Celebration mask

An ignorant question: In the Gemara, do Amoraim also demand verses and derive laws from them, or only conditions?

A little. Most of the sermons are about conditions.

If so, it seems that the Amoraim have already lost most of their ability to demand. And if so, why didn't they investigate and demand this in the Gemara every time there is a demand (created) to ask why they didn't demand differently and why they didn't demand in this way in other verses?

Either they lost the ability or they thought they did not have the authority to do so (to renew the laws). In any case, I do not know why they did not ask and demand.

And a question not in passing about changing sermons.
The dispute over the sages can be based on the mitzvah itself - whether people with disabilities are obligated to make the pilgrimage, or on a conceptual dispute - whether people with disabilities are "like" whole people (an observation on the concept of human value or something like that).

What can justify a dispute over the sages over the mitzvah itself? To dispute them directly seems a bit excessive, because why only about sermons and not about every explanation and idea they said, for example, this random example comes to mind and stumbles, etc. But the way here is to say that they had a different moral position and therefore demanded (or believed), and that we who have a different moral position will demand (or believe) another, and thus there is no direct debate with the Sages in Halacha, but rather that the debate in Halacha branches out from their lack of authority regarding another issue, and in fact it is like a change in reality. But this possibility is apparently ruled out according to your method that Halacha is a world in itself that is not related to morality (or did the Sages not know this?). And if so, it seems that there is nothing that would justify a dispute over the Sages in the mitzvah itself.

The possibility remains of disagreeing with the Sages in a conceptual dispute and from which a halachic implication will branch out. That is, that they perceived some Platonic concept in a certain way (and not that they perceived the moral demand in a certain way), here – They perceived the concept of man in a certain way, while we perceive it differently today, and therefore we will demand something different, and a different halakhic result will branch out, and in fact this is also like a change in reality. But, the point here is that when we come to divide in this way, we must not base ourselves on our moral perceptions, but only on our essentialist perceptions. This also requires assuming that in fact the halakhic law (and perhaps also morality) is determined according to the concepts that already exist in the world without any connection to it, and not that the laws are for their own reasons so that there is no reason for the halakhic conceptualization to overlap with the objective conceptualization in the world. Is the chatter correct?

[I once heard a lecture by someone named Golan Lahat. He described that democracy in Greece first encompassed rich men, and over the course of history it also expanded to poor men, and then there was also the emancipation of slaves and it expanded to them as well, and it expanded even further to encompass women. Then he claimed that ”the development was not in the concept of democracy but in the concept of the equal person”. In other words, from then until today everyone has held the democratic principle that each of the group of equal people deserves the right to take part in government, and if so, what has changed throughout history – the perception of the group of equal people has changed and it has expanded (and in any case, expansion has branched out into democracy). Then he stood tall and preached to introduce democracy for everyone.
It is not clear whether it is easy to separate the ancialist observation from the consequences that will be drawn from it later. Nor is it at all clear whether moral considerations, for example, are supposed to stem from such indirect observations, as has been raised several times on the site and in the article by Vladimir the Doctor regarding the definition of a person and death]

Maybe this will connect to the future column on the issue of the separation of powers, which also involves the essence of halakhic truth 🙂

Two notes:
1. I am talking about a future Sanhedrin that will change this, that is, when there will be no problem of authority. Therefore, the question of the ability to disagree with Chazal is not relevant here.
2. Moral considerations have a place as a motivation for seeking another halachic path. Morality is not the reason for the halachic path itself (as in Chazal’s case, the exclusion of the disabled was not intended to achieve moral goals), but a motivation for seeking another halachic path.

1. I referred to the component “not only in the sense of authority but also of essence. Who is knowledgeable in the sermons” that you wrote above.
2. To search but not to decide? If we searched, searched and found another possible option in halakhah and it is consistent with morality, is it possible to simply choose this option, or do we also have to think ‘halakhically’ that it is right?

1. If we had authority and were knowledgeable in the sermons, we could change.
2. If we found a reasonable option like the alternative, then we can certainly choose the more moral one. Like the time of stress or other extraneous considerations that allow a decision between alternatives. I explained in the last column (453) the mechanism of doubt in times of stress.

1. Oh, I understand, sorry. You said that it is also possible to directly disagree about the halacha because it is a future Sanhedrin and it can indeed also disagree about beliefs such as a piece becomes carrion or the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted and everything else in halacha, and it will also be able to disagree about sermons if it knows how to demand. [Although if this is the intention then this is a general answer to any question that perhaps the future Sanhedrin will change, and perhaps God will reveal himself anew and update the Torah. Or did you mean to emphasize that the future Sanhedrin will also need the knowledge of how to demand and without it it de facto will not be able to demand].

It is not reasonable to disagree with someone without being able to understand them. Although I can imagine a situation where a future Sanhedrin reaches a point where it has no understanding of the sermons, it seems to it that there are many changes required in the halakhah. It could perhaps decide to implement them without understanding the methods of preaching for the time being. Perhaps only temporarily.

Perhaps we can disagree. Because, for example, we can diagnose a statistical claim that the sermons of the sages tend to be very consistent with their moral/conceptual opinion in general. Then if he claims that he disagrees with them on a moral/conceptual level, he can assume that if he knew the ways of the sermons, he would demand a different sermon that is consistent with his moral/conceptual opinion quite well. This is a claim that seems completely reasonable to me. Is it enough to change? Or is it more "unintelligible" than relying on what has already emerged from the sage's secret mechanism?

possible.

Above I posed the question of what the relationship is between a conceptual-moral dispute from which a halakhic dispute branches off and a “dispute” in facts from which a halakhic dispute branches off in practice. Perhaps, as in a factual “dispute”, so also in a conceptual dispute that leads to a halakhic dispute in practice – we are essentially preserving the original halakhic law itself.

In the 2nd chapter of the Book of the Law, the exemption from going up to the Temple for those who have difficulty walking, seeing, and communicating is requested for the simple reason: it is difficult for them. Walking, and especially walking in a crowded and cramped place, is difficult for those who have limited walking, seeing, and communicating.

Whoever is willing to go up despite the difficulty, and to make his way through the crowded crowd, will be blessed, and no one prevents him from going up to the courtyards of the House of God, but to oblige the one who has difficulty?

Perhaps in the future, medicine will advance until he will leap like a stag and the eyes of the blind will be opened, and then there will be no problem at all, but as long as there are people suffering, May the law treat them with compassion and not impose on them the burden of the healthy.

With greetings, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kvass,

Hasdai, but today there is a scooter. In other words, it turns out that the reason for the sermon is no longer relevant today, and so why should it remain valid?
Perhaps you will say that the Torah commands according to what was customary and appropriate at the time of the giving of the Torah (or two thousand years of Torah) and since then simple conservatism has been adopted, but this is unlikely because ostensibly the Torah commands the principle and not the implementations.
Perhaps you will say that indeed the reason for the sermon is no longer relevant and so surely the Sages today would demand otherwise, but even so there is no authority to actually disagree with them. But this is also strange because apparently the Sages have no authority in this because what led the Sages was not part of the Torah but was born from what they truly considered appropriate in light of their time. And with respect to the Torah itself, there is no disagreement at all with the Sages.

I think that Rabbi Michi writes or they translated it on his behalf that even if there is a reason why they did not read, there is a reason why they did read. Because regarding the reasons, the thoughts of the sages are our thoughts.

Ltg ”G – Shalom Rav,

Even during the time of the Temple, there were people with means who could afford to ascend to the Temple while being carried in a palanquin, and on the face of it they were permitted to do so. But requiring everyone to bother and hire a palanquin and servants to carry it – the Torah did not require it.

And most importantly regarding the ‘scooter’ – Those who can afford to purchase a scooter and learn to drive it, will be able to ascend at least on weekdays on their scooter, but it does not appear that the halakha will require everyone to do so. Perhaps there will be a problem that the scooter will crowd out the place for pedestrians, and perhaps there will be a ‘path and way’ For scooters 🙂

But the prophet Isaiah foretells more than that: ‘God will come and heal you, then the eyes of the blind will be opened, and the ears of the deaf unstopped, then he will leap like a Passover ram, and the tongue of the mute will be unstopped… and the redeemed of the Lord will dwell and come to Zion, blessed and everlasting joy will be upon their heads, that they may obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing will flee away’ (33:6-10).

And we will all ascend to the Temple healthy and sound. I will weep”r

With blessings, Hࢭb Dak”k

And when the temple is built, all the outcasts of Israel will gather, some from the north and some from the land of China, and they will lead everyone who fails in their rickshaws.

Best regards, Ching Ching Ching, a man from Le-Wing

For the village of Le-Wing in southern China, see the Wikipedia entry for The Flying Tigers

By the way, they say (perhaps a caricature) that Chabad has a Kabbalistic time of urgency to exempt sleep from the sukkah because he regrets not being moved by the all-encompassing light (and if he is not in a position to regret this, then he is certainly regretting his position, etc.)

Good morning, Rabbi,

Lt.G., Shalom Rav,

In all matters of sleeping and not sleeping in the sukkah, and in particular in the customs of Chabad, see Chabadpedia, entry ‘Sleeping in the Sukkah’.

For the record, it seems that the Chabad rebbes did not sleep in the sukkah, for reasons that are both the fear of catching a cold (since they lived in northern Russia) and so as not to leave the woman alone. However, in order to prevent the sons of Aliyah from trying to be luxurious at the expense of their health and/or the peace of their home – We gave the custom reason for praise also according to the internal Torah, which makes it difficult for a person with sacred feelings to sleep in a place whose holiness is so great.

Incidentally, at the end of the entry (next to note 61) it is stated that the rabbi of Kfar Chabad instructed the members of his community to sleep in the sukkah, and it is also explained before that the Rebbe of the Germash, when explaining the custom not to sleep, said that his words were spoken as an explanation of the custom and not as an instruction to the public.

With greetings, Simcha Fishel Halevi Plankton

I pondered that perhaps they view themselves as a body and do not renew the mitzvah of sleeping in the sukkah, just as some do not renew the Tekhel.

In the S”d a”ch tov b”d r p”b

Lt”g – a guten tag,

I think that the inability of the Hasidim to fall asleep knowing that the Sukkah is lit by the heavenly lights is inherent in the nature of the Hasidim's fervor, which requires the Hasidim to be enthusiastic when thinking about the revelation of the holiness with which he encounters.

The halacha that requires bringing all levels of life into the Sukkah requires a person to also be willing to sleep in the Sukkah, to take refuge in the ’tsila dehaimanota’ out of calm and confidence that even when the person is not in the heat of the ‘muchin degdalut’ – the lights of the Sukkah protect him and allow him to sleep in it peacefully like a baby in its mother's arms.

And perhaps that is why the Yakuts would decorate their Sukkots with onions adorned with feathers, which alludes to the ’onions of your wings are a relationship’. After all, eating onions symbolizes the absence of great desires that brings peace of mind, as stated: ‘eat onions and sit in onions’.

With blessings, Hasdai Bezalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kvass

The two faces of the work of God ’ – passion and calm – are expressed in the two explanations for the mitzvah ‘besoms in the fruit until he does not know between the cursed Haman and the blessed Mordecai’, which the 16th interpreted as a mitzvah to be enthusiastic and to thank God ’ whether for the downfall of Haman or for the victory of Mordecai, until he does not know‘ Then we are already exempt from the commandment to praise and give thanks fervently.

Whereas according to the Maimonides, the purpose of joy is to fall asleep with a sense of peace and security that brings peace of mind. Therefore, Rabbi Aviner instructed that the manna should be heard in the ears of Haman, and not in the general sense, "You hear them, but rather, may you rest in peace." 🙂

With blessings, Simcha Fishel Halevi Plankton