Does the rabbi grant the request?
When I read for my pleasure the Ramada Shlita’s Responsa regarding intellectual authority, a question about Enak arose in my mind, and it is this: Rabbi Mikhi repeats that there is no authority for the Sages in the realm of thought, and I found it very puzzling, since it is based on the fact that there is no authority for the Sages in the realm of thought (it is based on, if you order me to write this out loud, independent thought, Rachel). After all, Rabbi Mikhi himself presented in the series: “God and the World” proof of a person’s lack of ability to replace a thought criterion with another’s (I will remind you: if a person has criterion a and I have a criterion not-a, when from my criterion b follows and from his not, I will never be able to convince him of b, since one of two things happens: if I try to convince him using a criterion not-a, he does not accept it and is eliminated, if I try to convince him using criterion a, he does not prove b and is also eliminated). If I accept that the Sages have authority in the realm of thought as well, that is, in the realm of logical deduction, then if you present me with a logical proof (for example, that I am compelled to think that 1 + 1 will equal 2 even if the Sages rule that this is nonsense), it is based on the fact that I already accept that the Sages do not have authority in making intellectual decisions, since the proof is based on the fact that I think something (= that there is a contradiction in demanding that I accept the Sages’ intellectual authority) contrary to the Sages’ opinion, and since this is where the dispute turns into a deadlock. The Rabbi assumes that I adopt his criterion and on which he builds the proof of that criterion. And if the Rabbi sees a source in the Sages for the need to think alone, then all of my “thinking alone” is based on accepting the Sages’ authority, and then it turns out that I still accept their authority.
If Rabbi Michi had not presented this as proof to others that the Sages do not have any intellectual authority, then this is a formulation for himself and for anyone who accepts his criterion (and then it is quite unnecessary). But since the Rabbi brings this as an argument against those who bring proof from the Sages, then it is very puzzling. I would love to understand how the Rabbi erred in such an error, if at all?
Demand and receive the wages of giants. Truly delusional babbling. All you write is the claim about the emptiness of the analytic, that is, every logical argument assumes the desired. See my article on the praise of the desired assumption.
My claim that there is no authority in the factual realm stems from the definition of the concepts of fact and authority, and not from any rabbinical sources or assumptions of one kind or another. A fact is a claim about the world. The concept of authority means accepting someone’s assertion even though it is not true just because they said it. This does not apply to facts, but only to norms. That is all.
A person can say that according to his assumption 1+5 = -13, and then you won’t be able to prove anything to him. Very true. Such a person should just be hospitalized and not try to prove anything to him. The same is true with regard to authority regarding facts. This is a purely logical argument, and whoever does not accept it is like someone who does not accept that 1+5=6. Indeed, you cannot prove anything to him, but you also don’t really need to prove anything to him.
I would be happy, if it is not a hassle for the Rabbi, to link to that article mentioned. I still do not understand your answer, you claim: “I claimed that there is no authority in the factual field stemming from the definition of the concepts fact and authority”, but the dispute revolves around your ability to define concepts. It is possible that if I define the resurrection of the dead systematically, I will reach a contradiction, and therefore they forbade me from defining systematically. The claim is not that a fact is not a claim about the world, but that the sages knew all the facts and we do not, and in such a case we must cancel our opinion of the facts in favor of their opinion (in other words, they never say wrong things, we simply do not know what the right things are). There is no problem not accepting what I wrote here (it is indeed pure nonsense), but the question is how can one convince another person that it is not true (for the reasons I have listed)? I do not think the Rabbi answered that.
I said it depends on the definition of fact and the definition of authority. If I have come to the conclusion that they know everything and therefore I cancel my opinion, that is perfectly fine. But that is not authority. Authority is to obey even though you think it is wrong. I distinguished there between substantive and formal authority.
I did this in the second and third books of the trilogy, and in the series of lessons that dealt with authority (there are here on the site). You can try and search the site for substantive and formal authority, and I think you will find it here too.
I have just read the Rabbi's article (the short one, the one on the website) about "praise for the requested assumption", but I am doubly puzzled that the Rabbi uses the same proof against those who come to him with arguments. That is, if we assume that there is a law that states that the Chazal has intellectual authority in the formal sense, meaning that I must obey even if it is not correct in my opinion (let's suspend the logical problematic, for example, let's imagine that we started with the laws of opinion in the Mishnah Torah and found this before our eyes), how can Rabbi Michi try to convince some douchebag that this law is not valid? There is only a logical possibility, but he can rule it out a priori from being logical - after all, in the possibility of logical clarification he does not accept anything (like that child who plugs his ears and sings "Enjoying a banana". Of course these people need hospitalization, my question is why is the rabbi trying to prove this to them instead of sending them to the Abarbanel.
I'll answer one more time and finish. I'm addressing those who understand the definition of the concepts. Those who don't understand or don't maintain logical consistency should go to Abrabal. That's all.
Leave a Reply
Please login or Register to submit your answer
