is whether the benefit of the property is actually the owner’s property or not). However, this too must be discussed, since the Rishonim in the Lesser Holin disagree about the harm of the benefit of the property of his friend, which for one reason in the Gemara there is property that has no claimants, why does it not have to be paid. For Rashi, this means that he is obligated to pay the priests, but there is no specific priest who can sue because he can defer it to another priest. And in Tos’ and Rosh there they added that he is obligated to pay according to the laws of Heaven. From this we see that it is the property of the tribe of priests. And the Rabbi on the Rif there wrote that there is no financial law here. His words indicate that it does not belong to the priests, and in his opinion there is room for your question.
But even with this method, it seems that there is an obligation to give to the priests, and as long as he has not given a benefit, it is his. But once it reaches the priests, it is certainly their property, and the law of benefit is not claimable (either because it is a grama in the first place, or perhaps because it is not complete property, as the Rishonim disagreed with in the aforementioned Kiddushin). Especially since in our case we are talking about a firstborn who is holy from the start and does not need a section like Tarom, and therefore it is even more clear there that none of this is stated.
Did Cohen attack correctly in the case of Adam's firstborn?
That the priest will catch the child?
yes
They will arrest him for kidnapping and child trafficking.
What the hell?! The child is certainly not his property. May Tefi's problem is a purely ceremonial question.
And of course he is not his parents' property either.
Rabbi
The priest has a right that does not arise from the father's obligation.
And the father has a duty that does not arise from the priest's right.
And yet the right and the duty are linked.
Otherwise, what is the dilemma?
I didn't understand.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
