Authority in matters of opinion

The Rabbi agrees, but is there a norm that would command the adoption of a fact into our code? For example, the reality of God that the halakhah treats as a fact that must be adopted. And in any case, it is in the realm of halakhah. As for the internal persuasiveness that a person needs to adopt, one must make an effort. No doubt. Like any innovative fact. If they tell me that the Shin Bet is listening to me, I can cancel this “fact” and can adopt this fact. In short, the fact in halakhic usage is subjective and the halakhah does not touch on the objective aspect at all.
Good night.

And what about the determination that a certain person is an infidel and must be killed?

No. This is what I have written in several places. Several of the Maimonides' commentators on the work of the Lord have already commented on the existence of God. I am not alone there. Although I am extending this to all the facts.

The determination that a person is an infidel and liable to punishment is normative and not factual, and therefore in principle (conceptually) it can exist. It is not a command on facts. I am talking about what is forbidden to be an infidel and not about a command for society on how to treat an infidel.
Although I personally do not accept such a command, even though it is conceptually possible, because if his infidelity is real (that is really what he thinks) then it stems from a rape in thought. In such a situation he is a rapist and certainly there is no punishment for him.

The truth is that a heretic is of the type that the Rabbi is talking about. He really has no punishment, but he also has no reward. The assumption is that we are talking about a heresy that comes from choice. A person does not indeed have a choice about what his eyes see, but he does have a choice whether to believe what his eyes see or not (to disbelieve). Although in such a case it is certainly not appropriate to talk about punishment because whoever disbelieves in what his eyes see will go crazy and be ignorant, and this does not belong to the commandment because it precedes the actual commandment (if you see the commandment with your eyes, then who said it exists?) and it is a way of the earth that preceded the Torah and also a type of transcendent truth. (The undermining of which undermines the very essence of thought).

But all the beliefs that are discussed in the Torah and Chazal are beliefs in realities that the eyes do not see (and not a heresy in what they do see. Such as the magnetic monopoly, for example.) And even there they are limited in time (i.e. believing forever without reaching sight and knowledge). The belief in the actual fulfillment of the mitzvah is problematic and I don’t think that Maimonides intended it either, but surely someone who doesn’t believe in the resurrection of the dead will not be resurrected in the resurrection of the dead, because it doesn’t happen automatically but is achieved after work whose goal is the resurrection itself. Surely someone who doesn’t believe in the resurrection will not be able to act on its behalf because they won’t do the required actions and in any case they won’t be resurrected. In other words, it’s not a punishment but a cause and effect. It’s like someone who doesn’t believe that they will succeed in their actions will indeed not succeed in anything because they won’t even try to do anything. It’s a self-fulfilling prophecy.

And in fact, it seems to me that the punishments of the Torah in such a case are not punishments of revenge or justice but of correction. Like a punishment where a father sends his child to his room if he does something wrong. That is, in such a case (of the resurrection of the dead), the lack of reward (from the Torah's perspective) is worse than the active punishment of hell, so it is better for him to spend time in hell or be reincarnated just so that he will believe in the resurrection at some point (after much torment. When he stops banging his head against the wall) and will ultimately be resurrected. And so it is with the rest of the beliefs.

And the truth is that in this sense we can talk about commandments. And also about Mitzvah A in Rambam. There are also commandments in Rambam that are not commandments but realities. Like the commandments of impurity and purification (“Let one touch a dead body that defiles”) and the laws (the law of the ox and the buter). So in this sense, any act that has an impact on reality (i.e., “punishment” if one does not do it or does not accept it as right (believes in it)) can also be counted as a mitzvah. That is, Mitzvah A is a commandment of the reality of God (he formulated “to know that there is a God there“. But formulating that ”there is a God” was a bit strange even for him)

Who talked about punishment? I agree that there may be consequences for those who deny the facts.
Regarding Mitzvah A, I also thought so in the past (that it is a declaration and not an actual command), but the urbanite brings the mitzvah to believe in the list of eternal mitzvot, and it is proven that he means a mitzvah that must be kept.