Authority in Halacha, Rabbi Feibelson.
Hello Rabbi,
A few days ago I heard a lesson by Rabbi Feibelson in which he spoke about the authority of the great men of Israel.
He brings the Gemara in the instructions and talks about the authority of the Sanhedrin. Later, he explains according to the Rambam and other commentators that the authority of the Sanhedrin has essentially ended, and he brings from the Rambam that what does remain as a binding law is that if the entire Jewish people, the majority as a whole, accepted a certain thing, then it is binding. He emphasizes that if there is a minority opinion, then it is not nullified, but rather a real majority of the majority as a whole.
He gave as an example electricity on Shabbat or Yom Tov Shani, which are laws that the majority of the entire Jewish people have accepted, and therefore even an individual who thinks differently is obligated, as in the Sanhedrin, but only if he manages to create a discussion that will have a minority opinion that will oppose.
He added another case to his understanding of Rambam:
Even a community or a particular place that has taken on a certain leadership obligates the members of the community.
Then he added a point that in his opinion, nowadays, the Ashkenazi community and the Sephardi community are binding communities because people are usually in certain communities and in certain synagogues, as well as in certain institutions (mainly in Haredi society) and with certain friends, and this really has the meaning of a community. So that is why he claims that a person who wants to do halakhic things against his community, for example an Ashkenazi who wants to do things like a Sephardi, can, but he will have to change communities because this community binds him even when he has learned and understands differently because it is like the authority of the Sanhedrin that binds.
Rabbi Feibelson also wanted to come and say another innovation that the Haredi community has an identity and a statement, and therefore it is some kind of specific community (for example, he took the position that the component of Haredi identity is a strategy of separation in order to protect oneself and for other reasons).
And those who belong to this community, that is:
He prays in their synagogues, and those are his friends, his children in their institutions, so he belongs to this community,
And if, say, the majority of the Haredi public has made a decision on a certain issue, it is binding on them because this community has made a decision, because this community has high-ranking rabbis to whom the public listens.
By this he meant to say that if there are certain issues that all the rabbis have made a decision on and generally the entire Haredi public follows them and there are rabbis that the public follows,
So this obligates those who identify and belong to the Haredi community even if they have a different understanding of halachic law!
And for someone who does not belong to the community, this does not obligate them.
What do you say about that?
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The end of the rabbi's words means that if one believes like the author, that is, he is a person of reason.
So what about a person who smells good/feels good walking like the Rambam and so on?
His intention is to say about a custom of a form of ruling, which was accepted as a practice like a party to a ruling. Like electricity on Shabbat.
As soon as the understanding that the local decision is binding from a halakhic perspective.
It is said that a place follows the ruling that electricity is forbidden on Shabbat.
That is, if the ruling was accepted as a certain opinion, it binds all the people of the place.
And if a group or community is like a local custom, then it will bind.
No?
In the previous response I was not clear,
I meant that Rabbi Feibelson's intention was, etc.
This is a follow-up question to Rabbi Michael.
If he smells, let him bless the creator of my kind in the perfume.
I explained everything.
Even if it's weeds?
Does the opinion of the majority of the sages oblige everyone, for example in the matter of electricity on Shabbat, a cell phone, for example, it turns out that this is a matter for rabbis, but is it acceptable to you that a rabbi ruled that it is permitted on Shabbat? This, from the perspective of an elder of Mamre, is a different rabbinic opinion than what all the sages teach
and it is forbidden to act according to his words
or are you saying that the agreement of the majority of the sages is only binding in the public sphere?
There is currently no binding authority for anyone. Although the agreement of the entire Sages or the entire Jewish community has binding weight, it may be relevant to the law they are renewing. On the interpretive level, one must follow the truth.
Electricity on Shabbat is not a renewed law according to any rabbinic ruling.
This is an interpretation of an existing rabbinic law or Torah. Therefore, there is no standing for the determination of the sages of our time or the sages of previous generations, if one can conclude that they are wrong.
But that is only if you are the most qualified to rule and interpret. Just a person who thinks otherwise without a halakhic basis is meaningless.
In short, if you use electricity on Shabbat, you will not be sued for not breaking the law, but you will be sued for desecrating Shabbat (assuming that you are wrong and there is a prohibition).
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