Conditional on what is written in the Torah

I didn’t understand what it meant to condition the law of an involuntary murderer. A condition requires an act of the person. When he does some act that depends on it (a consecration, a property, etc.), he can condition that the act be conditional on such and such happening. But with an involuntary murderer, nothing is done and I don’t understand what a condition is there. —————————————————————————————— Asks: The intention of the condition is to amend laws that are different from those specified in the Torah. For example, if someone commits an unintentional murder, he must serve such and such years in prison (instead of being exiled to a city of refuge). Regarding most of the laws of the Choshen Mishpat, I understood that it is possible to amend laws that are different from those written in the Torah. The question is, will it also be possible to amend differently here, or is there a kind of exception here regarding the ability to change because it says “to establish a law”? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: It seems to me that regarding exile, it is impossible to change it even without reference to the “Law of Justice,” since the Torah in our parasha states not to take a ransom for the life of a murderer, whether by mistake (a ransom in exchange for exile. See Rashi) or intentionally. In other words, the Torah warns against imposing something else on him in place of exile. —————————————————————————————— Asks: For the purpose of discussion, we will take this law: “And after the death of the high priest, the murderer shall return to the land of his possession.” Now let’s assume that we as a society want to extend the punishment so that the murderer will continue to reside there forever and will not return even after the death of the high priest. Is this possible? Or is it because it says “the law of justice” that it cannot be changed? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: It may be possible to extend it, after all, two hundred doses. But that is possible even after there is a verse of “The World Constitution.” —————————————————————————————— Asks: But there is a rule that wherever in the Torah it is said to be a law, the parasha must be carried out literally and grammatically, without changing even a small detail. And the verse says that “the murderer shall be rehabilitated.” So how can the obligation to “rehabilitate the murderer” be abolished? One can also ask a similar question about the law of the blood redeemer, whether as a society we are allowed to abolish the right of the blood redeemer to murder the murderer? Or is it forbidden to change this because of “the constitution of justice”? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: First, there is no obligation for the murderer to return. What is written is that afterwards he can return (and is not required). The obligation is that the murderer will reveal himself. Secondly, I don’t remember there being a rule that when a constitution is written, every detail is binding and cannot be changed. What I do remember is that when a constitution is written, it is binding (in sacred cases where the law itself does not necessarily bind). As a rule, if there is a law in the Torah, it binds and binds even without a constitution being written. Third, a court of law can punish contrary to the law (see H.M. C. 2). Therefore, extending the punishment is possible, but shortening it is like canceling a punishment, and in this I am not sure that the court of law has authority (for example, not to flog someone who is guilty). It is true that if the Sanhedrin decides to remove something from the Law, they can do so in the Law. But it is not within the authority of every court of law to punish contrary to the law. The same discussion exists regarding the right of a judge. A right is not an obligation (although there have been disagreements about whether it is a mitzvah in a judge), and therefore it is easier to remove it. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Apparently, according to your words, the verse: “And these shall be for you a statute of judgment throughout your generations, throughout all your settlements,” seems unnecessary. If so, what do the words “a statute of judgment” teach us in your opinion in this parsha?

Additionally, why, with regard to inheritance laws, cannot inheritance laws be amended that differ from the Torah laws? After all, there too, we are dealing with the rights of the heirs (such as the right of a barrister) that can be uprooted. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: I don’t know what these words were meant to say, but it’s hard for me to draw conclusions from the omission of words. First, they may have meant that the laws of exile are a world constitution (and not the return of the murderer to his place). Second, perhaps they meant that these laws apply at all times and not just during the occupation and settlement or something like that. Regarding inheritance law, the problem is different there. Ostensibly, it is about a person’s acquiescence in the laws of inheritance, since he is the one who gives it. But this is not possible because when the assets are still in his hands, they are not an inheritance but a gift from life (and this can really be done). And after his death, they are no longer in his hands, but in the hands of his heirs, as determined by Halacha, and in any case he cannot transfer them to someone else. Although from the language of the Gemara (which linked it to a condition on what is written in the Torah) and the poskim, it seems that there is a fundamental problem with making conditions on inheritance laws and not just a technical problem as I wrote. They are not considered property laws, that is, rights of the heir, but rather prohibitions (obligations of the testator). Therefore, it seems to me that the fundamental distinction is that in inheritance, the right is an obligation on the testator and not a right of the heirs, and therefore it cannot be conditioned. Whereas in the G’od it seems simply that it is not an obligation on the murderer towards the blood redeemer, but rather a right of the blood redeemer. If the heirs do not want the inheritance, the father is still obligated to bequeath it to them (after that, of course, they can give it up and give it to someone else as a gift). But if the G’od does not want to kill the murderer, there is no obligation on the murderer to be killed. The foundation of the matter is in the words of the Ramban (Numbers 27:11) that the order of inheritance also determines the order of inheritance, and all this because the will of the Torah is in the continuity of descendants to the father. In other words, the laws of inheritance do not express the will of the testator as is customary in other legal systems, but rather the will of the Torah, which is not dependent on the will of the deceased, and therefore should not be conditioned upon (in legal language: the laws of inheritance are cogent). Thus, the teaching in Mitzvah 20 writes: And when the testator’s power over the assets is withdrawn upon his death, the right of the heir immediately falls upon them, as is the case with the succession of works that the Creator, blessed be He, willed, one after the other without interruption. Again, I saw that the Rav made similar remarks in the difficult words of the Rabbi in the chapter on wives, 22:9, and see the Abbaza on the chapter on inheritance, 26:1, who commented on this and wrote that the decree was to be conditioned on inheritance because there is a verse that supposedly allows the father to transfer the inheritance to whomever he wishes: But if this is more the case, it should be called a legal excommunication, and from what I would say that the testator can remove the heir on condition that the gift is with him, even if the heir has agreed, since this is also admitted by the M.M. Haravd that the heir cannot confer because of a defect, so what is the advantage of the testator’s power to remove the heir from his inheritance, and even if it is implied that the withdrawal here is not from the assets that he will inherit later but according to the law of an heir who already has them, what does it have to do with this according to the law of a gift because of what is written in the Torah, since they did not do anything between them that would lead to the invalidation of the heir’s inheritance, but rather that the words of the Rambam need to be clarified, as it is clearly stated in the Mishnah, page 113, that a certain man cannot say that he will inherit me where there is a daughter, that my daughter will inherit me where there is a son, which was conditioned by what is written in the Torah, and it cannot be said that the one who actually called it a gift because of what is written in the Torah everywhere, but that he does not have the power to change the law of the written law In the Torah, on page 126, this verse is added to the law of gift, and it is refuted by Rabbi Yehuda, who said that in the matter of the covenant of money, there is a covenant, and from the second place, and it is proven that it is a single cause, and he wrote in this a dekhion of a dematani, then it is not for the riba, and so it is according to the law, if he said about someone who is worthy of his heir, his words are valid, and they learned in this verse from the reading of Debiyum, they bequeathed to their sons. The Torah gave permission to the father to bequeath to anyone he wishes, and therefore if he did not read the law of the law, we would say that it is impossible to bequeath, even if it changes according to the written laws of inheritance. I also saw there that the author of the law of inheritance, written in Parashat Nachalot, teaches in the Gemara that inheritances are not discussed at night, and only the Rambam learned from this the prohibition of changing inheritance laws (the Rambam, as is his custom, brings the appropriate verses even against the Gemara, as explained in the Rambam’s rules). In any case, we learned from this that the word of the law can teach completely different things even in the matter of a judge (for example, that he will not be discussed at night in exile), and nothing can be forced from them regarding changing for generations. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Regarding the exception of the laws of inheritances and property, I saw that the Rashbam in Tractate Bava Batra, page 113, page 2, compares the laws of inheritances to the laws of property, and this is his language: “The law of inheritances is a chamber – that they are not judged except on the day, as the rest of the laws of property are written in it (Jeremiah 21). The House of David’s law is to be judged in the morning. All the rest of the inheritances are judged in the morning. As it is written at the end of the Parashat of inheritances, and the children of Israel had a law from the Law of the Lord, a law from the Law of the Lord. All the rest of the inheritances are judged on the day, and because of what is written, and they judged the people at all times. The great Okamia Rava in the Sanhedrin, in chapter one, the laws of property (page 34), to conclude a law, but to begin a law on the day, it is written on the day of the inheritance, and we were to judge the laws of property by day and conclude it even at night.” Datania 20 – meaning that I have forgotten in my last baraita that the law of the Lord is for all inheritances. Dividing inheritances is like dividing partners in a marriage, and I will not consider the law of the Lord. And who is the one who will be punished? I will call you to account for the day you inherit, to begin the law of the Lord, and the law of the law will be applied to you for the multitude of all other inheritances. The law of the Lord is that on the day you inherit, I will not be punished except for the son who inherits from his father alone. It happened – the language of an event, a language of a case (Ruth 2), meaning it ended up being a law and it was necessary, and on the day of the judgment, the judges appointed all the laws of the estates to be a judgment, beginning on the day of the inheritance, as it is written, on the day of the inheritance. Also, I remember you saying in one of your lessons that the laws that appear in the Choshen Mishpat in the Shulchan Arbiter are usually obligations that arise from rights (unlike the prohibition of interest, for example, which is an obligation that does not arise from a right, and therefore does not appear in the Choshen Mishpat). The laws of inheritance appear in the Choshen Mishpat, so on the surface it seems that this is an obligation that arises by virtue of the right of the heir (unless you say that this is an exception). Even if you say that this is an obligation that does not arise by right, it is still possible to argue that the heirs are the donors and not the testator. The condition in inheritance that I mentioned above, I did not mean a condition that a person makes in his private inheritance, but rather a change in the law of the country so that the inheritance will be divided differently in a diplomatic manner. Therefore, it can be said that the heirs (who are citizens of the country) are the donors and not the testator (since the heirs accept the laws of the country that say that the inheritance is divided in a certain way). So the testator’s obligation still exists, only that the heirs grant (as part of their agreement with the laws of the country) their inheritance to the parties who are entitled to it according to the law of the country. This is similar to the law of property relations between spouses in the State of Israel, which says that the wife is entitled to a share of the husband’s assets after divorce (contrary to the law) – so in our case, it can also be said that the sister is entitled to a share of the assets of her brother’s inheritance (contrary to the law). Likewise, it can be argued that heirs are forgiven of the inheritance because the law requires them to forgive, and therefore a condition of inheritance (that is consistent with state law) is also beneficial (according to the Gemara in Bava Batra 1:11: “Even if Rabbi Yehuda had a disease, he would have known and had an illness, but he did not have a disease”). Even if you say that the forgiveness of brothers is not offered, it can be likened to the prohibition of interest, since there are state laws that sometimes obligate citizens to pay interest (say, in delaying payments to the electric company). In other words, a state law can overcome a halachic obligation that contradicts it (in financial matters), and we are not saying that the law is invalid because it is “conditioned on what is written in the Torah” (correct me if I am wrong here). I forgot to add that the Gemara in the following verse: states that a condition in inheritance is a financial condition, and the whole question is whether this is Rabbi Meir’s method, which states that a condition in money against the Torah does not apply, or whether it is Rabbi Yehuda’s method, which states that a condition in money against the Torah does apply (then they state that it applies only if there is forgiveness). So, I think everyone agrees that this is a condition in money. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: It is clear that this is considered legal and therefore not discussed at night. It is what I wrote. This is probably also the reason why it appears in a book that deals with laws between people. And yet the Rambam and other poskim ruled that it is not a law in the sense of the normal laws of property that can be conditioned upon, and not according to the Gemara you mentioned. I did not look now to see where the issue you are discussing is or whether this is not the conclusion of the issue there. Either way, it is certainly the Rambam’s ruling.
It should be remembered that even in the dispute between the R.M. and the R.I. regarding a matter of money, there are parallel issues that explain it in different ways (for example, everyone admits to the condition so that you do not omit a seventh, which is not beneficial, but the dispute is about the condition that you do not omit a seventh).
Forgiveness will not be useful here, because the brothers cannot forgive something that has not yet come into existence. They have not yet received the inheritance. They can forgive after they have received it, but then it is already a gift and not forgiveness. This is of course if they do not have a prior right, because if it is a prior right then it can be forgiven from the stage where you have it.
It seems to me that in inheritance laws, the heir has a right because of the Torah’s stipulation and not by virtue of any obligation or damage. Therefore, here it is not in his power to forgive, but only to give after he receives. It is like asking for you to omit the seventh and not the seventh. And this is not a condition (since they do not make anything conditional on it) but a forgiveness.
The state can also confiscate the property from the father or confiscate it from the heirs. But it apparently cannot change the inheritance laws themselves (and it is tempting to say that the property is confiscated from the father just before his death retroactively). In general, there is no law of the kingdom regarding something that cannot be conditioned.
By the way, I think there are some jurists who wanted to claim that the state can really change inheritance laws, and only private individuals cannot make stipulations. I didn’t search right now. —————————————————————————————— Asks: If you agree that the state can confiscate the property from the heirs after they have inherited, why wouldn’t the law then be useful for dividing the inheritance in a different way than the Torah? Simply interpret the law so that it confiscates the property from the heirs and not from the testator. —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: True. That’s what I wrote. The law can confiscate property from the heirs. But this is not an interpretation, but rather what the law is really supposed to do. Otherwise, it would not apply. Even with regard to the blood avenger, the law can punish the blood avenger with death without cause, thus de facto prohibiting him from killing the murderer. And even more so, it should be discussed, because if the purpose of the law is to transgress the law of the Torah, then perhaps some will atone under the authority of the law of the kingdom in this matter (because there is no law of the kingdom when one goes against the law of the Torah, and the question is whether it is possible when one goes indirectly or whether the purpose is what determines it). —————————————————————————————— Asks: If I understood you correctly, you are saying that theoretically the law could lead to a situation where the inheritance is divided differently from Torah law (by expropriation from the heirs), but that today the law in the State of Israel is not formulated in this way, and therefore it is not useful in this matter (and therefore a gift from life is needed)? If this is indeed the case, what will be the ruling regarding a person who buys an apartment from a woman who inherited the apartment not in accordance with Torah law (and land is not stolen). Will he have to return the apartment to its legal owner? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Good question. It’s pretty clear that she doesn’t need to answer and ownership is beneficial. Perhaps because the law can confiscate the apartment from the owner at any moment, and even if the inheritance itself cannot be canceled, then after the inheritance, the confiscation must have taken effect. In addition, I think that a distinction should be made between the question of whether it is permissible to do so and the question of whether when they did so, it was valid. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Another question in this context to clarify understanding,
Let’s say an inheritance worth 100,000 shekels falls to a brother and a sister. The sister insists on receiving half of the inheritance in accordance with the laws of the State of Israel, while the brother demands to receive the entire inheritance according to Torah law.
A. Is there anything wrong with the brother’s behavior in insisting on his right to receive the full inheritance?
on. If in the end the inheritance was divided half and half, the brother’s husband was unwilling. And after a few years he managed to steal 50,000 shekels back from the sister. Is it permissible for a brother to steal the share that belongs to him from the sister? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: A. The brother is in order halachically because he retains the rights he is entitled to. If you ask me morally, I’m not sure (unless he wants to receive the entire inheritance and then give her half voluntarily).
on. What is the difference between the wordings? It’s like the previous question. If the law of the state applies retroactively, even if it was forbidden to legislate it, it is forbidden to steal what is not yours. —————————————————————————————— Asks: Regarding B. It seems to me that there was a slight misunderstanding between us regarding the previous question (where I asked about the obligation of restitution of a third party and not of the sister). In any case, if the law of the state applies retroactively. Is the sister obliged to return her share of the inheritance to the brother? Or perhaps her entire prohibition is that she initially tried to apply the laws of the State of Israel regarding inheritance, and she should have followed the inheritance laws of the Rabbinical Court. But once the offense has been committed, is there no obligation to restitution? And what prohibition are we talking about here in general (stealing? Or something else?) —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Why does it matter whether it’s a third party or the sister herself? If the property isn’t hers, then whoever bought it from her isn’t his either.
Although if the state law applies retroactively, then she does not have to (legally) return it, but perhaps her possession of the property is a prohibition (because it came to her through a prohibition) and it is appropriate to return it in order to get rid of the prohibition and not from the law of theft.
But for the taker, it seems that there is no obligation to return, both prohibitive and not just fiscal (since it came into his possession with a permit).
And perhaps the law of despair and change of authority can be applied here. I need to think about that some more.