Choose to believe

I don't understand the whole twist, why assume that this is a case where there is a logical reason to believe, it is more likely to assume that this is a case where there is no logical reason to believe, (as in most cases there is no logical reason to believe in slander when a person is considered kosher) and the novelty is that one must feel, which is exactly the opposite of what the rabbi says.

According to the Rabbis, if there is a logical reason to believe, one must feel logically.

The sages in general commanded us not to be tempted to follow the custom of the masses to accept everything that is said, so you have no greater logical statement than that.

Indeed, it is not appropriate to command that which there is no choice about, but there is a choice about belief. There is a difference between belief and knowledge. It is not appropriate to command that you think differently about knowledge than you know is not so. Or that you know that something you do not know is so. Knowledge is like seeing and it is not appropriate to command that it is. It is possible to command observation and looking, but not their result.

Therefore, if someone told you slander and the story itself explains many other things that were not understood, and therefore it is very clear, the prohibition of accepting slander no longer applies to it. In such a situation, not believing the story (not accepting it) is like not believing what you see with your own eyes. And that is choosing madness. And there is what I call the “principle of madness” The Torah cannot command a person to be crazy (incompetent). This is even more than the principle that Derech Eretz preceded the Torah. Knowledge comes before everything else.

The prohibition against believing in slander means that in the absence of additional evidence or in the event that this story does not explain additional things, then you are not allowed to act on the assumption that it is true. You are not allowed to assume that it is true (this is something that you have a choice about). From your point of view, the only knowledge there is is that someone said about someone who did this. No more. But it is permissible when you come to act to take into account that it could be true (to fear it) and to take safety factors in case it is really true.

On the 13 articles of faith, for example, it does not belong to a command without a certain basis of prior knowledge. It does not belong to God to command to believe that there is a God because in the first place there is no knowledge of the very fulfillment of the command itself. But it does belong to God that you know of His existence to command you (if He has told you explicitly) to believe that He will raise the dead. That is, you act in your life on the assumption that when He is the dead will live. Note that there is no command here to know that the dead May God command this. It is also fitting that after 10 trials in the desert, God will command the people to believe in Him to help them in the wars of the land of Canaan and punish them if they do not believe in Him for this.

I hope I was clear

And as the rabbi argued here, it is exactly the same with regard to the commandment to judge your fellow with justice (learning righteousness). This is not a command to be stupid and ignorant and try to teach righteousness about someone who clearly (meaning you know this is so) has the wrong interpretation, but rather is the plausible interpretation. Note that I am not demanding certainty because there is no such thing (there is not even certainty in plain sight) but is merely applying the principle of madness. One of the best examples of this is one of the commenters here on the site who tried to teach righteousness about something that is clearly ignorant, as Rabbi Yitzhak Zilberstein of Bnei Brak said. Learning righteousness was even more ridiculous and ignorant (because this is not the first strange thing this rabbi has said and I am not the only one who thinks this way) than what the rabbi himself said.

Learning righteousness means that in a situation where someone has done something that seems bad at first glance, but it is not clear that this is really what happened (because we do not always know what the context is and perhaps there are always missing details that would change the whole picture), then the mitzvah is first of all not to react from the gut and judge evil (the crowd shouted) and in addition (as long as we have not investigated to the point where our hand touches all the details and we have exercised judgment)) if there is a good interpretation of the fact (which makes him righteous) and it is not implausible, then to believe in it, that is, to act on the assumption that it is correct. Note that this is not a mitzvah that is required by common sense (like you shall not murder, for example). Common sense here does not require us to assume some interpretation as correct, but rather to examine and truly judge what happened, and as long as we have not done so, to say that we do not know. The obligation of the mitzvah applies within something that belongs to the realms of common sense. However, the mitzvah also does not contradict common sense (i.e., it requires what is (deceived)

In short, the principle of insanity claims that God does not command things that are contrary to common sense.

Regarding the connection between discretion and choice that you mentioned in column 35. I didn't understand how choice is expressed in the process of exercising discretion. After all, if my discretion tells me that X is true, how can I choose to think differently?

Boaz, there is no difference. Terveyhu Eitaneh is in the house.

Oren, discretion itself is a type of choice. It is not that one chooses whether to go with discretion.

R’ Michi, you wrote differently in column 175. That's my understanding.

?Why don't Bible critics look at the site here?

I don't see where it says otherwise.

In what sense is discretion itself a type of choice? On the surface, I would say that discretion is forced upon me.

See the above column. Many of our decisions are complex. There are considerations here and there and you have to make a judgment (attach weight to each of them) and decide. It is not a calculative act but rather a choice-like one.
For example, deciding whether there is a God. There are considerations for and against that everyone knows and yet they reach different conclusions. So either it is forced upon us and then arbitrary (because it is a fact that we reach different results) or there is something like a choice here.
And of course I do not mean to say that there is no right answer, just as in morality there is a right answer.

How is this different from an eye test at the optometrist, where some people are able to see the smallest numbers and some are not. Here too, different people reach different results (regarding the numbers). What distinguishes those who are right from those who are not is their eyesight. Also regarding the understanding that God exists, what distinguishes those who are right from those who are not is their judgment. Both the eyesight and the judgment are seemingly forced upon a person.

You can of course argue that this is a calculation (based on incorrect facts) but in my opinion it is not. We have the same data and arguments and the conclusions are still different.
To the same extent, many argue that a choice in the value context is also a calculation.

I remember that in the past you addressed the issue of non-deductive logic and claimed that theoretically a computer could also use such logic. More sophisticated algorithms would be able to draw more correct conclusions than other algorithms. For example, today there are already autonomous cars from certain companies that drive better than autonomous cars from other companies. The input to the cars' driving algorithm is the same input (road conditions), and yet the output is different from company to company. The reason the output is different is because of the quality of the algorithm. The same is true with us, even though the data and arguments are the same, the conclusion can be different because of the difference in each person's judgment.

Obviously. This is the classic argument of artificial intelligence people who see this all as a calculation. But I don't agree that it is a calculation. If it is a calculation in the first place, the conclusions have no real value (except on the assumption that the computer is reliable and good, which itself is based on a calculation on that same computer).

Wow! I just now realized what you meant in column 35.
If I understood correctly, you claim that the understanding that our thinking is reliable is an understanding that by definition cannot be a simple computational understanding but a different kind of understanding (if all intuitions). And from there you conclude that we probably have a thinking capacity that a computer could never have and that is what you call free thinking. My question is, why connect the matter of choice with this unique thinking capacity? What makes it considered free in your eyes?

The reliability of thinking does not depend only on its quality (=the ability to think) but also on the fact that there is something outside of it that judges it and decides by independent means (=judgment and decision between alternatives) on its reliability. This is what I called the elective dimension of thinking. A machine, no matter how reliable it may be, cannot make decisions about its own reliability (and not necessarily because of the halting problem of Turing machines, although this may be related).

I understand 🙂

This reminds me of the verse in Jeremiah:
(11) And the word of the LORD came to me, saying, What seest thou, Jeremiah? And he said, I see with a light of zeal. (12) And the LORD said unto me, Thou hast well seen: for I am zealous for my word, to perform it.

It may seem difficult to praise Jeremiah for being able to see what the Lord meant. His faculty of vision is forced upon him. Rather, it must be said that he exercised here the unique faculty of thought of which we are speaking (thinking in freedom) and with its help he was able to see what the Lord meant. This ability, by definition, is not forced upon a person. Therefore, it is fitting to praise Jeremiah regarding it (in reference to column 134 and Bible study 🙂 )

🙂

Another point that I don't quite understand in this context is that with regard to a practical choice, it is worthy of appreciation when there is a price that the person making the choice pays. For example, someone who chooses to give to charity instead of using this money for other needs that are important to him, there is a sacrifice in this choice that is worthy of appreciation. But with regard to a choice on the intellectual level, what sacrifice is there here? I thought perhaps it should be said that the effort involved in learning and exercising thinking is the sacrifice that is worthy of appreciation.

Thinking rightly and living rightly is a value. Oh, beyond that, I'm not sure that the intellectual level should also be a price.