Buridan’s Man
You spoke on Friday about Buridan’s donkey, a topic that illustrates our sense that not everything is mathematical and predetermined.
My question is, as you explained in previous lessons and in your book, a choice is given only when there is a value consideration (if I understood your words correctly), and so when a person finds himself in a symmetrical situation like that donkey, he too will die of hunger, and it won’t help that in principle he has a choice.
Is this really what will happen?
When a person is about to die of hunger, it is definitely a moment of choice and decision.
But the point is (as I understand it) that the choice is between a value-based situation and a non-value-based (or less value-based) situation.
In this case, there is a very good reason to choose, but there is no way to choose – because both options are equivalent.
He chooses between playing the lottery and dying.
And if it weren't for the option of fate, then he would really die.
That is, even a person has no real possibility of breaking the symmetry.
I really don't understand this crazy discussion. Even if he's paralyzed and can't move, he'll die. So no, he won't die, because he'll draw a lottery.
Rabbi Michi,
If these are the two options before him - fate or death, then how does this relate to the question of choosing in a symmetrical situation? After all, these options are not symmetrical at all.
Of course, I am not concerned with his fate, whether he will die or not, but with the fundamental question of whether a person, assuming he has a choice, can choose simply or only between things of value.
The possibility of avoiding the question by casting a lot does not solve the question.
And even if he decided to make a fortune, the questioner here states https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%95-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%91%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%93%D7%90%D7%9F-%D7%93%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%96%D7%9D-%D7%95%D7%90%D7%91%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%94 that a decision (choice?) is actually required as to which power to roll the dice. And so on, so the question remains.
A deterministic being has no possibility of fate, and therefore must choose between two symmetrical options. A person with choice can decide to cast fate.
What good will fate do?
If we decide between the two symmetrical options, then the dilemma now is whether to cast a lot, and this dilemma is not symmetrical, so the whole sting of the story is gone: man is not better than the donkey in being able to decide between two symmetrical options, but he simply knows the options before him and he knows that the discussion can be focused on another question (whether to cast a lot) that is not symmetrical…
Rabbi Michi,
Now I understand the discussion here. Your answer explains what a person can do in a state of symmetry, but we (the thread starter and I) are trying to understand what the concept of ‘breaking symmetry’ is.
Casting a fate is not breaking symmetry, but rather a transition to another state that is not symmetrical.
If so, the parable of the donkey adds nothing to the question of freedom of will. It does not prove that we feel freedom, because in this story the person will cast a fate only because he knows the data and knows that there is a possibility of casting a fate (and this can also be done deterministically), and it does not explain what freedom is at all, because this case is not breaking symmetry but rather a transition to an asymmetrical state, as we will explain.
I despaired.
It's amusing to see how you elegantly avoid admitting your mistakes. Good luck moving forward.
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