Between the dignity of human beings and the commandment of rebuke
Hello Rabbi,
I find it difficult to understand how one combines the commandment to rebuke those who “slander, blaspheme, and blaspheme” (between man and place) with the rule that “the dignity of human beings is repulsive to that which is not to be transgressed.” Where is the line drawn in these matters? (I am asking according to the law, not in practice; it is clear that in our time there are other considerations, such as not being heard, etc.)
We will detail:
On the one hand, the Rambam writes the well-known rule of Hilchot De’ot: “In matters of what is said, in matters between a man and his fellow; but in matters of heaven–if he does not repent in secret–they slander him publicly and make his sin public and disgrace him to his face and revile and curse him until he returns to what is good: as all the prophets did to Israel.”
On the other hand, it is a well-known rule that human dignity repels anything that cannot be avoided. And those who degrade and blaspheme violate human dignity…
It is impossible to divide between a person and a place, since the famous issue regarding Shatnaz deals with the mitzvah between a person and a place. There is a famous book by Rabbi Rakover on the rules of respect for human beings, but I have not seen it deal with this in a systematic way.
All sorts of possible divisions I found:
- One can believe that the above rule in the Rambam that slanderers are specifically stated in the Torah commandments, but in the rabbis, slanderers and so on are not mentioned at all. If this were a division, it would certainly have been brought up in the Rambam.
- Another possibility is to say that the rule of respect for human beings was stated in a temporary situation, but not in a permanent situation (it is known in Yehuda Och 1:35, discussing the law of informing a husband that a woman has committed adultery under her husband) because according to the Rambam, you only become angry if a person you have proven to you several times and has not listened to you, and then there is no difficulty at all. (But then it is difficult for the method of those who allow a handshake, who believe that it is from the rabbis only because of respect for human beings, because the above-mentioned know that religious people do not shake hands, and then it is impossible to say that it is a one-time thing.)
- Rav Kook in Habash Par (Chapter 10, in a question about a comment to the elders about an error in putting on tefillin) grapples with this question and says that one proves it in the way that is required despite the dignity of the people, otherwise the mitzvah would be nullified. However, the only thing that is common and that all people are offended by is the prohibition in general (and an error in tefillin is not something like that), and in addition, just because the sages are the ones who prove it, there will be no shame in any case.
What does the rabbi say?
(And again, it’s clear to me that nowadays we don’t accept the rebuke, so it’s not clear that the mitzvah applies exactly as it did in the past)
I don’t see the difficulty. The rebuke is to prevent him from transgressing, so it is clearly justified even when his honor is violated. First, if he expects his honor to be preserved, then he will not commit offenses, and certainly if he is reproved, he will not continue to transgress and force me to resort to humiliation and insults (the general rule is that if he transgresses inadvertently, such as when he corrects his ways following the rebuke, then he really should not be reproved). Second, it is done for his sake, and therefore it is in his interest that his honor not be violated. And this is what the persecutor cannot claim against the rescuer, that the blood of the persecuted has not been shed for a drop of his own blood. He created the situation, so he will bear the consequences.
And perhaps there is a kind of image of the ruling party that there is no fear of blasphemy if you are looked down upon for keeping Shabbat. But this is just an association that requires examination.
The difficulty is that there are offenses that are rejected because of human dignity, so it turns out that you cannot harm his honor with a rebuke, since his honor outweighs the offense itself…
In any case, according to your opinion, the distinction is that human dignity rejects the commandment of reprimanding, but, except for the commandment of reprimanding that aims to prevent the commission of the offense. The problem is that this is apparently hidden from the issue of tearing a garment that is worn in public, here you can motivate a rabbinic offense from him, but you do not do it because of his honor.
I explained in several ways why there is no difficulty here. What is not clear?
I did not understand how the phrase "not to be offended" came into play here? I did not mention anything like that.
Beyond that, proving it is a law of the Torah and insulting a person is not a law of the Torah, so what does the honor of humans have to do with it? He only rejects the law of not to be offended (and perhaps also a false offense). And here, if I do not prove him, two offenses have been committed: I did not prove it and he is sinning with his own sin.
And as for the offense of negligence, as is known, the latter involved a disagreement between the Rabbis and the Rambam, but on purpose it simply seems that one certainly does not observe his honor when he himself is guilty.
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