Bond investment transaction permit

Hello A. I don’t fully remember the question. It’s about the prohibition of interest, not about holding in companies that violate prohibitions, right? Now I saw that, according to most rabbis, it is forbidden to buy bonds from an issue in a company that does not have a transaction permit unless you sell the bonds before you receive the coupons (the guaranteed interest at the end of the period). There is also reason to doubt this, because you still gave a loan at interest, but in the end you did not collect the interest. I saw that the Katar Institute distinguishes between buying from an issue and a secondary purchase (i.e. buying from someone who has a bond). They base this on the fact that in a secondary purchase you can sell before you have received the interest, but this is also true for buying from an issue. And perhaps they mean the explanation I wrote above, that in buying from an issue you have given a loan at interest even if you do not actually collect the interest. There is a reference to volume 6 of their publications that deals with this in detail, and you should try looking there. I have now found a concise article by Rabbi Ishon: http://www.dintora.org/print_page/articles/390 In addition, I found a list of companies that have a business permit here: http://www.gilefrati.org/aska/mhiterisk Government bonds should be made more lenient because perhaps there is no interest prohibition at all. As you told you, I am very skeptical about the application of the prohibition of interest on companies (and I remember poskim like Rabbi Asher Weiss who doubted this, and I remember Rabbi Feinstein permitting a loan at interest to a limited liability company). Such a prohibition is unreasonable in terms of the idea, and it is also impossible to actually implement today (the Torah was not given to the ministering angels). I am copying for you a summary of opinions regarding an interest-bearing loan to a company (corporation) that I found in the file: · The Gamma in Tractate Bava Metzia states that it is permissible for a person to tell his friend on his own initiative that he will take a certain amount of money for him and will lend money to a third person. The lender receives the repayment of the loan from the borrower, and in addition to this, receives an additional payment from another person for having agreed to lend to his friend. In this way, the lender receives additional money on his loan, and therefore this situation should have been prohibited due to the prohibition of interest. Despite this, it is Rava that this is permissible, because the Torah prohibited interest that comes from the lender only, and in the case of Didan, the additional payment comes from someone other than the borrower, and therefore this is permissible. Based on these things, the Rashba concludes and says that not only is it permissible to lend at interest when the interest itself is given by another person of his own free will, without the borrower’s command. Rather, based on the same principle, it is also permissible to lend at interest when the lender is a Torah scholar, and so on. Because the lender is not a person, but a kind of entity in itself, it is therefore permissible, since this does not constitute forbidden interest, because in this act there is no person lending. The Rosh, quoted in the words of the Rivash, disagrees with these things and believes that only with interest the rabbis permitted lending at interest for the sake of orphans, just as they permitted lending at interest by the rabbis for the sake of orphans, but with interest from the Torah it is prohibited. In any case, the Rosh understands that in this act there is a kind of interest that comes from the borrower to the lender. This is understood by the Rosh, because it is not similar to the case discussed by the Gamma, in which a completely different person gave the interest, while in the case of Didan the lender receives interest directly. In addition, the Rashba himself does not accept this ruling as halakhic, for fear that this ruling would permit all prohibitions on interest. The Shulchan Aruch brings the Rosh’s words into halakhic practice. The Rema brings out that there were those who practiced, on the basis of the Rashba’s words into halakhic practice, to lend at interest, which is prohibited by the Torah from the congregation, with the understanding that the congregation is considered a kedesh, and in this act there is no interest that comes with it to the lender, but he believes that this is prohibited except for a great need, since the Rashba himself did not permit this in practice. Based on these Rashba’s words, some of the latter understood that even in a loan to a limited company, there is no interest that comes with it to the lender. Because a limited liability company is an independent legal entity, and according to the deciphering code that uses this method, a form without substance. In the understanding of these poskim, the situation of a limited liability company is not like the property of the public, in that although there are no specific and defined owners, the entire public is the owner of the company, but a limited liability company in its clear definition has no defined owners at all. Therefore, they understand that in this situation, the Rashba will agree in practice that it is permissible to borrow at interest from this company, because in this there is no interest that comes from the lender. From these things it follows that the understanding of the Rashba and the latter, who take the fact that a limited liability company is a legal entity according to the wording of the law, and therefore there are no prohibitions on interest, understand that interest that comes from the lender is permitted, because this is considered a loan to and from a Gentile, which is permitted. In any case, anyone who is not defined as a Jew is not prohibited from lending and borrowing from him. Since, according to these poskim, a limited liability company is a company without owners, it is permissible to borrow and lend to it at interest. The Rosh, on the other hand, understands the words of the Gamma differently and believes that it is forbidden to lend at interest to a dedicatory purpose, and in that case, a limited liability company would also be prohibited from lending. Because interest that does not come directly to the lender is not, according to the Rashba’s understanding, as if it were permissible interest to non-Jews, but rather interest that comes only indirectly, and in that case, there is no opening, according to the Rosh’s understanding, to consider public bodies and limited liability companies as if they were non-Jews to whom and from whom lending at interest is permissible. The Shalat Yaakov believes in principle, as does the words of Tzafnat Pa’an, that it is indeed possible to accept the fact that a limited liability company is a legal entity. However, he believes in the simplified words of the Rashba, who believes that in fact it is forbidden to lend at interest in this way for fear of circumventing the prohibitions on interest, but this is prohibited only by the rabbis. In the Har Zvi Responsa, he also accepts in principle the words of Tzafnat Pa’an, but believes that a limited liability company does not have an independent legal entity, not related to the shareholders. However, the words of Tzafnat Pa’an are correct in his understanding of government companies. Because a large partnership company, with no matter how many shareholders there are, does not resemble the public, the public is considered a legal entity in itself. Therefore, in his understanding, although limited liability companies are prohibited from lending and borrowing at interest, government companies are permitted to do so according to the principle presented in the Rashba’s words above. Rabbinical rulings state that even if we accept the opinion of the Rosh Ha-Hala, as was indeed stated in the aforementioned Shulchan However, the Yitzhak proposal reiterates that, although the shareholders have the right to ownership in the matter of interest, if the company Ltd. holds businesses selling leaven on Passover or assets that are subject to other violations, it is permissible to hold shares in this company, provided that the percentage of shares is so low that these shareholders have no ability to express an opinion on the company’s affairs at all. In this situation, holding the shares is in fact only a partnership in the company’s profits and losses, and holding these shares is not considered ownership of assets, but rather as a kind of loan. It seems that the basis of the Yitzhak proposal’s innovation is based on our explanation above regarding explicit apothecaries, according to which the owners of the apothecaries – the borrowers – do not own it, but it remains in their hands only for the purpose of generating profits, and they cannot sell it, etc. Since a limited liability company is a kind of express apothecary, in any case, also with regard to the ownership of the shareholders, who have no decision-making power over the conduct of the company, it is similar to a borrower with an express apothecary, in which in effect the property pledged to the lender has passed out of the borrower’s ownership. It was found that opinions were divided regarding the jurists’ acceptance of the legal treatment currently practiced for a limited liability company as a legal entity. Therefore, it is very difficult to permit prohibitions on interest in limited liability companies, relying solely on the words of those who permit it. However, in the opinion of all these jurists, it is permissible to hold a very low percentage of shares in limited liability companies, even if these companies trade in leaven on Passover or in other prohibitions such as desecration of Shabbat, etc. · Some of the jurists refused to accept the law’s definition of a limited liability company as a legal entity without owners, and as a result, they prohibited interest-bearing loans to this company, but tried to find an opening from another direction, to permit interest-bearing loans to a limited liability company. Because of the special definition of this company, according to which there are situations in which the company goes bankrupt, and the lenders lose their money completely, interest in this situation can be seen as payment for the risk that the lender takes that his money will not be returned to him. In fact, this is how loans to certain entities are seen today, which raise interest rates because of the risk that exists in this process. However, the ruling in the Shulchan Arbiter, which permits charging an additional wage for the existing risk, permits doing so only in situations where the risk is indeed real and existent. Indeed, in certain situations, as we have said, even in today’s economy, there are situations in which it would be possible to lend at interest in this manner because the risk is real and existent. However, with the interest rates charged from banks in savings plans, it is very difficult to rely on this permit, because the chance that a bank in the State of Israel will go bankrupt is not at all reasonable. However, it is certainly possible to use this permit and lend at interest to companies whose financial situation is not good, with the understanding that the interest charged in these ways is for the risk that the money will not be returned to the lenders, and not for the waiting time for the payments. As we have said in the past, when the additional payment to the lender is not for the waiting time for the payments – agrar netter, it is permissible. However, as stated, the large credit granting systems in the economy do not have the ability to use this permit. It should be added that this solution is not beneficial for borrowing money from these companies, but only for lending to them. Money. Because if you borrow money from them, there is no risk that the money will not be returned, because the company, which is in difficult financial situations, in this case is the lender, and the private individual is the borrower, and there is no risk that the loan will not be repaid. · The Igraot Moshe is also one of those who believe that it is not possible to define a limited liability company as a legal entity in itself, and therefore to permit it to borrow and lend at interest. Despite this, he also believes that it is permissible to lend money to limited liability companies. The basis of his permission is based on the understanding that a limited liability company is, as we said above, an explicit apothecary. The meaning of this situation is that in this company, even if we consider the shareholders as the owners of the company, they have no responsibility for repaying the debt, and when the company’s assets are liquidated and it goes bankrupt, there is no responsibility on the owners of the company to repay the debt. This situation, according to the Igraot Moshe, is considered a loan on which interest is permitted, because in any loan where there is no repayment responsibility on the borrower, but only on his assets – the assets of the limited liability company, the Torah did not prohibit lending at interest. It seems that the basis of the words of the Igraot Moshe rests on the issue brought up above, regarding a person who lends money to the priests, and a gift that the debt will be repaid only from the tithes that grow from his field, that he may take them for himself and sell them as mentioned above. On this issue, the Gemara says that even if one lends with interest in this manner, there is no prohibition. The Tosafot as stated above believe that one should not learn from this issue, which states significant lenient provisions, since lenders will be able to lend more easily to priests, borrowers, and the poor in this manner. However, the Ritva learns from this issue that it is indeed possible to lend with interest in similar loans. The reason for the permission, as he understands the Gemara, lies in the fact that since this is an explicit apothecary, and because of this the lender has no responsibility to repay his money in other ways, it is permissible to lend with interest, because there is no personal obligation on the borrower to repay the debt. It is possible to add and explain his words, based on our words above, that since a limited liability company is defined as an express apothecary, which as we explained above at length in such a lien on assets, it is considered as if the borrower purchased the asset for the lender, and in the case of Didan, the limited liability company. In any case, when the lender receives interest from the limited liability company, it is considered as if he is not receiving interest from the borrower, but is receiving profits from his assets – the express apothecary – the assets of the limited liability company. This is based on the special relationship of the express apothecary, which is considered to belong to the lender and not just encumbered by him. Therefore, even though a person is a lender to a limited liability company, in fact, since there is no obligation to repay the shareholders and their private assets, in any case the relationship between the company’s assets and the lender changes from a relationship of borrower and lender, to a relationship of shareholder. Therefore, all profits defined as interest are considered as profits of a shareholder in the company, and of course there is no prohibition of interest in them. We have learned that the rabbis have indeed disagreed on whether it is permissible to lend money to a limited liability company, and there are rabbis who prohibit this in practice, and have not accepted any of the above-mentioned permissions in practice. However, since this is a matter of dispute, many of the rabbis permit lending at interest to banks and limited liability companies, and some even permit borrowing money from limited liability companies at interest. Therefore, in conjunction with the transaction permit that we studied in the past, it seems that we can rely without a doubt on lending at interest to limited liability companies, even if the transaction permit in itself, and the loan permit at interest to a limited liability company in itself, are not permits that satisfy halachic scrutiny. In addition, even more than that, it is permissible to lend and lend at interest from government-controlled companies, of which there were even more rabbis who permitted it. From these things, the demand arises again to enact laws that will limit the granting of credit and loans at interest to institutional systems such as banks and large credit companies, which by nature are all limited liability companies, and some are even government-controlled companies. In addition to the transaction permit they sign, loans at interest with them are better from a halakhic perspective than loans between private individuals. It can also be seen from these things that in the privatization processes that are most commonly used today, the fact that from a halakhic perspective it is easier to lend at interest to government companies must be taken into account in the many considerations that are taken into account, so that from this perspective alone, it is appropriate not to privatize businesses that provide credit and the like. It is therefore better to trade in government bonds than in other bonds, which rely solely on the permit of a limited liability company. In addition, due to the large permits on which the jurists rely on a limited liability company, any move that expands the number of businesses that will be considered limited liability companies must be encouraged, in addition to the permits The deal is to make interest-bearing loans found in today’s economic market better from a halachic perspective.