Driving without a license

Are you trying to say that a law must be upheld even when, in your opinion, there is no danger [i.e., if the legislator were faced with your special case, the consideration and decision would be different]? Do you really adhere to the tenets of law as a Torah from Sinai?
My question is, in the event that I do not have the possibility of obtaining a professional license [there are no tests], and to the best of my assessment there is no reasonable risk in my driving, why can't I decide on this as I decide on the rest of my driving, some of which also include the possibility of harming the environment?
Why is it that the general arrangement stipulates that one must obtain a professional license, which prevents a person from being able to test his or her skills on his or her own? [How is it done in places where there is no supervisory body (such as in the territories)? Is it immoral for a person to decide to drive at any time there too?

I mean both things, exactly as I wrote. You can't make decisions for the public. When you act, it also affects others who are threatened by you. Kind of like what I wrote in the column about R”H. Kanievsky

And if there were no traffic regulations from the government, could I have made such a decision?
So why, after such an arrangement is in place, is my choice canceled?

I would also ask about all traffic laws, which, as is known, are determined according to what should be prescribed in general, but it is very possible that from a private point of view, in a specific case, there is no danger of violating a particular law, and since the laws are not Torah from Sinai but a recommendation that it is appropriate and necessary to act in general, when I have a private reason to assume that there is no danger here, I do not see the reason to avoid it.

In your words here, and in the article about the Corona, it means that you are ‘stricter’ to observe all the laws as written and as they are, without noise and transgression, about the same as what the Haredim practice with regard to religious laws, except that the name of the binding source is at least understandable, here I do not understand.

I already answered that, and even though I didn't understand what wasn't clear, I'll answer again.
I'm not really strict with the laws of the state. I've already written this several times in the past that they shouldn't be treated as if they were halacha in the full sense (by the way, with regard to halacha, strictness is not a haredi matter. No connection). Although there is a dina demalkuta, it is necessary and right to apply common sense here.
But in this case, it's a law that aims to protect other people, and therefore here you don't have the authority to make a decision yourself. You can't decide that there is no danger to others if they themselves think so. It's like someone feeding you carrion without telling you, because in his opinion, strictness in kosher is nonsense, etc. Or alternatively, a brother in a kosher church who would give your son a shot of water instead of a vaccine because in his opinion, a vaccine is harmful.
Beyond that, your own assessments are biased, and therefore I wouldn't trust them in and of themselves.
And finally, let's assume that we allowed everyone to make such decisions for themselves. You agree that there will certainly be some among them who will make the wrong decision. If so, the categorical imperative requires that no one be allowed to make such decisions.