Consideration of remorse for a crime in modern law

Have a good week Rabbi,
A case was recently published about a man who established a striptease company that also provided prostitution services, sometimes to women on the verge of legal adulthood (age 17). The indictment attributes to him the offenses of multiple cases of bringing a person into prostitution, bringing a person into prostitution under aggravated circumstances (taking advantage of financial hardship), pimping and supplying drugs, multiple offenses of exploiting minors for prostitution, obstruction of justice under the Narcotics Ordinance, and a host of other offenses. This man converted religiously during the process of gathering evidence against him (before he even knew that the police were aware of his actions), and he stopped all of these prohibited activities. In Tractate Makot, Rashi claims that even someone who confesses to murder is exempt from punishment because the confession is an indication of repentance and remorse, and such a person should not be punished. My question is whether even in modern legal systems it makes sense to treat criminals who clearly have ceased their evil deeds out of genuine remorse (and not in order to escape punishment), as “different” people from the people who committed the offenses, and therefore exempt them from punishment. Or perhaps because the consideration of deterrence by others still exists, he should still be punished.
Best regards,