Causal relationship

Hello

Since I have a fear that my words were not understood properly, I will try again and I would be happy if you would give your opinion.

I did not write 1. That the impermeability of the sphere is forced upon us. 2. I also did not write that there is no need for observation to recognize the impermeability of the sphere.

What I did write is: 1. The discussion of whether the sphere is permeable or not is forced upon us, by the very fact that the concern is with matter, like many other properties that are asked to be discussed a priori when dealing with matter. (Since we know a priori what the consequences of each option will be), the decision as to what the correct option is in practice, is indeed known from observation alone. 2. My main argument was that causal relationships after observation are necessary, and not a hypothesis, because from observation we learned the fact (which was still discussed a priori) that the sphere is impermeable, and from this the result that occurred is already required, and this is how things are with the rest of the events of cause and effect on the physical plane. Observation is indeed necessary to know them, but after observation they are logically necessary, since observation established the properties of the materials we are discussing. And after observation, it is not a hypothesis that can be denied or that the cause can be imagined without its consequences. There are indeed cases, such as in the psychophysical plane, where even after observation, causal relationships will remain a hypothesis, and they are not necessary.

To summarize in one sentence.. In your understanding, are causal relationships on the physical plane, after observation, logically necessary (as required by their properties), or is it still a hypothesis that can be denied and the cause event can be imagined without its consequences?

I would appreciate your response.

I didn't understand a word. In particular, I don't know what "logically necessary after observation" means.

-After we have an observation, should tangible things behave according to logic?
-If the property of impermeability is something that can be observed or inferred in some way,
logically, what should happen when two spheres meet?

If we have reached some conclusion in any form, then that is our conclusion. This is of course a tautology. So what?

I did not write 1. That the impermeability of the sphere is imposed on us. 2. I also did not write that observation is not necessary to recognize the impermeability of the sphere.
Since I am really having trouble finding an answer to my argument from your short answers, I will raise the main points in detail, and I would be grateful if you would respond to each point even just with true/false.

1 David Yom writes that a causal relationship between two events is not observable or necessary, therefore it is only a hypothesis that can always be denied and the cause event without the effect can be imagined.

2 Any discussion of a substance requires a priori reference to its many properties, such as shape, mass, permeability, and more, and each option chosen from the options has a fixed and specific behavior.

3 Determining what the actual properties of each substance are is done through observation.

4. Therefore, the very discussion of whether billiard balls are permeable or not is required by the very fact that they are matter, although the actual decision that they are not permeable is known from observation.

5 After recognizing that the ball is impermeable, it is logically necessary that the event that ball A moves toward ball B, which is at rest, necessitates some change in one of the balls, that is, the event of the cause (the movement of ball A is impermeable toward ball B), necessitates a certain change, which means some results, and it is impossible to conceive of the cause without its results.

6. It is found that a causal relationship in the above case is not a hypothesis that can be denied, but is required by the properties of matter (even if recognition of those properties requires observation).

David Hume claimed that we have no empirical or logical basis for a causal relation, but rather temporal proximity and inductive generalization,

Kant responded to this claim that the causal relation is one of our a priori forms of cognition, reality.

(I am aware of the lack of precision in the presentation of things, but it is enough for us to understand what I am talking about)

The claim is that there are cases where a causal relation can be established logically.

In the parable of the billiard balls, one ball is at rest and the other is moving in its direction,

If the balls have the property of impermeability. (Apparently Hume would relate the property of impermeability to empiricism)

It logically follows that a change will occur in reality,

If no change occurs at the time of the meeting of the two balls, a logical contradiction will arise here,

The moving ball cannot continue to move while the resting ball continues to rest, this contradicts the property of impermeability.

Therefore, the solution to the mystery is a change in the state of one or both balls, either the moving one stops or the moving one moves or …. (Refer to the chapters that discuss motion in any high school physics book)

N’,

1. True.
2. In this section, I did not understand a single word, especially not the link between them. What does the mandatory meaning of “a priori” mean? The eight properties are the result of experience and not a priori. Do you mean that there are several a priori options and experience chooses between them? I do not see why. Why is it not possible for experience to introduce me to something that I had not imagined before? I did not understand what it means that each option chosen has a fixed and specific behavior? “Chosen” by observation? So observation produces a certain behavior. Are you implying that behavior is dictated by observation even though you did not learn from it?
3. True, if I understood. Subject to the questions from the previous section.
4. False. You can also discuss demons whether they are permeable or not, and also thoughts whether they are permeable or not. I don't see why the tautology that something is permeable or not is related to the claim that it is matter. Is the fact that it is matter a result of observation?
5. If the meaning of the concept “impermeability” is that nothing penetrates through it, then indeed after we have come to the conclusion that the sphere is impermeable (which itself is a generalization based on observation and not direct observation of course), it is indeed impermeable. What does this tautology add to us? It is not a relationship between cause and effect but between a concept and its definition.
6. Not true.

See my answer to N above. This is not a relationship between cause and effect, but between a concept and its definition. When you came to the conclusion that the sphere is impenetrable, you said that it cannot be penetrated. The phenomenon of impenetrability is not a result of the sphere's impenetrability property, but of its definition. When you came to the conclusion that the sphere is impenetrable, you are already past the generalization (and implicitly also causality).

I don't understand, there are two problems, the problem of induction and the problem of causality.

1 The problem of induction accepts the inference from specific phenomena to general ones, and claims that this transition is not necessary (and in our example, the transition from observation/sensation that the object is impenetrable, to the definition that the object in general is impenetrable, is not as necessary as is forced upon us by logical inference). This is agreed upon.

2 There is the problem of causality, which according to Yum, since we have no possibility of observing causality, the assumption that a causal connection does indeed exist between a pair of phenomena is based only on proximity of time and place, and an inductive generalization of the recurrence of the appearance of the pair of phenomena. Whereas, there is also no reason to deny a causal diagnosis.

These two problems are not related to each other, even after we have accepted induction as a possible method of inference (while recognizing its shortcomings), Hume continues to claim that the diagnosis of a causal relationship is a hypothesis that can be denied as follows
(I hope that you agree up to this point, if not I would be happy if you responded to these claims)

3 The new claim is that in the billiard ball analogy, after observation/touch and recognition that they are impermeable, plus an inductive generalization that the ball by definition is impermeable, they are enough to force a causal relationship on us in this drawing (even if we have never known the concept of causality), since an impermeable ball A moving towards an impermeable ball B that is at rest will necessarily produce a change in one of them (either a change in the motion of A or a change in the rest of B), and there is no other possibility, we find therefore that Hume's claim that a causal relationship between phenomena in this drawing is based only on empirical observation of proximity in time and place as well as induction, and therefore can be denied, is not accurate, after observation/feeling that the sphere is not permeable and inductive generalization of this property, the change in question is also forced upon us anyway.
Thank you in advance for your patience.

1-2. Agree but not completely. There is some connection between the problem of induction and causality. If there is causality, induction is derived from it. If there is induction, causality is not necessarily derived from it.

3. The touch does not show you that the balls are impenetrable. The conclusion that they are impenetrable is your conclusion. The touch gives you some feeling and that is all. And if you try to penetrate the ball in your hand and fail, it only means that your hands are not currently penetrating this particular ball. What about other hands, other balls, other times and places? I don't know.
And hence the impenetrability is already a conclusion that you have drawn from the observations and not the observation itself. This conclusion includes within itself the result that another ball will not penetrate there, and therefore there is no cause and effect relationship here but a relationship of identity.
This is logical deduction and not cause-and-effect relationships on the physical plane.
In other words, you made the causal generalization when you came to the conclusion that the balls are impermeable, not when you drew a conclusion about a future experiment from it. The change in direction that is a “cause” is an interpretation of impermeableness and not a causal result of it. Incidentally, a change in direction is actually neither one nor the other, since impermeableness can also lead to a situation where the hitting ball stops and stands still. It is not necessary that it will continue with a change in direction (and indeed, in a plastic collision, this is what happens. You are talking about an elastic collision).

We are repeating ourselves.

There is indeed a dimension of repetition in our words, but this stems mainly from your short and vague formulations, which I have difficulty understanding. You also argue against things I did not say, and this leads me to go back and set my words straight. (For example, I also wrote as you said that induction does not force causality, and causality assumes induction, but let's leave it at that.) If you do not wish to explain your words, that is your right, I will in any case not refrain from responding as long as I feel that my words were not understood correctly.

1 You wrote “The palpation does not show you that the balls are impenetrable. The conclusion that they are impenetrable is your conclusion, etc.’ and hence the impenetrability is already a conclusion that you drew from the observations and not the observation itself”.

This is exactly what I wrote above, the expansion from ’a feeling of impenetrability’ A general definition of ‘impermeability’ relies on an induction of observation/touch and not on observation.

2 You wrote “impermeability is already a conclusion that you have drawn from the observations and not the observation itself. This conclusion includes within it the result that another ball will not penetrate there, and therefore there is no cause and effect relationship here but a relationship of identity. This is logical deduction and not cause-and-effect relationships on the physical plane”.

I don't understand, I never claimed that the impermeability between the balls is a result, I explicitly wrote that the impermeability is an induction of sensation/observation, and yes, to the same extent this property will be expressed in the encounter between the balls, this is indeed a logical identity and not a result.

3. You wrote “A change of direction is actually neither one nor the other, since impermeability can also lead to a situation where the hitting ball stops and stands still. It is not necessary for it to continue with a change in direction (and indeed in a plastic collision this is what happens. You are talking about an elastic collision)”.

Again, inaccuracy, I was talking about a change in momentum, not a change in direction, I wrote that in the collision of ball A with ball B, assuming that they are impermeable, a change in momentum will inevitably occur in one of them (even if the first one stops, which means a plastic collision, a change in the momentum of the first one occurs), it is indeed possible that the change in momentum will be expressed in a change in direction, but the main point is that the assumption (the inductive one!) that the balls are impermeable necessarily leads to the result of a change in the momentum of one of them.

So far it is mainly grammar, but here is the main thing I fail to understand..

4. You wrote “The change in direction that is a “cause” is an interpretation of impermeableness and not a causal result of it.”

This is a sentence that I really don't understand, a change in direction (=in momentum, see 3) is an interpretation of impermeability?? and not a causal consequence of it?? I don't understand the meaning of this sentence, it is clear that the change in momentum in one of the balls, even according to David Hume, is a result (!) of a collision between impermeable balls, from an event of the movement of ball A’ to ball B’ at rest, a result of a change in the momentum of one of them is caused. This is not an interpretation of impermeability. The fact that one ball will not penetrate the other is an interpretation of impermeability, on the other hand a change in the momentum of one of the balls is already a necessary consequence of impermeability, and not an interpretation of it.

And that is where I argued that the result (only here) of ‘change in momentum’ (which I understand Yom also sees as a ’consequence’), is a necessary consequence of the impermeability feature (which is known from inductive generalization), and it is not just a hypothesis based on proximity in time and place and induction of the recurrence of phenomena, as David Yom claims.

Again, I think something important and fundamental is involved here, and I would be happy for you to clarify these points.

I want to go back and clarify N.'s words.
I think there is a very important discussion here.
1. I am willing to accept (for the sake of discussion) that the impermeability as a general property of every sphere is the problem of induction of Hume.
But the impermeability of a particular object, these spheres that are placed in front of me, I can rely on their impermeability.
(I can try to put a sphere inside a sphere)
If so, for a particular case I can rely on causality itself, the impermeability of these particular spheres entails a change in the state of at least one of them, when one moves in the other direction.
(Stopping is also a change)
2. Hume's problem of causality is the problem of the origin of the very concept of causality, even at the individual level, the problem of generalizing a causal law for every similar object is the problem of induction.

3. Not every concept can apply to every concept.
You wrote, ‘You can also discuss demons whether they are permeable or not, and thoughts whether they are permeable or not’
According to you, can a good measure be square?
Impenetrability is a definition related to place, a concept that is not local like thought, cannot be defined in a local concept.
Just as an object with a shape must have a defined shape, (it cannot be both round and square at the same time)
So an object that is in a place and has local dimensions must be defined in terms of its impenetrability.

Y’,
As I wrote, the change of momentum is a logical (and not physical) consequence of the impenetrability. What does it mean that the ball is impenetrable? That it cannot be penetrated. Hence, the object that collides with it cannot continue forward and therefore must choose a different path, that is, change momentum. Therefore, the change of momentum is an interpretation of impenetrability and not a causal consequence of it. A logical derivative is not necessarily a causal consequence.
More generally, if B is logically derived from A, this means that it is inherent in its concept. Therefore, when you know that A exists, it is clear from logical analysis that B will exist. But as I explained in my books on the sciences of freedom, the causal relation includes within it, beyond the logical connection, also a physical relation (causing). A relation that is purely logical cannot be a causal relation. The circulator is not a logical derivative of the cause.
Hence, the causal relation cannot be obtained from observation nor from logical deduction, and therefore is a result of our thinking. This is Yom's claim. But in his opinion it is a convenient fiction and in my opinion it is a synthetic-a priori insight.

Yaakov,
First, you must limit your conclusion not only to the object you observed but also to the specific case in which you observed. In other words, you cannot conclude the impermeability of an object but at most its impermeability in a particular case.
Second, you are actually assuming causality implicitly. After all, how did you come to the conclusion that the ball is impermeable? Because something collided with it and it changed its motion. And you assume of course that a change in momentum is caused (causally?) by an impermeability. From this you concluded that there is impermeability. And again you conclude from an impermeability that there will be a change in momentum.

I think we have exhausted ourselves. I don't know how to explain it better.

1 You write “Change in momentum is an interpretation of impermeability and not its causal consequence. A logical derivative is not necessarily a causal consequence”.

Z”A, according to you, in the parable of the billiard balls there is no causal relation at all, but rather it is a logical derivative. This is a very strange claim considering the fact that David Hume chose precisely the example of the billiard balls to illustrate the problem of causality (which means that he does see the change in momentum as a causal consequence, only that according to him this diagnosis of causality relies on proximity in time and place, and is not necessary, a claim that we both do not accept).

2 As for the substance of things, I understand there is no real disagreement between us, you also recognize that a change in momentum is logically necessary, but you refuse to call it a cause-and-effect relationship but insist on calling it a ‘interpretation of the ball's impenetrability/its logical derivative’. Whereas I also call this a cause-and-effect relationship, with one difference that it differs from causal relationships in other places that are not necessary but rely on proximity in time and place, alongside repetition, there are places like the parable of the billiard balls where the result is necessary as you also agree.
(It's a shame it took so long, it's the result of excessive use of the term tautology, to say ‘impenetrable balls will not penetrate each other’ is a tautology, but ‘a meeting between impenetrable balls causes a change in their momentum’ is not a tautology).

However, since this is not a purely semantic dispute (as it seems at first glance), I will dwell on this point and its important implications.

The question we need now is, what can be called a causal relationship? (And hence it is a short cut to claim that there are ‘causal relationships’ that are forced upon us, even if not all of them are).

In my understanding, the concept of causality is used to describe a certain relationship between two events, that is, if our observation of events can bring to our knowledge only the occurrence of an event or a sequence of events, and nothing more. Causality adds to this that there is also a causal connection between the events, that is, event B’ was caused by event A’, and if it were not for event A’, event B’ would not have occurred. So far, I think everyone would agree.
In the drawing of the billiard balls, observation (plus induction) yields: Event A, ’Impermeable billiard ball 1, moves towards impermeable billiard ball 2 which is at rest’. Event B, ’Change in momentum of one of the balls’, in my understanding these are two separate events, in which no observation is able to ’see’ the causal relationship, and therefore the diagnosis of this relationship is an addition for us, the observers. Now the question that remains is to clarify what the assumption that there is a causal relationship between the events is based on, that is, how do we know that event A caused event B, and if it were not for event A, event B would not have happened? And here there is a split, Yom claims that the diagnosis is based on proximity in time and place and the recurrence of the phenomena, I claim that the event of the ’change in momentum’ is a necessary consequence of the event of the ’meeting between impermeable spheres’. (And you claim that although it is necessary, it is not a causal relationship at all).

Ask why I decided to call it a causal relationship? Because as I understand it, any pair of events that direct observation does not link between them, but for other reasons we are interested/able to determine that if it were not for event A’ event B’ would not have happened, that would be called a causal relationship. I fail to understand why it is that the result is a logical derivative of the cause, that it deprives them of the application of a causal relationship there, and it seems to me that the responsibility for explaining this falls on you.

I adhere to the principle that even if there are pairs of events whose causal relationship is a hypothetical, as is the case with everyday things, there are pairs whose causal relationship is necessary, and this is a logical opening to understanding the concept of causality even if it were to be assumed that the causal form of thinking was not embedded in consciousness.

You explained your position very well, and therefore we can continue the discussion.
1) You write ‘You must limit your conclusion not only to the object you observed but also to the specific case in which you observed it. That is, you cannot conclude that an object is impenetrable, but at most that it is impenetrable in a particular case.’ According to you, the problem of induction is the problem of the stability of objects?
(Maybe objects do not retain their properties)
2) You write ‘How did you come to the conclusion that the ball is impenetrable?’
Answer, because I was unable to put them in the same place.
Even without a change in momentum, I tried to put a ball inside a ball when both were at rest, and I failed, (unfortunately).
3) I look forward to your response to your statement
‘You can also discuss demons whether they are impenetrable or not, and thoughts whether they are impenetrable or not’
Do you stand behind this?

Y’,
It may be just semantics, and I'm still on my own. If B is logically derived from A, then A is not the cause of B. Causality is not a logical relation. For exactly this reason (?) I don't accept your claim that the change in momentum is a consequence and not an analytical derivation from the meanings of the concept of impermeability.
I'll put it this way: when a ball hits another ball and cannot penetrate it, it means that it will not penetrate it. So much for a tautology. But the fact that it will not penetrate it means that there will be a change in its momentum. Again a tautology (after all, conservation of momentum means that it will continue into it and penetrate it).
Of course, if you define causality in your own way, you can conclude that a causal relation can be derived using logical tools from an observation. But this is again a tautology.
So here I have added the term tautology three more times (four, including this time). What can I do, these are really tautologies.
I think we've exhausted it, unless there's a new argument.

Yaakov,
See the explanation I gave to Y’ here. The fact that I couldn't penetrate it is a change in momentum. Simply a literal translation. Momentum that is conserved means that the ball continues at the same speed and enters the place of the impenetrable ball. If it doesn't do this – the momentum changes. A pure logical relation. I really don't understand what's so complicated about it.
3. In your opinion – Absolutely. The definition you propose for impenetrability (which is not logically related to a change in momentum) could also apply to the salty taste of the watermelon. But I don't think I'll continue to discuss it here because this discussion is going nowhere. We've clarified our positions and the voter will choose.

For the sake of order, I present a summary of the discussion.

One of David Hume's main claims is that a causal relationship between events is not a necessary thing, since causality itself cannot be directly observed, and our ability to infer a causal relationship is based on proximity in time and place between the two events, and on the fact that those two events occur one after the other again and again, which allows us to conclude by induction that there is indeed a causal relationship between the two observed events.
Hume illustrates his claim with an analogy, let's take a billiard table with two billiard balls on it, and give ball A a push and it is now moving on a collision course with ball B, Hume argues that there is no way to know what will happen to the balls when ball A hits ball B. will collide with ball B, and only an observation of the two events (1 the collision event, 2 the change in momentum that will happen to the balls or one of the balls), which reveals proximity in place and time between them, and the recurrence of these pair of phenomena, leads us through induction to the determination that there is indeed a causal relationship between these two events.

Here I want to clarify an important point, the concept of ‘causal relationship’, simply comes to describe a special relationship between two separate events, according to which event A’ caused event B’, that is, if it were not for event A’, event B’ would not have occurred, and any such diagnosis (made in a way that Yom mentioned) between two events is called a causal relationship (later it will be seen that in the method of M. Avraham the concept of causal relationship is defined differently).

Immanuel Kant added and refined this point and explained that causality is a priori knowledge, and is one of the forms of human cognition, similar to other a priori concepts.

What should be noted about Hume's words is that in the parable of the billiard balls (and in many other cases) the relationship between the two events can be logically established, and the causal relationship between them is not a mere hypothesis, but is forced upon us.
Let's go ahead and take the two billiard balls and try to insert them into each other, this is not possible and this leads us to the conclusion that the balls are impermeable (the discussion of whether the balls are impermeable is a discussion that should be considered before the experiment will decide whether they are impermeable or not, since the balls are a substance that by its very definition takes up space in space, therefore the discussion of whether it is possible to penetrate through them, that is, to take their place, is required).
By induction or from the very common claim that objects retain their properties (the problem of the stability of objects), it can be concluded that even in the future, the balls will not penetrate each other.
Now let's look again at the experiment that Day brings to light these things, when there is an event in which ball A moves towards ball B, which is at rest, Day claims that the results of this event cannot be observed, and even after observing the results of the event, attributing the result to the cause is only a hypothesis.
Here it is necessary to comment on his words, since we have previously observed that the balls are not permeable (through observation/the sense of touch), then necessarily that event A in which ball A moves towards ball B, which is at rest, it is impossible to imagine that ball A will continue its motion through ball B, and necessarily a certain change will occur in the momentum of one of the balls (ball A will stop, and B will begin to move, or A will continue to move and B will remain at rest, or both will move or both will be at rest).
This change in momentum, which is the resulting event from event A (the motion of ball A), is forced upon us from the examination that the balls are impermeable, and we find therefore that in this drawing the attribution of the effect to the cause is not a hypothesis that can be denied, as Hume says, but is an attribution that is forced upon us.
M. Abraham argues against this that the concept of a causal relationship does not exist here, because a causal relationship is only when it is not possible to observe a connection between the two events, but all that can be recognized in the properties of the object in question is its consequences (as here that the balls do not penetrate each other, and prevent the momentum through them), this is a relationship between a concept and its definition and not between cause and effect, and in other words, any case in which the effect necessarily stems from the cause, this relationship cannot be called causality.
That is, also M. Avraham agrees that the resulting event (a change in momentum in at least one of the balls) is necessary from the causing event (the movement of ball A’ impenetrable to ball B’ impenetrable), but according to him, the relationship between the two events cannot be called a cause-and-effect relationship (in your language, ‘if B is logically derived from A, then A is not the cause of B, causality is not a logical relationship. For precisely this reason (?) I do not accept the claim that the change in momentum is a result and not an analytical derivation from the meaning of the concept of impenetrability’).

Although it seems to be a purely semantic difference, and it doesn't matter what we call the same sequence of events, this point is nevertheless of great importance, because if we accept that such a relationship can also be called a causal relationship (but that it is not a hypothesis but a necessity), this changes our entire worldview on causality, and places it (in certain cases) on the same level as all the other information forced upon us.
The main arguments I have against your method are 1. Your definition of the concept of 'causality' is very new, and I think most will agree on the definition that 'any two separate events that appear one after the other, and from event A' event B' results (i.e. if event A had not occurred, event B would not have occurred), then the relationship between them is a causal relationship.
2. You claim that in the drawing of the billiard balls there is no causal relationship at all, so it is very puzzling how David Yom (and many others after him) chose precisely this example to illustrate the problem of causality?

So much for causality.

In the framed article, I think there is room for a separate discussion on an important and fundamental point (even more than 'causality') that arises from the words, and it is worth devoting a separate discussion to it (perhaps in another place). I am talking about the issue of attributing concepts to each other.

In the words, I wrote 'the discussion of whether billiard balls are permeable or not is required by the very fact that they are material, although the actual decision that they are not permeable is known from observation.'

Your response to this was ‘You can discuss thoughts or demons whether they are permeable or not, and not just matter’.

And in response to this, Yaakov wrote to you ‘According to you, can a good measure be square? Impenetrability is a definition related to place, a concept that is not local like thought, cannot be defined in a local concept.
Just as an object with a shape must have a defined shape, (it cannot be both round and square at the same time) so an object that is found in a place and has local dimensions must be defined in terms of its impenetrability’.

Your response to this was ‘The definition you propose for impenetrability (which is not logically related to a change in momentum) can also apply to the salty taste of watermelon’.

1 First, look at the thread above, the claim that 'one can discuss thoughts or demons if they are permeable', you wrote in response to the claim 'the discussion of whether billiard balls are permeable or not is required by their very nature as matter', and has nothing to do with the definition of the concept of impermeability, meaning that in your understanding the concept of impermeability can be attributed to the concept of demon or thought (in the sense of passing through the place where it is located).

2. Regarding the body of things, Yaakov did not claim that the definition of impermeability is not related to a change in momentum, but on the contrary, the definition of impermeability forces a change in momentum, only that in his understanding this relationship (of a collision of impermeable balls, which leads to a change in the momentum of one of them), is a relationship of cause and effect as above.

3. In addition, I saw on the site that you do not see a problem in attributing positive adjectives to it.

All three of these points show that according to your method there is no obstacle to attributing any concept to any other concept, and this is far from the mind, not every concept can be attributed to every concept, for example, the concept ‘mind’ cannot be attributed to the concept ‘still’, or the concept ‘sweet’ to the concept ‘square’, since there is no meaning to such an attribution, which leads us to the claim that for every concept, there is a certain range of concepts that can be attributed to it, in some sense, and there are other concepts that cannot be attributed to it by their very concept. It is difficult to know if there is a rule that clarifies which concepts can be attributed to which concepts, but by looking at the full and precise definition of each concept, it is possible to determine whether the claimed attribution between the two concepts is possible or impossible.
If you agree with this, then it is not possible to attribute the concept of penetration to the soul or to thought, since these do not occupy space, and there is no meaning of passing through them for them.
In addition, attributing adjectives to the ’, already assumes that we have some perception of it in itself (just as we do not attribute wisdom or bravery to an inanimate object, because these concepts can only be attributed to concepts that have such an attribute), and I think everyone agrees that we cannot posit the ’ as a defined entity to which such adjective concepts should be attributed.

According to you, the fact that the object is a triangle is a “reason” that the sum of its angles is 180, and it is also a reason why it has corners (three corners for my hat). And so is the fact that I am married a reason why I have a wife. A strange and unacceptable definition, but I see no point in arguing about semantics.
In any case, this semantic discussion is of no importance. The inference you are talking about is logically necessary, so in my opinion it is not a causal inference, and in your opinion it is also a causal inference. Okay. So we both agree that there are inferences that are logically derived from observations, but we argue whether these inferences can be called causal (semantics). The question is whether the ordinary inferences, those to which we both attribute a causal character and define them as causal inferences, are indeed logically derived from observation. The answer for both of us to that is no. So basically the debate remains only in terminology and content we completely agree. If so, what is the importance of the discussion of what to call the necessary consequences? We both agree that the necessary ones are necessary and the question that they are not necessary is correct about them and they cannot be derived from observations and this is our assumption (or fiction, in his opinion).
[By the way, Hume did not only claim that it is not necessary but that it has no basis and therefore there is no reason to assume that it is true (Russell's teapot).]

1. So, do you claim that David Yom was wrong with the billiard ball example, since there is no causal relationship in it?

2. What is your position regarding the attribution of a concept to a concept, can every concept be attributed to every other concept, or are there such limitations?

1. If he brought this example in this sense, then he was indeed wrong. Is there a “don't deviate” in relation to it, and I didn't know it?
2. There are limitations of course and I never claimed otherwise. But I won't return to this nonsense here.