Do not do it.
Following the column on “The Damned”…
If we assume that in every no there is a problem other than the very commandment that prohibits it (and that it is the cause of no, meaning that without it there is no no), then I understand that when there is a rule like “doing something rejects no”, the intention is that the Torah values the “good” action of the doer more than the “bad” action of the no (otherwise, even without no, he would not be able to perform it because of the action itself, in my opinion this is also the explanation for the rule of “it is possible to perform both”, etc.) So what is the meaning of the restriction of “no forever” over rejection? If I know that the Torah wants this action to take place even at the cost of committing an unrighteous action, the timing sounds irrelevant to me (unless we say that the commandment exists even when there is no wrongful act, or we argue that the Torah’s preference for good actions is only in their direct realization, but this sounds unlikely to me).
thanks!!
Neither argument is necessary here.
It is not necessary that the action is more equal to the Torah than the result of the transgression. It is possible that the bad value is canceled if the action is done for a good purpose (this is how the Rishonim believe, in their opinion, the non-law was permitted in return for the action. There is no non-law). Therefore, even if there is no rejection in eternity, there is no rejection. I also do not think that the relationship between the benefits is necessarily derived, because it is possible that another consideration that action will reject non-law (a desire to encourage people to keep the commandments and not to fear). An effect on the person that love is greater than fear. And so on and so forth.
(I didn’t understand the evidence you provided in parentheses.)
To say that it is adil is considered as if there is nothing wrong with it at all, except that it is strange to himself who said to expand the permission to such an extent, and besides, it means that the commands are not fixed but variable (and indeed most of the early ones disagree with this and believe that it is a postponement outside of the manner of his commandment in this and so on). In my opinion, the existence of the bad value can be proven from the fact that when it is possible to fulfill both and he makes a postponement, he is violating a prohibition.
To say that it is adil is considered as if there is nothing wrong with it at all, except that it is strange to himself who said to expand the permission to such an extent, and besides, it means that the commands are not fixed but variable (and indeed most of the early ones disagree with this and believe that it is a postponement outside of the manner of his commandment in this and so on). In my opinion, the existence of the bad value can be proven from the fact that when it is possible to fulfill both and he makes a postponement, he is violating a prohibition.
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