Contradiction in the Rambam regarding rape?
Rambam in the Basic Laws of the Torah (2:4): “Anyone of whom it is said, ‘He shall be killed, and he shall not transgress,’ and transgresses and is not killed, then he blasphemes the Lord. And if he were among ten of Israel, then he blasphemes the Lord publicly and nullifies a positive commandment, which is the sanctification of the Lord, and transgresses a negative commandment, which is the sanctification of the Lord. And yet, because he committed rape, he is not censured, and it is not necessary to say that the court does not put him to death, even if he committed rape.”
Indeed, in Halacha 6 it is written: “And they are healed from all the prohibitions in the Torah in a place of danger, except for idolatry, fornication, and bloodshed, which even in a place of danger are not healed from, and if one transgresses and is healed, the same court will punish him according to his due punishment.”
And the contradiction is clear. I thought of several ways to justify it, I’ll start with the first:
A. In the first case, the entire prostration of the person to God is not truly the person’s will, but rather it is his way of getting rid of death. However, in the case of illness, the person wants the medicine because it directly adds life to him. That is, in the first case, the salvation is indirect, while in the case of medicine, it is direct. This distinction expresses the person’s will, in a thing whose salvation is direct, he is connected and wants the thing, whereas in a thing that only calms the rapist, he is not interested in the action, but in calming him.
Although, a little bit, because in both cases the truth is that the person wants to live, here it is through medicine and here it is through a statue – in both cases he does not want the action itself but rather what is desired [to live], and what is the difference? And perhaps the explanation can also be seen somewhat the other way around: in medicine, which itself adds life, perhaps there is greater room for permission than in worship, which does not save directly, but indirectly.
I would love to hear your opinion.
This is an old question and many have already discussed it. I will start by saying that the Noach differed in the interpretation of his words in the Bible.
Some have understood that this is a punishment in the 14th century, and then there really is a contradiction between the laws. The latter have argued for it, even in the ways you suggested. See, for example, O’Sh on Atar (and preceded by the Shavuot, as I believe in answer to question 1), and much more in the Key to Frankel.
Others understood that he meant an unjust punishment, and then there is no contradiction (and it only takes a little study to understand why he did not mention such a punishment in the previous halakha).
Thank you. I'm glad I followed in the footsteps of those who were greater than me.
But the division itself requires explanation, could you expand a little? Do you see a connection to the explanation about ‘Zabina Zabin’ given in the Talmud?
It should be remembered that the division in the Rambam is only about the punishment and not the prohibition. In both situations, he violated a prohibition, so it is clear that there is guilt here. The question is whether he is liable for punishment or not.
There is a close connection to the issues of t'u Therefore, this should not be considered as a person's will to deal with the circumstances in which he finds himself. However, this is also the case in Talyuhu and Zevin, and there it is considered as a will even though it is a human threat.
It seems to me that the more successful formulation is based on an analogy to another contradiction in the Rambam. In Sohal Hovel and Mishik, the Rambam exempts the one who throws property from a ship so that it does not sink, while in Hala Gizila Pi'b he obligates the one who threw property during a storm in order to be saved. The Nohveh has already commented on this there and there, and in the M'M and K'S'M they wrote that the division is as follows: In Hala Hovel the storm threatens to sink the ship and the property is only a means of salvation. Therefore, if you threw the property, you must pay. But in Hala Robbery is about the burden of property that threatens to sink the ship (and not a storm), and in such a situation the property is what pursues him to kill him and therefore it is permissible to harm him, and therefore there he is exempt. This is very similar to the division between a persecutory law in which it is permissible to kill one (the persecutor) in order to save the other (the persecuted) and a will be killed and not committed murder in which it is forbidden to kill one in order to save the other (who would dare to say that your father is blushing?!), except that here it is about money and not about lives. Now you will see that a similar division can be made between a threat and a disease. When here the harm is to the offense (not to the offense or to the life). When there is a threat that he will commit an offense, then committing the offense is forced upon him. It is the offense that pursues him and causes his risk (because of which he is threatened). Therefore, when he “harms it” In order to be saved, he is exempt (although this is forbidden, since he would have had to give up his life, since there is a law here that he will be killed and not transgressed, but there is no punishment). On the other hand, when he is sick, the offense is unrelated to the matter. It is not the illness that threatens him, but the illness. He “infringes” the offense in order to save himself from the illness. This is forbidden and therefore he is obligated to do so.
This is convincing as a decoding of Maimonides' intuition. But does it seem reasonable to you on its own, in the ship and among the sick? (A frightened face and a few signs of surprise were dropped here from the urgency of the hour.)
Not unreasonable in my opinion. I am not their result as Mr.
When will you be? 🙂
I said I am not their result, so how can I predict a result? I can only say that I do not want to be their result but only want to wish well.
I will mention in passing that it is very difficult for fanatic consequentialists to study Gemara and scholarship. Anti-consequentialism is deeply rooted in the Shiite Shitin, and this creates an extremely oppressive dissonance. Sometimes I feel like a junior researcher from the outside because of this, and not like someone who is trying to fit in and identify. The Gemara in many cases does not arouse a hidden intuition in me, but rather calmly presses exactly where it hurts, and does not let go.
What is their result?
As a rule, judging action decisions only by their predicted results without regard to the action itself (the process). See ‘Consequentialism’ on Wikipedia.
In other words, the end justifies the means/necessity knows no laws? In other words, does their outcome, as long as you are in touch with the goal, not care how?
Yes. But sometimes there are consequences along the way, and they need to be addressed.
The best example is the classic trolley question. A train is moving and is about to run over two people tied to the tracks. You can quickly run to the nearest store to pick someone up and throw them (or yourself) onto the train, thereby diverting it from its track. That person will die, but the two will be saved. So in terms of the result, here one died and here two died. But in terms of the process, here you killed someone with your own hands who was not at fault, and here two died by themselves (who were not at fault).
The infamous distinction between getting up and doing something and sitting down and not doing anything is perhaps the essence of the debate between consequentialism and deontology in my opinion.
By the way, this distinction has many appearances in everyday life. I asked many people who told me that for them there is a difference between stealing from the supermarket and not correcting the mistake of the seller who charged them less, even though they agree that both are morally and halakhically forbidden. Or a person who does not want to hurt another person directly (for example, at various stages of a relationship) and therefore lets them understand it through a trickle of transmissions of actions, even though overall the trickle is more annoying than hearing it directly. From a consequentialist perspective, these differences between action and avoidance are only psychological differences in feeling and have no moral weight.
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