Christianity and artist

Regarding the repetition of the Shatz, if there is no repetition of the Shatz here, then the blessings are null and void. Now the question is what would take the statement out of the category of repetition of the Shatz.
See, for example, Rabbi Rimon's article on this here:
http://www.zomet.org.il/?CategoryID=160&ArticleID=6158

The question remains open here whether from a halakhic perspective one should burn and from a moral perspective one should not, what do we do in a conflict between morality and halakha - what prevails? (Perhaps it depends on the level of halakhic obligation compared to the level of moral obligation, etc.) I did not see now if it was written in columns 15-16

Why is there a prohibition? Because you must not destroy?
Even if there is no obligation to burn, one might think that burning books that contain nonsense is not you must not destroy.

Yishai,
It is morally forbidden to burn books that are sacred to other people (especially if they belong to them), just as we complain that they did it to us.

Itay,
The question of how to decide is always present in every value conflict. It is a question of feeling and what is right in the situation. Here it is clear to me (and seems agreed upon by all, even if they don't say it that way) that what is right is not to burn.

Rabbi, beyond that, if I'm not mistaken, Rabbi Kook treats Christianity very respectfully and I think he even attributes the Holy Spirit to some of its great leaders. Is it really correct to consider Christianity, in all its branches, to be idolatry?

Rabbi, you always mention the principle of Lex Specials, and here you are apparently violating it.
After all, there is a conflict between two values: 1) Consideration for the feelings of others. 2) Burning of books of various kinds.
For the matter of fact, both are written in the Torah. It seems clear that the book should be burned and book burning should be excluded from the rule of consideration for others. According to your solution, the value of burning books of various kinds is null and void.

Noam,
I am also willing to treat it respectfully. Is it a matter of opinion? Opinions differ on this. For Catholics, I think most jurists say it is a matter of opinion, and for Protestants, a large portion think not.

Itamar,
In your opinion, when there is a conflict between a do and a doer or any other conflict, we will always decide it according to LS. Does that make sense?
This reminds me of the story about Rabbi Eybschitz and the priest, who asked him why Jews don't follow Christians, since it is written in the Torah to follow the majority. Rabbi replied that following the majority is a rule of decision in doubt, but he is not in doubt. These rules are relevant after you have decided that there is doubt. If there is no doubt, there is no need to resort to rules. Here it simply seems to me that the moral prohibition prevails, anyway I am not in doubt and there is no need for LS.

So why did God command this? Would you also say this about the death of a court of law and the separation of a woman from her husband?

First, who said that God commanded this? Second, things in Halacha are time and period dependent.
God also commanded that women not learn Torah (?) and that they be Hebrew and Canaanite slaves.

1. Here you are already giving another argument (by the way, a very reasonable argument in my opinion) that times have changed. I am willing to hear that. But according to your original reason that morality prevails over halacha, it follows that even at the time of the giving of the Torah, it was necessary to refrain from killing a Sabbath desecrator. Therefore, I ask how you justify the commandment of the place? You yourself brought up the example of the Sabbath desecrator as an example of Lex Specials.
2. In one of the jokes here, you said that you do not understand those who say that it was once right to kill Sabbath desecrators and not today, because of the question of why a God who is not subject to time commanded something that was not right to do, after all, He knew the truth.
3. Now you claim that burning books is not written in the Torah, but simply a halacha that is not binding, so there is no need for the moral conflict to allow us to avoid its existence.

G-d also commanded that women not learn Torah (?) and that they be Hebrew and Canaanite slaves.

Regarding women, it is indeed not a mitzvah for them to learn Torah, but it is not a prohibition either. The sages were not comfortable with this.

And Hebrew and Canaanite slaves, again, it is not a mitzvah and it is not a prohibition.

But burning the messian is a complete mitzvah. To destroy all the געז. And doubt from the Torah is more serious. If the rabbi fears desecration of G-d in this matter, then at least he should burn it at home in modesty.

Itamar, I'm not sure what I failed to clarify in my words.
This is not a different argument. It's exactly the same argument. Times have changed and today it's not appropriate to do so. There's no point in applying LS here anyway. That's all.
Morality does not prevail over halacha in general. I wrote this about this case.
I didn't write that it wasn't a binding halacha, but that it wasn't written in the Torah. The Sages interpreted it that way. Therefore, there is room to change when circumstances change, or at least to freeze it.

Orthodox,
G-d did not command women not to study Torah. This is the interpretation of the Sages, just like the burning of the New Testament.
A thief who has nothing to pay is sold into slavery. This is a mitzvah. And also regarding the matter of permission, if it can change with the changing times, it means that the changing times allow for changes. Either it contradicts the eternity of the Torah or it doesn't.
As stated, my problem is not blasphemy, but it's out of the question to do such an ugly thing (and then to lament that our books are being burned).

So only when the interpretation is from the sages can we say that morality prevails? What if the Torah explicitly said to burn the New Testament?

If it had been written explicitly, it would have been more difficult. And there is still room for freezing even if not for change. See the case of the woman of good looks and in column 15.

I read the Tener. But the case of a beautiful woman is very soft, after all God revealed to us that there is no religious defect in taking a beautiful woman (like eating dead animals in war), so the moral value that says not to do this enters a vacuum, and is certainly binding. Would you say the same in cases like Amalek or killing a Sabbath desecrator?

This is again an interpretation of the sages and not explicitly stated in the Bible.

In the case of a woman of good character, this is the most reasonable and simple interpretation in the Bible. It takes a lot of effort to understand that the Torah wants this from the beginning.

If it belongs to them, that's another story.
But what do they care if it's burned if it doesn't belong to them? I only care if it's done in front of my eyes so I have to tear it up. Of course, if it's done in private, it shouldn't bother them.

To Rabbi Mikhi:
A. The answer you gave is apparently out of enmity and not out of morality (we don't want our books to be burned)
B. Even if it is out of morality, one can also argue the opposite: the respect I give them is precisely because they believe in what they do. Yes, they burn my books because their faith is true, and therefore I also burn their books because my faith is true. Liberalism, as attractive as it may be, does not truly respect them, since it transmits that their faith is not true (even in the face of the Palestinians, my respect for them is real precisely because I want to defeat them and not contain them like the fake left).
C. And one can even argue that the reason for not burning is not out of morality but out of the laws of idolatry: idolatry that has been corrupted by its worshippers is void of the law of idolatry. The secularization process that Christianity is undergoing corrupts idolatry and ends up turning it into a profane one. A church closed in Europe due to the lack of participation of the local population ceases to be idolatry and becomes a historical tourist site, just as the statues of Baal or Zeus in a museum are no longer idolatry. There is no need to burn the New Testament because there are no longer any believers in the New Testament.
D. This sting can also be directed towards Judaism. If Christianity is secularized, Judaism can also be secularized. Those who engage in it do not really believe in it and therefore there is no holiness in it. A Torah scroll written by a secularist is not holy because he does not believe. This is essentially Rabbi Tao's argument against academia. Turning secularism towards Judaism kills it.

A. I wrote that there are both. And here I will add another reason that I did not write above: a person should make decisions about his life according to the most arguments and data. Therefore, it is impossible to burn relevant sources, just as it is impossible to close a person off from the possibility of examining his path by virtue of “You shall not turn away”.
B. Well, this is just babbling. Burning does not mean respecting, and the fact that you do not burn does not mean giving legitimacy, but rather minimal respect for a person and his path, exactly as we expect of ourselves. It is not for nothing that we came with claims to those who burned our books and did not see this as respect for us, and rightly so.
C. There are hundreds of millions who believe in the New Testament. It has not been abrogated.
D. Regarding secular Jewish identity – I did not understand what Rabbi Tau added. It is a simple explanation. See here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%96%D7%94%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%99%D7%94%D7%95%D7%93%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%96%D7%9E%D7%A0%D7%A0%D7%95-%D7%95%D7%91%D7%9B%D7%9C%D7%9C/
There is the Protestant thesis that there is secularization (scholarization) on the level of Sociological, but it has no religious significance.

Yishai, in principle I am talking about collecting the books and burning them in the city square. In principle, it is possible because it is not harmful. But if there is such a permanent law, then even if they do it in Zina, it is visible to everyone.
Beyond that, the reasoning I added in the previous response to Y”D.

What point about a woman of good looks is rabbinic? And besides, you still haven't answered whether this is also possible in Torah. After all, you brought up a woman of good looks as an example of halakha from Torah. I really didn't understand.

A. And in your opinion, how can all the prohibitions on reading books of the kind that appear in the Rambam apply? (Or have they become a dead letter in the context of a demand and a reward?)
B. 🙂
C. And an empty church in secular Europe?
D. In my opinion, secularism's view actually has a halachic implication regarding Christianity. Regarding Judaism, the difference is that Judaism, as defined by the Christians, is not in the spirit but in the flesh. A Jew is a Jew if he is born to a Jewish mother. Therefore, even if the criticism of the spirit succeeds (a Platonic invention), it does not succeed on the flesh, since the flesh is part of this world (both I and my mother are part of this world, without a doubt). Since the divine revelation for Jews is found in the flesh (“The heralds of God” indeed, Job's, but still relevant), secularism fails to harm us.

Itamar,

Who said that a woman with this title is a rabbinate? I wrote that it is an interpretation of the sages of the verses (like most Torah laws).
In the Torah, this is also possible, at least as a freeze if not a change. There are several examples. For example, do not crowd together. Today, I do not prohibit two courts in one city. The custom is not a local custom but an ethnic custom. The sages in the Talmud (without the Sanhedrin) uprooted something from the Torah in a nutshell (such as killing the moral code of money, etc.). A vow that is not implemented, an oath in a synagogue, etc. I also gave examples of permission that is not exercised (such as slaves). And there are many more (I am slow because I am a peddler).

14,
A. They cannot be valid and have never been valid.
C. This is a question in the law of nullification of the עז, and it has nothing to do with it (I think that an empty church is not considered nullified in terms of nullification of the עז, but I haven't checked yet). I'm speaking here on a principled level.
D. I didn't understand anything, but I don't understand what the discussion is about. It is clear that there is no Judaism without Torah and Halacha. Flesh, presidents, clouds and wind, and there is no rain.

But all your examples are about the changing times and the improvement of the world. (For no reason other than the sake of heaven, morality), there is no clash of values here. I really don't understand.
And in general, why in this matter would there be a difference between something that is clearly written in the Torah and the interpretation of the sages?

Indeed. That's what you asked for, isn't it? The changing times reflect a different attitude towards Torah law. A clash is created between a world of values and the law as it was.
The interpretation of the sages is a product of their perceptions, and therefore here there is definitely a possibility of error and not just change.
I think we've exhausted it.