Dilemma between state laws and the commandment of God

Hello Oren. This is a fairly general and broad question. It is related to a general theory of normative duality that I have dealt with in the past, and I also write about it in the theology book that I am currently working on. I will try to address it here briefly and only in a general and theoretical manner. If there is a specific question, it can be discussed in its entirety in light of what has been said here. Assumption A: In general, the assumption is that there is an obligation to both sets of laws. Whether the halakha itself recognizes these two obligations or not. A person can decide that he is obligated to both. There is no need to see the halakha as the final arbiter even for those who are obligated to it. Assumption B: Almost every person, religious or not, has a dual obligation in parallel with the law of the state. Similarly, most secular people have an obligation to morality and the law. Therefore, contrary to popular belief, such conflicts are not the preserve of the religious person. The religious person’s value system is simply more comprehensive and detailed, and therefore the conflict with the law is more frequent. Furthermore, by the very nature of the moral system, it conflicts less with the law than the religious-halakhic system (because the legislator is secular and is usually obligated to morality but not to halacha). Assumption C: When there is a dual obligation, conflicts can arise, and there is no problem in principle with this. This does not contradict any logical law, just as a conflict between moral values ​​(moral conflict) does not contradict logic. It is clear that the decision that is reached will conflict with one of the obligations, but this does not mean that he is not committed to this system, since this is the nature of a decision in a conflict. Assumption D: The decision in such a conflict cannot be made within the framework of one of the two systems, since it is a decision about them themselves. Therefore, there is no “school answer” to such conflicts, and it is a matter of your personal decision. The decision is also not left to the posk and the halakha in general, since it is not a halakhic decision. Conclusion: Given such a conflict, you must decide what the nature of your commitment to the two systems is and what the nature of the conflict is. Translation: Decision A is to decide which of the two is preferable in your opinion. And decision B is to determine how important the step in question is from the perspective of each of them. The reason for the need for both decisions is because even if the commitment to the religious system is paramount in your opinion, it is still possible that this is a marginal violation of religious law but a substantial and important step in terms of the commitment to the law. For example, in the dilemma of whether to refuse an order. Consider someone who is religiously opposed to the return of territories and for whom the religious commitment is more important than the cohesion of the army and the values ​​of law and democracy. Should he necessarily refuse an order to evacuate settlements? Not really. If the damage to the cohesion of the army is fatal and the religious value that is damaged is minimal, there is room for obedience even if the religious commitment is more important in his opinion. The opposite is also true, of course. When the damage is equal, the decision will be made according to the status of both systems in your case. How is this status determined? As stated (see assumption d), it is a personal matter and there are no rules about it (since none of the systems themselves can dictate its status in relation to other systems. Only the person himself decides that). In general, how should a religious person deal with the dilemma between values? —————————————————————————————— Yuval S.: Hello Rabbi Michi,
If I understood correctly, the solution you gave to the dilemma is to give weight to each side and choose according to the greater weight (and this despite the possibility that the one with the lower weight is the preferred system, for example, Halacha).
The dilemma dealt with choosing between two conflicting systems, and the solution you proposed was to posit a third system that examines the first two using weights and decides between them in cases of conflict. But ostensibly, if one system is the correct one in our eyes and to which we are committed, why should any weight (however heavy) of another system affect the decision? It seems that the third system intervenes and enters into the first system and denies us the commitment. So again, we are back to the dilemma of why the third system that chose the one with the higher weight is preferable to the first system that we chose to commit to? It seems to me that it is among the things that you posited a third system that is decisive and in fact you chose to commit to it instead of the first.
If we go into spoken language, the person who argues against you will argue that you are not really committed to Halacha but to your own values. I know that you are not moved by definitions and designations as long as you believe in what you are doing. But as someone who sees himself as committed to Halacha, isn’t there really a choice here of another norm at the expense of Halacha? (I am not saying that this is wrong, but rather trying to understand and clarify.)

Thank you and have a good day, —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Hello Yuval.
When you are committed to several normative systems, as part of the matter you must establish a hierarchy between them. This is your task, and no one can do it for you. You can call it a third system, but I prefer to say that it is yourself. Similarly, the commitment to moral values ​​requires you to establish a scale of values ​​that establishes a hierarchy between the different moral values. This scale is not determined by one of the values ​​but by the person who is committed to them.
Therefore, you are right in that first and foremost, man stands. He is the one who determines the obligation and the relationship to the normative systems, and it is clear that his decisions have decisive weight compared to them, since their validity is based on his decisions (he is the one who decided to be obligated to them). Incidentally, these are exactly the words of Rabbi Shekap in chapter 5 of Shaarei Yashar when he discusses the doctrine of law. He says that since it is the intellect that decided to listen to the Torah, then of course additional principles that it dictates are also binding, even if they are not written in the Torah. And I would add that if the intellect decides not to listen to the Torah, it certainly overrides what the Torah says (this is the concept of a sin per se in the issue of a Nazirite. The Sages also recognize this, like conscientious objection in legal thought).
In this sense, it is absolutely true to say that I am committed to my own values ​​and only to them. And so is everyone else. But my values ​​teach me to be committed to the Torah. Anyone who says otherwise simply does not understand what he is talking about. If the commitment to the Torah is not his decision, then there is no commitment here, but rather a mechanical action. And if this is indeed his decision – then we are back to the fact that he and his decisions are above all else. And rightly so he is. —————————————————————————————— Yuval S.: It is clear that the intention is that the third system is ultimately the person himself. And it is true that he is the one who chose to commit to the Halacha system and is the one who considers, chooses, and decides in everything.

Presenting a way for a person to decide between conflicting systems that he has chosen, and it is logical and clear. It seems to me that the uniqueness of the dilemma of halakha is that people usually give a heavier weight to halakha than to other systems in advance. It can be said that there is a discussion here about the totality of the obligation, as soon as a person has chosen a total commitment to halakha over any other system, he decides in advance that it will have the higher weight in any dilemma that arises. Therefore, if in real time the person gives a higher weight to the outcome of another system, it appears that this choice does not entail a full and total commitment to halakha.

I will try to refine,
It is claimed to depict two models of choice in different systems along with Halacha.
1. Our commitment to Halacha is equal to any other system we have chosen (global morality, state laws, etc.) and then the person does indeed decide between them equally with the help of his discretion, which gives weight to each system. Ostensibly, it turns out that there is no total commitment to Halacha, but rather to the person’s choice.
2. Commitment to Halacha is above any other system and has a higher weight in the first place, and in times of dilemma, Halacha will always prevail, except in extreme cases when Halacha itself will recognize that a person’s decision locally, seemingly against it, is the one that is appropriate for it (I don’t know how to formulate this Halachaically, if at all it is not nonsense). According to this, Halacha is indeed total and is simply the one that recognizes the existence of additional systems that sometimes prevail.
There is apparently a third option to give total weight to Halacha in every case without exception, but then it is a matter of choosing one Halacha system and not several. This is different from 2 because there I do not introduce morality, for example, into Halacha and make it Jewish, but rather as a parallel system that the Torah recognizes and sometimes itself will give it the heavy weight.

So is Halacha total? Is it like any other system? —————————————————————————————— Rabbi: Hello Yuval.
I don’t see anything new here. I can only repeat everything I wrote.
The question of whether Halacha comes first or whether it is total is up to you to decide. How can I answer that for you? I can tell you that for me it is not total. Nor for Chazal (an offense for its own sake).
If you see a non-total commitment as a lack of commitment to health, that’s just semantics.