definition

What about the second example of someone coming down the road and hearing a scream? Is this also only avoided on a physical level? If not, then what is the problem with the former prayer?

It's exactly the same thing. The problem is (and I wrote in the trilogy) that God probably doesn't really intervene in nature (meaning He doesn't even do physical restraints. Of course, He could in principle do so, but He decided not to). The sages thought that praying about the future is not intervention, and praying about the past is. Today, we understand that even future change is intervention in nature, and the conclusions are up to you.

Rabbi, I'm not sure that if Chazal knew that nature is deterministic, they would have given up on prayers altogether. One can simply explain that such interventions that change the past (even though your wife screamed, she actually didn't scream) are too drastic, compared to local interventions that only affect the future.

There is the example of his wife being pregnant
that after a few days he would not pray that she would give birth to a son
and here the miracle is not completely evident
and in any case he considered his prayer a vain prayer

Any repetition in time is a logical paradox, because the events that were or were not in the past are defined as ’were’ or ‘were not’, and by means of ”repetition” you assassinate the definition.

And regarding the issue in the blessings, the responding rabbi apparently did not look at ”what God cannot” there, nor at the issue itself, since it is the Mishnah that compares prayer for the fetus to prayer for the past. With the claim that the rabbi raised that prayer for the fetus can also be in the future, he is already dealing with ”what God cannot” there.

Hal, I disagree. I referred to my book where I show that this is not a logical contradiction (a little more ad hominem: this is probably what all physicists who deal with the feasibility of this matter also believe). Furthermore, if it were a logical contradiction, then it would also be impossible to discuss the law of choice or the condition of from now on, since a logical contradiction is impossible even if it is not about facts but about norms (either it was expelled or not. Both together are a logical contradiction).
Beyond that, whatever our opinion on return in time may be, as I explained above – the issue of praying for the past is not about returning in time at all.

I did not read the book and only responded to what was written here in the question. It is quite possible that he discussed it there. But the reference to praying for the past to praying for the past was explained well by me. Therefore, I did not understand the connection between your words and mine. I argue that praying for the past does not necessarily mean returning in time. Please note that I am not arguing about the terminology “prayer for the former”, but only explaining it differently.
Regarding the question of whether the fetus is for the former or not, I wrote here what I think. If you would like to bring here an explanation or other argument that is presented there, I would be very happy. As mentioned, I have not read it.

In the forum, people think they copied from the book at this point and I'm copying what they quoted there – There's much more in the book but I don't have the strength to copy it myself.

“The Talmud only argues against the Mishnah, which chose the case of “May my wife give birth to a male child” as a classic example of a ”former screamer”, alongside “He would come along the road and hear a shrieking sound in the city and say “May it not be within my house”. And this, the Talmud claims, is seemingly without justification; in the case of “A shrieking sound in the city” only a change in the laws of logic would help to solve the problem, while in the case of “May my wife give birth to a male child” The matter can also be resolved simply by changing the laws of physics, by reversing the sex of the fetus from now on, as in the case of Dinah. What is the reason, then, that a person in such a case would need to pray to change the laws of logic, to the point that the Mishnah uses it to draw an example of the prohibition of such a prayer?! For comparison, the case of a person praying for a cure for his illness in such a way that the illness would disappear retroactively was not used to determine that ”this is a vain prayer”. This is because such a drawing is illogical: a person praying for a cure for his illness wants the illness to cease afflicting him from now on, but why would he also want to change the past, which now does not increase or decrease anything? By the same token, a person who is interested in his wife giving birth to a male child would ask for a change in the sex of the fetus from now on, a change that involves nothing but a violation of the laws of physics, and why would he also pray for the past, until the Mishnah takes this as an example of its ruling?

The Talmud responds to this and distinguishes between cases that “do not mention a miracle.” That is, from a philosophical perspective, there is certainly a gulf between a miracle that involves changing the laws of physics and a miracle that involves changing the laws of logic, but from the perspective of the ordinary worshipper, there is no difference between the cases. Because, as is usual in everyday life, miracles that involve only changing the laws of physics are not found at all, to the point where a man who is already trying to change the sex of his wife’s fetus in prayer does not specify in his prayer whether it is a retroactive change or a change from here to hereafter. In terms of everyday experience, both are equally nonexistent, and therefore it is legitimate for the mishnah to take as an example of a prayer to change the past, “May it be your will that my wife give birth to a male child,” rather than “May it be your will that I may recover from my illness retroactively.” But in terms of halacha, there is no difference; Only praying to change the sex of the fetus retroactively is forbidden, but praying to change it from here on out is permitted and completely legitimate, as indeed Leah prayed for her fate.

And this is where many of the latter went wrong, who, due to their ignorance of philosophy, did not understand the enormous difference between praying to change the laws of physics and praying to change the laws of logic, and as a result, did not understand at all the Mishnah and the issue in the Gemara. That's all for the copy from the book (note 30, pp. 20-19), and anyone who wishes can read more there.

That's all for now, think about it, see there:

http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?cat_id=24&topic_id=3134493&forum_id=1364

Regarding what you brought from the law of choice, I do not think it has anything to do with going back in time. In that case, it was already determined in the past whether the woman is expelled or not, and now there is only a retrospective investigation. You might argue that this leads to a deterministic view, but so what? If it were a moral question, a problem would arise with the choice, but in most of the illustrations that the Talmud presents on this matter, there is no moral problem, and even if there were, we could probably manage somehow.

If you claim to have a solution to the issue of going back in time, I would be happy if you wrote it down briefly. Unless it is Dammet's solution, which also tries to argue with the Mishnah in Tractate Berakhot (!) and already discusses it in "What God Cannot Do" there.

This quote didn't really change anything. His words about changing the sex of the fetus are exactly what I wrote here. Regarding hearing a cry in the city, contrary to his assumption, this is not against the laws of logic either (and in general, no change in the world is really against the laws of logic). God can change the trouble like a fire from now on (to heal those who were burned and burn others in their place).

A consistent definition of going back in time requires two timelines, the return of which occurs in only one of them. The basis of this is McTaggart, and my continuation in the fourth book of Talmudic Logic.

Regarding choice, we are talking about actions of people that simply depend on choice (like the side that will come to be wise in the Eruvin). Therefore, there too, we are not talking about a disappearing reality. In general, a disappearing reality is not a choice. When a child is born to me and I am abroad and therefore do not know its gender, then when I find out that it is a boy, nothing becomes clear retroactively. This does not belong to the issue of choice. Choice is never an action back in time. And so it is with the condition that in order (at least according to R”i in Tos’ Ketubot 4d).