Commitment to the views of our ancestors in matters of beliefs and opinions

I protest strongly and with pain and disappointment about the comparison between Mo”n and Kant and his friends.

I will start by saying that the honor of Rabbi Avraham is also very important to me, I do not believe that it is permissible to express oneself with the audacity of God behind the keyboard, I also sign my name of course. I would also protest in the shiur Pa”p – as a rare but necessary step.
I would also respond personally and not publicly, but unfortunately the harsh things have been published, and the protest will be attached to them.

In your opinion, the stories about Abraham Avinu in the Pentateuch are not a settled law!
And what does that mean?..
I will not complete the argument out of respect for the Torah, please understand what I mean.

Did Kant and Wittgenstein serve as Torah scholars? What exactly is the “Torah in the Gebra” in them?
And yes, I understood that you mean that the ”Gebra” is the learner, who from his point of view takes it to understand the Torah, and not the author. It doesn't matter.
The great, great, very intense, conscious adherence of the Maimonides to the revelation – also turns his breakfast into the Torah, the real Torah. The interpretation of the revelation. The normative significance of a model to emulate. Especially since his pure book Mo”n, which is a commentary on the written and spoken Torah – entirely shapes practice and has dedicated chapters for practice! While Kant's most enormous philosophizing may be the opposite of morality and the will of God.

There is no justification or apology for calling Kant “Torah” – God He gave us Torah so that we can say that a Gentile philosopher is “Torah”?!
And to compare it to our rabbi!

Painful and shocking.

I am sure that the intention is to convey a complicated idea about the difference between a decreed law and a thought, and to give it a sharp illustration like a scalpel in order to be clear. But this is entering a foreign place (I am restrained). Not everything is permitted.

This is my first encounter with your words. Please repeat yourself (then delete this response of mine)
It is also possible that I did not understand the rabbi's intention at all and the rabbi did not intend the comparison at all. But then I only have a small “guilt of the cause”, and this does not remove the rabbi's responsibility not to express himself in a way that is interpreted in this way, and that arouses such feelings.
Faithful, loving wounds.

Snir Harel
Ma'ale Adumim

Hello Snir. An insult is no substitute for reasoning. I definitely stand by my words, and of course you have the right to protest. The fact that the Maimonides served as a rabbi does not make his medical statements correct, and in my opinion the same is true of his intellectual statements. That's all. If, following this encounter, you come to the conclusion that my words offend you, you are welcome to stop reading. One of my fundamental principles and that of the site is that it is permissible to say anything as long as it is reasoned and well-founded. Insults play no role in determining what is right and what is wrong (although of course things should not be said just to offend. But that is not the case here). I will add that at least for me personally, Kant contributes more to me than the Maimonides and Aristotle in the fields of philosophy. Perhaps if he were alive today he would translate Kant into "Jewish" instead of Aristotle and he would become more relevant to me.

I combined three arguments in my words in a negative and positive way: Abraham our father as words of thought that are bodies of Torah, Rambam served as a Tahsin and therefore carries the non-verbal but normatively binding quality of the Torah, Mo’N is a book that deals with the interpretation of revelation, also with normative meanings.
And their absence in Kant and his group.

Should one express one’s feelings or remain restrained?
This is not a personal “insult”, but to the best of my understanding an insult that is consistent with the values of the Torah.
Yes, my criticism is precisely that the comparison made also has a disadvantage (in transmitting the) emotional, experiential, and I will not let this be swallowed up among the arguments.

Regarding your last comment:
Rambam in Mo’N is the interpreter of the Torah, the revelation. He does not Judaize Aristotle, but says where Aristotle was right (and appreciates it) and where he was greatly mistaken. Aristotle is the relevant figure already familiar with the Torah in those days.
Leibowitz, for example, takes the opinions of the Rambam and confronts them with those of Kant, and in effect nullifies Kant from a value perspective by virtue of the values he finds in the Rambam - the meaning of the work of God for its own sake.
The point is that the Rambam's statement in the Mo'n is Torah and not Aristotelian, and even today one can find in his words in the Mo'n an understanding of what the will of God is - something that does not exist in either Aristotle or Kant.

What is the opinion/understanding (of the Lord in the Mitzvah) of the will of God and nothing else?

What the heck. The Mo”n is the interpretation of the Torah and the Sages by the will of God.
It is important to see the difference between the thoughts of a person and his thoughts, and the thoughts of a person that constitute a (human, correct) translation of the content that penetrated reality from above.
There is nothing in the Mo”n that is not supported by the Torah and the Sages, including physics and metaphysics, especially the points that disagree with Aristotle.
In other words, it is a book of interpretation of Revelation. An interpretation of the Tosh”k and Tosh”a given at Sinai.

This is fundamentally different from a general thinker who says what he thinks/understands about the will of God, by the way also from Abraham our father (who received confirmation after the fact when it was included in the Torah).

All the more so since it is different from a thinker who does not even try to say what the will of God is (unless it is just a matter of terminology). The values, which are axioms for discussion, are freely selectable.

You wrote, “It is important to see the difference between a person’s thoughts, not a person’s thoughts, and a person’s thoughts that constitute a (human, correct) translation of content that has penetrated reality from above.”

Can you explain:
1. What is the difference?
2. How do you determine whether a person’s thought falls into the first or second category?
3. Do you claim that Maimonides’ thought was not influenced by external philosophy, i.e., it would have remained the same if he had not been exposed to Aristotle, or alternatively – if he had been exposed to Kant?

Snir,

I must say that I was very impressed by the following incomprehensible sentence: “bears the nonverbal but normatively binding quality of the Torah”. But what can you do when impressive sentences are not reasoning. To convince me, one must present arguments and reasons and not make slogans and be offended (in the name of the Torah and its values).
I don't know which Tahs used by Maimonides, but in any case, the use of Tahs is irrelevant to the discussion. I am concerned with the content of the words and not with the saying. Certainly not when it comes to a collection of inventions from his mind and not because of a sage who served or did not serve.

I didn't ask you to let something sink in. I just said that in my opinion it is irrelevant. If you think so – to your health. Don't hide anything that you think or feel.

I completely disagree with you. Maimonides draws many of his principles and ways of thinking from Aristotle, and states them as if they were binding truths (including, with great force, the opinions and foundations of the Torah). The fact that there are things he rejects only shows that he was not a foolish Hasid.

I did not understand why your comment from Leibowitz (which I do not agree with) is relevant.

After all, the Mishnah did not move from its place.

Good.
Cold reasoning.
For now, from the halakhic perspective, without even addressing the thought structure you propose.

I am going to base all of the following on the rulings of the Rambam in the laws of Talmud Torah:

A third of the time devoted to studying Torah should be spent studying the Written Torah
and a third the Oral Torah
The words of Kabbalah (=Prophets and Writings) are included in the Written Torah
and their interpretations are included in the Oral Torah.

That is:
Interpretation of verses, such as the interpretations of Rabbah, Ramban, Radak and the rest
and also the Midrash of the Agada, of course,
all interpret verses.
And therefore they are all Oral Torah.
Check me on the commentators – Is this what the Rambam meant. Now we can continue.

If there is a verse that deals with the Gothic theme, such as the entire Torah up to “this month for you”, much of the Torah in general, all the reasoning for the mitzvah that appears in the Torah – such as the remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt, etc., and all that – all deal with philosophy, beliefs, and opinions.
Any commentary on these verses will of course also be Gothic. The commentators will try to say what Gothic idea the writer was referring to.

Please don't be caught making all the examples I gave difficult, look for examples of Gothic verses – it shouldn't be difficult. The simplest is the book of Proverbs – it's all pure philosophy and morals.

Then you have two questions:
A. When the Torah says “The perfect rock acted– – This is clearly a Gothic statement. And it is clear that it is Torah, unlike Kant. And so are the stories of Abraham our father. They are the thought written by God himself.
B. When the commentators seek to interpret this verse and similar ones, they are considered, according to the above halakhic rulings, to be the Oral Torah.

The chapter in the Mo’n that deals with the interpretation of the verse “The rock did not work” would also be considered Oral Torah, for example. But Mo’n is not the issue here, but rather all Torah thought that constitutes an interpretation (authentic, meaning that one truly strives to interpret the writer’s intention) of biblical verses.

Do you see the difference in the halakhic status of this literature and Kant?

They are considered “Oral Torah” By virtue of being commentaries on the Bible. They deal with thought because the Bible deals with thought.
Kant is not considered an oral Torah.

Kant may be able to help with the part of the “Talmud”, the development of human thinking around the contents of revelation and creation.
But Kant is neither the written Torah nor the oral Torah, while Jewish thought is indeed the oral Torah (=Mishnah), beyond being helpful to the Talmud.

The written Torah and the oral Torah, according to the Maimonides”s definition, are well-defined groups of works, in which the books of Jewish thought are included insofar as they interpret verses in the entire Bible. Perhaps he preceded you in defining the concepts “Torah in the haftza/gebra”, perhaps not, we will not go into that because I did not follow your words on the subject.

Talmud, according to the Maimonides, is not a book at all, but rather the human act of thinking about the two groups mentioned above and about reality as a whole, and then any book that helps clarify the truth can be used by a person in his Talmud activity, without the book itself being Torah at all.

Summary: The book of Jewish Thought is a complete Torah because it interprets verses. Kant does not interpret verses and therefore is not a complete Torah.

Your words comparing them are contrary to Halacha.

Well, now at least it seems that there are arguments here.
The fact that there are verses that deal with philosophy is clear. You don't need to convince me of this, and that's not what the debate is about.
The first question is whether there is an organized tradition on the interpretations of this philosophy or whether each thinker chooses his own ideas from his own interpretations and the influences of his environment. I believe the second option, and since this is the case, the words of this or that thinker have no binding authority. And even if there were such a tradition, Maimonides himself writes that there is no authority in non-halakhic fields.

Second comment. When Kant interprets the meaning of space and time, he is also interpreting verses in the Torah. He does not need to refer to the verses, since he is interpreting concepts and ideas discussed in the verses. As far as I am concerned, if he is right in his understanding of space and time, then this is the correct interpretation and not Maimonides', even if Maimonides mentions verses and refers to them and Kant does not. It has no importance at all. If you were to say that now I take Kant and interpret the verses through him, just as the Rambam did for Aristotle. So, now there is already a Kantian interpretation of the verses and you can rest assured that this too was said as an interpretation of the verses.
It seems that you are attaching the name “Torah” to the idea intended by its thinker (did he intend to interpret a verse when he said the idea), and I did not do so. What would you say about Christian interpretations of the verses of the Torah? They were also said as an interpretation of the verses, so are they Torah?

And finally, where did you get the idea that my words are contrary to the law, I did not get to understand. At most, you claim that they are incorrect (and I disagree with you). Of course, even if they are contrary to the law, it does not really matter, since if I think they are correct, then in my opinion they are correct whether they conform to the law or not.

As an immanent philosopher, it is difficult to say that Kant is in the tradition of revelation, and so is Wittgenstein. It is even more difficult to say this about Anselm, and so are the Christian commentators that Abarbanel cites.

In any case, the custom of the world agrees with Snir and not with you. We bless the blessings of the Torah for studying thought/faith/morality, and so on, and not for reading Kant and Wittgenstein. And in order to defend the custom of the world from the judgment of reason, I will try to make the following argument:

The revelation of the Torah does not remain only at the level of the written Torah, but also in the oral Torah of the sages. The sages themselves reveal the Torah in their understanding and according to their own way. This is true in scholarship and in faith. When a sage reveals to us the meaning of a law - not in the sense of a reason for reading, but in the sense that Rashi writes about at the beginning of Parashat Mishpatim - he reveals the Torah to us anew, and therefore there is a retransmission of the Torah here. The Gemara says that at the beginning the Torah is called the Torah of the ’ and at the end it is called His own Torah. And so Rava was puzzled by the people who stand before a Torah scroll but not before the Sages. The Torah does not end with the written Torah but rather rolls on and goes to the oral Torah. Then it is understandable why it is not in the heavens, and how new interpretive revolutions could occur from time to time.

The Rabbi divides between scholarship and faith and sees scholarship as preparation for halacha. This is a very visionary but extreme approach. There is something in studying the Gemara that is not halacha in practice, and the Rabbi himself cites such cases (for the consecration of a woman…). On the other hand, there are also aspects of halacha in practice in studying faith (the difference between the passive approach of the Breslov Hasidim and the activism of the students of Rabbi Kook, for example). In my opinion, when a Sage whose Torah is delirious decides to say something, it does not matter whether what he says is in halacha, scholarship, or faith – In any case, it is the revelation of the Torah by that sage.

Sometimes sages decide to reveal their Torah in response to the perplexities of the generation. Sometimes they decide to base themselves on the wisdom of the time as a Torah statement (Rambam in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah is an embarrassing example). In this situation, they sometimes put themselves on the back burner. It turned out that Aristotelian science is not well-founded and now one can wonder what to do with Rambam's Laws of the Foundations of the Torah. And yet it seems to me that even if Rambam made a mistake, we should bless the Torah with blessings on the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah of the Strong Hand, as well as on the Teacher of the Confused. Even if Aristotelian science itself is false, Rambam's very approach already expresses to us Rambam's revelation of the Torah, which is true for all generations.

The world did not use to bless the Critique of Pure Reason, and when I read it at university (a superficial reading, of course), I did not bless the blessings of the Torah. Kant is not part of revelation and does not see himself as part of revelation. Therefore, to bless the blessings of the Torah over him is to interpret him in a way that is sinful for him and the direction of his book. One can wonder about Anselm of Lanfranc. At the time, I tried to argue in one of the responses that as someone who is not a Jew, he is not part of revelation. But things are complicated, as the rabbi made it difficult for me. Or perhaps it could be argued that there are two laws here: the law of engaging in Torah matters, which also belongs to him, and the law of the giver of the Torah, which also belongs to him, and then one should bless only one blessing: – engaging in Torah matters…

(Regarding the books of faith, a separate question was raised, regarding sermons, I am considering writing a response in the rabbi's column, a pleasant day in his honor)

I did not say that Kant espoused the tradition of revelation.
I did not say that the custom of the world is like me. By the way, I am not sure that you are right. In the classical yeshivahs, they did not study books of thought, and I doubt whether it is considered there as actual Torah study that is blessed with the blessing of the Torah.

As a matter of fact, issues of thought are usually factual areas, and not like halacha, which deals with norms (and not facts). Because of this, it makes no sense to say that sages discover or create the Torah in their interpretations. Take, for example, the issue of providence. There is a debate about whether God, the Almighty, oversees every detail among the Gentiles or animals. This is a factual question (either He oversees or not). What is the point of saying that the interpretation of the Maimonides or the Rasa creates the Torah here. Do they change reality? In Halacha, it is possible (and correct in a certain sense, and yet) to say that the interpretations of the sages of their generations create the Torah.

If Kant did not advocate the tradition of revelation, what was the point of Amina even blessing the Torah?

The world does not end in the ”classical yeshiva”. With all due respect to Rabbi Chaim of Brisk, books of thought were studied before and after him. The fact that the ”classical yeshiva” did not emphasize these books does not make them not Torah studies. Incidentally, the Mir Yeshiva in Shanghai printed quite a few books of thought and philosophy that probably interested the students there.

Your basic argument that this is a dispute in factual areas is, on second thought, a bit strange. If the matter can be clarified, then why argue about it. If the matter cannot be clarified, then there is no argument. It seems more like a dispute over the logical definition of God in the manner that was customary in the Middle Ages according to Aristotle (and see Israel Rubin's new book “What God Cannot Do”). One can say that these are matters of fact and one can say that they are not (ibid.). However, the basic claim that these are matters of fact and thus to dismiss them immediately does not make sense.

I am not saying that they are perfect and there is certainly something a little tedious about reading them. Shalom Rosenberg writes in the ”Introduction to the Khozari” that for the Maimonides there is an interest in reviving Aristotle in order to understand the picture of the world that the Maimonides saw before his eyes, but for the Khozari it comes out really ridiculous to revive Aristotle only to discover that the Rabbis disagree with him.

Of course, most philosophical discussions are value-based, not factual. And the purpose of all of them is value-based, without exception.

The Torah was given to us so that we could read it from the premise that it speaks in our language and style. Otherwise, we could say that ”no”=”yes”. (I have shortened it because I am building on the fact that this highly significant argument is understood and agreed upon).

And when I read the Torah in this way, I get the impression that almost every mitzvah is attached to, or is taken for granted against the background of the extensive philosophical chapters in the Torah, a general value-based reasoning.
And I read that there are general “paths” that all the mitzvot are supposed to express.
And I am supposed to clarify these ways, the Gothic, and follow them.

Therefore – The author of a book that deals with clarifying the values of the Bible, of the authors of the books (not clarifying "concepts"), and he does not hold the concept of heresy (as we perceive from Christians according to Halacha) - this and only this Torah.
In other words, he interprets with the intention of upholding, he truly investigates what the values that appear there are because they are his values, and he has no overt and clear religious distortions.

You have nothing to be confused about in the question of the gray area. Maimonides says that "words of Kabbalah are in the general written Torah, and their interpretations are in the general oral Torah."
You are welcome to interpret Maimonides for yourself - does he also include Christians in this definition (of Torah in the hafza)? And grammar and terminology books that haven't heard of the Bible?

There is a gray area that raises a question. But I don't think that Christians, or those who don't accept the basic principles of Judaism, or mere interpreters of concepts (and not the values of the authors of the Bible!!) are included in his list.

It's easy for me to see that this is what Maimonides intended in his halakhic text. These are minor cases, not cases of a gray area.

Ethical issues in the books of philosophy:

What is the meaning of the concept of "good".
What is the purpose of life?
What is the meaning of the concept of "holiness" and what is required of us in "be holy", "and do what is right and good".
What are “Chesed, Mishpat, and Tzedakah in the Land”?

Why does G-d want us to keep the mitzvot?
– This question has a special meaning in the intention of the mitzvah
– in the dimensions of chassidism and order involved in it – in which direction should we take them
– and of course – to the halachic midrash.

For example: “And gave in her hand” – And gave – from anywhere. In her hand – In her hand specifically. (Books of Deuteronomy)

What compelled the sages to demand this? It is clear that they saw a value struggle between the need to allow divorce easily (from anywhere), and the need to ensure that the woman has evidence (only in her hand).
Therefore, they decided – Including the condemnation of hay and carrion - a decision between conflicting values.
Let's not argue about the example if you find the principle worth thinking about (or agree with it from the beginning).

All this is speculation.

The issue of the care of animals also interests us purely from a value perspective, as the Maimonides says in 3:17 or thereabouts - "Therefore we were permitted to slaughter them", because they lack care. The fact is not the debate here, but the value inherent in the concept of "care". After all, we follow the ways of God, and therefore the whole discussion is whether we should personally care for animals.

I would emphasize that I am not saying that the manner of decision and the weight of the author's authority in such questions are the same as in halakhic questions.
(Although this is debatable, the commentary says that the Rambam certainly did not mean that there is no decision in thought.
In the Book of Mitzvot there are five commandments that are “to believe that..”)
I am saying that this is a Torah in a nutshell, and Kant is not.

Y.D. and Snir.
I will answer briefly because I have already explained my position.
It really doesn't matter whether the factual discussion is intended for value clarification. As long as it is a factual clarification, no authority belongs to it. It also doesn't matter whether these facts can be clarified in another way. If it is a question of facts, the way to clarify them is not to study the M&N or the R&S. Find out how you want, just as the Maimonides and the R&S themselves did.
The specific questions related to halakha and Torah (like Nathan in his hand) did not concern the philosophers and therefore there is certainly nothing to learn from Kant there. What does all this have to do with our discussion? On the other hand, the Maimonides has no authority on such questions either. The factual questions I dealt with are the general philosophical questions and therefore regarding them I said that Kant is like the Maimonides in this.
I have already explained that it is of no importance who said the words and what their motivations were. What is important is what was said and whether it is true. It could be a Christian, a demon, an angel, an Eskimo, or a cat.
Regarding the Lithuanian yeshivas, they certainly do not know everything, but when you say that my words are against tradition and the accepted practice among the Jewish people, I have given you a counterexample. That is all.

I brought a lot of examples of things that have nothing to do with reality but with pure values. In particular, the ways of the Lord, what their essence is. It becomes clear in the Bible and other books of course. Yes, the reasons for the commandments are content that is explicitly mentioned in the Torah.
The connection with the Halacha Midrash is that the thought of the reasons for the commandments guides the Sages on how to teach Halacha Midrash. Where did you get the words “and gave” and “in her hand” and how to connect them. Do you really think it is written in the verse, that the language of the verse forced them to conclude “a narrow and narrow mind”?
No, that is the Goth’s clarification. Who interprets the words of the verse, does not depend on them artificially.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I greatly appreciate the way you stood firm against
A. Claim that your words are shocking and painful.
B. Claim that your words are against the Halacha.
C. Claim that your words are not accepted by the Jewish people.

And you stuck to your reasoning and demanded that we stick to your reasoning.

I honestly see such sanctification of God.

Although, I think that the three above claims are still true regarding your words.

I stumbled upon this by chance, and I hope that we have gained important clarification on the essence of the Torah in preparation for Shavuot.
Halacha and thought (in the sense of values, not facts) are intertwined and intertwined with each other in the written Torah. The attempt to say that in the Torah as it is written the situation is different is forced and mechanical, and I hope that I have demonstrated with a little elaboration that this is not the case.

In your straightforward style, you gave me the feeling that there is someone to talk to and that it is worth investing in writing, and I applaud you for that.
That is what I gained from this.
All the best.

Oh yes
In your words, you mentioned the foundation on which you rely in cutting off the legendary part of the oral Torah tradition and its authority: “The first question is whether there is an organized tradition on the interpretations of this thought or whether each thinker chooses his own ideas from his own interpretations and the influences of his environment. I believe in the second option…”

Let us examine the meaning of your words.
Moses received the Torah from Sinai.
The Oral Torah is the interpretation of the Written Torah, God interpreted the Torah to Moses and ensured his understanding.
You agree that God also interpreted the philosophical realm of the Torah to Moses, and not just the halakhic realm. To divide here is really artificial and illogical.
In other words, value content from God entered our reality, and not just behavioral imperatives. Both in the written Torah, and as required by this in its interpretation – the oral Torah.

Moses stored in his mind an understanding of the interpretation of the halakhic part of the Torah and also of the philosophical part – contents that penetrated the world from above, from the ’.
He transmitted to Joshua.
Joshua to the elders
Elders to the prophets.

So far you agree. But in your opinion, somewhere in the chain someone was negligent and no longer transmitted the Gothic tradition, but only dry laws.
Someone in the chain became a technocratic robot and did not think there was any significance in transmitting explanatory conceptual contents (which were transmitted to him by the ’ in the chain!!), or he is incapable of doing so.
Somewhere in the chain of Kabbalah, in your opinion, there was a generation that did not at all resemble the ”Angel of the ’ Hosts”.

Then a few generations passed, we came to our senses, and we began to think of religious ideas from our own minds. Without any connection to Sinai.

That's what your words imply.

I believe that no generation was negligent, and that everyone always knew that thought and knowledge encompass and guide action, and passed on the philosophical content given to Moses from Sinai.

I believe that these contents are still with us today.

That's why I make an effort to learn from my rabbis.

That's why I make an effort to study Jewish books of thought.

General books of thought can contribute to human thinking. They don't convey to me values that Moses our rabbi understood when the Lord explained them to him, and that our ancestors were meticulous in their faith to ensure that they would reach us.

All the best.

I simply do not accept the claim that this is a dispute in reality (i.e. about facts). To claim that a dispute in matters of faith is a dispute in reality is to claim that the disputants are a bunch of idiots who disagree about something that either can be determined by empirical testing and then why are they wasting our time, or that it cannot be determined and then intellectual honesty should oblige them to admit that they have no ability to decide on the matter. Since we know them and know that they are not idiots and have intellectual honesty, their dispute is probably not a dispute about facts.

You want to continue to argue like this, good luck, but be aware that you are presenting them as a bunch of idiots who disagree about something that they have no ability to decide just because they want to.

Snir Shalom.
These a priori arguments are insignificant in the face of the facts. Read the Maharal and tell me whether his words are rooted in the tradition of previous generations or whether they are a completely new thought that came from him and him alone, and even the terminology and basic principles were invented by him. The same goes for the Rambam, the Mo’n, R’Tsadok, and other thinkers. You can continue to deny facts in the name of slogans (which must have been a tradition because it doesn’t make sense not to) but that’s not really convincing in the face of facts.

Y’D,
I don’t want to argue anything. I’m simply arguing it. I didn’t say they were idiots. People who deal with issues that cannot be empirically clarified deal with them using arguments that make sense to them. My or their ridicule will not help here.

Let's put it another way. In your opinion, will we need to recite the blessings of the Torah over your books of faith or not?

Dear Rabbi
Please refrain from using the word bota. Part of the discussion here is (for me) the importance of the appropriate emotional attitude towards people in general, and Torah scholars in particular. Not that it was said about anyone, hon., but it creates an atmosphere.

Rabbi
So we come to the question of “Read the Maharlika/Moslem/Rabbi Tzadok and tell me if you think this is original or not”.

I read a little, and my simple feeling is exactly the opposite of what you expect me to agree to, supposedly ‘if I just look honestly’. I see here one unique Torah, very deep shared values, unique to the Torah, which I find already in the Bible, Chazal, through the Rishonim and Aharonim that you mentioned, and up to my own very own Rabbi.
I see it through the veils of different terminology and style, even radically, and also through the veils of different emphases within the same whole, for reasons that time, situation, or character dictate.

It is clear to me (intellectually and empirically, not at all axiomatically) that Maharl is a commentary on the prophets. I feel this strongly.

It has been said about this that “no two prophets prophesy in a similar style.”

This is evident in the ideas as well as in the nuances, verbal (=literal) and non-verbal (can be explained but does not belong here).

I feel, as a simple and authentic experience (and this is what you are asking about now), that there is one statement here, a tradition, a school developing from Sinai.

And I did not assume this in advance. On the contrary, it surprised me. And continues to surprise me from time to time.

We have different experiences with the same phenomenon (Torah literature).
When I come to such a case, my childhood habit was to think that the other is deluding himself. Today I know how to pay close attention to such things.

Y”D,
I don't know. I think not, and the same goes for Munn and Kant. If one blesses the Torah in the name of God, then one should bless everyone.

Snir,
Indeed, completely different perceptions. My feeling is that they are not close to each other, except for a few simple and trivial principles of course.

It is clear that the opinions are different and have a common core, and it does not matter if you call it trivial – it is what distinguishes Jewish thought.
I of course disagree and believe that the common denominator that distinguishes Torah writings from one another reaches very deep and complex levels.
This does not contradict the possibility that there may be disputes over this core, and even if one of the opinions is not authoritative, the entire corpus is Torah, and writings external to it do not possess the same core from Sinai and are not Torah.

We have a halakhic commitment to certain principles of faith and faith cannot be separated from halakhic law. To provide background for this and followed by examples, I am attaching a note on Mo”n a, n – The concept of faith (in the sense of establishing an opinion):

Faith as a halakhic requirement

The concept of faith described in this chapter (faith) is not only a philosophical concept describing a component of human psychology, but also a concept with a binding halakhic status.
In the second chapter of the ”Eight Chapters” Maimonides claims that there are mitzvot that can be fulfilled with the mind. The way to fulfill a mitzvot with the mind is through “faith”, in the sense of establishing a correct opinion based on thinking:

“But I say that it is possible for the (intellectual) power to also be discipline and discipline, according to belief (itqad)
an empty opinion or the belief of a true opinion”.

Here we see that faith according to Maimonides is an active act of deciding how to see external reality. It is not a passive experience that a person is forced into by virtue of the data that he knows, but rather it has an element of decision. If a person has reached a belief that does not correspond to reality, this is called “heresy” (Mun 1, 30), meaning that he is measured according to objective truth as it is.
At first glance, this is difficult: if it is an understandable and reasoned belief – how can it be a matter of decision? It seems that the data force a person to believe in something!
This question is incorrect, because a person is not an absolutely rational creature by nature, but often tends to deceive and delude himself. Faith as an action is the decision and desire to be rational, to think about the data and reflect on them out of a desire and aspiration to arrive at the most plausible, or even obligatory, worldview based on them.
A leafing through the Book of Commandments (written in Arabic) will reveal to us the list of commandments that are fulfilled by the intellectual-conscious action of “faith in…” (itqad):

Asa A (faith in the reality of God)
The first commandment
is the commandment that we are commanded to believe in God, and it is: that we believe that there is (there is) a cause and an effect, which is the agent of all that exists.
And this is what the Almighty said: “I am the Lord your God’ (Exodus 20:2 and Deuteronomy 5:6).
And at the end of the Gemara Makot…

{By the way, in the The beginning of the verse 22 makes it clear that this commandment requires us to believe that the name of being, the absolute truth, is the name of God, the possessor of all powers. This is very specific, Aisha}

Act 2 (Faith in Oneness)
The second commandment
is the commandment that we are commanded to believe in oneness, and that is to believe that the agent that is in its first cause is one.
And He said, “Hear, Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one” (Deuteronomy 6:4).
And in most of the midrash you will find that they say

{And all the chapters of the titles in the MUN are guidance for fulfilling this commandment. It doesn't matter if they are authoritative or not, they are Torah!}

Eze 4 (Faith in Fear – this is how it is worded there)
The fourth commandment
is the commandment that we are commanded to believe in His fear, may He be exalted, and in His fear, and not to be complacent and trusting – but (let us wait) [and be determined] for the coming of His punishment, may He be exalted, at all times.
And this is what He said: “Fear the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 6:13).
And in the Gemara Sanhedrin they said in a way that is easy and simple…

You shall not do a (not to believe in the divinity of others)
is the warning that we are warned against believing [and attributing] divinity to others, may He be exalted.
And he said - may God exalt himself by attributing to him a saying -: “You shall not have other gods before you” (Exodus 20:3). And it was already explained at the end of the plagues…

You shall not do 7 (not to follow our hearts)
The 7th commandment
The warning that warned us against being free in our thoughts, to the point of believing opinions that contradict the opinions brought by the Torah, but rather we should limit our thoughts and make a reservation for them that will stand with Him – and they are the commandments of the Torah and its warnings.
And he said - may God exalt himself: “And you shall not follow your hearts and your eyes” (Numbers 15:39).
And the language of the books…
{There is no attempt to be precise in the language of the Rambam”s “commandments of the Torah and its warnings” As if everything is open in matters of belief and opinion, since the four previous commandments in the list are about thoughts. And in general, this is not detailed in the Mishnah Torah 17:72 regarding thoughts.

This is a list of the commandments listed in 1333, but there are many more halachic commandments whose fulfillment is not done by moving a bodily organ but by a conscious act of faith (such as intentions in prayer, shavuot, blessings, sacrifices).

Even in the Shulchan Aruch there are specific commandments of faith, it should not be thought that this constitutes a change of direction (O’Halem 8:1):
The interpretation of the words is specified in blessings. When the name is mentioned, the interpretation of its reading is specified in lordship, that it is the Lord of all, and it is specified in its writing in Yom Kippur 5:1 that it was and is and will be {=reality is bound in a simple formulation}. And by mentioning God, it is clear that He is strong, capable, and has all powers.

And is evidence needed that there are commandments that depend on the heart and not on actions? After all, there are six permanent commandments of education in the Reish of the Twelve, and there is the Rambam's introduction to the ninth root and much more.
So what does this prove? There is that part that is clear and agreed upon (that there is a God and that He created the world and created us and gave us Torah), and it is apparently given in tradition. The rest (including the decision that He does not have the image of the body, for example) is a decision of the various jurists and thinkers (Rambam and Shulchan Aruch) from their own interpretation, or they relied on the interpretation of others. Where does the assumption come from that this is binding on us? In the Rambam there are also laws of the foundations of the Torah and opinions. Are these laws also binding? I must accept that there are distinct minds and that the mind is active, and that reality is made up of elements (earth, wind, water, and fire) and other ancient and outdated matters. Or must I accept the Maharal's words that the number 8 is above nature and 7 is nature?

If you had just said there was no authority, I wouldn't have responded.
I responded because you said it wasn't Torah in a nutshell.

Did someone say you were obligated to a certain opinion?
And in Halacha, are you obligated to a certain opinion beyond the core?
And there too, you can disagree even on a Mishnah, and practically obey only because of accepting the authority and the need for national unity, but not to subordinate your truth, God forbid (although a humble person with experience would not rush to exclaim that he discovered that everyone was wrong, but would check a hundred times. But oh well, never mind).

The value system of the Bible is unique and complex.
The Moshe and the Mahal received from outside or created a certain terminology.
Clearly, you are not obligated to the system of technical words and concepts that was relevant to them, nor to the science that was accepted in their day.

But in the frameworks they had, they spoke about the unique values of the Bible and the Toshish.
They are deeply rooted in these values and have absorbed them into their hearts. With their mouths, they express them in the language of their generation, or in a language they have found within themselves a talent for creating.

How is this different from the Halacha ruling of Beit Hillel that it is permissible to kill lice on Shabbat because they do not reproduce and multiply?
Does anyone force you to accept the fact that lice do not reproduce and multiply??
And since you know that this is not reality, does that mean that this Halacha ruling is not Torah?

Of course it is Torah!
It encodes a Torahic value within it: If you find a creature that does not reproduce and multiply sexually, know that killing it is not a work of art. Fascinating!

As in the original, You find words and concepts from Western philosophy there, but they are used to present original Jewish ideas.

After all, the written Torah also used concepts that were understandable to the people of that period: both linguistically and scientifically and conceptually - this is stated in a way that fits into our framework of cognition.

But the Canaanite and Egyptian (Toshbi) or Aristotelian (Mo'n) or Maharalian building blocks - are used to express values that came in revelation!
To express them, and also to refine them from one instrument to another in each generation so that it fits the language of the generation and its concepts - not so that you can claim that if someone translated it into the language of the generation then it is no longer the Torah, quite the opposite! He did his job as a copyist of the rumor: extracting the values from the previous generation, internalizing the values to the point of adhering to them, and then expressing them in the language of the new generation!
After all, you do that too, don't you? Are you just rehashing? Or do you sometimes explain existing Jewish ideas in current terminology?

And if everyone took it in a different direction – What is different from halacha?? The fact that there are disputes means that it is not Torah? All are Torah directions, they deal with the values of the Torah!

And if they do not actually decide – So what? Even in halacha, an opinion that does not cease is still Torah, and they change it and examine it because it has a message, it has a point, it has an important perspective – It is not nonsense.

What sustains your method is the thought that the common core of values is very superficial.
That the concept “Torah values” That we can really agree that they came by revelation and not from outside – is neither deep nor detailed.

But is the unique Jewish perception superficial, eh?

Is it not possible to formulate a clear difference on the issue of God's titles between us and the Christians (a God who is able to throw away his wife!) or between us and the Muslims (a God who does not give room!)
And what I have written now is truly superficial. Much more is possible than that. This is done when you read the verses about God's titles – they have a deep unique content.
Then you read the sages about these verses
And then you read the first and last ones about them..
A distinct and deep Jewish discussion of the essence of the Torah message that ’ gave us in the revelation of Moses and the prophets.

I don't need to argue with you about the issue of commitment to descriptions of reality, because the issue of God's ways according to the verses is not an issue of describing reality. There is no laboratory that can reveal that God is truly “Merciful”.. These are descriptions of the world of values that underpin reality and are reflected in the facts, not a description of the facts. It is true that this can be achieved through thought built on a pure heart and a sound mind, but still no one fully understood it until Moses revealed it to us in the rock. And since then, his words have been discussed and developed and built upon with wisdom, understanding and knowledge, again through a pure heart and a sound mind. We innovate and create on their basis. Not without them. Not without Moses.
Kant's ethics is without the intention of upholding Moses' opinion, but from the decision of reason alone. Moses influenced him against his will, but that is not enough. An intention is required to interpret Moses' words specifically. Specifically to rely on Sinai. Why? Because G-d spoke! G-d said that this is the Torah, this too! We will not decide for him what is in his domain and what is not, and G-d – He put it in, expressed himself in this domain within the supernatural framework of Tosh”k and the meaning of Tosh”a.
And I am not just talking about the list of the 13 virtues, but in fact all the stories in the Torah constitute an arena for the struggle for different values, for the ways of G-d, and they clarify their essence and the priorities between them. All from G-d from Sinai.

Want another topic exactly like this – The Tastes of the Mitzvot!
So unique to Judaism, and yet so detailed – Every mitzvah and commandment has reasons that begin with the verses of the Torah and are discussed in the form of a continuous discussion throughout the chain of Kabbalah (and as I said – defining the virtues of Hasidism and the rabbinic world, the world of intentions, and even the Halacha midrashim). With arguments, disputes, contradictions and innovations – as befits a beit midrash! You are at the end – but do you even reach the end or do you give up the effort to stand on the secret of the ’ because you don't think it's a beit midrash at all??
A deliberate effort is needed to stand on the position of the Torah of Moses on issues of the ways of the ’ and the reasons for the mitzvot, general and particular issues that are very, very numerous. The clarification is done with the help of the sages, the first and the last, who present a continuous chain of discussion connected in the first katzeh to Moses and the ’ Like any Torah inquiry! There is no laboratory that can bring facts on these subjects – This is revelation, and the intellectual development of the contents of revelation. And the first interpretation of revelation was given to Moses directly by the ’ – and it continues to be passed down to us. Just search, search among the transmitters, not among Kant. Not the values of the Torah. If it contributes to your understanding of reality, you are welcome to express the values of the Torah through its concepts (or those that seem relevant to you).
From sources outside the Torah we learn reality, perhaps even some human values built on a sincere heart – but not Torah values.

You might ask:
And if a member of another religion or no religion were to discuss these very things, the ways of the ’ and the reasons for the commandments – would this be Torah?
The question is not difficult for me, the same answer as in Halacha!
After all, if he doesn't believe in these values, he doesn't think they should be chosen, and he didn't absorb them directly by way of personal example from his rabbis - his discussion is very, very unreliable. But it's a shame to argue, it's not absolute, it's a question of a gray area. A certain difficulty in defining borderline cases really doesn't obscure the broad picture, in which it is clear that there is a very, very broad mainstream with fringes that are also legitimate, of scholars of Torah who discuss the Torah while accepting its starting assumptions and genuine honesty and internal integrity - and then that's Torah, in Halacha and Agga.

Snir's last response really captured my heart.