Circular definitions and explanations
I noticed that there is a common (built-in?) regression in the ability to define metaphysical/subjective concepts, which always stops in a closed circle. That is, the ability to define a concept that is not empirical is only through the repeated use of that concept itself. In cases where it is possible to use a parallel concept, that (parallel) concept is explained by the first concept. And so on. Is there a failure here on my part and on the part of those who fail to do so, or is there a fundamental problem with a priori logical thinking?
2. Even in empirical concepts, the full definitions of the concepts are ostensibly a priori, and then they again enter the aforementioned dilemma.
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If each concept on its own has no real definition for us, then how does the connection between concepts manage to do so?
Isn't there a certain urgency here?
First, a definition is just a verbal formulation of understanding, so the fact that there are no definitions does not mean that there is no understanding.
Secondly, what I wrote is that the perception is of the fabric of concepts as a whole. Why do you assume that it must be from concepts to the whole and not vice versa? By the way, among educational researchers there was a big debate whether it is better to teach letters and then words or to teach words and from that they will learn letters. They even made attempts in both directions.
You are right about the literal formulation, but regarding the continuation, the question arises again - what is there in the whole that is not at the level of the individual, and if there is not sufficient understanding in every detail, then how does the whole overcome this?
If you are talking about perceiving things in the real world around us, then I agree, because a real thing is usually complex, and built from many definitions. So that a single definition cannot capture the whole thing.
I think that letters and words are something a little different, because the definition of letters is not exactly like a definition of the type you shared above, because it is actually a definition of a single character by sight. Just as a letter in ancient Hebrew writing would not be understood by a person who is not accustomed to it. And so every word is built by sounds that are built by letters; I think the dispute was on which side is better to remember. And especially the idea that the child already knows the meaning of words by hearing them and not by reading them. Otherwise, we have only complicated the world even more for him.
1. Since there is no such thing as conceptual empiricism, how can verbal claims and definitions be systematically tested?
2. Doesn't the circular fate of language and logic indicate its inability to touch the things themselves? “The things themselves”= I do not mean the empirical phenomena to which we never have absolute access (Kant), but the a priori ideas that are also seemingly inaccessible to definitional formulation because of the aforementioned circularity”
1. David, I don't understand. You can't put definitions to the test. You can think about whether they are accurate or not. The test is mental.
2. Language describes things, and I don't understand what it means that language cannot know the things themselves. Language doesn't touch anything.
Language is perceived by us as a way of knowing and understanding an idea or essence. Since it is circular, it is also closed and limited. That is, it knows how to explain things from the verbal level for the sake of the verbal consciousness. It is possible that there is a level that is not verbal, but that language cannot describe. If so, language and definition are one dimension that may be small and limited in relation to the essence itself, which tolerates other perspectives that are not verbally accessible. It is always possible to assume that such a level may exist, but I am trying to prove from the verbal circularity that it is reasonable to assume that this level really does exist. Isn't that right?
I really don't understand where you're getting these statements from. Language certainly describes the non-verbal layer. That's the whole idea of language. There is a thought that is in itself non-verbal, and language describes it.
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