Disputes in Reality in the Gemara
Peace to the rabbi.
I have heard several times about a rule according to which there are no disputes in reality in the Gemara and the disputes are always principled.
In many Gemaras it is very difficult to say so, and it seems from the language of the Gemara (and the Rishonim) that the disagreement is in reality.
What is the origin of this rule? And is it agreed upon?
The origin of this rule is a desire to reach a situation where no one is wrong, since in a real-life dispute, one is necessarily wrong and one is right. But the rule does not stand the test of reality, and the motivation does not hold water either (why assume that there is no error in the Gemara?).
Although there are disputes that appear to be disputes in reality and are not, there are certainly those that are, and as mentioned, there is no reason to assume that there are not.
Doesn't the motivation stem from the difficulty of accepting that there are disagreements in reality, because it is strange that there is such a disagreement ("Let them go check what the reality is", there is no root to the disagreement, often there is no ability to decide, etc.)?
Not always so much checking. For example, how would they check what was in the Tabernacle (were planks moved from one cart to another through the rabbinate or not)? And also regarding assessments of human nature (at that time they did not yet practice and did not know how to conduct organized surveys).
In the Gemara B ”M 1:1 there is a nice example (in my opinion) on the subject:
“The sword and the knife and the dagger and the spear and the sickle and the harvest sickle from whence do they receive impurity from the time of the completion of their work and from whence is the completion of their work? Rabbi Yochanan said, from when they are heated in the furnace. Reish Lakish said, from when they are purified in water. God knows that the deviation of its luster is known”.
And the robbers only know facts.
On the 1st of Rosh Chodesh Kislev 7
Without entering into a general discussion on the question of ‘dispute in reality’ –
In the case you mentioned there is no dispute in reality, it is clear that after the combination in the kiln the sword is usable, but that brushing with water improves its quality. The discussion is halakhic: what level of ‘finishing’ is required to consider the sword a tool. Is the strict standard of ‘professional’ required or is a basic level of finish sufficient. That will satisfy most people who are not professionals.
Best regards, S.C. Levinger
This is really not a dispute in reality, but rather in the question of when the instrument is defined as being finished. The expression "listim balistiyotah yed" is ironic. There is no statement here that the listim really have a definitive understanding of this matter. It would be appropriate to say that the listim have a more reliable sense of when the instrument is finished.
It seems strange to interpret ironically when it is irrelevant, but it is possible.
And I wonder about the place where it was said – supposedly if the Listim have more reliable feelings then the two problems in the halakhic dispute return: A. Those who went out to check (they will go to the Listim to benefit from his advice and resourcefulness, or they will do a little bit of research for the sake of a few) B. One was wrong (because if the adjective ‘reliable’ enters the story, it means that there is one absolutely correct opinion).
Levinger – It is clear that the body of the dispute can be explained as usual as a moral/halakhic/metaphysical dispute and I rely only on the expression Listim etc.
Rabbi Yohanan, in saying to R”l that he knew the ballistics, hints at his reasoning. R”l is right that in the high level of demands of a ‘professional’ an unpolished sword is not considered = but according to R’ Yohanan, the decisive point of view is that of a ‘human rifle’ who do not need such a level of finishing.
R”l”s perfectionism is expressed in the fact that he would only talk to people whose loyalty was tested, to the point that they said that anyone R”l was willing to talk to could be lent to him without witnesses. In contrast, R” John greets everyone in the marketplace, even a foreigner, and even speaks with a leader of robbers, showing that he loves people and brings them closer to Torah.
With greetings, S.C. Levinger
Yehoshua, the sages do not have the mentality of empirical testing. They lived in a rationalist view (like Aristotle) that if something makes sense then it is true. Even the premises they cite were not tested in a systematic survey.
What about the question: Was there one frog that everyone wanted? Apparently, it was the frog that actually existed? How is it possible that both of them are right? Same with the question: Do angels eat real food?
First of all, who said that both are right? Beyond that, these are not real disputes. They are fairy tales and proverbs.
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